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1. While it may be t rue that capitalism develops 'a conservationist tendency' 
(Escobar 1996: 47), it is equally t rue that m a n y conservationists actively 
develop capitalist tendencies (this thesis). 
2. In Papua N e w Guinea, at tempts to improve the registration of customary 
landholdings are often seen as outside-sponsored at tempts to gain control 
over land and resources. The main drive towards registration, however, is 
coming from within (this thesis). 
3. Conservationists should take more t ime to listen to and engage wi th local 
people (this thesis). 
4. The next twenty years will be a t ime of great disappointment for many 
environmental groups 'working together' with so-called indigenous 
peoples. 
5. If development interventions are essentially struggles 'about ideas, about 
forms, about images and imaginings ' (Said 1994: 7), and if such 
interventions are characterised by 'more or less naive, unproven, 
simplifying assumptions ' (Hoben 1995: 1008), then development is the 
business of imposing simple ideas on poor people. 
6. Participation, social capital and local knowledge are not necessarily good 
things. 
7. 'Facts never speak for themselves, they are bespoken and spoken for' 
(Apthorpe 1986: 380). 
8. Niet-Westerse Sociologie,... maar wat dan wel? (Paul van den Brink). 
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INTRODUCTION: I C A D PROJECTS AS INTERVENTION 
The notion of 'crisis' constitutes the lifeblood of both conservation and development 
discourse. Images of poverty, war, starvation, pollution and deforestation serve as 
an urgent call to action and legitimise a variety of rapid response policies, actions 
and projects (Apthorpe 1986, Roe 1995). The discourse on the loss of biological 
diversity too, rode to prominence on a wave of catastrophic predictions concerning 
the rate of tropical deforestation and resulting species extinctions. In this view, 
environmental degradation and species loss is a result of the combination of human 
overpopulation and the use of increasingly extractive and destructive technologies. 
These lead to the fragmentation of natural habitats, the extinction of localised 
species and ultimately, the collapse of whole ecosystems. Especially habitats and 
species in the naturally rich tropical countries are thought to be at risk. These 
arguments, reinforced with dramatic projections of the rate of extinctions, led the 
Club of the Earth to claim that 'the species extinction crisis is a threat to civilization 
second only to the threat of thermonuclear war ' (Takacs 1996: 38). Although the 
earliest crisis scenarios based on the highly schematic inferences from island 
biogeography were exaggerated, 1 their political impact was huge, making the 
destruction of tropical rainforests and the loss of species a topic of international 
concern. 
During the 1980s environmental scientists have not only entered the field of 
international politics to make the point that biological diversity should be preserved 
(Takacs 1996). A number of them have also used their position as scientists to assert 
1 Myers (1979), for example, predicted that we were losing some 2.6 percent of tropical forest per 
annum, a figure, which combined with an exponentially growing population, led him to the 
conclusion that we were on the road to losing one-quarter of all species by the year 2000. The Ehrlichs 
similarly calculated that a deforestation rate of 1 percent per year would lead to a near-total loss of 
species by 2025, while a rate of 2 percent per annum meant that half of all biological diversity would 
be gone by the year 2000 (Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1981; 161-62 footnote 96). 
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that mainly those trained in the scientific area at stake are to speak out on moral 
issues pertaining to that area. Thus recourse to science not only becomes a means to 
inform and legitimise certain viewpoints, but also serves to exclude other people 
from debate. According to this view, only doctors are sufficiently qualified to speak 
out on medical matters, only nuclear technicians can judge the acceptability of the 
use of nuclear technology and only biologists have sufficient credibility to speak out 
on biological diversity. Janzen for example, argues that: 
'Engineers build bridges, writers weave words and biologists are the 
representatives of the natural world.... In short, biologists are in charge of the 
future of tropical ecology.... Set aside your random research and devote your life 
to activities that will bring the world to understand that tropical nature is an 
integral part of human life. If our generation does not do it, it won't be there for 
the next' (Janzen 1986: 305). 
These assertions of authority, however, ignore the fact that environmental problems 
are not just of a technical and scientific nature, but essentially cultural, political and 
moral questions, which revolve around the issue of who conserves what, for whom 
and why. Scientists are no better equipped to make such moral choices than anyone 
else. 
The political implications of environmentalist assertions are often hidden behind the 
strategic use of words. Next to the language of catastrophe as a mobilising 
mechanism, and recourse to science as a means to further a personal agenda, 
conservationists tend to employ rhetorical devices centring on the notion of 
'responsibility' and 'precaution'. Responsibility in this case is defined in terms of the 
dictum that 'we have not inherited the Earth from our parents, but borrowed it from 
our children' (Raven in Hannigan 1996: 155). It covers mankind's moral obligations 
towards nature and future generations, but does not necessarily include people 
presently alive. 'Precaution' as in the appUcation of the 'precautionary principle' too 
refers to how we deal with the natural world, not to the question how to take care of 
the needs of other people. The universalist proclamations made in the name of 
'mankind', the 'public good', or the 'global community', thus hide a deep conflict of 
interest between two sets of rights; the right of people in tropical countries to use 
their natural resources as they deem fit and to make their own mistakes on the one 
hand, and the right of well-meaning outsiders to intervene in the name of nature, 
future generations and their own interests on the other. 
According to Guha (1989: 78) for example, Janzen's claim to authority over global 
nature implies a 'frankly imperialist manifesto'. Large parts of the globe are to be 
taken over for conservation purposes in a move that subsumes the social, political 
and economic interests of poor people to a foreign and culturally rooted brand of 
environmentalist concerns. Rather than the 'love for nature' of a few well-heeled, 
white conservationists who tell usually poor, coloured, resource-dependent people 
to set aside their natural resources for the global good, local communities should 
have the ultimate right to speak u p on behalf of their natural resources. 
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APPORTIONING BLAME 
From this latter perspective, it is particularly galling that the West, which has 
relentlessly exploited its own natural resources and those of other people, now 
presents the biodiversity problem as an essentially tropical issue and itself as the 
saviour of the environment (Shiva 1991). Whereas Western conservationists perceive 
a natural world in crisis, people in developing countries are experiencing a 
development problem. To many poor people the suggestion that should bear the 
cost of mamtaining 'biodiversity' in the name of an abstract 'global community' only 
shows that the western world cares more about tropical nature than about non-
western people. 
As in all environmental discussions, the debate centres partly on the apportioning of 
blame. Whereas western conservationists have tended to focus on the 'uncontrolled' 
growth of poor populations and their supposedly destructive habits, a number of 
dissenting social activists agree that the natural world is at risk but instead take aim 
at western culture. They argue that the level of consumerism in western countries 
might be the more fundamental issue, or suggest that the unequal exchange inherent 
to the western capitalist system lies at the root of environmental degradation. They 
may also claim that indigenous people have at least retained some sort of traditional 
conservation ethic. In this latter view, biodiversity thus not so much needs to be 
protected from local people. Instead it needs to be kept from northern 
conservationists, whose ostentatiously well-intended concerns compromise the 
autonomy of indigenous peoples and provide a cover for industrial interests aiming 
to appropriate Third World biogenetic resources. 
Conservation issues are thus inevitably linked to cultural and political questions 
concerning the version of reality at play, the allocation of blame, the distribution of 
costs and benefits, and issues of autonomy, power and control. Conservation issues 
cannot be resolved by recourse to scientific argumentation. It is this clash between 
perceptions of reality, systems of knowledge or 'moral universes' (Cussins 1998) 
which has come to dominate conservation issues in tropical countries. There are few 
areas where the political debate over the nature of environmental problems, the 
features of possible solutions and the relative importance of environmental and 
economic issues have become so outspoken as around the issue of protected area 
establishment. Ironically while the biodiversity issue gained prominence during the 
1980s and 1990s, its predominant solution to species loss - the establishment of an 
international system of protected areas - has come under fire. 
PROTECTED AREAS UNDER FIRE 
Since the end of the 19 t h century, the establishment of parks and nature reserves has 
been based on the assumption that only the exclusion of humans enables the 
maintenance of 'wild' ecosystems. Programs to protect nature have mainly been 
conceived as technical and managerial programs in which centralised agencies select 
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potential conservation areas based on biological indicators. The experts of these 
agencies subsequently design management models to reduce human pressures on 
the ecosystems inside these areas. Such a mechanistic view of outside conservation 
intervention negates the fundamentally social, political and negotiated nature of 
such conservation initiatives. Protected areas can not serve as straightforward 
technical solutions for the worldwide threat to biodiversity because of the simple 
fact that conservation programs affect people's access to natural resources and their 
ability to make a living from these resources. In many cases, their relation with the 
environment forms an essential element of local culture. A second problem in the 
establishment of national parks lies with the division of costs and benefits attached 
to a protected area. The 'global community' through the protection of biodiversity, 
tourists through their enjoyment of local flora and fauna, hunters through the game 
that they shoot, and the state through its collection of revenues, all benefit from the 
establishment of conservation areas. In contrast, local people carry the brunt of the 
costs associated with this type of nature protection. 
Not surprisingly, the exclusion of local communities from traditional hunting and 
gardening lands elicits strong responses. These responses may directly contravene 
the conservation objectives of the executing agency or the state and in many cases 
break state law, as people continue to use protected land and resources. In some 
cases, such popular resistance takes the form of open revolt (See Pimbert and Pretty 
1993). More usually, however, it takes the shape of 'everyday forms of resistance' 
(Scott 1986) through sabotage, foot dragging, and smuggling, poaching, 
resettlement, gardening, fuel wood collection and incendiarism. Conservationists, in 
turn, have responded with what Machlis and Tichnell (1985: 96) call 'an essentially 
military defense strategy'. As the conflicts around protected areas intensify, 
conservationists are becoming aware that a policy based on a denial of access to 
resources may appear manageable in the short term, but 'runs the risk of backfiring 
in the longer run' (Brown and Wyckoff 1992: 24). 
In an attempt to deal with the social-economic and moral implications of protected 
area establishment, the 1980s and 1990s have seen the development of a number of 
new conservation strategies. One such methodology constitutes the use of income 
earning and service-delivery activities to raise the benefits derived from an intact 
environment. An example of such an endeavour is the development of eco-tourism 
enterprises. There is no point in setting up community-based guesthouses for clivers 
in a coastal area where the reefs have been dynamited. By stimulating such 
enterprises in an undegraded environment, the conservation agency actually 
increases the benefits derived from keeping the environment as it is, while reducing 
the incentive to seek other, potentially more destructive alternatives to development. 
Many of the new strategies focus on the community level. These strategies have in 
common that they redefine conservation from an expert-driven, state-sponsored 
imposition on local people to a more-or-less participatory process. In the latter case, 
conservationists aim to come to a common understanding with local people over 
whether there is an environmental problem, what to do about it and how to 
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compensate those that bear the costs of the proposed solutions. In the organisation 
of community-based and participatory conservation activities, conservationists are 
increasingly using approaches that are comparable to those in rural development 
projects (Wells and Brandon 1992) . Like development experts conservation 
managers are nowadays trying to devise ways to provide jobs, incomes, services and 
opportunities to rural people. Like development practitioners, they have to come to 
grips with the fact that such projects are seldom simple interventions that are 'rolled 
out' in a linear sequence of steps, but intensely social and political, processes. Within 
the general international trend towards less exclusionary forms of conservation, 
PNG represents a specific case. 
T H E CASE OF P A P U A N E W G U I N E A A N D T H E BIODIVERSITY P R O G R A M 
The prime audience of this thesis consists of conservation practitioners that wish to 
understand some of the pitfalls that characterise people-oriented conservation 
initiatives. With the process of decolonisation, the growing emphasis on human 
rights, good governance and participation, the proliferation of NGOs, and the 
omnipresence of the media, a conservation policy based on the forceful exclusion of 
people is becoming more and more difficult to maintain. These trends, as well as the 
growing importance of local-level resource management (Ostrom 1990) , have 
strengthened the bargaining power of the populations in naturally rich 
environments. The specific situation found in PNG, puts this country in the 
vanguard of developing community-based, participatory and incentive-driven 
conservation initiatives and provides a learning experience from which community-
based conservation initiatives in other countries may benefit (See Lynch et Al. 1995) . 
A first element of importance in the discussion of conservation in Papua New 
Guinea (PNG), is the structural inability and unwillingness of the Government of 
PNG to control the logging operations of predominantly Asian multinationals. 
Donors have supported a variety of Government institutions in an attempt to 
improve the management of forest resources and to strengthen local capability for 
environmental management, but have generally met with very little success. The 
high demand for cash incomes by rural people coupled with the systematic inability 
of the Government to provide the most basic services leads many resource owning 
groups to commit their forest to timber companies. Timber companies promise a 
'fast track' to development through royalty payments and the construction of roads, 
schools and aid posts, but in many instances leave people behind with little long 
term income, substandard infrastructure and a destroyed resource base. Apart from 
the social consequences of logging, the destruction of the forest habitat is thought to 
be the greatest threat to the environment and biodiversity of PNG. 
In the second place, there is the issue of land tenure. Whereas the establishment of 
protected areas continues to be seen as the best means to conserve nature, the ability 
to do so is predicated on the existence of a strong state. Whereas this is already 
problematic in most countries, such a state-sponsored approach is not possible in 
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PNG because its constitution recognises the ownership rights of local clan groups 
over land and resources. In practice, the Government of PNG has no means to 
alienate land for the purpose of conservation or any other public good. This implies 
that the landowners, and not the Government, are the first interested parties when it 
comes to negotiations concerning the harvesting or conservation of their resources. 
The only practical means to conserve nature in PNG left open, is thus to negotiate 
directly with local groups of resource owners and to make conservation attractive by 
combining it with development services and income generating opportunities. 
FIGURE 1: T H E TWO PROJECT SITES OF THE BIODIVERSITY P R O G R A M IN P N G 
Bismarck-Ramu Area of Interest 
Because of the above features, donors and local NGOs concerned with the 
conservation of biodiversity in PNG have increasingly lost faith in the Government's 
ability to further conservation objectives. Instead, they put their hopes for 
conservation on the resource owning communities. This allows them to largely by-
pass the central government, while at the same time focussing their attention on the 
actual owners of biodiversity. This analysis of the PNG situation has since the 
beginning of the 1990s led to a rapidly increasing interest in community-based 
Integrated Conservation and Development (ICAD) methods developed by a range 
of agencies. These methods have in common that they conduct direct negotiations 
with resource owning communities over the establishment of protected areas. This 
has led to a marked shift in the composition of project teams. Where these were 
initially dominated by natural scientists and conservation managers, community 
development specialists and anthropologists are playing an increasingly prominent 
role in the design and implementation of such interventions. 
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The GEF-funded PNG Biodiversity Conservation and Resource Management 
Program was established in 1993 with the intention of developing two conservation 
areas with the use of ICAD methods. The first project took place in the Lak area in 
New Ireland Province between early 1994 and late 1996. The second project focused 
on an area known as the Bismarck-Ramu area on the northern escarpment of 
mainland PNG. This latter area would be the target of UN interventions between 
April 1995, and halfway 1999. The project continues u p to the present in a different 
institutional form. As such this s tudy covers a period of almost 10 years, ranging 
from the first discussions over the need to develop such projects into the present. I 
will focus, however, on the interventions in the Bismarck-Ramu area. 
In the next few pages, I will discuss my own work for the PNG Biodiversity 
Program, the relation between the studies conducted for the program and the 
present study, and the methodology and sources of information used. Subsequently 
I will take a brief look at the literature on planned intervention, and will conclude 
this chapter with an overview of this study. 
T O W A R D S A N ANTHROPOLOGY OF CONSERVATION 
Not only the practice of development itself holds lessons for conservationists. The 
anthropological s tudy of planned intervention may also do so. A detailed analysis of 
such projects may clarify the assumptions on which they are based, as well as the 
manner in which the people concerned modify, resist and adopt such interventions. 
Anthropological work on planned intervention can be divided into two kinds. On 
the one hand there are those that conduct development anthropology i.e. that use 
anthropological methods to 'make projects work'. On the other hand and there are 
scientists that focus on the anthropology of development, that is the 'socio-scientific 
analysis of development as a cultural, economic and political process' (Grillo 1997: 
2). These two terms reflect a shift in my own work. Between June 1996 and January 
1998,1 had the good fortune of working for the National Research Institute in Port 
Moresby. In that capacity I was seconded to the Bismarck-Ramu Integrated 
Conservation and Development Project of the Biodiversity Program and responsible 
for the conduct of a Social Feasibility Study (SFS). The aim of the SFS was to assess 
the best opportunities for conservation in the Bismarck-Ramu area. As such, I 
worked closely together with the project team that implemented the project, 
collecting data on the make-up of local society, the socio-economic situation of the 
Jimi and Ramu Valleys and people's predispositions to conservation and 
development initiatives. 
On returning to the Netherlands, the Development Sociology Group of Wageningen 
University enabled me to adopt a perspective akin to the 'anthropology of 
development' mentioned above. Instead of focusing on local people, as had been the 
issue with the SFS, I decided to take the project interventions of the Biodiversity 
Program itself as the topic of this thesis. In contrast, this s tudy takes not only the 
situation and perceptions of local people as its topic, but also looks at what Olivier 
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de Sardan (1995 in Den Ouden 1995: 32) calls the 'developmentalist configuration'. 
This entails the largely cosmopolitan universe of experts, bureaucrats, NGO 
employees, researchers, technicians, project leaders and field officers, who somehow 
live from the development of others and who mobilize or manage for that purpose 
considerable material and symbolic resources'. This focus on the sum-total of actors 
involved in the process of conservation and development is in line with a recent 
trend in the anthropology of development. Anthropologists studying processes of 
intervention have enlarged their focus from the way in which recipient populations 
manipulate and enlist planned interventions, towards the manner in which the 
intervenors themselves also represent a variety of personal and collective interests, 
imaginations and narratives. According to Olivier de Sardan, such intervention 
studies are characterised b y 
• A non-normative approach towards interventions, in which the actions and 
reactions of various actors are in the first place seen as 'social events' that have 
to be analysed in their own right, rather than be judged as 'good', 'bad', 
'successful' or 'failures'. 
• A view of planned intervention as an 'ongoing, socially constructed and 
negotiated process' (Long 1992: 35). The outcomes of such processes can not be 
understood with a mechanical or linear approach, but are often unpredictable 
and unintended because of the strategic behaviour of the different actors 
involved. 
• A methodology whereby 'the social event of development' is looked at by 
focusing on the interactions between various actors and the way in which these 
modify, resist, distort and use such programs to advance their own individual 
and collective goals. 
• A historical approach. Whereas projects have a tendency to regard their 
intervention as unique and entering untouched territory, many communities 
have experiences with previous projects and interventions. Many community 
reactions to project interventions can only be understood in the context of the 
past (Olivier de Sardan 1988). 
Fundamental to this endeavour is a so-called actor-oriented analysis (Long 1992, 2001) 
which focuses on the ability of actors to enrol other individuals, groups and 
institutions into their own strategic endeavours. The resulting picture of society is one 
of a network of individuals and collective actors all with their own understandings of 
the world, strategic goals and limited means, trying to organise their lives by enrolling 
each other into their personal and collective projects. Such enrolment is rarely 
complete, often temporary and may lead to spatially distended networks of people 
and groups which pass on ideas, images and representations, while simultaneously 
'translating' these ideas to optimally suit their needs and wants at a given place and 
time. The social processes and constellations that result have to be seen as the 
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continuously emerging and shifting properties of an overlapping network of 
collective and individual actors. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY I N PRACTICE 
Due to the size of the project area, its social and cultural fragmentation, and the fact 
that the project did not want to pin itself down on one particular area (See chapter 
5), the sire selection process, community development work and my own field 
studies took the form of patrols. The resulting study was thus not that of the 
anthropologist in residence, spending an extended period of time with 'his' or 'her' 
people. In total, eight SFS patrols were made, of which the shortest lasted only 
several days, while the longest, which traversed the whole area on foot, took three 
weeks to complete. The first patrols were conducted together with community 
development workers who introduced me to the villagers and their leaders. After 
the initial introduction, I was able to visit villages with the assistance of the two Jimi 
radiomen of the project. They acted as guides, carriers, and interpreters. In this 
manner I studied three Jimi Valley and three Ramu Valley communities, each of 
which was inhabited by a number of different clan groups. These villages were 
located in the area between the district centre of Kol in the Jimi Valley, and the 
villages of Foroko-Brimde, and Sepu in the Ramu Valley. To give an impression of 
the size of this road-less area: the distance between Kol and Foroko-Brimde is a hard 
five day walk through the Jimi Valley and down the virtually uninhabited Bismarck 
Fall. The distance between Foroko-Brimde and Sepu takes between one and two 
days by motorised canoe, depending on whether one travels with or against the 
flow of the Ramu River. 
During the first period, I was completely lost, as I found that I needed at least six 
months just to get a basic idea of the area and its people. The latter aspect proved to 
be especially complicated due to the complicated segmentary structure that 
characterises highland society. Finally, more than 150 names of groups were 
identified (See VanHelden 1998b Appendix II). Based on this information and an 
increasing understanding of local geography, individual and collective migration 
histories were recorded. This was an essential step in determining the patterns of 
alliance and enmity between clans and the basis for their claims to ownership and 
use rights in the area. 
The collection of information on the availability of social and economic services 
proved to be the easiest part of the whole SFS as the lack of services, as their 
deterioration and the preoccupation with politics during the 1997 election year made 
this the favourite topic of many discussions. Some insight was gained in the 
decision-making patterns and social cohesion of various communities by discussing 
patterns of community work. 'Community work', as it is known in PNG, involves 
the joint maintenance of public infrastructure such as schools, aid posts, churches, 
airstrips, footpaths and marketplaces. Whether people are willing to undertake such 
activities, is often taken as a measurement for community cohesion. 
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FIGURE 2: OVERVIEW OF THE BISMARCK-RAMU PROJECT AREA 
Apart from the features of groups and the level of services available in the Bismarck-
Ramu area, information was collected concerning the agricultural and hunting 
practices and income generating activities of local people. This provided some 
insight into the manner in which people perceive their environment and the reasons 
why people could possibly be interested in resource management issues. 
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Field data were collected through a combination of observation and semi-structured 
interviews with a range of different respondents. Especially informal discussions 
with whoever wanted to talk proved useful. This often happened through the 
practice of 'storying' ('to tell stories') which usually consists of sitting around a fire 
and the relaxed sharing of memories, stories and experiences, the asking of 
questions followed by an open discussion of the answers and mental associations. 
New stories and questions would again follow these. Inevitably the issues that were 
on people's minds at the time would come out, whether they had to do with 
conflicts with other groups, their perception of their place in the world or the 
problems that communities face in drawing in the necessary Government services. 
Notes were written u p on return and were largely incorporated into the final 
document. The community development workers of the Bismarck-Ramu program 
constituted an invaluable source of information as they recounted their exploits 
during the debriefing meetings, answered my queries, and clarified many things 
that I did not understand. PRA exercises conducted by the community development 
teams, provided additional information with regard to the main issues that lived in 
the various communities as well as an insight in the environmental changes that 
people thought were taking place. By combining the information collected from 
various sources of information with field observations, interviews and the results of 
the PRA exercises, the Social Feasibility Study provided an overview of the 
development and resource management issues at stake in the Bismarck-Ramu area. 
This resulted in a monograph published by the National Research Institute in Port 
Moresby under the title Between Cash and Conviction (VanHelden 1998b) and a 
summary report containing a number of recommendations for future work in the 
area (VanHelden 1998c). 
SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
Social analysis of the Bismarck-Ramu area started with a literature study and a 
patrol into the Marum and Ramu sections of the area by Colin Filer of the National 
Research Institute in April 1995.1 started with my own patrols and data collection 
from July 1996 onwards. The scientific literature reviewed covered linguistic, 
geographical, agricultural, anthropological, historical, and socio-economic sources. 
This information was supplemented by a number of project reports, Rapid Rural 
Appraisal studies, newspaper clippings and information gleaned from the patrol 
reports by Australian colonial officers, which are kept at the National Archives in 
Port Moresby. 
In conducting the analysis of the Biodiversity Program, its intervention in the 
Bismarck-Ramu area and its relations with local people, not only the mentioned 
literature and my field reports were of importance, but also the written texts of the 
project itself became a source of information. I was considerably aided by the fact 
the PNG Biodiversity Program is probably one of the most well documented 
interventions worldwide. From 1995 onwards, the staff of the Biodiversity Program 
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systematically recorded events, subsequently presenting project reports, papers and 
articles that discuss the programs interventions, methodologies and results in with 
openness seldom found. The run u p to the Biodiversity Program and its first 
program interventions in Lak, for example, have been documented in a number of 
publications/reports, foremost by Filer (1991a & 1991b), McCallum and Sekhran 
(1997), Filer with Sekhran (1998) and McCallum (1996). The switch to a more 
participatory methodology is recorded in (McCallum and Sekhran (1997), the use of 
PRA techniques by Grant (1996), the methodology and outcomes of the community 
entry process by Lalley (1999), Ellis (1998) and Filer (2000). 
Most of my own writing, not all of it published, has focused on the methodology of 
the SFS and its relations to biological indicators for protected area establishment 
(VanHelden 1997), the findings of the SFS itself (VanHelden 1998b and 1998c) and 
local motivations for conservation (VanHelden 1998a). After returning to the 
Netherlands, two papers were written on the Jimi Valley discussing the interaction 
between social structure and resource use (VanHelden 2000), and between social 
structure and business development (VanHelden 2001a). Apart from work based on 
the SFS, a number of papers have been gleaned from this s tudy as it evolved. This 
resulted in a separate paper dealing with the principles of the Bismarck-Ramu 
community entry approach (VanHelden 2001b) as contained in chapter 5, and a 
paper based on the first interventions in the Jimi valley (VanHelden 2001c) along the 
lines of chapter 4. A consultancy job done for Conservation International allowed 
me to come to grips with PNG conservation legislation (VanHelden 2001d). Over a 
period of years, work done for ICCO, a Dutch co-financing organisation, has given 
me some insight in aspects of community-based forestry (VanHelden 1996, 
VanHelden 1998d; VanHelden and Schneemann 2000). 
Next to the 'official' literature concerning the Biodiversity Program and the various 
sources used in the SFS, I have also extensively used information from a number of 
sources internal to the project. In the first place, there are several detailed patrol 
reports compiled by the program between early 1995 and early 1996 (CRC 1995 b & 
c and CRC 1996 a & b; Filer er Al. 1995; Hedemark et Al. 1997). These reports played 
an important role in analysing project-people interactions during the period when I 
was not yet part of the program. From July 1996 onwards, when I joined the 
program, the interventions by the community development workers in the area 
were recorded in so-called 'patrol reports' which give a detailed description of 
project activities in the field, people's responses and the subsequent analysis and 
decisions on the part of the project team. It was one of my first jobs to start the 
process of recording this information, a task soon taken over by the New Zealand 
conservation manager. In total this study contains the reports on 21 community 
development patrols (BRG 1996 a-c; BRG 1997 a-e; BRG 1998 a-g; and BRG 1999 a-fj 
and on 4 separate conservation patrols by the conservation manager of the 
Bismarck-Ramu teams (Chitoa 1998 a-d). All of these patrols were conducted 
between July 1996 and November 1999. It is especially the richness and detail of 
these sources, which in combination with my own information on the area, its 
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communities and many of the individual people mentioned in these patrol reports, 
has enabled me to put together this study. I have deliberately used extensive quotes 
from the various patrol reports, as I can not hope to present the flavour of events 
any better. 
Next to these patrol reports, I have made use of a number of project reviews and 
project progress reports, the minutes of meetings and workshops held, monthly 
reports, internal communications, as well as letters and e-mails from a variety of 
sources. Access to this information was made possible because the Department of 
Development Sociology enabled me to visit the Madang project office in early 2000. 
By then the office of the Biodiversity Program in Port Moresby had been closed and 
its files were inaccessible as they were sitting in cardboard boxes and collecting dust 
in the new premises of the Office of Environment and Conservation. The files of the 
Bismarck-Ramu Group in Madang, however, contained much information on the 
evolution of the Biodiversity Program, and the staff was so kind to allow me to 
make copies of all relevant documents and communications. 
These written materials were over time supplemented by a number of interviews, 
especially those held during my visit to Madang, which were in some instances 
supplemented with information by E-mail. In line with the verification principle, a 
number of chapters have been distributed among former colleagues in order to give 
them the opportunity to comment. The final interpretation and all errors of fact and 
judgement that this s tudy contains obviously remain mine. I also realise that I have 
only been able to collect comments from several of my former colleagues and not 
from the Jimi and Ramu people described in this study. The gap in terms of 
communication, language and education was too wide to bridge. 
ETHICAL, METHODOLOGICAL A N D POLITICAL QUESTIONS 
Studies as this present an ethical and methodological dilemma since the social 
scientists concerned must set about deconstructing project interventions of which 
they themselves were part. This leaves such analysts open to the accusation that 
they mix u p the role of 'involved' member of the project staff and that of 'detached' 
observer. It also leads to the allegation that the scientists concerned, often 
anthropologists, build their careers by deconstructing and debunking the cherished 
myths of other people, while underplaying their own position in the 
'developmentist configuration'. They thereby tend to omit their influence, strategic 
choices and possible flaws. 
The only answers I can give to such comments is 1) to express my pride at having 
been part of the program described in these pages and to accept part responsibility 
for all that has happened; 2) to emphasise the fact that such studies can only be 
conducted with detailed knowledge 'from within' and like many development 
studies tend to benefit from the knowledge of hindsight; and 3) to extend an 
invitation to anybody inclined to do so to unravel the interests, cultures and myths 
of anthropological practice itself. The field workers of the Bismarck-Ramu project 
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were very much aware of the career interests that anthropologists may have. Long 
after I had left, a local query as to how and why 'anthropologists and social 
feasibility s tudy experts' collect local stories and information was answered with the 
explanation that 'these people.. . come into the area and listen to your stories, get the 
names of the sacred places or stories on how to plant taro and many more, write 
books and sell them to make money' (BRG 1999c: 13). 
An additional issue of concern with this s tudy is that it describes a series of ideas, 
which together provide the basis of the community entry approach of the Bismarck-
Ramu program, but which continue to evolve u p to the present day. This is a 
problem as my own data cover the period u p to the end of 1999, while the thinking 
of the project has continued to develop. This is especially visible in the treatment of 
two main issues central to the Bismarck-Ramu philosophy. Whereas the program 
was at first rather radical in its rejection of economic incentives, it has in recent years 
come to look at the use of economic incentives as something which, provided it is 
'processed' properly, may constitute an additional tool in its drive towards the 
empowerment of Madang communities and the conservation of their resources. The 
second issue has to do with its vision of local people as 'naturally' inclined towards 
conservation. Whereas this was originally an important assumption, it has in recent 
years gradually been nuanced to the suggestion that Melanesians may have a 
stronger affinity with land and resources than western people, and are thus more 
likely to engage in conservation by default. Thus when some of my readers find that 
I describe their views in rather stark terms, this may indeed be due to a failure on 
my part to adequately represent their opinions, but it may also be a result of the 
evolution that the Bismarck-Ramu approach is continuing to undergo. 
I believe it may also be useful to state my own political views about conservation 
and development issues here. While I regard myself as an environmentalist who is 
fully aware that we are experiencing a global conservation crisis, and am personally 
in no doubt that valuable ecosystems are being degraded and species are going 
extinct, I still tend to side with people rather than nature. Being trained as a 
development sociologist and economist, I am concerned about those aspects of the 
conservation discourse and practice that treat environmental issues as if they are 
technical and scientific rather than political and economic matters. In writing the 
first chapter, which provides a background to present-day conservation discourse 
and the special position of PNG therein, I have become aware that the conservation 
debate is structured in a manner which generally speaking mitigates against the 
interests of rural people in developing countries. By employing the pressure cooker 
of a crisis narrative, emphasising the antagonism between nature and people rather 
than the differential perceptions and priorities amongst people, by pretending that 
conservation is science-based and thus value-free, and by giving too prominent a 
role to technocratic conservation managers in the implementation of such projects, 
we risk loosing sight of the human issue. 
Even in the highly people-oriented conservation programs described in this study, 
conducted by professionals well aware of the need to focus on people rather than 
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nature, it is striking how time and again the people issue becomes buried under the 
technicalities of drawing boundaries on maps, the building of infrastructure, the 
conduct of biological surveys, the drawing u p of social feasibility studies and the 
need to secure financing. One of the things that the Bismarck-Ramu project 
described in this study has taught me, is how hard it is in the daily hustie and bustie 
of project implementation to stay focused on people. This, however, is essential for 
conservation to succeed, because as Eidsvik (1980: 186) has written: 'If Man will not 
provide for the protection of Man, what hope do we have, that in the face of 
increasing scarcity, he will protect Nature' . 
In the next few pages, I will first discuss some of the development literature on 
planned interventions to describe projects as 'arenas' in which a number of factions 
pursue a variety of personal and collective interests. I will also introduce the 
'interface' and middle ground' concepts, before ending with an outline of this 
document. 
P L A N N E D INTERVENTION A N D THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
Theories of development intervention of apparently very different signature have 
more in common than we usually presuppose. Rather than emphasising the 
differences in the various theories of social change since the Second World War 
Long (1992: 18-20) identifies the paradigmatic similarities which the dorninant 
development theories have in common. These theories, known as modernisation 
theory and its ideologically opposed neo-Marxist counterparts, have in common that 
they see development as emanating from the centre and expanding to the periphery 
in a linear and sequential movement punctuated by a series of development phases. 
These views also have in common that they regard the recipient population in Third 
World countries as inherently passive and in various stages of readiness to be 
encapsulated, inevitably leading to a loss of autonomy, the loss of 'traditional' forms 
of co-operation production and resource management and increased levels of socio-
economic differentiation. This type of thinking leaves littie room for the way in 
which various groups of stakeholders themselves interpret, modify, and reconstitute 
the social process of transformation. Grillo (1997: 21) notes that this perception of 
third world populations is grounded in a 'victim culture', which negates the wide 
variety of possible responses on the part of recipient populations. 
These linear and top-down development models have strongly influenced policy 
formulation and project implementation. Planned interventions have a tendency to 
be perceived as politically neutral, scientifically grounded and are often based on a 
linear and mechanistic conception of the relation between policy formulation, 
implementation and outcomes. In the case of conservation interventions for 
example, the 'recipient' or 'target' population is simply made to accept the 
establishment of a national park. In practice, the pattern is usually that of foreign 
biologists pouring over maps to define the areas of high biodiversity and drawing 
the outlines of potential protected areas of stipulated size, shape and location. They 
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then turn their gaze upon local circumstances, listing threats in the form of 
population growth, local subsistence and cash cropping practices and the presence 
of industrial threats. Having defined both the problem and the solution, these 
experts subsequently move towards 'dealing' with local communities. In the past 
this often meant that local people were simply evicted, nowadays conservationists 
are in the business of designing integrated packages of development and 
conservation measures that rely on a combination of coercion and incentives. 
Often these problem definitions and the solutions to them are shrouded in technical 
terms, presenting the proposed solutions as the only and inevitable outcome of a 
neutral scientific analysis. The perception of planned intervention as essentially a-
political, is increasingly criticised by social scientists who study the ideological and 
culturally determined constructs underpinning western development (Ferguson 
1990; Escobar 1995) and conservation interventions (Brosius 1999; Fairhead and 
Leach 1997; Hoben 1995; Zerner 1996). The fact that all of these interventions are 
inevitably based on theories of social change, grounded in a selective set of 
mterlinked problems, values, priorities and solutions and based on a culturally and 
institntionaUy-detennined praxeology makes them an integral part of cultural and 
political valuation processes. 
THE PROJECT AS ARENA 
Schaffer (1984) and Long and van der Ploeg (1989) have criticised the a-political and 
mechanistic notion of planned interventions by pointing out that not only the 
intervening agencies have an agenda, but that also local people, communities, 
pressure groups, and segments of the state actively pursue their own interests in the 
face of these interventions. These various interests and agendas do not necessarily 
converge with those of the intervening agency, leading to a negotiated and 
fundamentally unpredictable process of social change. In this view, planned 
intervention should not be seen as a single project that is being 'rolled out' along the 
lines of the project cycle, but rather as a continuously sWting bundle of often 
conflicting individual and collective endeavours, of which many have very little to 
do with the objectives that feature in the documents produced by the project 
implementing agency, or with the statements made by villagers during public 
meetings for that matter. 
The realisation that in real life situations, policymakers, project personnel and local 
populations are locked in a continuous recursive process of interpretation, 
contestation, transformation and legitimisation, defeats the idea of a linear 
relationship between policy, implementation and development outcomes. All 
interventions, from the most modest and participatory attempts to influence 
people's decisions, u p to the use of brute force, are necessarily resisted, mediated 
and transformed by the culturally determined interpretations and strategic 
responses of social actors. As a result, the study of intervention and social change 
can not do without paying attention to the internal and localised values, images and 
Introduction 17 
experiences held by local people, as well as the orientations held and practices 
employed by the frontline project personnel. A detailed description of the ideas that 
underpin these interventions not only bares the implicit assumptions, values and 
priorities from which western conservation proponents operate, and how these 
differ from local perceptions of the natural environment, but also the strategic 
manner in which such images are presented to local people, donors and policy 
makers. It also shows how the project continuously selects new explanations to 
come to grips with what is happening, redesigning its interpretation of facts and 
priorities, and the nature of its practices in the process. Next to the 'multiple 
realities' that exist within a project there are also the 'multiple representations' that 
are produced for a variety of audiences (Hilhorst 2000). 
Notwithstanding the continuous attempts on the part of policy makers to make 
sense of the situation, such programs evolve in a fundamentally unpredictable 
manner. Time and again project staff aim to develop modes of interaction with local 
people, step by step programs to develop a means of 'working together', and time 
and again things happen in totally unpredictable and unexpected ways. Thus 
whereas the implementation of policies is generally thought to lead to a number of 
pre-planned outcomes, this thesis will argue that such interventions constitute a 
muddled and complicated process of which the outcomes are more a matter of 
coincidence than design. 
The increased awareness of the ability of local people to influence development and 
conservation projects has led to an amended view of development endeavours. In 
this view the mtervening agencies and their target groups jointly construct or produce 
the outcomes of development initiatives through an ongoing process of negotiation 
and transaction. The realisation that project and people are jointly responsible for 
the outcome of such planned interventions may help to explain the enormous 
heterogeneity encountered in response to seemingly similar interventions. The 
resulting picture of planned intervention is one of individual and collective actors all 
with their own ideas, strategic goals and means trying to enrol each other into their 
private and collective endeavours. Such enrolment is rarely complete, often 
temporary, and may lead to spatially and temporarily distended networks of people 
and groups which pass on ideas, images and representations, while simultaneously 
'translating' these ideas to optimally suit their needs and wants at a given place and 
time. The social processes and constellations that result, thus have to be seen as the 
continuously emerging and shifting properties of an overlapping network of actors, 
both collective and individual (Long and van der Ploeg 1989; Long 1992; Olivier de 
Sardan 1988). 
In this view, project implementation should be regarded as an intensely social and 
political 'arena of struggle' among different interest groups (Bierschenk 1988; Crehan 
and Von Oppen 1988). Even if project and local communities agree to co-operate in a 
number of joint conservation and development activities, there will be a continuous 
struggle over the content of these activities and their relative priorities. Olivier de 
Sardan distinguishes the 'principles' of selection and appropriation in the response 
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of target populations to projects. Their usual behaviour is to dismember the package 
on offer and select those aspects which please, distort what has to be modified to be 
useful, and reject what is regarded as not useful or even threatening. He also notes 
that 'the more a project is intended to be integrative and coherent, the more it risks 
becoming dismembered' (Olivier de Sardan 1988: 220). 
INTERFACES A N D THE 'MIDDLE GROUND' 
The points of interaction between different social groups and institutions where 
systems of knowledge, values, priorities and sources of power and influence 
intersect have become known as 'interfaces' (Long 1989, 1992, 2001). In line with the 
view of the project as an arena discussed above, it is especially at the interface 
between various stakeholders involved in a project, that opposing definitions, 
images and priorities become apparent. Thus while the very existence of an interface 
at least suggests that the various actors have an interest in communicating with each 
other, it is the interface itself that becomes the site of struggle and negotiation (Long 
2001). This should not just be seen as a struggle between reified groups of people 
such as contained in notions of class, profession, ethnicity, or community, but rather 
as a process in which a variety of collective and individual actors interact. 
Interfaces should not be understood as fluid and one-off encounters in which 
various actors bounce ideas off against each other, but tend to develop a logic of 
their own, setting boundaries between groups. It is through the practical encounters 
between various groups, each with their own history, images, knowledge, needs and 
strategic resources that patterns of interaction and the 'rules of the game' develop, 
turning the interface itself into an element that structures future encounters. Thus 
interactions between extension staff and farmers tend to follow certain patterns, 
which define how these meetings take place, how they are structured, who speaks 
and who listens, what information is deemed relevant and what not. Such 
encounters also tend to develop their own practices for handling opposing interests 
and perceptions. While an interface analysis focuses on issues of confrontation, 
social and cultural divergence, it is at the interface that donor agencies, project teams 
and local people may or may not establish some mutual understanding or 'middle 
ground'. The 'middle ground' concept developed by the historian Richard White 
(1991) refers to the 'the place in between' where various groups of people, often with 
different cultural backgrounds, through processes of negotiation, confrontation and 
innovation may succeed in establishing an understanding by which all involved 
hope to achieve some of their aims. Such middle grounds are essentially pragmatic, 
often temporary and jointly constructed adaptations 'that do not fit a simple rubric 
of domination, subordination and acculturation' (Conklin and Graham 1995: 84). In 
simple terms: a 'middle ground' is an interface 'that works' even if the co-operating 
parties are involved for very different, sometimes even contradictory, reasons. In 
White's (1991: x) more eloquent terms: 
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'On the middle ground diverse peoples adjust their differences, through what 
amounts a process of creative, and often expedient, misunderstandings. People 
try to persuade others who are different from themselves by appealing to what 
they perceive to be the values and practices of those others. They often 
misinterpret and distort both the values and the practices of those they deal 
with, but from these misunderstandings arise new meanings and through them 
new practices - the shared meanings and practices of the middle ground'. 
Important to note in the context of conservation, which has a history of violence and 
suppression is that 'middle grounds' only arise by virtue of the inability of any of 
the involved parties to gain their ends through the use of coercion. How stable these 
'middle grounds' are, is a different matter altogether. 
A study of interfaces in the area of development and conservation interventions and 
the extent to which project teams and local people manage to develop a 'middle 
ground' implies the detailed study of the encounters between the various 
participants in the form of the local rural population, field staff, administrators and 
the various professional groups that constitute the project-implementing agency. As 
must be clear from conception of the project as an arena, such interventions are 
characterised by a variety of factions and thus by a plurality of interfaces. Recipient 
populations are often differentiated along the lines of gender, class, ethnicity, 
religion, social standing, kinship and territoriality, while executing agencies too are 
rarely the monouthic bodies that they are made out to be. More common, is that 
these agencies contain a number of competing problem definitions, priorities and 
courses of action. Oppositions within executing agencies may for example lie 
between different professional groups, between 'imported' westerners and 'local' 
staff, between bureaucratic factions within the agencies or between the hierarchical 
levels of the organisation. 
The latter aspect for example, is illustrated by Quarles van Ufford et Al. (1988), who 
describe how policy goals change as they 'trickle down' the bureaucratic hierarchy 
towards their implementation in 'the field'. As successive elements of the 
bureaucracy receive their Instructions and translate them into practices depending 
on their own perceptions, administrative needs and wants, the original policies of 
the top of the institutions become gradually transformed into practices which have 
little to do with the initial aims with which these goals were formulated. Especially 
the step from bureaucratic policy formulation to practical implementation 'in the 
field' constitutes a gap that allows ample room for modifications and conflicting 
interpretations. The project described in this study would break down because of 
the fact that the understandings of donors and the higher echelons of the 
programme ao!ministration proved incompatible with the ideas and practices 
employed by the field staff. 
Conflicts between professional groups such as conservationists and development 
experts often arise over the relative importance of ideologies such as nature-
conservation versus economic-development. The issues that both disciplines study, 
overlap to a great extent and although environmentalists and development experts 
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do not hesitate to use each others data for their own purposes, in practice a 
'disciplinary bias' makes a meaningful integration of both professional cultures very 
difficult. Although the problems that they study are inextricably interlinked in day 
to day reality, environmental and social scientists speak fundamentally different 
languages, have different professional cultures and take different priorities. 2 This 
issue constitutes an important aspect of this study. For a project 'to work', it thus has 
to establish a range of 'middle grounds' across a number of interfaces, in which a 
variety of parties - both within the intervening agency, w t h i n the intervened 
population and between those two groups - come to a mutually agreed and 
pragmatic course of action which somehow benefits those involved. Fortunately, 
language is a flexible thing which may help to conceal the essential divisions 
between the negotiating parties. 
LINGUISTIC AMBIGUITY AND THE 'MIDDLE GROUND' 
Particular communicative problems a n d / o r strategic opportunities may arise where 
two or more discourses are based on the same terminology even though resting on 
fundamentally different understandings of their content, value load and underlying 
assumptions, triggering a struggle about the meaning given to the terms and the 
practical implementation of the resulting activities. 'Development', for example, has 
long been recognised as an ambiguous and elusive concept. Frank (1987: 231) calls it 
a 'Trojan horse of a word ' which is sufficiently vague and devoid of meaning to 
allow itself to be used by a variety of people and institutions whom each can fill her 
with their own meanings, intentions and agendas. The success of the concept of 
'sustainable development', which has come to be used by both radical 
environmentalist pressure-groups as well as by relatively conservative development 
agencies, may also have much to do with its intrinsic vagueness and ambiguity (O' 
Riordan 1988). 
Many apparently common-sense notions in development and conservation 
discourse lack a theoretical core, becoming 'convenient rhetorical flags under which 
ships of very different kinds can sail' (Adams 1990: 3). This holds true for notions 
such as 'conservation', 'participation', 'sustainabillty' and 'community' within the 
present debate on development and the environment. As long as these reified 
notions remain sufficientiy ambiguous to incorporate a number of competing 
2 Adams (1990: 8-9) for example, criticises the difficulty that many environmentalists have to 
understand that culture and ideology structure people's views on the environment (see for example 
Spinage 1998). Their continuous emphasis on the supposed impartiality of scientific 'truths' obscures 
the politically and culturally determined interpretation of data and becomes an obstacle to a common 
approach to understanding and addressing practical problems of poverty and environmental 
degradation. On the social science side the highly mechanistic views of economists, combined with the 
parochial and doctrinaire views of radical social theorists and the irrelevant detail of anthropological 
study have also been berated. "While anthropologists perform archaistic studies of odds and ends of 
humanity ... authorities struggle with the problems of toxic wastes - with little help from social 
scientists' (Bennett 1990:435). 
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understandings, or, in the process of being translated into another language loose 
their specificity, a sheen of shared meaning may remain in place. Once such 
abstractions are translated into a set of practical activities, however, differences in 
understanding erupt and become the subject of negotiation and struggle. As Lovejoy 
in (Harvey 1996: 118) explains "The contemporary battleground over words like 
'nature' and 'environment' is a leading edge of political conflict, precisely because of 
the 'incompletely explicit assumptions' ... which surround them'. In this sense, a 
variety of agenda's may fit under one ambiguous concept. Such alliances, however, 
tend to be brittle and temporary as they may fall apart when the rather vague 
notions on which they depend, have to be turned into real life practices, with all the 
consequences that these entail. 
This s tudy will argue that such a temporary alliance resting on a number of 
diverging narratives concerning the notion of 'conservation' constitutes the main 
outcome of the Bismarck-Ramu project discussed in this thesis. The main reason 
why two particular groups of people on the Ramu River and the project team 
entered into a joint endeavour under the notion of 'conservation', had to do with the 
fact that the resulting outcome was sufficiently open to create the 'expedient 
misunderstandings' (White 1991: x) necessary to attract both parties. To local people, 
the project became an ally in their attempts to keep highlands migrants at bay and to 
secure legal rights to land and resources. To the executing project team it confirmed 
the success of its participatory conservation strategy, while at the level of the 
program administration it facilitated an application for donor funds, as the program 
now appeared to meet the conservation goals defined by its donors. The question 
whether this indeed constitutes conservation in the sense intended by the donors 
and a discussion of the question to what extent such conservation on the Ramu 
River is sustainable Illustrates the fragility of such alliances. 
O U T L I N E O F THIS THESIS 
In March 1998, when I returned from PNG, I realised that I had studied the Jimi and 
Ramu people and their view of nature as part of my work for the Biodiversity 
Program, but that I knew very little about what 'conservation' means in the western 
world, where it comes from and how it has evolved. As a result, this study starts 
with a narrative or discourse analysis of the origins of western conservation 
thinking. Around the 1930s the various conservation ideas congealed in a 
preservationist narrative which rests not only on the assumption that 'wild' 
environments are the most valuable type of environment, but also on negative 
conceptions of local people and their practices. The second half of the chapter 
discusses the counter narratives that have been developing in the form of 
community-based conservation models from the 1970s onwards. With the 
decolonisation and the realisation that the newly independent states, were more 
preoccupied with the social and economic well being of their population than with 
the western quest to save wildlife, debates on development and conservation 
22 Through the Thicket 
became increasingly intertwined. At the practical level of the national parks the 
increasing conflict between the growing populations and national park managers 
stimulated a search for mechanisms which allow park managers to combine wildlife 
preservation with development activities, triggering a search for compensatory 
mechanisms and an interest in the notion of participation. It is in this latter narrative 
of 'community-based conservation' and 'integrated conservation and development' 
that PNG comes to play a role. 
Chapter two describes how, notwithstanding its spectacular and highly diverse 
natural endowment, PNG has not stood at the heart of international conservationist 
concerns until recently. This is mainly as a result of its land tenure system which 
recognises the ownership rights over land and resources by local communities. Land 
owners in PNG have generally not been prepared to sell their land making the 
establishment of national parks impracticable. The intensification of forest 
exploitation at the end of the 1980s coincided with the establishment of the Global 
Environment Facility and the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development. The remainder of this chapter will discuss the attempts by the 
Biodiversity Conservation and Resource Management Program to establish a 
protected area in the Lak area in New Ireland Province with the help of integrated 
conservation and development methodologies. When the project failed to out-
compete a locally operating timbert company, the lessons learnt from that 
experience provided a rationale for a new, more participatory approach to 
conservation in the Bismarck-Ramu area. 
Chapter three and four discuss the Bismarck-Ramu area and its inhabitants, the Jimi 
and Ramu people. It also outlines the conflict between Jimi migrants and Ramu 
landowners in the Ramu Valley in which the Bismarck-Ramu project would come to 
play a role. The fourth chapter also looks at local resource management practices, 
arguing that biodiversity conservation as pursued by the Biodiversity Program is an 
alien concept to most people livng in the Bismarck-Ramu area. In the case of the Jimi 
Valley, it is difficult to see how a community-based, participatory conservation 
approach could ever be successful, not in the least because of the large population 
with its high economic aspirations, the prevailing patterns of competition and 
conflict, and people's instrumental attitude towards both nature and outsiders. For 
the Ramu people, there are a number of different reasons w h y people may profess 
an interest in conservation. These reasons mainly have to do with the fact that they 
see themselves being overrun by Jimi settlers and that they regard the establishment 
of a protected area as a buffer between their own communities and those of the 
settlers. An additional consideration is that these marginal communities fear being 
swamped by a number of mining and oil drilling projects. 'Conservation' thus 
becomes imbued with notions of territoriality, cultural identity and maintenance of 
the status quo, providing a basis for a co-operative relationship, a 'middle ground', 
between people and project 
Chapter five presents a detailed account of the first face-to-face interactions between 
project and Jimi people. The chapter describes how the project team presented the 
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project as an exchange of conservation for development. Although publicly 
welcomed, the team quickly became entangled in a series of conflicts with a 
bewildering variety of people around the organisation of its biodiversity survey. The 
resulting disappointment by the project staff with local communities was a 
consequence of the gap between the rosy-tinted and simplifying preconceptions 
with regard to local society from which the team operated, coupled with a tendency 
to take public statements at face value, and the reality as it was encountered. This 
chapter argues that a more realistic conception of the political and differentiated 
nature of communities and their leadership, an emphasis on the collection of socio-
cultural data before starting project operations, and a more cynical attitude towards 
the statements made at public meetings, may help to prepare conservationists more 
adequately for their interaction with local people. The chapter also argues that local 
reactions to the project's intervention show a remarkable continuity to Jimi 
responses to the arrival of Australian colonial administration and that such 
responses are thus not so much driven by the nature of the intervention, as by the 
nature of Jimi communities and their drive to pursue status, security and economic 
well-being. 
Chapter six analyses the new approach that was developed as a result of the 
negative experiences in Lak and the Bismarck-Ramu area. This new approach broke 
away from the ICAD approach used in Lak and the opening stages of the Bismarck-
Ramu project, instead proposing a highly participatory project strategy based on 
ideas of empowerment and self-reliance. In contrast to the Lak project, this approach 
did not aim to 'sweeten' conservation by linking it with development services and 
income generating activities, but emphasised self-reliance and control. This 
approach suggests that communities should define their own problems and engage 
in natural resource management and development activities only because they 
themselves regard these issues as important. It thus defined the issue of 
sustainability from a managerial and biological issue centring on the defence of a 
protected area to a social issue in which communities jointly decide to look after 
their environment. This shift also meant a remarkable shift in staffing in the 
Biodiversity Program to a large extent replacing the biologists and conservation 
managers that had until then dominated the program with social scientists and 
community workers. This chapter also discusses the uneasy relationship between 
ideas of participation, self-reliance and conservation, arguing that there is something 
paradoxical in the idea of empowerment by outsiders, as well as in the idea of 
participatory conservation which stood at the basis of this approach. The chapter 
ends by arguing that the seemingly 'open-ended' participatory approach of the 
Bismarck-Ramu team was in fact quite highly structured as a specific worldview 
was being emphasised. 
Chapter seven recounts how groups of PNG community development workers tried 
this new approach in the Jimi Valley, among the mixed Jimi-Ramu communities and 
among the purely Ramu communities Uving on the Ramu River. Not surprisingly, 
the new approach did not go down very well with the Jimi people. Whereas the 
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initial idea of exchanging conservation for development had caught their interest, 
they were now confronted with a shift in project philosophy that de-emphasised the 
importance of material incentives. Among the mixed Jimi-Ramu communities 
especially territorial and authority issues came to play an important role, as a variety 
of people tried to enrol the project in their strategic endeavours. The ongoing 
conflicts between Jimi settlers and Ramu landowners into which the project was 
drawn finally led the project team to abandon these areas as well. Among the purely 
Ramu communities, however, it was especially the territoriality issue which 
provided the basis for a co-operative relationship between project team and Ramu 
people. The Ramu came to perceive the project team and a potential ally in their 
conflict with the Jimi settlers and the establishment of a protected area as a means to 
keep the latter at bay. Over time, they complied with the requirements of the 
participatory philosophy, thus co-opting the project into their own strategic goals. 
Although all involved called this development 'conservation', what this meant in 
practice, whether the resulting 'middle ground' is not exceedingly fragile and 
whether anything is being protected are points of debate. 
Chapter eight describes how the project got into trouble over the requirements for a 
continuation of donor funding. Gradually the Bismarck-Ramu project was torn apart 
between the conservation conceptions as they existed among its donors and the 
philosophy of the project staff, which emphasised community development over 
conservation. The administrators of Biodiversity Program emphasising the need to 
secure funding set about remoulding the project and local realities to suit the 
definitions of the donor, thus reproducing the mainstream conservation narrative of 
biodiversity under threat as a result of destructive local practices. Over time they 
developed a proposal which would probably have been acceptable to the Global 
Environment Facility, but which was as at odds with the community-based 
philosophy developed by the field staff. In the end the discursive gap between field 
staff, administrators and donors proved too large to bridge, leading to a breakdown 
in the project coalition. 
The final chapter reviews the various interfaces at play within the Biodiversity 
Program, the key elements in the narratives that sustain these interfaces and the 
'expedient misunderstandings' that allow for a brittle and probably temporary 
'middle ground' between project team and people on the Ramu River. 
Chapter 1 
FROM STICK TO CARROT: CHANGING NARRATIVES IN 
INTERNATIONAL CONSERVATION 
"The idea of nature contains, though often unnoticed, an extraordinary amount of human history' 
Raymond Williams, Problems in Materialism and Culture. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the introduction of this thesis, I have argued that development and conservation 
projects should be seen as social 'events' that have themselves become an object of 
ethnographic analysis. One influential way of looking at planned intervention is to 
analyse such endeavours by means of their discourses (Foucault 1972); i.e. the way 
in which individuals and groups involved in development or conservation projects 
talk, write and communicate about that project and each other. According to this 
line of thought, 'development' and 'conservation' represent specific modes of 
understanding. These forms of knowledge and the attached practices are seen as 
part and parcel of the political, economic, institutional and historical contexts in 
which they are situated (Ferguson 1990). 'Discourses', or 'narratives' as they have 
been rephrased in the policy context (Roe 1991), and as they will be used 
interchangeably in this study, thus refer to the sets of preconceived ideas and 
images that both inform and legitimise specific policy interventions. 
Narrative analysis is not just a useful tool to understand the way in which various 
groups of people and institutions ascribe meaning to the world, but also allows us to 
understand the essentially political nature of such representations. Every statement 
that we make is ultimately a representation of a particular worldview and therefore 
closely mtertwined with issues of power and control. Some stories and explanations 
become dominant while others are suppressed, some questions can be asked, others 
can not. Discourse analysis thus provides a means to analyse the interconnection 
between the specific representations of a problematic and the political forces and 
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iratitutional interests behind that particular representation. In addition, the choice 
for a particular representation of reality is not without consequences: 
'By writing stories about environmental change, we divide the causal 
relationships of an ecosystem with a rhetorical razor that defines included and 
excluded, relevant and irrelevant, empowered and disempowered. In the act of 
separating story from non-story, we wield the most powerful yet dangerous tool 
of the narrative form. It is common place of modern literary theory that the very 
authority with which narrative presents its vision is achieved by obscuring large 
portions of that reality. Narrative succeeds to the extent that it hides the 
discontinuities, ellipses, and contradictory experiences that would undermine 
the intended meaning of its story. Whatever its purpose, it can not avoid a covert 
exercise of power: it inevitably sanctions some voices while silencing 
other'(Cronon 1992:1349-50) 
In practice, the study of narratives and discourses refers to the way in which people 
and organisations communicate about a subject. It is a particular manner of defining 
the world characterised by its own concepts, linguistic conventions and underlying 
values and assumptions, thereby denoting a specific view on how reality is 
constituted. Meaning is not only embedded in speech or text, but is also embodied 
in organisational practices, technical processes, patterns of behaviour, forms of 
transmission, diffusion and teaching. A key issue in the s tudy of narratives the 
analysis of the positions and viewpoints from which people speak and 
communicate, as discourses are irrevocably tied to the social position of speakers, 
the type of groups and institutions to which they belong and the social settings in 
which they operate. The study of narratives may reveal glimpses of the 'worldview' 
prevalent within that group, and the way in which its members legitimise their 
actions. 
Apart from situating narratives within the institutions to which they belong, 
narratives are also discernible by reference to their specific 'topicality', which lies at 
the centre of communication. Different narratives and discourses elaborate different 
concepts and are underpinned by various sources of legitimacy. Development 
discourse for example identifies the appropriate and legitimate ways of thinking, 
talking and writing about 'development' vrfthin a social environment preoccupied 
with the organisation and study of social and economic change. It can be found in 
institutions such as development agencies, government bureaucracies, universities, 
and NGOs and legitimised by notions of 'justice', 'equality', 'self-reliance' and 
'emancipation'. The discourse of biodiversity conservation belongs to another set of 
institutional groups, is centred on a different topicality and based on a different set 
of values, concepts and assumptions, with the procedures of natural science as its 
framework for discussion and source of legitimacy. 
In a simple treatment of narratives these are thought to be singular explanations 
which are congruent with cultures, institutions or certain factions, leading to a 
reception of development projects as a clash between 'western' technocratic 
modernisation discourse on the one hand, and 'traditional' ideas about livelihoods 
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on the other (for examples of such binary treatment of interventions see Hobart 
1993, Verschoor 1994, VanHelden 1998a). In many instances the western discourse is 
seen as the more powerful, overwhelming local institutions, people, communities, 
their knowledge and abilities, while enforcing a vision of people, nature, 
development and conservation which suits the need of the western interests that 
create these visions. Examples are Said (1994) who looks at the manner in which the 
non-western 'other' is being constructed in western policy and literature, Ferguson 
(1990) who describes how World Bank policies simultaneously construct and 
depoliticise their object of intervention, and Escobar (1995) who analyses the specific 
manner in which notions of 'poverty', and the 'third world' shape the practice of 
'development'. In the field of conservation, important examples are the work of 
Fairhead and Leach (1997), Leach and Mearns (1996), Tiffen er Al. (1994), Stott (1999), 
Cronon (1992 & 1995), Hoben (1995) and Zerner (1996). 
There are, however, also much more mundane reasons why planned interventions 
in developing countries tend to be decontextualised expressions of western culture. 
An important one has to do with the simple fact that such projects take place in a 
complex world characterised by political, economic and environmental uncertainty. 
In order to deal with this complexity and to design interventions, policy-makers and 
planners tend to draw u p simplified images of their field of intervention which 
allow them to more-or-less plausibly describe what is going on, define a problem 
according to that description and secure political and institutional legitimisation for 
the activities that they employ. Often these schematic narratives develop into 
entrenched standard approaches to problems of a similar nature, leading Fairhead 
and Leach (1997: 35) to talk of 'off-the-shelf narratives' that are used 'to define ... 
problems and justify interventions'. It is this perspective, that will be used in the first 
part of this chapter to argue that international conservation policy exudes the 
characteristics of a dominant discourse. This so-called preservationist narrative is 
based on distinctively Anglo-Saxon and colonial notions of nature and people, is 
nowadays institutionally located within the international multilateral organisations, 
and embedded in the policy requirements that determine the funding eUgibility of 
conservation projects. 
I do realise that such an idealist and structuralist approach, which presents 
conservation and development discourses as sets of preconceived ideas which come 
'crashing down' upon developing countries, is rather unsatisfying in a number of 
ways. In the first place, such an approach separates the ideas that people and 
institutions may carry from the practices that inform, modify and sustain these 
narratives. A number of what Leach (2001: 3) has called, 'more patient 
ethnographers' have pointed out that bureaucracies, projects and institutions are not 
monoliths that stand aside from the rest of the world, while Hilhorst (2000) has 
noted that each and ever intervention situation is characterised by counter 
discourses. In the second place, a representation of project agencies as collective 
actors in their own right, casts the actors that comprise these institutions as devoid 
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of consciousness, agency and power, thus also freeing them of responsibility for 
whatever these institutions do (Long 1992, Grillo 1997). 
Unravelling the workings of international bureaucracy, however, requires what 
Marcus (1995) has called 'a multi-sited ethnography' which falls outside the scope of 
this thesis, due to the simple fact that the material contained in this thesis 
specifically deals with the interactions between the different actors involved in a 
specific project. Due to this focus, the considerations of the 'higher' levels of the 
conservation bureaucracy, especially those in the international arena are less 
accessible to ethnographic analysis. I have therefore made the choice to spend one 
chapter on the history of protected area establishment and the recent proliferation of 
narratives which propagate a variety of 'integrated', 'participatory' and 
'community-based' styles of intervention as if they are detached from the practices 
that sustain these ideas. This provides a background to the remainder of this study 
which tries to untangle the day-to-day decisions, the various sources of meaning 
and legitimacy, the responses by local people, the administrative constraints and the 
importance of coincidence in the more detailed and 'patient' manner referred to by 
Leach. 
OUTLINE OF THIS CHAPTER 
This chapter starts by tracing the roots of western conservation thinking within the 
gradual shift from a strictly utilitarian view of nature towards a perspective that 
aims to reconcile utilitarian, aesthetic and moral notions. The environmental policies 
that follow from this view can be defined in terms of the opposition between 
conservation and preservation. Conservationists contend that the value of nature 
lies in its human use and that the environment should be managed as a resource for 
future human use, while preservationists aim to protect 'wild' nature from 
disruptive forms of human use. 3 The latter view would become the dominant 
narrative in national park management over time solidifying into a form of 'fortress 
conservation' (Hulme and Murphree 1999) which saw the activities of local 
populations as the main threat to nature. Following a discussion of the origins of the 
national park idea I will look at the implementation of the first national parks in 
British Africa where the opposition between nature preservation and the welfare of 
indigenous people has become most starkly visible. The focus here is on the varying 
conceptions of indigenous people that are used to legitimise conservation 
interventions. 
3 To a certain extent, the terms 'conservationist' and 'preservationist' have become pejorative 
caricatures with conservationists stigmatised as those willing to sacrifice nature to economic interests, 
and preservationists stereotyped as aiming 'to lock away' resources at the expense of poor people in 
name of some upper-class ideal (Norton 1991 6-9). Notwithstanding these connotations, the terms 
serve a purpose both as historical categories in the discussion of conservation discourse and as ideal-
typical extremes on a continuum of thought on the relation between man and nature. 
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Later the idea that nature only tends towards a mature and stable state when 
humans refrain from interfering with natural communities would reinforce the 
preservationist view. The view that all natural elements matter, not just for aesthetic 
and moral but also for utilitarian reasons, constitutes the main argument for the 
preservation of biodiversity-rich ecosystems. In recent years, however, there is a 
growing realisation that wilderness is a category of the mind rather than an existing 
reality, that people may actually contribute to the ecosystems and the biodiversity 
that we cherish, and that ecosystems do not tend towards equilibrium. Not the fact 
that people make use of natural resources, but also the question what environmental 
impacts these uses have, which form of nature we like best, how to manage 
behaviour and the distribution of the costs and benefits related to conservation are 
becoming important. Notwithstanding the debates triggered by 'new ecology', 
conservation policy continues to pursue the old idea of protected area 
establishment. 
From the 1970s onwards preservationist policies diverged into a variety of more 
'integrated', 'participatory' and 'community-based' approaches, airning to take care 
of both nature and the people that suffer as a result of protective practices. This 
development was a result of the recognition that it is morally unjust to impose the 
costs of global environmental concerns on already poor people, and the growing 
popular resistance against environmental dispossession. The view, that social and 
economic issues as well as issues of participation and democratic control constitute 
an integral part of conservation policies is premised on a new set of images of 
indigenous people. On the most extreme opposite to policies predicated on the 
image of the 'destructive native', one finds scientists projecting on non-western 
peoples ideas of 'ecological nobility'. Neo-liberal approaches have tended to treat 
non-western people as rational and therefore responsive to economic incentives, 
recasting conservation management as the judicious application of both positive and 
negative inducements. This description of western conservation narratives and the 
varying conceptions of indigenous people serves as a background to the analysis of 
project-people interactions contained in this study. 
SHIFTING CONCEPTIONS OF MAN AND NATURE 
Western medieval science explained the physical world as a purposeful and divine 
organism in which all elements were tied together in a mutually dependent 
hierarchy infused with Godly design. In the 17 t h century, this outlook shifted 
towards a worldview that emphasised man's authority over the natural world and 
that valued nature in terms its utility to mankind. Seen from this angle, brute beasts, 
wild plants and uncultivated land were inferior to livestock, food crops and 
cultivable land (Cronon 1995). The utilitarian appraisal of nature also meant that the 
aesthetic preference went out to cultivated landscapes (Thomas 1983). This view also 
contrasted human rationality, the possession of a soul, and the capacity for moral 
responsibility with the irrational, perishable and immoral characteristics of wild 
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nature. People were uncomfortable with the 'animal' aspects of their bodily habits 
and by developing strict rules of social conduct emphasised the boundary between 
the mtrinsic evilness of wild nature and the morality of human society. This view 
also allowed for the imposition of notions of 'savagery' on the foreign peoples with 
which Europeans came into contact through their colonial exploits (Said 1994). 
The perception of the solar system as a divine watch governed by the laws of nature 
paved the way for the Cartesian separation of mind from matter, subject from object, 
and culture from nature. The development of the scientific method, in combination 
with the assumption of mankind's central place in the world, logically led from the 
aim to understand the laws of nature to the use of this knowledge in the subjugation 
of the natural world. Science became an instrument in the development of a free and 
just society in which civilised and modern people distinguished themselves by their 
power of reason, morality and utilitarian manipulation of the natural environment. 
The first 'scientific' attempts to manage nature took place in the field of forestry in 
the 18 t h century, when a concern with timber supplies took hold of western 
Governments. 4 From 1765 onwards, the development of the discipline of 'scientific 
forestry' engendered a transition from a laissez-faire' policy to the design of 
uniform and highly productive forest plantations (Beinart and Coates 1995, Scott 
1988). The technique of 'conservation', as it became known, was driven by 
considerations of productivity and efficiency. Ideas of human development and 
nature conservation, thus both have their roots in notions of 'improvement'. The 
first in the improvement of the human condition, the second in the perfection of 
nature for human use. 
By the end of the 18 t h century the development of the natural sciences provoked a 
closer sense of affinity with the 'brute creation' and questioned the idea that nature 
was merely there for the sustenance of man, gradually giving rise to a romantic 
movement which denounced the man-made urban and agricultural landscapes 
while viewing wild nature as a source of aesthetic delight (Thomas 1983, Cronon 
1995). The two different ways of valuing the natural environment, one in terms of its 
direct use to mankind, and the other as possessing an intrinsic moral and aesthetic 
worth, play a key role in the history of environmental txiinking. In the utilitarian 
vision, there is no contradiction between material and aesthetic considerations as 
nature subservient to society is per definition more beautiful than 'useless' 
landscapes. The Romantic tradition, however, forced people to prioritise between 
their material needs and their aesthetic preference for wild nature. This opposition 
constitutes one of the central ambiguities in present-day society 
4 Whereas historic studies of environmental policy have focused on changes in western countries, 
some suggest that the first conservationist management measures took place in the colonies (see for 
example Grove 1995 & 1997). These views present conservation as a product of the colonial encounter, 
but ignore the resource management practices that indigenous peoples may employ. 
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EARLY AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM 
American colonisation is largely framed in terms of the utilitarian view of nature, 
with European settlers aiming to convert the 'hideous and desolate wilderness' of 
the New World into a 'second England for fertileness' (William Bradford in 
Merchant, 1995: 140). The resulting frontier ethic, which emphasised individual 
enterprise and the God-given right of the settlers to civilise both America's 'wild' 
nature and its 'savage' population dominated until well into the 20 t h century. As in 
Europe this utilitarian view would be countered by a romantic movement that 
inspired people to transcend the utilitarian valuation of nature, instead valuing it on 
moral, aesthetic and spiritual grounds (Pepper 1984). Wilderness became 'an island 
in the polluted sea of urban-industrial modernity, the one place we can turn for 
escape from our own too-muchness' (Cronon 1995: 69). 
From the mid-19 t h century onwards, the revaluation of wild nature led to a rising 
concern with the environmental consequences of economic development. The 
opening of the western frontier brought thousands of settlers, whose arrival saw 
widespread deforestation, the virtual eradication of the buffalo and the vast 
grasslands of the western plains ploughed u p (Beinart and Coates 1995). These 
events changed people's perception of the balance of power between human society 
and nature. Whereas in the 18 t h century nature was seen as a dangerous force that 
needed to be conquered, nature now became a value that needed to be cared for 
(Worster 1994). The new valuation of wilderness gave the young nation a welcome 
theme of civic pride on which it could easily compete with Europe. Shortly after 
their establishment these national parks would become 'the cathedrals of the 
modern world' (Elliot in Thomas 1983: 269). By the early 20 t h century, wild nature 
symbolised a spirit of endeavour and strength with which the United States was 
gladly associated (Olwig 1995). 
The process of urbanisation induced people to seek out commons, gardens and 
cemeteries for recreational purposes, in due course forcing every self-respecting 
town to lay out treed avenues, public walks, and parks as natural zones of 
recreation. In the 1830s the increasing need for recreation triggered off the first state 
involvement in site management, a decision which constituted a noticeable 
departure from the laissez-faire policies of the time (Shultis 1995). In 1832 George 
Catlin was the first to suggest the establishment of 'a nation's Park, containing man 
and beast, in all the wild and freshness of their nature's beauty' (in Colchester 1994: 
1). The idea of a park itself was not new. Medieval Western Europe counted 
numerous private hunting reserves. In Britain where game used to be common 
property, the growing intensity of hunting triggered the establishment of trespass 
laws, gradually restricting the access to wild resources by local communities. The 
enclosures replaced the scattered mediaeval open-field system with much more 
profitable pasturelands, but also gave rise to the establishment of private parks, 
illustrating how the notion of 'park' has strong historical connotations with the 
privatisation of common property, the alienation of land and resources, and the 
eviction of local people. What was new about Catlin's idea was the pre-eminent role 
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of the State. His ideas first came to fruition in Yosemite State Park in 1864 and in 
Yellowstone National Park in 1872. Catlin's suggestion to include 'man and beast', 
however was rejected, and after their proclamation the Indian population was 
evicted from these parks, in a move that would from then on define national park 
management as a quasi-military operation (Kemf 1993). 
THE DICHOTOMISED LANDSCAPE 
By the end of the 19 t h century, the negative ecological consequences of untrammelled 
economic growth in the United States gave rise to an influential environmental 
movement. This movement incorporated both conservationists propagating a less 
wasteful and actively managerial use of natural resources and preservationists 
clamouring for the total protection of wild landscapes. Although conservationists 
and preservationists had their disapproval of wasteful economic development in 
common, and shared an anthropocentric and utilitarian viewpoint, they became 
increasingly divided over the question how natural systems could be most useful to 
humanity. While the preservationists argued that the enjoyment of undefiled nature 
presented a far greater worth than a utilitarian application of nature, in the view of 
Gifford Pinchot, the US chief forester: 
'The first fact about conservation is that it stands for development. Conservation 
does mean provision for the future, but it means also and first of all the 
recognition of the right of the present generation to the fullest necessary use of 
all the resources with which this country is so abundantly blessed' (Pepper 1984: 
82). 
According to this view nature should be seen as a 'savings bank' from which one 
can every year take the interest while leaving the principal untouched, a view which 
is still with us in notions of 'sustainable yield'. This view warrants a strong 
preoccupation with the useful elements of nature, while all other species are either 
useless or competitors in what is essentially a zero-sum conception of nature 
(Demeritt 1998). Scott (1998) notes how a focus on the utilitarian aspects of the 
environment led to a change in vocabulary in which the generalised idea of 'nature' 
was replaced with the term 'natural resources'. Valued plants, trees and animals 
became known as 'crops', 'timber', 'game' and 'livestock', while competing species 
became known as 'weeds', 'pests', 'trash trees' and 'predators'. Over time a 
managerial and utilitarian approach to conservation became dominant, while 
preservationist policy, focusing on mamtaining the aesthetic and spiritual values of 
wilderness became restricted to national parks. 
In an in-depth analysis of the wilderness concept, Cronon (1995) argues that the idea 
of 'wilderness' influences our thinking about nature and mankind in a number of 
unexpected ways. In the first place, the notion of 'wilderness' is based on the 
opposition between mankind and nature, and by emphasising this antagonism tends 
to obscure the differences between people, their various needs and their perceptions 
of nature. This view also allows us to regard 'nature' as something that is 'kept' in 
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national parks, preferably in exotic tropical places. Nature is thus not perceived as 
something that surrounds us in our daily lives and is in need of daily care. In this 
manner, the inferred opposition between nature and society legitimises a flight from 
social and environmental responsibility (see also Guha 1989). The exclusion of 
humans from national parks through preservationist policies is also visible in the 
landscapes produced by preservationists policies, leading to a separation of 
'landscapes of production' from landscapes of recreation' (Neumann 1995). 
In recent years, a number of authors have argued that wilderness is a product of the 
western urbanite mind which does not exist in reality. In this view all eco-systems 
on earth are influenced and modified by human behaviour (Gomez-Pompa and 
Kaus 1992, Denevan 1992). Because wilderness does not exist 'in the wild', it was 
only when wilderness thinking as a cullmaUy-determined perception of nature and 
society came to define environmental policies during the 19 t h century, that the 
spatial segregation of nature and society became a tangible reality. In this view the 
only 'wilderness' that we know is 'new' and an artefact of preservationist policy 
(Flannery 1994). National parks are thus not the pristine remnants of some pre-
human environment and the natural opposite of contaminating urban-industrial 
society. They are a product of that very society and in many respects 'as artificial as a 
safari park in the grounds of an English stately home' (Marnham in Pearce 1997). 
The idea of wilderness as an uninhabited pristine, primordial and timeless space in 
which nature takes her own course, thus conceals the history of close human-nature 
interactions which have created the landscapes that we value (Headland 1997).5 
Ironically, strict preservationist practices such as those imposed on many tropical 
peoples are not part of national park management in Britain and other European 
countries. Olwig (1995) contrasts the American situation with Denmark, which - as 
a small country - has fewer wilderness areas to set aside and, as a result, enforces 
strict rules on economic and urban development in the whole country. British 
national parks too did not take their shape through land alienation and the eviction 
of its users. Notvrithstanding the enclosure acts, community rights to access and 
resource use were never fully extinguished. This led to a policy of landscape 
conservation rather than wilderness preservation, which allows hundreds of 
thousands of people to continue to work and farm in Britain's National Parks 
(Harmon 1991). Preservationist policy in contrast, became the dominant model for 
nature conservation elsewhere. 
5 In recent years social scientists have questioned the modernist separation of nature from culture, 
instead analysing how nature influences culture and vice versa. An increasing number of scientists 
argue that nature and culture must be seen as 'co-created' rather than seen as opposed. Nature is 
'produced' or 'socially constructed' rather than a simple and a-political material reality (Demeritt 
1998; Escobar 1996; Evernden 1992; Katz 1988, Sismondo 1993). Latour (1993) calls for a 'symmetrical 
anthropology' in which nature-culture divisions have no place. 
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AFRICAN PARKS AND THE 'PRIMITIVE OTHER' 
Rather than stemming from a concern with aesthetically valuable landscapes, the 
drive towards the establishment of national parks in British Africa was primarily 
connected with the British preoccupation with hunting. MacKenzie (1987) 
distinguishes a number of phases in the hunting development in Southern Africa. 
The first resulted from the desire for wildlife products, which formed a major aspect 
of the drive into Southern Africa. The availability of abundant wildlife resources 
facilitated and subsidised the development of new settlements, railways and 
mission posts. The agricultural and livestock-rearing communities that jumped u p 
in the wake of the military campaigns emphasised the need to tame the wilderness 
and its inhabitants. Settlers regarded large sections of the local wildlife as 'vannints ' 
aiming to eradicate predators, while government campaigns tried to eradicate 
wildebeest and other potential carriers of sleeping sickness (Beinart and Coates 
1995). These measures, combined with the arrival of boatloads of new settlers and 
the improvement of firearms triggered a hunting binge which would virtually 
devoid large areas of Southern Africa from game by the end of the 19 t h century. By 
then the Blaaubok antelope was extinct, while the last Quagga, the yellowish-brown 
zebra of the Karoo region, died in the Amsterdam Zoo in 1883 (Fitter and Scott 
1978). 
In the second half of the 19 t h century, hunting became linked to a hunting ethic 
associated with British ideas of sportsmanship. Hunting was a form of recreation 
based on the idea that there was a fair chase between sportsman and game. It was 
seen as way of preparing for life in the British upper classes, as it honed military 
skills and built character (MacKenzie 1987). With the reduction in wildlife and the 
increasing human population, a struggle over resources ensued in which hunting by 
white commoners and Africans became frowned upon by the higher classes. Where 
in previous times, game was for the hunter and not tied to territory, trespassing laws 
were increasingly used to exclude these groups from hunting. The restriction on 
access to private lands gradually became reinforced by state legislation. In 1900 and 
1906 respectively Game Ordinances in Kenya and Uganda turned all game animals 
into Crown property (Graham 1973). 
From the 1890s onwards, wealthy landowners aiming to safeguard their hunting 
interests instituted the first private game reserves in Southern Africa, the Sudan and 
Kenya. In general, these reserves covered areas of little economic value as they were 
placed in malaria and tsetse infested country. The first outright national park in 
Africa, administrated by the government rather than private individuals, was 
established at Virunga in the Congo in 1925 by King Albert of Belgium (Fitter and 
Scott 1978). With the growing appreciation of wilderness, preservationist ethos 
would become part of the discourse on national unity in Southern Africa leading to 
a change in perception of game from being objects of the hunt to a symbol for the 
greatness of the new country (Beinart and Coates 1995; Carruthers 1989). 
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At the end of the 19 t h century the threatening disappearance of African game 
triggered international concern leading to the establishment of the Society for the 
Preservation of the Wild Fauna of the Empire (SPFE) in 1903 (Fitter and Scott 1978). 
In 1931, the SPFE investigated the African situation, recommending the immediate 
establishment of a widespread system of national parks. In 1933, this 
recommendation was endorsed by all European powers in possession of African 
colonies (Boardman 1981). Following this endorsement of national parks as the 
primary tool for nature protection it took until after World War II for the 
preservationist conception of conservation to become embedded in the international 
circuit of multinational organisations and NGO's located in Paris, the Geneva 
region, Washington and New York (Adams and Hulme 1998). Noteworthy in the 
international constellation of multilateral bodies dealing with conservation issues is 
the Global Environment Facility (GEF), a joint program of the United Nations 
Development Program, the United Nations Environment Program and the World 
Bank. Since its establishment in 1990, it has rapidly become one of the main funding 
bodies in international conservation. 
After the second world war protected areas have been established an accelerating 
rate, with 100 established in the 1950's, 200 in the 1960's and some 330 in the 1970*s 
(Eidsvik 1980). As a result of this effort, nine countries in Africa now have more than 
9 percent of their land under strict preservationist regimes, while a country like 
Tanzania has as much as 13,5 percent of its landmass in national parks, covering an 
area as large as the joint territories of Switzerland, Slovakia and the Netherlands 
(Neumann 1997). 
THE EXPANSION OF CONSERVATION-WORTHY NATURE 
As the managers of the first African game reserves were initially preoccupied with 
game suitable for hunting, they not only restricted indigenous hunting activities, but 
also actively aimed to eliminate all predators competing over game. Such practices 
were standard policy in game reserves until well into the 1930s. The control of 
predators by the emerging Game Departments would be legitimised by highly 
anthropomorphic conceptions of wild animals. Elephants destroying local gardens 
were regarded as 'vandals' that had to be 'taught a lesson'. Lions harassing local 
people were typified as 'insolent' and military style campaigns were undertaken so 
as 'to instil some measure of respect for humanity in their now contemptuous 
outlook' (Graham 1973: 66). Animals such as baboons and wild dogs were simply 
dubbed 'vermin' and shot on sight. 
Only gradually would an aesthetic revaluation of animals reduce the number of 
species in the category of 'vermin'. While in the national parks of British Africa the 
category of 'useless' or 'harmful' animals initially included Hon, cheetah, leopard, 
hyena, wild dog, buffalo, baboon and crocodile, many of these animals would 
become increasingly scarce following the extermination efforts by wardens, settlers 
and tsetse control agencies. A changing perception of the aesthetic value of 
36 Through the Thicket 
predators and changing insights with regard to their place in 'the scheme of nature', 
would gradually come to warrant their preservation. Lions would in Kenya stop 
being seen as 'vermin' by the mid-1920s, while leopards emancipated from being 
pests as late as 1933 and only because they were thought to control bush pigs and 
baboons, reflecting notions of ecological balance. Cheetah, hyena and wild dog had 
to wait until well after World War II before they were considered preservation-
worthy (Mutwira 1989). As late as 1954, a warden on an official visit to Lake 
Rudolph in Kenya described the good fun he had shooting crocodile (Graham 1973). 
The discontinuation of indigenous management practices such as burning, herding, 
cultivation and woodcutting influenced the outlook of African national parks, 
turning the open savannah into shrub. As game became condensed and human 
populations and agricultural and pastoral practices ceased, the supposedly 'natural' 
state of the environment within the park boundaries was lost. Graham (1973: 215) 
describes the situation for the Murchison Falls in Uganda 'where the consequence of 
compressing elephants into restricted areas, aggravated by fires, has reduced most 
of the park to a uniform grassland that is as 'unnatural ' as a field of wheat'. 
Consequently, aesthetic notions of flora and landscape increasingly attracted 
attention, eventually becoming an object of preservation in their own right. This was 
in many ways a logical conclusion of a gradual evolution in African park 
management from the conservation of a number of useful game animals into the 
wholesale preservation of biodiversity for the sake of recreational enjoyment and 
ecological balance. 
C O N T R A S T I N G CONCEPTIONS OF THE 'PRIMITIVE OTHER' 
Western interventions in the Third World are not only struggles over economic and 
military interests, but largely conflicts 'about ideas, about forms, about images and 
imaginings' (Said 1994: 7). In the area of development and conservation 
interventions, not only the construction of ideas of nature such as contained in the 
notion of 'wilderness', but also the preconceptions and images held of non-western 
people are of importance for the manner in which these interventions are shaped. 
Many of the practices employed by western colonial governments as well as by 
present-day development or conservation interventions are based on stereotypical 
images of the 'primitive other'. 
Torgovnick (1990) traces the image of the primitive man back to the 18 t h century and 
notes that this so-called 'primitivist discourse' contains two fundamentally different 
images of non-western people; one of the supposedly good, harmonious, wise and 
nature-conserving 'native' and the other of the archetypal bad, backward, violent 
and destructive 'native'. By projecting both negative and positive stereotypes on 
other peoples, the West forges a contrasting idea of itself. Both stereotypes, which 
mirror the contrasting conceptions of wilderness, are continuously invoked as a 
means to justify and legitimise western interventions. Fabian (1983) has pointed out 
that the primitive other is not only defined in spatial terms as those people 'out 
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there' in the tropics, but also seen as belonging to another time, to the stone age, or 
some other pre-modern period. This 'allochronic distancing device' is part of the 
more common tendency on the part of western society to construe the primitive 
other and tropical nature in a way that a -priori defines its 'inferior', 'wegitimate' 
and 'destructive' or alternatively 'exotic', 'natural' and 'pure' status. These two 
contradictory conceptions of primitive people and their environment came to play 
an important role in national park establishment. 
THE 'CARELESS' NATIVE HUNTER 
The first, and dominant view, emphasises the mtrinsic evilness of the wild 
environments of the Dark Continent, the intolerable heat, its terrible diseases and 
the dangerous animals. In an extension of this view, African people were branded as 
heathen primitives who failed to render nature productive, and who were a threat to 
scarce natural resources due to their mrrinsically destructive habits. This negative 
view is still dominant in present-day environmental discourse. Leach (in Pearce 
1997) notes how 'people have been reading the landscape backwards. Wherever 
there are some trees, a presumption is made that there once was, and indeed ought 
to be, continuous forest cover'. The explanation inevitably following from this 
presumption is that local people are responsible for environmental degradation. 
Such presumptions give rise to a series of tightly interconnected ecological, 
historical and political ideas, which leave little room for understanding local 
environmental dynamics. Research by Fairhead and Leach (1997 & 1998) in West 
Africa suggests that environmentaUsts have been locked into such preconceived 
ideas to the extent that they have failed to realise that in some case people may play 
a role in creating forests. Tiffen et AJ. (1994) provide another example of research 
which negates the basic environmental 'truth', that there is a direct relation between 
population growth and a loss of tree cover. 
Following the settler-initiated hunting binge of the late 19 t h century, the increasing 
restrictions on African hunting were legitimised by reference to the relative value of 
different hunting motives and techniques. At the top of the ladder stood the British 
sportsman, whom demonstrating his manhood in highly ritualised forms of 
sportsmanship (MacKenzie 1987). These sportsmen looked down on the African 
population, traditionally dependent on a dwindling animal population, and 
increasingly blamed for the reduction in wildlife (Adams 1990:18). Such stereotypes 
remained dominant for many decades and are not restricted to Africa. As late as 
1963, a handbook for Indian foresters noted that: 
'Forest dwelling communities are invariably inveterate hunters and have in most 
areas practically araiihilated game animals and birds by indiscriminate hunting 
and snaring. It is surely time to instil in the tribal mind a respect for the basic 
game laws of the country' (Stracey in Tucker 1991: 50). 
By restricting access to reserve areas, hunting by indigenous people became a 
criminal offence; its perceived difference from British sportsmanship legitimised by 
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presenting the hunting activities of the indigenous population as 'mdiscrirninate', 
and 'destructive', or as a laziness-induced attempt to avoid wage labour (Beinart 
1989; Graham 1973). 
Over time, national park management shifted from a focus on managing game for 
hunting, to the use of a jargon steeped in notions of collective responsibility. This 
allowed white settlers once more to oppose the supposedly destructive habits of 
local people to the moral superiority of their own practices, at the same time leading 
to a series of contradictory conservation measures. While the Game Departments 
culled large numbers of predators in military-style campaigns in order to preserve 
game suitable for hunting, rangers would actively disarm pastoralists at risk from 
those animals and prosecute 'poachers'. Few realised that explaining the importance 
of game preservation for future generations to local people was difficult with the 
gunshots of white hunters ringing in the background. 
Wherever indigenous people resisted European civilising efforts, or where strategic 
and economic interests of white settlers and the colonial state were at play, these 
negative stereotypes legitimised military and economic interventions. The corollary 
of this categorisation of indigenous people in terms of their wild environment was 
that the borderline between the hunting of animals and the murder of Africans was 
disconcertingly narrow (See MacKenzie 1987). In the worst cases, such narratives 
were used to justify the virtual extermination of indigenous peoples thought to be 
beyond redemption. In other cases, these views would warrant the segregation of 
indigenous people from colonial society through the strategic use of the reserve-
concept, suggesting a functional connection between 'native' reserves and nature 
reserves. 6 
Over time, the image of the 'destructive native' would be reinforced by a renewed 
interest in the well-known thesis by Thomas Malthus which asserts that the linear 
growth of food supplies as opposed to the exponential growth of populations 
inevitably leads to disaster. In the late 1960's population growth would become a 
public issue, with scientists such as Hardin and Ehrlich arguing that countries either 
had to take measures to limit population growth or would become subject to 
'positive checks' in the form of famine, war and environmental degradation (Ehrlich 
1968). However, not all despoilers are equal. Hardin en Ehrlich, for example, did not 
see the United States with its high levels of consumption and wastage as responsible 
for environmental degradation, but pointed the finger to those poor countries that -
they asserted - were not taking sufficient fertility reducing measures. The resulting 
conception was that of a 'responsible' western world, taking the necessary measures 
to curb its human numbers, as opposed to a 'reckless' and ever-growing Third 
8 Grove (1997), for example describes how in South Africa as early as 1853 a Royal Forest Reserve 
settled by African groups loyal to white settler interests was installed as a buffer against the incursions 
of Xhosa tribes. The occupants of the reserve 'to act as a sponge, absorbing civilisation from the white 
man and transmitting it back to the barbarous tribes' (Pollock and Agnew in Grove 1997: 105), while 
these reserves simultaneously allowed for the removal of unwanted elements from white settler 
society. 
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World population. Linked to the view of the environment as a common pool of 
resources under risk due to its open-access nature (Hardin 1968) these ideas led to 
what would notoriously become known as 'life-boat ethics' and the policy advice 
that western countries should terminate food aid to developing countries that were 
not taking sufficient measures to reduce population growth. The suggestion was 
that by allowing population to increase, the eventual die-off would only be much 
larger, while everybody on earth would be worse off due to the environmental 
damage resulting in the mean time (Pepper 1984). In blaming the third world for 
environmental degradation, Ehrlich and Hardin ignored not only an important set 
of behavioural and demographic facts, but also issues of social justice and the 
historical and geographical differences in access to resources and levels of 
consumption (Commoner 1975). In addition, these views treat humans as devoid of 
the reflexive capability that enables people to respond to their changing 
environment. Notwithstanding the strong reaction against these theories and 
especially the manner in which these are used as a crude blaming mechanism 
(Harvey 1974), they remain an integral part of present-day environmental discourse. 
'NATURAL MAN 'LIVING AMICABLY AMONGST THE GAME' 
The second view at play in primitivist discourse falls back on the romantic 
interpretation of 'natural man'. The romantic view of wild landscapes first found 
their social equivalent in the idea of the 'noble savage' brought forward by 
philosophers such as Rousseau. In the African context, this view projected the 
continent as the symbol of primeval nature, the very Garden of Eden. In line with 
this romantic conception of nature, Africans were looked upon as the ultimate 
'natural' and morally innocent people. This outlook became especially important in 
the stereotypes developed concerning pastoralists and hunter-gatherers, which with 
their low-impact productive systems were thought incapable of degrading the 
environment (Neumann 1997). In policy terms, this implied that Africans had to 
remain 'primitive' to retain the mtrinsic goodness associated with that state. 
The view of the 'native living amicably amongst the game' (Hingston in Neumann 
1995: 160) gained in importance during the international discussion over national 
park establishment during the 1930s. Although, in line with preservationist policy, it 
was thought that humans should preferably not live inside national parks, the 
colonial powers were initially not prepared to push for the total exclusion of local 
people. This decision was largely justified by reference to this romantic view of local 
peoples and the supposedly environmentally neutral behaviour of these peoples. On 
the extreme end, the views of local people falling within this narrative simply 
equated African people with wildlife. Thus in the case of the King Albert National 
Park the pygmies were 'left undisturbed' because '[they] are rightly regarded as part 
of the fauna' (in Neumann 1995: 154). In 1931, another colonial administrator 
suggested that primitive people added to the aesthetic appeal of parks: 
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'[T]he pig-tailed [Maasai warrior] poised on one leg with a spear for a prop, 
standing sentinel over his father's cattle, is a picturesque sight, and it is fitting 
that this human anachronism should make his home in the same country as the 
rhinoceros and other survivors of a bygone age' (Sayers in Neumann 1997: 568). 
In South Africa racist ideas justified treating Bushmen as fauna, leading to a policy 
which allowed the last group of bushmen to live as tourist attraction in the Gemsbok 
National Park (Gordon 1985 in Colchester 1994). In this manner, 'primitive' Africans 
were relegated to the pristine animal kingdom that existed prior to the age of 
mankind (Haraway 1984, Fabian 1983). 
Indigenous people could stay within these parks as long as they were prepared to 
remain in their 'primitive' and 'natural' state, a notion termed 'enforced primitivism' 
(Goodland 1982). Cultural and economic change had to be frozen inside the park 
boundaries, the use of new technologies was disallowed and economic and material 
progress could only take place if groups were prepared to move to areas outside the 
national parks. This not only introduced the earlier mentioned dichotomy between 
'consumptive' landscapes inside and 'productive' landscapes outside parks 
(Neumann 1995), but also introduced a rather schizophrenic approach to local 
people on the part of the colonial state. Those living outside national parks were 
considered backward and were subjected to development through the modernising 
policies of the colonial bureaucracy. Those within the national parks, however, were 
to play the role of the 'natural conservationist' and were to remain suspended in 
time and place. 
A third stereotype of indigenous people at play in conservation debates constitutes 
the view of local people as 'fallen angels'. This view is based on the assumption that 
local people essentially live in harmony with their environment, but are forced to 
undertake degrading practices as a result of their incorporation into wider global 
society (Berkes 1999).7 A corollary of this conception is the way in which 
community-based conservationists may conceive of local communities as either 
'spoiled' or 'unspoiled', depending on the extent to which they had adapted to the 
modernising forces of capitalist society (Haraway 1984: 50; Neumann 1995). This 
view of local people is a variety of the stereotype of the 'good native'. 
7 From the 1950s onwards a variety of anthropologists has argued that nature is kept in balance by the 
cultural practices of indigenous people (see the discussion by Scoones 1999). In Rappaport's view of 
the Maring in the highlands of PNG for example, rituals serve as a 'thermostat' keeping a precarious 
ecological balance intact. As ecological pressures in the form of overwork, garden damage due to the 
number of pigs being held, and population pressure mount they gradually produce a consensus that 
allows the clan to take a ritually defined course of corrective action in the form of pig exchange, 
warfare and territorial expansion. In this neo-functionalist perspective rituals are part of a binary 
system which: 'switches on and off... to correct the deviation of variables from their acceptable ranges' 
(Rappaport 1968; 234). These perceptions essentially fall back on the positive view of indigenous 
people. Political ecologists have adopted similar notions to argue that the culturally-defined 
homeostatic controls of indigenous communities are destroyed by the penetration of market forces 
pushing indigenous people into environmentally degrading lifestyles (see Brosius 1999 and Scoones 
1999 for overviews). 
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THE EVOLUTION OF 'FORTRESS CONSERVATION' 
Over time, the idea of indigenous people as 'natural' and as lacking the capability to 
impact upon their environment could not be sustained. Population pressure 
increased, the competition over resources grew, new technologies were introduced 
and it became clear that indigenous people both possessed the ability and the 
willingness to impact on their natural environment. Many groups simply refused to 
live by the standards that outsiders imposed on them. The rangers of Gemsbok 
National Park, who had previously 'allowed' the bushmen to pursue their 
traditional Uvelihoods as a sort of tourist attraction, now noted with disgust that 
'their desirability as a tourist attraction is under serious doubt, as is the desirability 
of letting them stay... in the park. They have disqualified themselves' (Gordon 1985 
in Colchester 1994:15). 
Others, undergoing cultural change as they were exposed to wider society, actively 
adjusted their attitudes towards the environment. A recent example of such change 
in attitudes from South America can be illustrated by the debate between the 
anthropologists Posey and Parker on the supposedly conservationist predisposition 
of the indigenous Kayapo Indians of Brazil. While the two anthropologists are 
locked in debate on the conservationist meaning of the so-called 'forest islands' of 
the Kayapo, the latter have adapted their lifestyle to that of the rest of Brazil and are 
actively engaged in marketing timber, gold and medicinal plants. Today members of 
the 3,500-member group own cars, apartments, video cameras, television sets and 
three aeroplanes and wonder why they are being berated as 'immoral' by 
conservationists, when they simply wish to live like everybody else (Conklin and 
Graham 1995, Headland 1997). 
Consequently the idea of 'natural man' living in a state of benign primitivism within 
a 'pristine' environment made place for the opposing vision of the 'destructive 
native' living at odds with his environment. In the realm of African park 
management these negative conceptions of indigenous resource-use would be 
contrasted to the activities of the white park wardens who increasingly came to be 
seen as the last line of defence for against an encroaching indigenous population. 
Where the ideological conceptions of wild nature and its indigenous people were 
initially conflated in a single value judgement, of wild nature and wild people either 
being 'bad' and in need of civilisation, or alternatively both 'good' and a source of 
inspiration, by the 1930s the views of nature and local population became 
disarticulated into an ideological formation which presented wild nature in Edenic 
terms, but which projected local people as the main threat towards the preservation 
of that very asset. 
Over time, the explanation of degradation as stemming from the behaviour of non-
western people came to dominate the conservation debate. This view gradually 
consolidated into a 'cultural blueprint' (Neumann 1995) aimed at segregating nature 
and people. This narrative and the a-priori prescriptions that it contains, preclude a 
more detailed case-by-case analysis of actual resource use by real people. The 
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influence of Western ideas and media and the increasing intensity of global 
communications mean that conservationist ideas have also become entrenched in 
the imagination of the urban elites and middle classes of Third World countries 
(Adams and Hulme 1998). 
Over time, the managerial ethos of national parks shifted its focus. Rather than 
managing nature by hunting predators, park management was increasingly aimed 
at controlling the economic activities of the indigenous population and the 
behaviour of recreational visitors in order to keep human activity from disturbing 
the natural balance 'at work' within the park, gradually leading to the infrastructure 
and control measures which characterise present-day parks. The activities of people 
living inside or near national parks were increasingly restricted in order to preserve 
the perceived integrity of the wilderness inside the national parks. As human 
populations grew after the Second World War, this task would become increasingly 
daunting, leading to a border-management ethos replete with spatial concepts such 
as 'core conservation areas', 'buffer and transition zones', and 'wildlife corridors' 
and an increasing use of military-style surveillance, control and defence techniques. 
BIODIVERSITY A N D THE PRESERVATIONIST FRAMEWORK 
The beginning of the 20 t h century saw the development of an ecological paradigm 
that provided the preservationist narrative with an ecological rationale. In the view 
of the ecologist Frederic Clements', interdependency and co-operation rather than 
Darwinian competition were the driving forces of evolution. Clements postulated 
that plants lived together in interdependent 'plant communities', which develop 
through a succession of vegetational phases to a 'climax state' of equiUbrium in 
which no further evolutionary development occurs. If an outside force, such as a 
bush fire or a timber company interferes nature is set back into one of the earlier 
phases of development, from which it will again inexorably move towards the 
climax state. This led Clements to postulate the fundamental incompatibility of 
human activity with the needs of evolution. Nature only develops towards a climax 
state in the absence of human interference, while mankind can but satisfy its 
material needs by setting natural succession back (Worster 1994). 
Aldo Leopold, an American forester and ecologist, was the first to make the climax 
state the benchmark for environmental management. Based on the repeated failure 
of managerial conservation in forestry and game management, he concluded that 
nature should be allowed to take care of itself. As he postulated' environmental 
management is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, the stability, and beauty 
of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends to do otherwise' (Leopold in 
Takacs 1996: 203). Leopold was also one of the first to argue that species may 
provide ecological services in unexpected ways, arguing that questioning the use of 
individual elements of the natural system is silly. 'Who but a fool would discard 
seemingly useless parts? To keep every cog and wheel is the first precaution of 
intelligent tinkering' (Leopold in Worster 1994: 289-290). From the 1940's onwards, a 
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growing number of écologiste came to regard diversity of species as a value worth 
conserving in its own right (See Ghilarov 1996). A consequence of the succession 
view of nature was that more advanced and therefore more diverse ecosystems were 
thought to be more stable, with the tropical rainforest with its innumerable and 
dynamic interactions presented as the ideal and stable state of nature. In the 1960s 
and 1970s the notion of interdependency was further elaborated with the argument 
that evolution left alone would lead to ever-greater diversity, balance and stability, 
and that it through human activités that natural variability was reduced and 
ecological systems destabilised (Takacs 1996). 
The concept of 'biological diversity' was thus hardly a new thing when it rose to 
prominence in the 1970's. Its ascendance, however, stemmed largely from a practical 
political problem that the American environmental movement was facing. Until well 
into the 1970s, species were the prime mover of environmental opinion, an approach 
also central to the US Endangered Species Act. As a result, the environmental 
movement had to frame battles over habitat in terms of the endangered species 
contained therein. Over time, however, conservationists came to realise that habitat 
uniqueness, measured in terms of endemicity and diversity, might provide a better 
measure for nature's worth. The problem with habitat, however, is that 'it looks like 
a green blob' (Janzen in Takacs 1996: 74) and lacks the charisma to muster public 
support. The concept of 'biological diversity' solved this problem by merging the 
totality of species, which live within and simultaneously constitute that habitat, into 
one concept. 
THE EXTINCTION 'NUMBERS GAME' 
Science takes a special place within the analysis of environmental discourses by 
virtue of its nature. In the past the scientific method was supposed to generate 
unquestionable truths. Wherever multiple views of reality existed, science could be 
invoked as arbitrator. The idea that the observational statements produced by the 
scientific method refer to some ultimate reality which exists independent of human 
perception is grounded in the modernist/Cartesian distinction between nature and 
culture, the observed and the observer, mind and matter. In the last couple of 
decades, however, science itself has become increasingly recognised as a social 
construction, built on images which we borrow from daily social life and which may 
clash with other sets of values and representations of reality (Sismondo 1993, 
Demeritt 1998).8 
8 It is for example, remarkable how often visions of nature are a reflection of society and vice versa It 
is no coincidence for those looking at the history of the natural sciences that Darwin's idea of 
evolution through competition found its equivalent in 19th century social Darwinism and a laissez-
faire attitude to government policy. It is similarly no coincidence that the organismic ideas of society 
as developed by Spencer found their ecological equivalent in the work of Clements, or that the Fordist 
approach to industrial production is reflected in the ecosystems view held by Tansley. All of these 
ecological views were held to be 'scientifically' valid at the time but were simultaneously impregnated 
by the dominant values and images of their time (Worster 1994). 
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As a result, our relationship with science has shifted from one of blind faith in the 
answers generated by cumulative scientific advance, into an 'interrogatory 
relationship' in which the findings of science are questioned, criticised and 
strategically deployed in common with other refiexively available sources of 
knowledge and meaning (Giddens 1994: 216). The 'answer culture' of science is 
retreating, not through the dissolution of science as a source of knowledge, meaning 
and legitimacy but through the multlpUcatlon of scientific fact. Scientific facts 
constitute an important source of legitlrnisatlon but are simultaneously subjected to 
counter-claims. Science thus helps us in constructing 'arguable worlds, but can not 
release us from argument' (Myerson and Rydin 1996: 213). 
This situation is eminently visible in the crisis narrative by which conservationists 
claim authority over global nature, as the outcomes produced by the various 
scientific models vary so widely that estimates for the rate of man-made species 
extinctions are at best 'guesstimates' (Lawton and May 1995: v) which lie wide and 
far apart. Thus where Wilson (1992) suggests that we are losing 225,000 species per 
year and Myers (1979) even comes u p with the unlikely rate of 525,600 extinctions 
per annum, other analysts suggest that maybe some 3000 species per year are going 
extinct, most of which are insects, fungi and bacteria 'which most people would not 
even hesitate to step on' (Hannigan 1996: 154). The problem to the outsider is that 
there are no firm grounds to choose between the various extinction scenarios, and 
the opposing suggestion that the extinction problem should not be allowed to 
impede the socio-economic development of poor countries. The difference between 
these representations, however, is the basis for recommending various all-
encompassing national and international policies which exert high costs from 
already poor populations, or no environmental action at all. Even when biologists 
arrive at a consensus that we are losing several thousands of species a year, what 
this means to humanity, who is to blame, and what costs global society should 
impose to stem these extinctions, involves a political value judgement. 
Environmental debates are thus not resolved by the proliferation of scientific fact, 
but consist of strongly opposing representations of reality, of whole 'moral 
universes' (Cussins 1988) in which culturally and professionally determined visions 
of nature, people, and science play a role. This reduces the vast majority of 
environmental communication to the use of poUtically strategic imagery in which 
simplified messages on the 'the problem and how it arose', who is to 'blame', 'the 
order of priorities', the 'necessary solutions' and the 'distribution of costs and 
benefits' are continuously projected. Next to the notion of crisis, such simplified 
preconceptions and assumptions are also visible in the ecological narrative that 
conservationists use to legitimise the establishment of strictly protected areas. 
N E W ECOLOGY AND THE PRESERVATIONIST FRAMEWORK 
The preservationist narrative is based on a number of crucial assumptions with 
regard to nature and the impact of human society, which together suggest that 
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protected areas are the best - if not only - way to look after nature. The first is the 
Clementian idea that nature in its most 'natural' and climax state reflects the highest 
levels of biodiversity. The second supposition is the idea that highly diverse 
ecosystems are more stable and balanced than less variable systems, while the third 
is that human activities degrade and simplify nature, thereby compromising 
diversity and balance. The combination of these three hypotheses logically leads to 
the argument that the best way to look after the environment is to safeguard large 
areas of wild nature separate from human society. Based on the notion of biological 
diversity as a measure of nature's worth, and the Clementian assumption that the 
most diverse environments are those least affected by people, a state of maximum 
biodiversity has thus become more or less synonymous to the older notion of 
'wilderness'. The main difference is that the notion of 'diversity' pretends to have 
the quality of a scientific indicator (See Callicott et Al. 1999 for a discussion of the 
values inherent to the biodiversity concept). 
The aim of protecting wild nature from human induced degradation is the logical 
consequence of this point of view, grounding the practice of protected area 
establishment in ecological theory, and associating biodiversity conservation with 
the preservationist narrative. Noss (1990: 49) for example, argues that biodiversity 
conservation provides a justification for the establishment of large wilderness areas, 
as 'wilderness and biodiversity need each other'. These areas are to serve as in-situ 
depositories of evolutionary processes. 9 The IUCN taxonomy of protected areas 
defines its three dominant categories of protection as areas that are established with 
the goal of mamtHining biodiversity and natural formations in an 'undisturbed state' 
(Kemf 1993). Although most conservation biologists realise that the battle to 
conserve biodiversity will be won or lost through the active management of 
multiple-use lands in which protected areas can at best play a limited role, the 
underlying idea still remains that such an integrated policy is second-best. 
Consequently, international conservation interventions, especially those in 
developing countries, continue to focus on protected area establishment as the main 
means to preserve nature. 
In recent years, proponents of the 'new ecology' have thrown into doubt the 
ecological tenets on which the preservationist project is based. In the first place, field 
studies suggest that diversity does not necessarily increase with different 
successional phases, thus doing away with the Clementian idea that the most 
B Some of the suggestions made by radical conservationists go very far. Snyder suggests that the 
human population on earth needs to be 'reduced' by 90 percent to allow room for nature, while 
Foreman argues that large parts of the world need to be 'cordoned off for the same reason (in Guha 
1989). Mainstream organisations too get carried away by grandiose scenarios. A recent report by the 
IUCN (1999b), for example, calls for an expansion of effectively protected forest areas with 50 million 
hectares (!) by 2005. Although this is to be done in a 'socially responsible manner', the report is 
dominated by the technical determinants of assessing threats to protected areas and implementing 
more effective management regimes. The fact that local people have much to lose by these policies, 
and that their implementation requires massive intervention in the affairs of independent countries is 
not even acknowledged. 
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mature ecosystems are also the most complex, diverse and worthwhile. The findings 
from 'new ecology' which suggest that ecological systems never achieve a balanced 
climax state but always operate in a state of disequilibrium (Botkin 1990, Zimmerer 
1994), has important consequences for protected area and forest management. Not 
in the least because the omnipresent notion of 'sustainability' looses much of its 
meaning. Without some inferred 'natural', 'balanced' or 'climax' state that serves as 
an objective benchmark for environmental management, such policies are reduced 
to pursuing a set of professional and cultural values. Botkin (1990: 195 my italics), 
for example, notes that in order to calibrate one's environmental policies 'it is 
necessary to choose a time period that has the dested appearance'. 
Secondly, there is the assumption that systems that are more diverse are also more 
stable. Ehrenfeld notes that because conservationists tend to make use of a utilitarian 
rather than moral arguments to convince public and policymakers of the importance 
of nature conservation, they are also provoked into 'exaggerating and distorting' the 
utilitarian values of wild nature (Ehrenfeld 1978: 193). One of the most important 
examples of such exaggeration is the diversity-stability hypothesis. This hypothesis 
has been under fire since simulations by May (1973) suggest that complex systems 
tend to undergo more extreme population fluctuations than simple systems. In 
contrast to the diversity-stability hypothesis, this suggests an inverse relationship 
between natural variability and eco-systemic balance. May's findings are supported 
by field studies that suggest that systems with high diversity, such as rainforests and 
coral reefs, are exceptionally vulnerable to human intervention, while more simple 
communities prove highly resilient and adaptive. Although there are indications 
that under certain circumstances natural diversity may enhance stability, such as in 
the case of grasslands recovering from drought (Tilman and Downing 1994), or in 
laboratory designed eco-systems (Naeem etAl. 1994), these explanations are context-
specific and do not 'sell' as well as the generalised diversity-stability hypothesis. 
Consequently, conservationists have been loath to give u p this attractive argument 
for the preservation of 'wild' nature. 1 0 
The third assumption underpinning protected area establishment, namely that 
people inevitably detract from nature, has been thrown into doubt by field studies 
which not only suggest that humans may contribute to the diversity of biological 
communities. Ehrenfeld (in Callicot et Al. 1999) gives the example of the Papago 
Indian Country of Arizona's and Mexico's Sonoran Desert where there are two oases 
only thirty miles apa r t The northern one is fully protected as a bird sanctuary, with 
no human activity except bird watching allowed. All Papago farming that existed 
1 0 Sagoff (1985) notes that - at least until halfway the 1980's - the diversity-stability hypothesis was 
used as an argument in virtually all US conservation legislation. A recent brochure by the Ecological 
Society of the Americas also argues that species diversity confers stability on eco-systems. This to the 
dismay of many of the Societies' members who argue that this interpretation is unacceptably coloured 
by the personal values of the involved conservationists (Cf. Kaiser 2000). According to Stott (1999: 34) 
many ecological scientists prefer to maintain a variety of ecological myths 'as the collateral 
environmental benefits outweigh the scientific uncertainty'. 
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there since prehistory was stopped in 1957. The other oasis in Mexico is still being 
farmed. During their studies ornithologists found that two times as many bird 
species lived within the farmed oasis as in the officially protected bird sanctuary. 
Collinvaux (1989) also argues that species diversity is highest in localities where 
disturbance is frequent but not excessive. 
A related issue, is the growing realisation that in many places the cessation of 
management practices and the concentration of game has actually altered the 
landscapes that caught the interest of conservationists in the first place. Where 
Clements brought forward a sharp distinction between the human and the biotic 
community, the ecosystems thinker Arthur Tansley would argue that there is no 
such thing as a 'natural' environmental state (Worster 1994). Following research in 
Britain, he came to realise that mankind had played an important role in the 
development of valued landscapes and that any rigid attempt to preserve these 
environments through a policy of non-intervention would lead to their degradation 
(Cf.SheailetAI 1997). 
In this view, it is imperative that nature is managed in order to keep it in its desired 
state. Where such management ceases as a result of overprotective measures, 
landscapes may actually be damaged as a result of the very policies intended to 
preserve them. An example is Tsavo national park in Kenya which in the beginning 
of the 1970's was so densely populated by elephant that it stood out 'as a 
photographic negative of one's expectation of a park. Rather than an island of green 
in a wasted landscape, Tsavo appeared as wasted island amid a green land' (Botkin 
1990: 16). There is also evidence that biodiversity may suffer from preservationist 
policies. David Western, Director of the Kenyan Wildlife Service, notes that 'puTling 
out the human component' from Amboseli National Park, led to 'the loss of half of 
the plant species' (Western in Pearce 1997; See also Western and Gichohi 1993 and 
Smith 1993). Similar findings for forests have led Wood (1995) to wonder whether 
these are not being 'conserved to death'. 
The result of these issues is that the state of the environment which ecologists infer 
to be the most 'natural' and which serves as a benchmark for environmental policies 
is a normative choice based on a culturally and professionally determined view of 
nature rather than on indisputable scientific criteria. There is nothing within nature 
itself that allows us to conclude that one form of nature is more valuable than 
another. Man bestows value on its natural environment and visions of nature are 
inevitably influenced by social and cultural values (Demeritt 1998). Even the 
perception of extinction as something to be mourned or largely irrelevant is exactly 
that: a perception. Ultimately we choose the type of landscapes that we like, which 
then comes to serve as a benchmark for environmental policies. Approaches which 
view conservation policies as a product of positivist science, and thus as separable 
from political and social issues, only show that some conservationists find flora and 
fauna more important than human welfare. 
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The strategic use of scientific discourse as a means to further a set of cultural, 
professional and personal values has led Evernden (1992: 15) to call ecology 'an 
institutional shaman', that can be used to 'pronounce natural' whatever we want to 
see as natural, and which is 'being used as a blunt instrument to help implement 
particular life-styles or social goals'. Stott (1999) argues in similar vein that western 
conservationists use their science to impose a culturally determined view of nature 
on developing people. 
T H E CONTINUATION OF 'FORTRESS CONSERVATION' 
Notvvilxislanding these debates, biodiversity conservation policies continue to be 
imbued by the usual Clementian assumptions and the models derived from island 
biogeography. Environmental policy makers brought u p in the ideal of the 
dichotomous landscape, script the landscapes that they want to preserve as 
'uninhabited', 'pristine' and 'wild'. The view of the 'sanitised landscape' (Zerner 
1996) or the 'empty forest' (Chase-White in Myerson and Rydin 1996) simply ignores 
the fact that globally some 70 to 80 percent of all protected areas are inhabited 
(Colchester 1994, Amend and Amend 1992, Kemf 1993), and ignores the manner in 
which these people contributed to these landscapes. Conservationists continue to see 
local people as the source of the problem and they continue to premise their policies 
on the need to separate man from 'wild' nature through the establishment of 
conservation areas. 1 1 There are a number of reasons for this state of affairs: 
In the first place, there is a time lag between science and poUcy-making. It takes time 
for the findings from 'new ecology', anthropology and archaeology to sink in. A 
related issue is that conservationists operate in a crisis management mode which 
makes revisiting the premises of ones approach dangerous. One may lose precious 
time by doing so. In addition, the generalised model of 'fortress conservation' 
(Hulme and Murphree 1999) has been institutionalised to the extent that 
conservationists are restricted by the preconceived modes of thinking that 
characterise the present international conservation institutions. These happen to be 
mainly located in a limited number of international institutions with a very similar 
analysis of conservation issues. Often such narratives not only exist in the minds of 
the involved policymakers, but are also embedded in legal and administrative 
requirements. Amend and Amend (1992) note how South American conservationists 
are often required by law to exclude people from protected areas, even when there is 
no evidence that the presence of these people is txireateriing to the environment. 
1 1 The notion of the 'empty landscape' has had serious consequences for local people all over the globe, 
as it has helped to define land as 'up-for grabs', legitimising the dispossession of indigenous people by 
western settlers. Conservationists are only recently becoming aware of the historical, political and 
cultural connotations of their terminology. In 1995, the Ninth Conference on Eco-politics for example, 
accepted a resolution which called the term 'wilderness' unacceptable due to its connotation with the 
concept of terra nullius (Freeman 1998). Other organisations, oblivious to the political connotations of 
their jargon, redefine 'wilderness' in a technical sense and continue to use it. 
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Such laws and policy prescriptions thus continue to enforce preservationist 
intervention practices. 
In the second place, there is fear. Many scientists fear that if people are recognised as 
part of nature, or if we deconstruct the conservationist narrative to show the cultural 
values -inherent therein, such opens the floodgates to free for all degradation (Cf. 
Soule and Lease 1995). In this view, it is politically more opportune to maintain a 
strict separation between nature and people, however artificial, and to fall back on 
semi-scientific notions of 'native' biodiversity, than to go into complex political 
debates about what to do with the environment with an array of political interest 
groups. The dual role of ecologists as both environmentalists and scientists also 
plays a role. In order to bring their personal values forward in the world, claim 
authority to speak on behalf of nature and grab the necessary attention to do so, 
conservationists can not do without their status as scientists, an emphasis on doom 
and gloom and the halo of expert objectivity. Agreeing that their views are value-
imbued, risks reducing their status to that of just another special interest group and 
reduces their claim to make decisions about the use of other people's resources 
(Takacs 1996). 
Thirdly and finally, there is complexity. Accepting that environmental issues are not 
a choice between the absolutes of pristine wilderness and human use, but a political 
and cultural preference for certain lifestyles, landscapes and environmental uses 
complicates conservation policy to a great extent. Managing resources in a natural 
and human world in flux, simultaneously dealing with local people, their definition 
of nature and what to do with it in a continuous political process of negotiation, 
coercion and compensation, is infinitely more difficult than a approach based on 
spatial zoning. Consequently, the conservation establishment continues to bring 
forward the old preservationist messages. 
The remainder of this chapter describes how not the findings of new ecology, but in 
the first place the social consequences of preservationist policies, the process of 
decolonisation, and the increasing ability of indigenous people to strike back at 
conservationists are forcing the latter to change strategy. 
NARRATIVES OF COMMUNITY-BASED CONSERVATION 
After World War II, western concerns with the willingness and capability of the new 
post-colonial governments to establish new parks and maintain the integrity of 
existing national parks became an important issue. Burnett and Butler Harrington 
(1992: 160) suggest that the brunt of park creation in Africa was 'jammed' into the 
few years between World War II and the beginning of African independence and 
suggest that 'many of these parks were rushed into existence with little thought 
about their purpose, the integrity of their borders, or their consequences for local 
people' As before the war, international attention focused on Africa with its large 
charismatic species and rapidly growing human population (Boardman 1981). 
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Several international conferences on the future of national parks in Africa were held, 
aiming to influence the public opinion on conservation in developing countries. 
These conferences made clear that there was a wide gap between western 
conservation and African social and economic development priorities (Adams 1990). 
They also made clear that the establishment of national parks imposed serious 
hardship on local people and that where colonial Governments had generally shown 
little concern over the consequences of park formation for local people, the new 
democratically elected governments could not sustain such a myopic view. 
Many people hving inside and around protected areas not only suffer from a loss of 
resources and property as a result of conservationist dispossession but also suffer 
from the psychological, cultural and socio-economic impacts of forced relocation 
and the brutality of the wardens, police and internal security forces in charge of the 
protection of national parks (Colchester 1994, Cf. Peluso 1993). The ultimate example 
of the disaster that the fortress model of conservation can bring to local populations 
is illustrated by the plight of the Ik, a small group of hunter-gatherers living in the 
game riddled forests of the Kidepo valley in north-western Uganda. By the end of 
the 1960s, the Kidepo Valley was designated as a national park. Ignoring the fact 
that this small group of people lived in relative harmony with their environment, 
the Ik were evicted to a number of densely populated settlements where they were 
told to farm under the watchful eye of a local police post. Hunting and gathering, 
their main form of subsistence was now called 'poaching' and severely punished. 
The result of this displacement was a total loss of social values, norms and attitudes, 
large-scale hunger and starvation, prostitution, violence and neglect that heralded 
the end of Ik society and culture (Turnbull 1972). 
Such evictions are not a thing of the colonial pa s t In Sri Lanka during the 1980s 
similar initiatives saw the Vedda people removed from their home territory, while 
1988 saw a Masaai group evicted from their village near Ngorogoro Crater in 
Tanzania (Gray 1991). Feeney (1993 in Colchester 1994) describes the 1992 forceful 
eviction of 30,000 unsuspecting indigenous people living near Kibale Forest Reserve 
and the Queen Elizabeth National Park in Uganda as part of a European 
Community funded project aimed at creating an elephant corridor between the 
forest reserve and the national park. The project led to a further impoverishment of 
local people when they were evicted. The police action itself was characterised by 
the use of violence, the looting of property and the burning of houses and led to the 
death of several people. Such events are not restricted to developing countries 
either; Shkilnyk (1985) tells of the displacement and cultural destruction of the 
Ojibwa tribe in Canada. 
These preservationist practices are usually legitimised by invoking an image of local 
people as being inveterate poachers whose destructive practices threaten the future 
of nature and wildlife. In reality, however, local people can not simply be scripted as 
'poachers'. Zimbabwe's Northern Game Park, for example, mainly suffers from 
organised groups of Zambians crossing the border (Duffy 2000). In the case of 
Amboseli National Park in Kenya, local Maasai actively assisted in reducing 
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poaching and spearing during the early 1980s (Western 1994a). Such finesses are lost 
in the stereotype of the 'destructive native', which in the media becomes supported 
with the grim images derived from the intensive anti-rhino and elephant poaching 
efforts. In the first place, the facile opposition between the definition of local people 
as 'wndlife poachers' and game wardens as 'wildlife protectors' also conceals the 
fact that the anti-poaching squads and game departments themselves are heavily 
implicated in illegal hunting and the ivory trade (Duffy 2000, Gibson 1999). In the 
second place, it underplays the social consequences of the war on poachers that is 
being fought. According to Colchester, for example 
The Kenya Wildlife Service ... has since 1989 been involved in a virtual 'war' on 
ivory poachers and has summarily killed, without charge or trial, literally 
hundreds of indigenous people. Like wise in the Central African Republic, 
French soldiers have admitted to a 'take no prisoners' policy in eliminating 
poaching, even killing off wounded poachers brought down by their guns' 
(Colchester 1994: 24-25). 
Duffy (2000) describes the Zimbabwean shoot-to-kill policy that saw 170 poachers 
killed, some of them summarily executed, between 1984 and 1993. This policy was 
legalised by a 1989 act that indemnified anti-poaching personnel for the 
consequences of any action carried out 'in good faith'. The parks department also set 
u p a rewards system that paid rangers for the captoe /k i l l ing of poachers. These 
actions were applauded by many western conservationists who conveniently forgot 
that the people in question were killed without trial. 
The social costs of displacement, the behaviour of the game departments vis-a-vis 
local people, and the numbers of people killed without trial, have led many critics to 
argue that preservation-oriented conservationists systematically neglect issues of 
social justice. A number of commentators have pointed out that conservation efforts 
are often used as a cover for extending state control into rural areas (Peluso 1993, 
Neumann 1997). Environmentalists are obviously not unaware of these issues, but 
have tended to focus on containing the violent backlash that their policies triggered 
by intensifying their management and control efforts, rather than on questioning the 
policies themselves. From the 1970s onwards, however, it became increasingly 
apparent that resident populations were fighting back in a variety of ways, ranging 
from open revolt to the random killing of wildlife and incendiarism (Brown and 
Wyckoff 1992, Pimbert and Pretty 1995, Wells and Brandon 1992, Western 1994a). 
Such struggles, combined with the growing call for justice by afflicted communities, 
the questioning of the moral right to inflict hardship on poor people without at least 
some form of compensation, the ascendance of NGOs focusing on human rights and 
the recognition that a policy of ever tighter controls was not sufficient, gradually 
forced conservation agencies to think about ways of integrating notions of human 
development with the conservation of nature. 
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T H E M A N A N D BIOSPHERE PROGRAMME 
While the linkages between conservation and development problems were 
becoming increasingly obvious and politically sensitive, it was also becoming clear 
that environmental concerns required a more international approach. The global 
nature of environmental problems became a key point of discussion at the Biosphere 
Conference of Paris 1968 which had the merit to be the first international forum to 
assert that the conservation of natural resources should be achieved in conjunction 
with their use for human benefit. This constituted a paradigmatic departure from 
the preservationist model, which had driven post-war conservation (Adams 1990). 
The year 1971 saw the establishment of the Man and Biosphere (MAB) programme 
which aimed 'to develop within the natural and social sciences a basis for the 
rational use and conservation of resources of the biosphere and for the improvement 
of the global relationships between man and the environment' (in Kellert 1986: 101). 
The programme consisted of a range of research and resource management projects 
aimed at preserving a cross section of world-wide environments (Batisse 1982). The 
MAB was given an exhaustive and open-ended series of objectives that allowed 
increasing attention to be paid to the interaction between natural ecosystems and 
socio-economic change. Project 8 covered conservation issues aiming to conserve 
'natural areas and the genetic information they contain through the establishment of 
biosphere reserves'. The main criteria for selection of such reserves were the need to 
include as many different biogeographical areas as possible (Adams 1990). 
At the basis of the biosphere reserve concept stood the idea that through multi-
disciplinary research sustainable and acceptable forms of development and 
conservation could be identified and transferred to local populations. The 
assumption was that if local people were made aware of the importance of 
conservation they would readily co-operate in a joint project for the benefit of 
mankind. As Battise (1982:107) wrote optimistically 
'experience already shows that when populations are fully informed of the 
objectives of the biosphere reserve, and understand that it is in their own and 
their children's interest to care for its functioning, the problem of protection 
becomes largely solved. In this manner biosphere reserves become fully 
integrated - not only into the surrounding land-use system, but also into its 
social, economic and cultural reality'. 
The MAB concept also stood at the basis for the now increasingly common sense 
notion that local people should 'ultimately benefit from the protection measures and 
the results of research' (Batisse 1982:108-09). What these benefits were to entail, who 
was to benefit and who was not, and what time horizon applied, was usually not 
stipulated and continues to be one of the key issues in community-based 
conservation. 
Although theoretically attractive, the management models proposed by the MAB 
programme proved difficult to implement. Stakeholders with a variety of interests 
continued to exert pressure on the biosphere reserves in much the same way as they 
Changing conservation narratives 53 
did before on national parks. The newly established reserves in turn continued to 
impose limitations on the use of resources by indigenous populations, thus keeping 
the fundamental tension between the interests of local people and those of the 
conservationist constituency alive. The Biosphere Reserves were centred on a so-
called Core Conservation Areas which became ringed by buffer zones of 
decreasingly restricted use, creating a 'bull's eye of preservation' (Katz 1998; 55). The 
interior buffer zones around the Core Conservation Area were generally designated 
for education and Iraimng as well as for environmental research, while a second 
outer buffer zone could be used for certain limited resource uses such as timber 
extraction, grazing and fishing (Batisse 1982). As Governments designated their 
existing parks as the core areas of the new MABs, the need to establish buffer zones 
led to a further alienation of land and resources thus hardening rather than 
softening the contradiction between local people and conservation interests. 
This led to the paradox that while the establishment of buffer zones is generally 
justified by reference to the encroachment of growing populations, parks themselves 
also 'encroach' on local people. Buffer zone establishment extends the reach of 
conservationist control over the property of local people, continuing the process of 
alienation characteristic of national park establishment (Neumann 1997). Not 
surprisingly, people living inside and around national parks see the implementation 
and expansion of strict conservation regimes, even as part of the more considerate 
MAB strategies, as a choice in favour of flora and fauna and against local people 
(Kellert 1986). As a Malagasy colleague of Kottak (1999:27) remarked: "The next time 
you come to Madagascar ... All the people will have starved to death, and a lemur 
will have to meet you at the airport'. Again, these issues are not restricted to non-
western countries. Stoll-Kleemann (2001) for example, documents the widespread 
local resistance against protected area establishment in Germany. 
Where the rhetoric of the MAB emphasised the integrated nature of economic and 
environmental interests practice remained preservationist in nature. Over time, 
however, the benefit of the MAB concept lay in the fact that for the first time 
conservationists had to start thinking about the welfare and rights of the people 
living inside and around protected areas. Increasingly conservationists became 
aware that it was the uneven division of costs and benefits that lay at the root of the 
conflicts generated by conservation interventions. As a result buffer zones 
developed from being physically delineated areas around the Core Conservation 
Areas, to zones in which the interests of the various stakeholders involved in 
protected area formation had to be combined in a manner acceptable to all. It is in 
this latter capacity that the experiences gained in buffer zones have laid the 
foundation for a flurry of cornmunity-based and integrated conservation and 
development projects. Although conservation proponents continue to defend the 
inviolate status of the Core Conservation Areas within the Biosphere Reserves, they 
have increasingly come to realise that national park management could no longer be 
approached as a purely managerial issue based on a process of spatial zonation. 
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Park management nowadays involves complex ecological, political, economic and 
social trade-offs in which a variety of stakeholders exert influence. 
FROM BUFFER ZONE MANAGEMENT TO COMMUNITY-BASED CONSERVATION 
Gradually, the dominant preservationist idea is being challenged by a view aimed at 
including local people in the management of natural resources. This perspective has 
become known under the various titles such as 'community conservation' and 
'community-based conservation' which have a variety of 'joint', 'co' and 
'participatory' management styles in common. All of these approaches, jointly 
dubbed the 'new conservation' by Hulme and Murphree (1999), pursue 
conservation goals by including, rather than excluding local people in decision-
making. This does not mean that the preservationist ideal of 'setting wild nature 
aside' no longer plays a role, but it is at least a negotiated process in which local 
people have a say and may be compensated. The roots of this new vision can be 
traced to a number of developments. 
In the first place conservation thinking is making a shift from the preservationist 
framework aimed at segregating humans from nature towards notions of 'eco-
development' and 'sustainable development' which aim to integrate the needs of 
humans with that of nature. The call for sustainable development rather than 
national park formation, and a new emphasis on the conservation of biodiversity 
outside protected areas was - in Africa at least - aided by the recognition that 
reducing conservation to 'islands' in a sea of degraded landscapes offered no hope 
of survival of the large migratory species (Western 1994a). The same insight has led 
many densely populated European countries to integrate the requirements of 
conservation with human activities in a living multi-purpose landscape (Harmon 
1991). In this perspective, the community comprising of local people and their 
resources has become the locus of intervention. 
A second element leading to a renewed focus on the responsibility of local people in 
conservation comes from a shift in triinking on the role of the state and its public 
policies vis-a-vis civic society. Where until the 1970s the state with its national parks 
was seen as responsible for managing the public interest, the 1980s would witness 
an increasingly influential communitarian movement which shifted away from the 
view of the state as an omni-present problem-solver and provider (Etzioni 1993). 
Instead, individuals and their communities were to take charge of their own affairs, 
assuring accountability through local democratic, and often informal institutions. 
This view was reinforced by a number of neo-populist theories that emphasise the 
importance of popular participation in development and conservation interventions. 
At the basis of this new emphasis on community involvement in development 
policy and practice stands what has been called a 'moral economy' view of non-
western communities (Scott 1976, see also Popkin's (1979) discussion of this 
perspective). This view represents the idea that indigenous people essentially tend 
towards social and environmental harmony, but as 'fallen angels' (Berkes 1999), are 
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pushed into degradation and social conflict by the imposition of inappropriate 
technologies, market-based pricing structures and unequal power relations. 
Policy recommendations stemming from this analysis waver between the extreme of 
what Milton (1996) calls an 'anti-globalist perspective' propagating a complete 
decoupling from world markets and political systems, to an increasing emphasis on 
the use of participatory problem analysis and development. The former view, 
enlailing a withdrawal into the boundaries of the community in order to restore 
previously used livelihood systems and the supposedly harmonious relations of the 
pre-capitalist community, is restricted to a number of activist groups and theorists. 
The use of participatory methods, however, has become central to virtually all 
present-day development and resource management interventions. The emphasis on 
participation is part of a wider change in development thinking which took place 
during the 1970s and to which community-oriented conservationists are also 
catching on. This is generally presented as a shift from top-down to bottom-up 
planning and implementation approaches; from an emphasis on standardisation 
towards increased attention to local diversity; and from a blueprint implementation 
approach towards a view of project implementation as a dynamic process (Esman 
and Uphoff 1984, Korten 1987, Chambers 1992). It is nowadays not only fashionable, 
but a plain necessity in order to secure funding to profess ample interest in the 
views and opinions of the involved 'stakeholders'. This general enthusiasm, 
however, hides a range of participatory practices (See Bass et Al. 1993). 
A third cause for the increased focus on the role that 'local' and 'indigenous' people 
may play in the conservation of the environment lies in the strategic and symbolic 
coalition between local people, indigenous advocacy groups and the international 
environmental movement. Until recently, environmentaUsts saw the presence of 
people in valued natural environments as an obstacle to conservation, while the 
indigenous advocacy movements emphasising indigenous people's right to cultural 
survival and self-deterrriination was not particularly interested in conservation 
issues. During the late 1980s, however, these two movements would find each other 
in a media-driven strategy, which coupled the image of indigenous people as 
'guardians of nature' with the need to preserve cultures in order to look after nature. 
This shift was triggered by the rising interest in indigenous knowledge as a means 
to understand natural environments and the useful elements that these contain. 
Therefore, environmental planning became increasingly imbued with development 
notions emphasising social equaUty, good governance and the preservation of local 
culture. 
An important side-effect of this approach was that it legitimised western 
environmental interventions in developing countries. Rather than being perceived 
as eco-imperialists intent on meddling in national affairs and dispossessing local 
people of their natural resources, environmentaUsts now at least had an aUy in 
indigenous people. In addition they could take the moral high-ground by arguing 
that they were talking about human rights as much as about nature. To the 
indigenous advocacy groups, the projection of local peoples as 'stewards of the 
56 Through the Thicket 
rainforest' was a public-relations bonanza. Public opinion in western countries was 
greatly concerned with rainforest issues, but much less so with the plight of local 
people within developing countries. By coupling images of exuberant forest with the 
othering images of supposedly 'pure', 'exotic' and 'natural' body-painted 
indigenous peoples in feathered head-dresses public media attention was 
guaranteed. Both the human rights groups 'going green' as well as the 
environmental groups 'going native' had much to gain from this strategic alliance, 
even if their agenda's were not necessarily mutually compatible (Conklin and 
Graham 1995). 
A fourth reason for the sudden emphasis on communities over state-machinery 
resulted from a shift in emphasis from a managerial approach based on a policy of 
prohibition, to a more economic approach to conservation. This latter view was first 
recognised in the World Conservation Strategy ( IUCN/WWF/UNEP 1980) which 
emphasised the importance of local participation in protected area planning while at 
the same time stressing the need to make people benefit from conservation. Rather 
than emphasising the vague collective and long-term benefits from MAB 
establishment, this approach led to a search for mechanisms that would enable local 
people to make a living from conservation rather than having to bear the cost of 
conservation. This position was reaffirmed at the 1982 conference on National Parks 
in Ball and led to a search to establish effective linkages between conservation and 
development activities (McNeely and Miller 1984). 
In 1985 the drive to make conservation-activities more people-oriented led to the 
establishment of the WWF Wildlands and Human Needs Program This program 
aimed to establish 20 protected areas in developing countries where equal emphasis 
would be given to development and conservation aspects. The methods which have 
since evolved cover a range of operations and activities with widely different scales of 
operations, but have in common that they attempt to tie the development interests of 
local resource owners with the conservation interests of the donor. It is this gradual 
merging of conservation and development issues at the community level which laid 
the ground work for a new series of 'integrated' approaches to nature conservation 
and development. 
INTEGRATING CONSERVATION A N D DEVELOPMENT 
The neo-liberal interest in development as a means to influence conservation issues 
has led to a proliferation of thought on the relation between conservation and 
development, resulting in a variety of policy recommendations in addition to the 
traditional preservationist and conservationist arguments. These old views would 
during the 1980s be complemented by views basing themselves on the role of 'the 
market' and neo-liberal pricing policies. In order to achieve public goals such as 
development and conservation this view argued that one had to start with 'getting 
the prices right'. Any policy opposing the direction indicated by cost-benefit 
analysis was doomed to fail. In this economistic view, conservation was typically a 
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skewed cost-benefit issue where local people were made to bear the costs of 
conservation, while the 'global community', tourists and the state reaped the benefit. 
If local people would benefit from protected area establishment than conservation 
measures could be freed from their sharp edges. It is this view which lay at the basis 
of attempts to make conservation pay. 
Many of the first Integrated Conservation and Development projects (ICAD) aimed 
at finding suitable sustainable income-generating activities that could be undertaken 
vvithin the buffer zones to alleviate human pressure on the protected area. The 
integration of conservation regimes with local development has over recent years 
increasingly led environmentaUsts to present protected area estabUshment as a form 
of development. A poUcy paper by the IUCN on the estabUshment of parks as 
depositories of biodiversity for example, argues that: 
'Protected areas are not an end in themselves... Simply stated, they are tools for 
development - a special kind of development that respects both people and 
nature; a development conceived to meet the needs of today without sacrificing 
the potential for tomorrow' (IUCN 1999a:7). 
Such statements are not just rhetoric, but have, with the development of ICADs 
become part of the 'toolbox' of present-day conservation. The question whether such 
methods indeed generate a level of income and services sufficient to keep local 
people from exploiting protected resources is subject to much debate and in any case 
highly context specific. The principle itself is under fire by those that argue that 
linking development and conservation near national parks only increases the 
rapidity of environmental exploitation. 1 2 This new conservation narrative revolves 
around the vision of poor people as economicaUy rational actors. The view of non-
western people as being essentially economicaUy rational actors differs from the 
'othering' strategies mentioned above. Whereas the images of the destructive or 
romantic 'native' are formulated in contrast to the western world, the image of the 
economicaUy rational actor does not make a distinction between western and non-
western people, simply assuming that all human behaviour is guided by economic 
principles. Although one can argue about its premises, in this sense the neo-Uberal 
perspective is more mature. Notwithstanding the proclaimed universaUty of 
economic theory, the events recounted in this thesis suggest that - certainly in the 
opening stages - the success of community-based conservation interventions 
appears to have less to do with economic incentives, than with the abiUty to 
maintain social relations in a format that is recognisable and acceptable to local 
people. 
12 According to this view, policies aimed at increased urban and rural welfare through an 
intensification of economic development are more effective in protecting the environment than the 
preservationist policies revolving around protected areas. Southgate and Clarke (1993: 165) for 
example, argue that in the case of the Amazon the focus on the possible linkages between 
conservation and development in the immediate vicinity of a limited set of protected areas is 'the 
worst shortcoming in the current campaign to save biological diversity' (see also Oates 1999). 
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With the idea that the state can influence behaviour by rewarding specific forms of 
behaviour also came the notion that people can be made to conserve their resources 
through the deployment of economic incentives and disincentives. The mainstay of 
this economistic view of conservation is that natural resources are there to be used, 
and that part of the task of environmentaUsts is to 'unlock' the monetary value of 
these resources by txirning them into marketable, but sustainably-managed 
commodities. This 'use it or lose it' approach means that communities can be seen as 
business-units with their natural resources as their assets. It is this view of nature as 
a community-owned and exploitable resource, which has led to a raft of research 
into community-based forms of sustainable forestry, non-timber forest product use, 
eco-tourlsm, wildlife ranching, big game hunting and bioprospecting. While Escobar 
(1996: 47) argues that capitaUsm develops 'a conservationist tendency' in order to 
profit from the products and services of biodiversity, it is thus equaUy true that 
present-day environmentaUsts are actively developing 'capitalist tendencies' in 
order to make their case for nature. 
The resulting 'conservation-with-development' (Stocking and Perkin 1992) or 
'integrated conservation and development' approaches aim to develop income-
generating activities that are predicated on the continued existence of a more or less 
undegraded environment. Such approaches take a variety of different shapes as they 
cover a range of operations and activities with widely different scales of operations 
and modes of participation. They have in common, however, that they tie the 
interests of local resource owners with the conservation interest of the donor. In 
practice this is done by developing conservation-related activities, which aim to 
meet the mcome-earning aspirations and other welfare objectives of the involved 
communities in such a way that destruction of natural resources leads to a loss of 
economic opportunities and services. The establishment of 'expUcit linkages' 
between 'the planned realization of social and economic benefits by people Uving 
outside the park ... and the necessary behavioural response the project seeks to 
achieve to reduce the pressure inside the park' (Wells and Brandon 1992: x) Ues at the 
hart of the ICAD concept. By forging linkages between environmental management 
and income generating activities, the economic benefits derived from an intact 
environment increase, thus reducing the incentive to seek more destructive 
development alternatives. 
The growing importance attributed to the socio-economic aspects of conservation 
has also meant that conservation managers, biologists and ecologists have 
increasingly been confronted with proponents of the social sciences in the form of 
economists, sociologists and anthropologists, lawyers, and specialists in community 
development, training and communication. McNeely and Guruswamy (in IUCN 
1999a: 9) note how environmentaUsts now have to share 
'a larger and more important political stage with agricultural scientists, NGOs, 
anthropologists, lawyers, economists, pharmaceutical firms, farmers, foresters, 
tourism agencies, the oU industry, indigenous peoples and many others. These 
competing groups claim resources, power, and privileges through a political 
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decision-making process in which biologists, local communities, the private 
sector, and conservationists have become inextricably embroiled.' 
Co-operation between the managerially-oriented ecologists and social scientists is 
not always easy. Not only do both fields of s tudy and practice consist of expert 
systems with their own rules of debate, concepts, language, training and culture, but 
also their focus is very different. Where conservationists tend to focus on the needs 
of nature, social scientists often aim to represent the interests of local people, thus 
reproducing the conflict between nature and people within the project teams 
responsible for the implementation of such 'integrated' conservation policies. 
Nolvvithstanding the new tools and the resulting debates between conservationists 
and social scientists, the policy of separating of mankind from protected nature, 
continues to be the essential focus for most environmental agencies. The main 
difference with the past is that conservationists now combine a variety of tools in 
one intervention. Thus community-based conservation has not replaced national 
park formation, but is used in conjunction with more strictly protected regimes. 
Blue-print approaches have not been discarded, but are being 'softened' by allowing 
room for participation on carefully selected issues. Integrated conservation and 
development projects to stabilise or establish protected areas are an example of an 
approach which combines both preservationist and conservationist elements by 
aiming to maintain the inviolate status of its Core Conservation Areas, while dealing 
with local people through a number of integrated sustainable development 
activities, compensatory packages and co-management regimes in its bufferzones. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
The introduction into the origins of western conservation thinking, the role of the 
colonial experience in framing conservation ideas, and the influence of the ecological 
sciences help to define the basic ideas behind national park management as they 
emerged during the 1930s. The perceived weakness of wild nature, the valuation of 
natural over man-made landscapes, combined with a negative conception of 
indigenous resource-use would be contrasted to the allegedly beneficial activities of 
the colonial administration. As a result, national park estabUshment is not only 
linked to western conceptions of man and nature, but also irrevocably linked to a 
history of class justice and racism, processes of land alienation and forced relocation, 
and the suppression of local Uvelihood practices. 
Not surprisingly, the history of national park estabUshment shows that strict 
preservationist poUcies have mainly been implemented in societies characterised by 
a strong state. TypicaUy, this has been the case in the United States, in Africa and in 
India where local populations have been evicted from vast expanses of land in order 
to make room for nature. Conservation interventions in these countries have 
generaUy been supported and legitimised by stereotypes projected on local people. 
This chapter has identified several of these stereotypes. The main ones are the 
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disparaging view of indigenous people, which brands their practices as 'inefficient, 
destructive and backward' and the romantic view of local people which regards 
them as 'natural conservationists' living in harmony with their environment. A 
variety of the latter type is that of the 'fallen angel'. This view reflects the idea that 
people used to live in harmony with their environment, and would again do so if 
only they could, but are pushed into environmentally degrading behaviour as a 
result of the imposition of market-based pricing structures and unequal power 
relations. A more recent typecast is the view of the 'economically rational native' 
which lies at the heart of recent 'use it or lose it' approaches central to ICAD 
methods. In many conservation programs, a number of these stereotypes are 
employed concurrently, as part of the implicit or explicit assumptions that underpin 
these interventions. 
The process of decolonisation, the emancipation of indigenous peoples, the 
establishment of national and international pressure groups, new forms of 
communication, and an increasing emphasis on issues of democracy, good 
governance and human rights have increased the ability of local people to speak u p 
against conservation interventions. Even where states - often with the support of the 
international community - are willing to implement protected area schemes, there is 
a growing awareness of both the cost imposed on local people as well as their ability 
to influence, modify and jeopardise these schemes. In order to soften the 
consequences of park establishment, and reduce the level of conflict around 
protected areas, an array of methods and concepts have been developed which have 
a focus on environmental education, compensation and participation in common. 
This way of looking at environmental management has been strongly influenced by 
the development debate where notions of 'community development' and 
'participatory planning' find their mirror image in concepts such as 'community-
based conservation' and 'participatory resource management'. In practice, the 
compensation given to communities living inside and around national parks takes 
the form of economic and social services which constitute a 'carrot' with which 
people are enticed to leave protected resources alone. 
The shift from preservationist policies towards more relaxed notions of conservation 
involving issues of compensation, participation and co-management nowadays 
means that most conservation professionals managing protected areas find 
themselves using a variety of conservation instruments. The wielding of the 'stick' 
of state coercion on the one hand and the dangling of the 'carrot' of development-
oriented activities on the other, have become complementary strategies in the 
toolbox of the modern environmentalist. In addition, present-day conservation 
interventions try to embed protected area management in the consciousness and 
day-to-day practices of local people through intensive environmental education 
campaigns, the establishment of sustainable income-generating activities and the 
development of 'para' research programs aiming to integrate western environmental 
expertise with local knowledge. 
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This 'new conservation' (Hulme and Murphree 1999) has also led to a shift in the 
types of professionals working on protected area establishment and management. 
Where in the past conservation was the domain of biologists, ecologists and 
conservation managers, usually opting for a rather technocratic, top-down and 
science-based approach, conservation nowadays also includes the activities and 
visions of anthropologists, community development specialists, economists and 
lawyers. The wide range of different practices that nowadays take place under the 
notion of 'conservation', and the variety of actors involved mean that such 
interventions are characterised by a variety of ideologies, narratives and 
professional and cultural views which may only become apparent in a detailed 
analysis of the day to day practices employed in conservation interventions. This 
s tudy attempts to provide one such description. 
As a final comment I wish to note that the various narratives of community-based 
conservation have thus not replaced the dominant discourse of national park 
formation but that elements of both community-oriented approaches are now often 
used in conjunction with more strictly protected regimes. Blue-print approaches 
have not been discarded but are being softened by allowing room for participation 
on carefully selected issues, and most existing national parks have now been 
retrofitted with some sort of community development package. Both the strict 
'fortress-style' policies of the past, as well as the situation where the state only 
entices people into conservation activities are rare. Such a latter situation, however, 
is the topic of this study, as it is in the narrative of incentive-driven community-
based conservation - without the possibility of using coercive measures - that Papua 
New Guinea plays a role. 

Chapter 2 
CONSERVATION WITHOUT COERCION: CONSERVATION 
POLICY IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
The past chapter has described international conservation efforts as an essentially 
political and cultural project in which conservationists tend to structure the object of 
their interventions in such a manner that the establishment of protected areas 
appears to be the only reasonable possibility to avoid the total collapse of global 
ecosystems. As I have argued, this dominant policy narrative is based on a selective 
set of assumptions, many of which are a source of considerable discussion. I have 
also argued that it is not so much the scientific debate, but the social consequences of 
protected area establishment, which have triggered a range of new incentive-driven, 
community-based and participatory approaches towards protected area 
establishment. In the remainder of this thesis, I will argue amongst others that the 
narrative of the preservationist program is not only incompatible with the way in 
which 'local people' in PNG perceive their environment, but also tends to have very 
little impact on the actual outcomes of these interventions. 
As argued in the introduction, part of the unpredictabUity that characterises project 
interventions is the result of the responses by local people. Part of it, however, is also 
a result of issues playing a role on the side of the project implementers themselves. 
These issues are also political, but have more to do with the daily difficulties that 
policy makers and planners face in dealing with social complexity and 
unpredictability, how to legitimise interventions in the face of complex 
adrrdnistrative requirements, issues of authority, accountability and control, and the 
personal need to maintain jobs, avoid a loss of prestige, build careers and safeguard 
institutional continuity. Once people involved in project implementation start 
communicating, not just their ideas of what constitutes reality, the culturally-
determined perceptions of 'nature', 'local people' and 'what should be done', but 
also the micro-level strategic goals and representations become part of that process 
of communication. The choice of words, the idiom in which problems are phrased 
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and the images used constitute 'political' choices which allow people to influence 
and pressure each other in order to reach their goals. Such representations can thus 
not be seen as the decontextualised expression of a certain worldview, but have to 
be seen as inextricably linked to issues of power, sets of cultural practices and - in 
many cases - as a strategic tool. 
One particular issue that may affect the choice for one particular narrative over 
others may have to do with the specific requirements of the institutions to which 
conservation practitioners belong. A well-known example of how projects create 
interpretations of an intervention situation to suit their administrative and political 
needs stems from the work of Hirschmann. Already in 1968, his Development Projects 
Observed argued that the manner in which such projects are being represented 
towards decision makers is highly selective and strategic. Hirschmanns 'hiding 
hand ' principle describes the situation whereby project planners systematically 
underestimate the troubles that they are likely to encounter, while overestimating 
the benefits in order to get the project started. In some ways, such strategies are 
fortunate because they allow people to undertake projects that would otherwise 
never have come off the ground. 
Whether these projects ultimately end u p being failures or successes, depends on the 
question whether the project executing staff manages to find solutions to the 
problems they encounter during implementation. According to Hirschmann the 
extent to which project staff will invest effort into solving these problems in turn is 
largely determined by the degree to which the project has been 'caught' by the time 
these difficulties arise. Thus, project teams that have committed substantial funds, 
time, energy and personal and professional prestige will be strongly motivated to 
solve the problems that they are confronted with. Such teams may actually pursue 
projects well beyond what would appear rational to the outsider. 
This chapter will argue that whereas the practice of 'fortress conservation' (Hulme 
and Murphree 1999) described in the first chapter represents one extreme on the 
continuum between incentives and fines, the other is represented by the situation in 
PNG where conservation interventions have largely come to rely on inducements 
and protracted negotiations with Papua New Guinean communities. The second 
half of this chapter will present the Biodiversity Conservation and Resource 
Management Program, provide an account of the experiences of its first Integrated 
Conservation And Development (ICAD) intervention in Lak in New Ireland and the 
manner in which the project produced a new intervention model for its second 
ICAD site during its withdrawal from the Lak area. 
SETTING THE SCENE: PEOPLE A N D NATURE I N P A P U A N E W G U I N E A 
Papua New Guinea covers the eastern half of the island of New Guinea. The 
mainland is bordered by four large and some 600 smaller islands, ranging from 
Manus to the north, to Bougainville in the far east. The mainland is shaped by the 
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collisions of the northward moving Australian tectonic plate with the Oceanic-
Pacific plate pushing u p the east-west mountain range that constitutes the 'spine' of 
the Island of New Guinea. Over millions of years the run-off from this steep 
Cordillera, at its highest point some 4500 metes ASL, has created the vast floodplains 
of the Ramu and Sepik Rivers to the North and the Fly and Strickland Rivers to the 
South. 
Papua New Guinea is home to some 4.5 million people. The population is officially 
growing at a rate of some 2.3 percent, but this is likely to be an underestimate. 
Population densities, on average some 10 person per square kilometre, vary widely. 
The highlands, parts of East New Britain and the TorriceUi range being populated 
by more than 50 persons per square kUometre, whUe some coastal and lowland 
areas are characterised by population densities of weU below 2 persons per square 
kUometre. These low density figures should not be taken to mean that parts of PNG 
can be considered uninhabited wilderness. All of PNG's ecosystems are impacted by 
human activities in the form of gardening, hunting, fishing, burning, and the 
cultivation of semi-domesticated food crops such as sago and pandanus nuts. Many 
of these activities have left clear marks in the landscape; others may be more 
difficult to see. 
The most critical feature of PNG natural resource management is that land and 
resources are owned by a large number of clan groups. These tenurial rights over 97 
percent of aU land are recognised in the Constitution. A mere three percent is State-
held. Customary tenure not only covers land and terrestrial flora and fauna, but also 
extends into freshwater and marine resources, covering beaches, reefs and fishing 
grounds. Only open seas, mineral resources and Government land - usuaUy 
purchased during colonial times - are vested in the State. Land in PNG is essential, 
not only in the economic terms of subsistence and cash crop production, but also in 
socio-cultural and political terms, as a source of identity, unity, status and security. 
Also people Uving in modern urban centres, working in a rapidly modernising 
pubUc and private sector, expect to retain customary rights to land in their place of 
origin, where most of them plan to retire and virtually everybody expects to be 
buried. The feelings that local people have towards land can be expressed in the 
dictum that not the land belongs to people, but that the members of a particular clan 
belong to the land. The land is permanent, whUe its occupants are only passers-
through. 
The Australian Colonial Aclrninistration treated the landownership issue rather 
carefully, generaUy accepting that people should retain rights to their land and 
resources. In principle land could only be leased by the State for specific purposes, 
when the landowners agreed, and when the ceding clan had land in surplus to its 
own subsistence needs (Clarke 1977). In general, groups have been reluctant to seU 
their land. Towards the end of colonial administration, it became clear that the 
difficulties encountered in aUenating communaUy-held lands for pubUc purposes 
constituted an obstacle to economic development. The 1963 Land Tenure (Conversion) 
Act aUowed landowning communities to individuaUse their tenure by mutual 
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agreement in a bid to change the status of landholdings from common-held 
property, which could not be sold as it belonged to the community at large, to an 
individually-held asset which could be disposed off as the owner liked. A newly 
established Land Titles Commission became responsible for demarcating and 
registering titles to land. Few communities made use of these provisions. In places 
where they did, the appearance of a new body of law next to customary 
arrangements exacerbated existing land conflicts, while those that sold off land in 
the past used the act to reclaim lost property or push for additional compensation. 
Consequently, land issues are among the most highly politically charged conflicts in 
PNG (Filer with Sekhran 1998). 
Although the Land Act formally allows for the alienation of land and resources in the 
name of the public good, such alienation has rarely occurred since Independence in 
1975. Due to the pohtically sensitive and technically problematic nature of land 
alienation it is safe to say that the Government of PNG has no practical means to 
access, manage or exploit natural resources without the co-operation, and 
compensation of local resource owners. This tenure arrangement has great 
implications for both the provision of public services and private sector investors, as 
this power balance between communities and the state, implies that groups of 
landowners, and not the Government, are the first interested parties when it comes 
to negotiations concerning the use or non-use of natural resources. The realisation 
that clan groups collectively own resources and may use these as productive assets 
within the legal framework set by the state is also recognised in PNG business law. 1 3 
Filer (1997a) notes how landownership has not just become a political feature of the 
country, but has congealed into an ideological construct in which Papua New 
Guineans distinguish themselves from other peoples by virtue of their strong 
attachment to land. This ideology tends to deny the possibility that a Papua New 
Guinean can be landless, or for that matter, that land can be ownerless. The idea that 
each and every PNG citizen is always a 'landowner', combined with the notion of 
the sheer abundance of the country's natural resources, suggests that Papua New 
Guineans are at worst temporarily disenfranchised people waiting until their 
natural resources are converted into hard cash by outside companies. Based on this 
view, many rural groups in PNG are desperately trying to attract foreign investors 
to bring them the riches supposedly associated with landownership (see also Ballard 
1997). The fact that in many instances people may be 'functionally landless' 
(Hewlett 1973) as they have land of little practical value, does not fit this ideology. 
1 3 The Land Groups Incorporation's Act (1974), for example, allows customary land groups to register 
their traditional social unit as well as their land, and resources by law. Once registered the group 
acquires corporate status with its natural resources as its assets, the use rights and dividends of which 
are still distributed as under customary law. The Act allows Incorporated Landowner Group to hold, 
manage and deal with its land and resources and provides a vehicle to deal with other national and 
international corporations (Holzknecht 1994). Similarly the Business Group Incorporation Act (1974) 
provides for the incorporation of groups of people who wish to conduct business in a unit based on 
clan ties and/or shared landownership. The act allows people to model their business groups on pre-
existing social forms and is based on an ideology of kin relatedness and mutual aid (Brooks 1996). 
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A second issue that needs to be mentioned here is the raging debate over the land 
registration component the World Bank/ IMF Structural Adjustment Program. Part 
of this program was a 1995 attempt to improve the registration of customary 
landownership. The World Bank tends to regard customary landownership as a 
hurdle to development as unregistered land clan-held lands can not be bought or 
sold. This also affects credit provision to the rural sector, as land can not function as 
collateral either. The World Bank, by emphasising the need for land mobilisation in a 
draft document, underestimated the ideology of landownership described above, 
triggering co-ordinated protests across the country and riots amongst students in Port 
Moresby. A coalition of students, NGOs and influential politicians opposing the 
Structural Adjustment Program managed to depict the move as an attempt by foreign 
exploiters to register and alienate land from its customary landholders, thus 
destroying the Melanesian way of life, and triggering impoverishment for the masses 
that - it was suggested - were about to be dispossessed. 
This depiction of the drive towards land registration as an outside attempt to increase 
Government and foreign control over natural resources ignores the fact that the 
strongest pressures towards land registration are corning from within the country. A 
number of provincial governments have actually made moves towards the 
registration of customary lands in order to stimulate smallholder cash crop 
development (Filer et Al. 2000). At the village level, however, pressures towards 
registration are primarily a result of growing populations, and the fact that 
landownership is increasingly seen as the last possibility towards development, 
either through enlisting an outside company to exploit local mineral or timber 
resources, or by making land productive through cash cropping. 
These patterns are visible in the densely populated highlands, where, in contrast to 
the ideology of communal landownership which prohibits the sale of land by 
individuals, one may see coffee plots for sale. Jimi people from the Kol area are 
known to purchase coffee lands on the other side of the Sepik-Wahgi divide. They 
assert their ownership through a combination of forging social ties with local clan 
groups, while also registering their holdings if they can (VanHelden 2001a). My 
Simbu colleagues from the Bismarck-Ramu project would explain that in highly 
populated Kundiawa, arable land was now seen as individual property, carefully 
marked with hedges and fences and upon inheritance divided over the male 
offspring. Attractive plots on the highway, suitable for the construction of stores of 
coffee buying enterprises could be sold and bought. In this study, I found that even 
in the scarcely populated Ramu Floodplalns, individuals as well as groups of people 
are actively trying to assert land claims in a variety of ways, one of them being an 
attempt to register land in their name. In fact, I will argue that the professed interest 
in conservation by a number of Ramu clans, is in the first place an attempt to regain 
control over land and resources. 
The close connection between groups of people and their land, and the fact that the 
country is still largely forested has made outsiders susceptible to the romantic 
interpretation of Melanesians as 'natural conservationists'. The argument goes that 
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as these people are so dependent on the direct returns from their natural 
environment, they can not be anything else than conservation inclined. This 
perception is flawed in a number of ways. In the first place, it is fundamentally at 
odds with the way in which most Papua New Guineans perceive themselves and 
their environment. Papua New Guineans are in the first place gardeners who make 
a living by converting forest into farmland and who are proud of that capability 
(Filer 2000). They often prefer to live in grassland, matataining it with the use of fire, 
and it is usually only under duress that groups of people move into the forest 
(VanHelden2000). 
In the second place, this view ignores the fact that Papua New Guineans have not 
yet had to prove their conservation mettle as they are only starting to experience 
serious environmental degradation. Until very recently, a combination of low 
population growth and limited technology has curbed the extent to which people 
could transform their natural environment The fact that people have been unable to 
significantly degrade their environment in the past says little over what they will do 
in the future. Like most people around the world, Papua New Guineans are highly 
pragmatic people, who may very well sacrifice their environment if it gives them a 
chance to a better and more 'developed' life. The eagerness, with which many 
landowning groups commit their forest and mineral resources to exploitation, 
suggests that the presence of a conservation ethic among PNG landowning groups is 
an exception rather than the rule. 
BIODIVERSITY A N D CONSERVATION I N P A P U A N E W GUINEA 
Due to its rugged nature, its high levels of forestation, its many different local 
environments and its long separation from other landmasses, the island of New 
Guinea is characterised by a highly diverse and unique ecological make-up. 
Estimates by the Conservation Needs Assessment (Alcorn and Beehler 1993) and the 
PNG Country Study on Biodiversity Diversity (Sekhran and Miller 1994) suggest that 
PNG harbours some 5-10 percent of global biodiversity counting among others some 
20,000 species of ferns and flowering plants; 190 species of mammals; more than 750 
different species of birds; 497 species of reptiles and amphibians: 3000 species of 
fish, and at least 200,000 species of insect of which most are still to be classified. 
Among all of these groups the levels of endemicity is very high, ranging from an 
estimate of some 7,5 percent for flowering plants to some 53 percent for birds and 81 
percent for mammals. A total of 54 species are under threat and listed on de IUCN 
Red List of threatened animals with some 14 species classified as endangered and 
about 40 as vulnerable (Miller et Al. 1994). The PNG Department of Environment 
and Conservation (DEC) has listed 72 species as being endangered. 
Notwithstanding its spectacular and highly diverse natural endowment, PNG has 
not stood at the heart of international conservationist concerns for several reasons. 
In the first place, the country was one of the last places opened u p by colonial 
exploration, with parts of the highlands of PNG only becoming accessible to 
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outsiders as late as the 1950s. In the second place, for a long time PNG appeared not 
to have a serious conservation problem. Being a large country with abundant 
resources and few people, conservation was less of a priority to the colonial 
ariministration than the pacification and socio-economic development of the country 
and its people. At Independence in 1975, the Fourth Goal of the National 
Constitution, in a phrase which reminds one of Pinchot's definition of 
'conservation', explicitly called 'for PNG's natural resources and environment to be 
conserved and used for the collective benefit of us all, and to be replenished for the 
benefit of future generations'. In spite of the constant invocation of this charter in 
policy debates, the relationship between notions of 'conservation', utilisation' and 
'replenishment' remain as debatable as ever (Filer with Sekhran 1998). 
In the third place the land tenure situation has seriously hampered attempts to 
establish national parks as there was no legal basis for the nationalisation of 
communally held lands that has characterised national park development 
elsewhere. Not surprisingly, PNG has a very limited system of protected areas 
established under three different acts on both customary-held and state-owned 
lands. These areas cover no more than 2 percent of the nation's landmass and are not 
representative of its diversity of landscapes, ecological systems and flora and fauna 
The 12 national park areas established under the National Parks Act are generally 
rather small due to the cost of land purchase, poorly managed due to a lack of 
resources, and in many cases subject to confUcting land and compensation claims. 
Other mechanisms such as Wildlife Management Areas, established under the Fauna 
(Protection and Control) Act provide local groups with a mechanism to manage 
hunting activities in order to conserve local fauna. Such areas constitute the 
dominant form of environmental protection, covering 27 sites ranging in area from 
just two hectares in the case of Lihir Island to 590,000 hectares in the case of Tonda 
in Western Province. In the eyes of international conservationists, however, such 
areas constitute a low-level protection mechanism as regulations are generally 
limited to the protection of fauna and as the enforcement of conservation regulations 
lies in the first place with the resource owners and not with the DEC. A third legal 
mechanism, the Conservation Areas Act of 1978 has never been applied due to a 
combination of bureaucratic ineptitude and political disinterest (Whimp 1995, 
VanHelden2001d). 
Conservation issues have little priority among PNG politicians, who are pre-
occupied with meeting the nation's development objectives and securing their own 
political future. In 1998 the DEC was abolished and replaced by an Office of 
Environment and Conservation, while its meagre annual allocations in the national 
budget are rarely fully disbursed. Conservation monies are largely derived from 
foreign donors and disbursed through the public sector. The mining companies 
spend sizeable amounts of money on environmental impact assessment and 
mitigation measures, part of which is used for biodiversity related activities 
(VanHelden and Bualia 1994). 
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The prevailng community-based tenure system implies that policy and legislation 
concerning land and resource issues can rarely be used as directive mechanisms. In 
the context of PNG land tenure, one can very well find communities managing their 
natural resources without the involvement of Government bodies and legislation. 
The option of forcing a community into conserving its resources in the interests of 
society as a whole, however, is not possible. In general, the Government of PNG and 
intervening conservation agencies can not hope to conserve nature unless they 
develop instruments that make conservation directly attractive to local resource 
owners. This political constellation also emphasises the need for a genuinely 
participatory approach in which local people's views of nature, the management of 
natural resources, and the often strongly-felt need for socio-economic development 
are from the start integrated into project design, planning and implementation. 
A SENSE OF CRISIS: FORESTRY, DEVELOPMENT A N D G O O D GOVERNANCE 
After the Amazon Basin and Central Africa, PNG has the third largest remaining 
tropical forests on earth. As by far the largest proportion of terrestrial biological 
diversity is to be found in the tropical rainforests, the rapid conversion of forest 
habitat, and its limited capability for regeneration after logging (Vigus 1993, Saulei 
1994) are thought to be the greatest threat to biodiversity in the country. 1 4 The 
concern with tropical forests is a recent thing. Until the 1970s, the clearing of 
rainforest was internationally seen as a good thing as it meant that otherwise 
unproductive land was being made available for economic development. Scientific 
opinion swung around in the late 1970s when the destruction of tropical rainforest 
became a prime issue in the species extinction debate. Only during the early 1980s, 
would rainforest become the dominant metaphor for biodiversity, becoming 
associated with notions of 'abundance', 'diversity' and 'vulnerability' (Hannigan 
1996; Myerson and Rydin 1994; Stott 1999), and would the activities of forestry 
companies come to be seen as problematic. 1 5 
Until 1970, logging in PNG was strictly controlled. The Government purchased 
timber rights from landowners and then negotiated a Logging and Marketing 
Agreement with the permit-holding company on their behalf. From then onwards, 
1 4 The threats to coral reefs systems, over fishing and oceanic pollution have been largely ignored in 
the early stages of the biodiversity debate (Mazur and Lee (1993). Recently, however, conservation 
concerns have triggered a proliferation of marine management projects. 
15 One of the less often mentioned reasons why tropical rainforests and the activities of logging 
companies may have gained such prominence in the biodiversity debate stems from the fact that 
conservationists like to present a clear-cut opponent against whom they can contrast their own ideas. 
Tbe loss of biodiversity is the result of a diffuse combination of demographic, economic and spatial 
trends with few clear-cut hoodlums (Hannigan 1996). Forest operations and their proponents, 
however make a wonderful opponent. The graphic images of burning forest, the stark contrast 
between 'pristine' and 'logged' areas and the view of helpless nature-loving indigenous people being 
robbed from the resources on which they depend, by corrupt forest companies made the latter an 
ideal target for environmental concerns, allowing conservationist groups to contrast their own 
benevolent activities against the destruction wrought by the timber lords. 
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however, landowners were allowed to negotiate directly with the timber companies 
and developers would manipulate both the process of community decision making 
and government policy formulation in order to maximise their returns. The strategy 
of the timber companies is to establish patron-client networks with influential 
landowners, thus providing them with a local power base. Semi-literate landowners 
often do not realise the market value of their resources and do not have the skills to 
supervise the logging contractors, while logging companies increasingly make a habit 
of setting up puppet landowner companies in order to gain access to the timber 
resource. The clan leaders controlling these puppet companies are kept happy with 
jobs and incomes by the company in return signing the required paperwork to apply 
for a formal logging and exporting license with the forest adrranistation. The 
government has a poor capacity to regulate the activities of developers operating in 
remote sites and even though technically the forest aclministration may refuse such 
licenses when not in accordance with the regulations of the successive forest acts, in 
practice the forest administration buckles under the pressure brought upon it by 
politicians and foreign companies alike. 
The DEC ostentatiously involved in approving mining and forestry permits, is 
characterised as a joke, while other departments also fail in the execution of their 
duties. This leads to a situation in which 
'the logging industry in PNG is virtually unregulated. The DEC does not 
regulate forest activity, it has no field capability. It is a lame duck. The National 
Forest Authority cannot be considered a serious regulator. It has no recent record 
of regulating timber projects, although it now has some presence in the field. The 
Internal Revenue Commission and SGS [a Swiss log export monitoring unit] 
present the only significant regulatory ability affecting loggers. Migration and 
visas, work permits, labor regulation and occupational health and safety are not 
serious impediments to loggers' (Brunton 1996). 
In 1987, the Barnett Commission of Inquiry into the forest sector found that the PNG 
forest industry was 'out of control'. The lack of a functioning policy framework, the 
absence of adequate supervision over the interactions between resource owners and 
the limber companies, and the high levels of political interference in the issuing of 
permits led to large-scale environmental destruction in return for comparatively little 
benefits to resource owners and Government. In line with the view of habitat 
conversion as the greatest threat to biodiversity and the definition of New Guinea as 
one of the world's biodiversity 'hot spots' (Myers 1988), the forest industry was 
quickly defined as the villain in the play. 
In response to the Barnett findings, the Government, with assistance of the World 
Bank, set u p a Tropical Forestry Action Plan to review the sector in 1989. This in turn 
led to the National Forestry and Conservation Action Programme, aiming to bring 
about the sustainable use of PNG 's forest resources. In 1991, a new Forestry 
Management Act established the National Forest Authority comprising of a 
politically independent National Forest Board and a separate National Forest 
Service. A moratorium was imposed on all new timber projects, while the new 
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authority developed a set of forestry guidelines and a new forest revenue system. 
The latter was meant to increase royalties both to landowners and the Government. 
In its entirety, the set of forest measures proposed in PNG belonged to the most 
comprehensive and ambitious anywhere in the world. Their practical 
implementation, however, proved extremely difficult. Especially the notion of 
'sustainability' remains elusive, with the forestry debate disintegrating into a 
'numbers game' akin to that sketched for the extinction scenarios in the previous 
chapter (See Filer (1997b) and Tacconi (1998) for discussions of the widely varying 
PNG forest statistics). The main reason why the perceptions of the 'reality' of forest 
management lie so far apart have to do with the fact that the forestry debate is 
dominated by a number of different stakeholders, who each try to further their own 
strategic interests. 
DIFFERENT STAKEHOLDERS, DIFFERENT CRISES 
Filer and Sekhran (1998) distinguish six stakeholders in the PNG forest policy 
process - politicians, public servants, the forest industry, NGOs, donors and the 
local landowners. None of these interest groups is homogenous in make-up, outlook 
and policy perspective, tiirning the debate into a true pandemonium of shifting 
alliances and positions. Three groups, the donors, the logging companies and the 
resource owners dominate, with the first two factions essentially engaged in a 'tug 
of war ' over the third. Thus, one finds the logging companies emphasising to 
resource owning communities that only forest projects can 'bring development' to 
remote areas, feeding into the frustration generated by the slow pace of 
development experienced by many rural communities. On the other side, the World 
Bank and the Australian donor agency AUSAid emphasise the need to exploit forest 
resources in a controlled, sustainable, and transparent fashion so as to maximise 
local and national benefits, while minimising ecological damage. 
Politics in PNG are characterised by the fact that neither the State nor any other 
social grouping is able to dominate the country. Due to the land tenure system 
summarised above, the state has comparatively little influence over decisions made 
by resource owners and Government institutions and politicians are caught in the 
middle of the battle between exploitation and conservation. The corridors of power 
have themselves become the locus of struggle, pulling the state in different and often 
contradictory directions. This situation is illustrated by the bewildering variety of 
often conflicting positions taken by politicians, parliament and the bureaucracy vis-
a-vis in the forestry debate. Successive Governments of PNG have been so divided 
amongst themselves and have had so little control over the statements made by 
various senior players and Government departments that over the years the Sate has 
even failed to keep u p the pretence of speaking with a single voice. Consequently, the 
international community regards the PNG Government as a thoroughly unreliable 
partner that needs to be kept under pressure to comply with the rninimum standards 
of good governance. 
Conservation policy in PNG 73 
NGOs of a variety of backgrounds have generally being opposed to the logging 
companies but also protesting loudly against the structural adjustment policies of 
the World Bank and other international donors. Even though in these debates NGOs 
have tended to present themselves as the representatives of the landowners, such a 
claim is somewhat preposterous in a country with thousands of different clan 
groups speaking some 800 different languages and many distinct cultures. There is 
not such unity as the landowners of PNG. Between landowner groups, the 
differences are huge, depending on their geographical location and history, 
ecological endowment, cultural affiliation and the availability of services and 
income generating activities. Within communities people are divided along the lines 
of age, gender, educational attainment and political exposure. Many landowner 
groups are not able to agree among themselves by whom and how they are to be 
represented. 
These various groups, although all involved in the forestry debate and all using a 
crisis narrative, do not share the same sense of crisis. During the 1990s, the 
Government became increasingly dependent on the revenues from timber operations 
with the share of forest revenue from non-grant revenues growing from less than 2 
percent in 1991 to 10 percent in 1994 (Filer with Sekhran 1998: 51). Notwithstanding 
all the rhetoric on the need to serve the interests of rural resource owners, the State is 
capturing an ever-larger share of the proceeds from logging at the expense of resource 
owners' royalties. Whereas resource owners received some 11.6 percent of the final 
log price in 1982, this had dwindled to around 3 percent in 1995 (Ariku 1996). 
Successive cash strapped Governments have been reluctant to slow the approval of 
new logging permits by strictly implementing the guidelines or to suspend timber 
operations breaking forestry laws. As the financial crisis deepened, the main issue to 
successive Governments became to increase revenue in order to ensure political 
survival by 'fast-tracking' a number of large new timber concessions. 
Whereas PNG politicians define the main issue as a lack of income, among donors 
the 1990s saw a growing concern with the wastage of valuable resources through a 
lack of control over forest operations on the income side and unwise government 
spending on the outgoing side. In a study conducted for AUSAid, Duncan (1994), 
for example, estimates that an economic surplus of about of Kina 225.5 million 
(about U$ 250 million) was lost by landowners and Government in 1993 and 1994 
alone. This figure is comparable to 80 percent of Australia's annual bilateral 
assistance to PNG or 4.5 percent of GDP. The poor performance of the PNG State is 
among others visible in PNG's ranking on various development indexes. Where the 
country ranks 104 th in terms of per capita income as is a 'Lower Middle Income 
Country', it occupies the 128 t h position on the Human Development Index which 
takes on board a number of social criteria to assess the state of human development 
(UNDP 1997) This suggests that development is not so much a resource issue, but in 
the first place a management and governance problem. 
The NGOs and the resource-owning people that they claim to represent are also 
divided over the nature of the crisis that PNG is facing. While many national and 
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international NGOs are pushing a conservationist agenda to counter what they see 
as an environmental disaster in the making, landowners regard the lack of 
development and the decline in Government services as their main problem. To 
them, forest exploitation may constitute a strategy to get out of a state of poverty, as 
people desperately need services in the form of schools and hospitals, infrastructure 
that allows them to bring their produce to the market and some money in their 
pockets. A small gift of cash and the mere promise of more to come are often enough 
for rural people to support a timber company. In recent years, the perception that 
natural resource exploitation and thus landownership may constitute a short-cut to 
'development' has grown, and land and its natural resources are increasingly valued 
insofar as their exploitation can provide financial rewards. This shift from use-
values to market values is most clearly visible in the forestry sector in PNG, but in 
essence applies to all natural resources. 
The timber companies, united in the Forest Industry Association, tend to 
strategically feed into the crisis narratives of landowners and the government, 
ascertaining that their industry can bring both development to rural communities, 
and make a substantial contribution to the always empty Government coffers. In 
some instances the Association may also revert to a crisis narrative, emphasising the 
fact that the industry is hardly profitable, in a state of decline and that - as a result -
many opportunities for 'development' are lost. In 1995, I had the opportunity to 
witness a visit by the chairman of the Forest Industry Association and head of the 
largest Malaysian timber conglomerate in the country to the Department of Finance. 
He came to voice his concern over World Bank-supported moves to increase log 
taxes, repeatedly throwing his hands in the air while exclairning that we policy 
makers had no idea of the 'sorrow of the forest industry'. 
COMPETING OVER NATURE 
As a result of the land tenure system, the exasperation among rural people with the 
slow pace of development, and the increasing commercialisation of the 
environment, the PNG environmental debate is dominated by conservation agencies 
and limber companies competing over the resources held by rural communities. The 
divergent interests of these outsiders can on the one hand be characterised by the 
stereotypical image of the corrupt, fast-talking logger and his cronies who helicopter 
into remote, poverty-stricken villages, offering money in return for signatures. These 
papers then allow the company to start the application procedure for a timber 
concession. (For a description of such an event, see chapter 7). 
The pattern repeats itself all over the country, with local leaders being flown to the 
cities, wined and dined in order to obtain the necessary popular support. If there is 
vocal opposition within the community, gifts of money seep into the resource 
owning groups through patronage linkages, eventually swaying the momentum in 
favour of logging. The resulting timber operation is a quick and dirty venture, which 
provides a few menial jobs, substandard infrastructure and causes serious ecological 
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damage. After several years, the company departs, leaving a conflict-riddled 
community with a destroyed subsistence base behind. Ecologists fear that as the 
loggers 'eat' their way through PNG's forests irreplaceable ecosystems disappear 
and species go extinct. Forest companies in turn argue that especially a growing 
population combined with the practice of shifting cultivation is responsible for 
deforestation. 1 6 
In the view of the conservation estabUshment, the only thing able to stop this 
process are the concerted efforts of local and international conservation agencies. 
Their efforts tend to focus on biodiversity rich and thus usually forested areas by 
taking a two pronged approach. In the first place, they aim to reduce and improve 
forestry practices, in the second place they try to limit the negative impact of local 
subsistence and cash cropping activities. Like in development discourse, the 
narrative structure that supports these conservation policies is one closely 
resembling that of the archetypal folktale. Almost always there is a 'problem' or 
'crisis' that is to be 'remedied' or 'prevented' through the activities of some 'policy', 
'project', or 'hero' which overcomes a number of 'trials', 'constraints' a n d / o r 
'opponents' (Roe 1989). 
T H E ARCHETYPAL LOGGER A N D HIS CONSERVATIONIST OPPONENTS 
This view of the forestry sector has to be qualified in a number of respects, as 
conservationists tend to 'denaturalise' their opponents. This view is reinforced by a 
rather hectoring rhetoric (Stott 1999). To give an example from an e-mail forum 
dealing with PNG forestry and policy issues: 
'Through their actions, this small band of marauding Asian logging companies 
are undoing hundreds of millions of years of evolution, threatening global 
planetary ecosystem sustainability, driving countless species to extinction, and 
dooming millions of inhabitants of tropical countries to abject, hopeless poverty. 
Advocates must conceive and advocate an end game that banishes the evil of 
cut-and-run predatory logging from the Earth' (Barry 2001). 
Such oratory needs to be shaded In a number of ways. In the first place, it is 
important to note that the initiative for forest conversion lies not simply on the side 
of the logging companies. A growing number of landowner groups see logging as a 
short-cut to development and actively seek to enlist potential resource developers in 
their pursuit of development. To many regional politicians and Members of 
Parliament the only way to retain their position in the next elections is to bring 
large-scale 'development' to their rural constituencies in a short period of time. A 
logging 'project' is one of the few options fitting that requirement. Ironically, many 
1 6 A survey of recent patterns of conversion in PNG, however, suggests that only 3 percent of all land 
brought under cultivation has not been previously used for agriculture and that the impact of shifting 
cultivation may be much more marginal then the forest industry would have it (Allen in Filer with 
Sekhran 1998: 29). Due to the amount of labour involved and the fear of unknown territory the Jimi 
people, for example, are generally reluctant to move into primary forest (VanHelden 2000). 
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conservationists, realising that there are few other income generating options in 
PNGs rural areas, are now themselves pursuing sustainable timber harvesting 
projects on a variety of scales in a 'use it or lose it' approach (Martin, 1997; Salafsky 
etAl. 1997/98; Sekhran etAl. 1996; TNC 1998; VanHelden and Schneemann 2000). 
In the second place, limber operations in PNG are a high risk business with 
considerable sunk costs and widely fluctuating margins. Whereas in some years 
logging companies have made astonishing profits (Duncan 1994), in other years they 
have suffered badly from low timber prices, the vagaries of the weather, conflicts 
with landowners and endless political squabbles over permits, landownership and 
compensation packages. While conservationists tend to complain that working in 
PNG can be very difficult due to the often quarrelsome and fragmented nature of 
many communities; these same issues also affect the loggers. In the third place, the 
Chinese Malays driving sleek cars through Port Moresby associated with the 
logging business, are not representative of their countrymen operating the logging 
concessions. Most concessions are run by labourers recruited amongst the Serawak 
poor who are illegally landed on the shores of a country that they don't know, 
among groups of people that they don' t understand and quickly learn to fear (See 
Cooke 1997 for a description of the variable relationships between loggers and local 
people in Lak). 
On the other hand of the divide, one finds the well-meaning environmentalists and 
community-developers that aim to make rural people aware of the fundamental 
choices that they are facing. They do so in the firm conviction that if local villagers 
come to realise the value of their resources and really understand the consequences 
of a limber operation, they will inevitably do the right thing. Often these notions are 
underpinned by the images of Papua New Guineans as essentially nature-respecting 
'natives' living in a primeval wilderness and at risk from being corrupted by outside 
influences. The view of the essentially nature loving community at risk from 
logging-related corruption and in need of environmentalist salvation blinds 
conservation proponents to the fact that Papua New Guineans are not conservation-
oriented forest-dwellers but pragmatic cultivators, whose culture is based on their 
capability to convert forest land into fertile gardens and who take pride in that 
ability. In addition, it ignores the fact that rural Papua New Guineans are not 
content with their lot in life but suffer from strong feelings of relative deprivation, 
fearing that they are being left behind while the rest of society and the wider world 
advances without them. 
The view of local communities as having a natural mclination towards conservation 
also conceals the fact that in the eyes of resource owning communities the 
conservationists themselves may not be so much different from the much-maligned 
loggers. Both conservationists and timber companies are outsiders aiming to use 
local people's resources in a manner that they deem appropriate. Both, in an attempt 
to achieve their respective goals, enter into negotiations with local communities, 
using a variety of arguments and incentives to make their case (VanHelden 1997). 
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Consequently, PNG resource owners are increasingly aware that the foreign interest 
in their environment constitutes a source of political leverage. 
The environmental NGOs tend to fight on two fronts. They may hold the timber 
companies responsible for the environmental damage done to PNG ecosystems, and 
see themselves as allies and representatives of the local people, but do not like the 
international agencies much either. Especially the World Bank and its structural 
adjustment policies are seen to bring natural resources into the ambit of the market 
economy, thereby sowing the seeds of market-driven exploitation. Over time, 
radical NGOs have come to battle the whole constellation of big-bad-business, the 
multilateral organisations and the national government and its corrupt politicians. 
The highly antagonistic feelings between the environmental NGOs and the logging 
companies, and possibly also their different cultural backgrounds with western 
conservationists and their local PNG friends pitted against Asian loggers and their 
PNG allies, have precluded any attempt to work directly together with the timber 
companies. 1 7 
A POLICY SHIFT FROM STATE TO COMMUNITY 
The growing recognition that the State of PNG is not just unwilling, but structurally 
unable to control the activities of foreign operators in the rural areas has driven 
environmentalists away from the policy-debate and the ongoing attempts to control 
logging though bureaucratic procedures. These groups argue that in a political 
environment where even the most powerful international donors fail to make a 
difference, and where the prime decision-makers over the use of resources live in 
scattered rural communities, it is more sensible to by-pass a corrupt and inefficient 
government all together. The struggle over natural resources between the 
environmental constituency and the timber operators has thus shifted towards the 
level of the rural community. While timber companies continue to throw money at 
communities and their leaders and systematically pressure local politicians and the 
National Forest Authority to approve the 'landowner requests' for a timber permit, 
conservation NGOs try to convince local resource owners that participation in 
logging ventures constitutes a short-cut to poverty rather than a short-cut to 
development. 
With the increase in awareness raising activities in the early 1990s and the 
realisation that development opportunities and better services would not be 
formcoming from an increasingly derelict bureaucracy, landowners began to show 
signs of fatigue with environmental proponents. Increasingly, rural resource owners 
argued that they understood the risks of logging very well, but that in their remote 
17 In countries such as Cameroon, Gabon and Congo the WWF, IUCN and the Wildlife Conservation 
Society aim to forge partnerships with the timber industry in an attempt to reduce the negative 
impacts of timber exploitation and hunting for bush meat. In the Netherlands too, environmental 
groups are increasingly establishing linkages with mainstream timber industry in an attempt to 
improve production processes. 
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location they had no other alternative to development. Rural people often simply 
refused to accept the idea that their present situation was much to be preferred over 
the offers of a logging operation As a result, a growing number of environmental 
groups came to the view that just 'raising awareness' was not good enough and that 
alternative income-generating options to logging had to be developed to make 
conservation palatable. 
The experience with ICAD projects in Africa offered the theoretical framework for 
this approach, with the fundamental difference that whereas elsewhere ICAD 
methods are predominantly used as a means to reduce the pressure on existing 
protected areas, in PNG such methods were proposed as a means to establish 
conservation areas. This view became very popular in a short period of time. Where 
the Lak ICAD project would be the first of its kind in 1993, by 1995 there were no 
less than 10 projects of this type in preparation a n d / o r execution, with a number of 
existing community-based conservation projects now redefined as ICADs (James 
1996). As ICAD approaches now became seen as a means to make conservation 
economically competitive with logging, the political constellation of interests shifted 
to one in which the timber companies and the conservation agencies competed 
head-on. Both tried to put together the most attractive package of resource-related 
benefits, both attempted to convince local communities that their views were most 
valid in an effort to sway local people to follow their lead. It is this struggle between 
logging and conservation that would dominate the first project of the Biodiversity 
Program in the Lak area in New Ireland. 
T H E GEF/UNDP BIODIVERSITY P R O G R A M M E 
The story of the Biodiversity Program begins in 1989 when, following the exposure 
of widespread malpractice in the forest sector of PNG, the World Bank sprung into 
action. Before forest conditions became an integral part of its structural adjustment 
programs to PNG, the main policy vehicle for the World Bank constituted the 
international Tropical Forest Action Plan (TFAP). This action plan aimed to curb 
tropical deforestation by strengthening forest policies in developing countries while 
supporting these with a number of specific project interventions. By the end of the 
1980s, the TFAP came under criticism from commentators who meant that the only 
thing the plan established was a further commercialisation and exploitation of the 
tropical forest resource. No consideration was given to other use options, while the 
process was pushed along in a top-down and technocratic manner, paying little 
attention to the interests of local people and thereby failing to address the root 
causes of deforestation. These criticisms led to a growing attention to issues of 
participation and conservation in the early 1990s (Filer with Sekhran 1998). 
To some extent, PNG became a test case, with its forest plan renamed into the 
National Forestry and Conservation Action Programme (NFCAP). This name 
reflected the fact that it was one of the first forest plans to include conservation 
issues and advocate the use of local communities as the basis for what was called a 
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'socially sensitive forest industry' (Mayers and Peutalo 1995). The PNG NFCAP as it 
developed between 1990 and 1995, consisted of a number of studies and project 
interventions, divided over four components. Two had to do with the restructuring 
of the forest sector and were located in the Department of Forestry, the third was 
aimed at conservation issues and was brought under the Department of 
Environment and Conservation (DEC), while the fourth, aimed at 'Promoting 
Landowner Awareness' was taken on by the German Development agency GTZ. In 
practice, the plan thus fell apart into four programmes, based at three different 
institutional locations and led by three separate consultants. Each programme in 
turn consisted of a 'bundle' of projects funded by a variety of donors (See Filer and 
Sekhran 1998:108-109 Table 6.1). 
In April 1990, the PNG NFCAP kicked off with a Round Table Meeting for 
representatives from the PNG Government, the international donors and local 
NGOs. One of the unexpected outcomes of this meeting was the conclusion that 
there was need for a separate Task Force on Environmental Planning to assess the 
conservation potential of those areas where biodiversity conservation and industrial 
logging interests were most clearly at odds. The conference also slated the Lak area 
in South New Ireland as an area of high conservation value and the Minister of 
Forests, under pressure from the international donors, not only imposed a 
moratorium on new forest concessions, but also declared the Lak area a priority 
conservation area (Filer 1991a). Not much later it became apparent that the 
designation of Lak as a conservation area was made despite the fact that the 
Department of Forests was also issuing a timber concession of 81,000 hectares to a 
local landowner company known as the Metlak Development Corporation (Filer 
1991a). This permit gave the corporation the exclusive right to harvest and sell 
timber and other forest produce from the concession. As the Metlak Development 
Corporation did not have the capacity to exploit local resources on its own, it 
entered into a logging agreement with Niugini Lumber Merchants, a subsidiary of 
the Malaysian multinational Rimbunan Hijau. The start of logging operations in 
January 1991 was of great importance to local people who described it as 'a ticket to 
happiness' (McCallum 1996: 34). 
These events prompted a response on the part of the conservation constituency, and 
in the year following the round table meeting, and after logging at Lak had 
commenced, an environmental task force made a foray into New Ireland to gauge 
local peoples attitudes to the idea that an international project using an appropriate 
'benefit package' might assist them in halting large-scale logging. Notwithstanding 
the entreaties by the visiting conservationists, it became clear that the Lak 
communities were highly sceptical of their ability to deliver conservation-related 
development, with the social anthropologist on the team concluding that 
'Our conservationist friends in the developed world sometimes seem to imagine 
that PNG villagers resemble the Indians in the Amazon rainforest- people living 
in simple harmony with Mother Nature, for whom 'development' is a menace 
imposed by outsiders. If these people went to Lak, they would be in for a great 
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shock. It would probably be difficult to find another place in PNG where local 
people were more insistent on the need to have their trees cut down as soon as 
possible!' (Filer 1991b:71). 
T H E BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION A N D RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 
These events were shortly afterwards followed by bid by the Department of 
Environment and Conservation to the Global Environment Faculty for the 
establishment of an in-country biodiversity conservation program. The GEF was 
created in late 1990 to provide funding to environmental initiatives in four specific 
areas: greenhouse gases, biological diversity, international waters and ozone 
depletion. During its inception phase a heavy emphasis was placed on biodiversity 
related projects with not less than 18 out of 26 GEF funded proposals dealing with 
biodiversity at a total cost of some U$ 178.4 million (Reed 1993: 53). Many of these 
projects were aimed at establishing new protected areas in locations characterised 
by high biodiversity. Due to the specific nature of landownership in PNG it was 
clear to everybody involved in the planning of the Biodiversity Program that it 
would have to focus on the resource owners in order to achieve conservation. In 
1992, the DEC's request for GEF assistance to the tune of U$ 5 million was approved. 
The three 'Immediate Objectives' of the Biodiversity Program were 1) 'to establish 
two pilot Integrated Conservation and Development projects to develop innovative 
methodologies for the conservation of biodiversity'; 2) To provide institutional 
strengthening to DEC; and 3) to establish an institutional, legal, financial and policy 
framework for the expansion of PNG's conservation system (UNDP 1993). The first 
objective would get by far most attention and was aimed at establishing two ICAD 
sites; gathering basic data on these sites and their peoples; and estabushing a 
planning and decision-making process. 
Notvvithstanding the realisation that people are important, the first three years of the 
Biodiversity Program were dominated by a rather top-down and linear vision of 
protected area establishment. The project document outlined the strategy of the 
Biodiversity Program as a series of steps, supported by an ongoing awareness 
programme. This sequence of steps, leading from the selection of an ICAD site, 
towards the assessment of local biodiversity and an analysis of the local social and 
economic situation. All of this was to result in the implementation of a package of 
integrated conservation and development activities to protect a conservation area. 
Because the development activities would be 'linked' to the maintenance of the 
conservation area, people would develop an economic interest in conservation, thus 
guaranteeing the sustainabUity of the protected area regime. 
The whole process would be punctuated by a number of landowner forums during 
which local people could voice their concerns. The flow diagrams contained in the 
project document reduced the role of local communities to saying either 'yes' or 'no' 
at several points in time. The fact that people may actively modify and select specific 
elements of the package rather than simply accepting or rejecting the project's 
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suggestions, or play the game as long as it suits them, had no place in this vision 
(UNDP 1993: annex IV). The fact that the project was on the one hand basing itself 
on economic understanding of human behaviour, but at the same time financially 
not equipped to compete with the level of benefits distributed by the already present 
timber company was ignored too. In international terms, however, the explicit 
inclusion of communities in the program of conservation area establishment was a 
novel approach, as it reflected the realisation that conservation issues are as much 
about people, as they are about nature. The extent to which these representations 
were internalised by the project personnel is another question. 
USING BIOLOGICAL OR SOCIAL INDICATORS FOR CONSERVATION? 
Once the funding had been approved, the key issue became to set u p office within 
the DEC and to select two project areas. Notwithstanding the start of logging 
operations in Lak in early 1991, the conservationists of the Biodiversity Program did 
not loose sight of the Lak area. In the same year, a coalition of Washington-based 
NGOs conducted the so-called Conservation Needs Assessment (CNA). The CNA 
produced a set of individual maps identifying the most species rich and ecologically 
critical areas of native flora, warm-blooded vertebrates, fishes, non-marine 
invertebrate fauna, freshwater wetlands and coastal and marine ecosystems. By 
overlaying these various maps, an overview was produced with allowed the CNA 
team to identify large parts of PNG 'highly significant' or 'very highly significant' in 
terms of biodiversity values. 1 8 This exercise confirmed both the Bismarck-Ramu area 
on the mainland of PNG and the Verron and Hans Meyer ranges on South New 
Ireland as areas of very high conservation priority for biodiversity conservation 
(Beehler 1993c: 204 and 209: Figure 11-3). The latter classification was made even 
though the same report also classifies South New Ireland as a 'major unknown 
terrestrial area' (Beehler 1993c: 196 and 207; Figure 11-1). 
The CNA exercise culminated in a workshop at Madang in November 1995 at which 
the involved natural scientists, representatives of environmental NGOs and a 
variety of donors and managers were present. At this workshop, a gap in perception 
revolving around the use of biophysical versus social criteria for conservation area 
establishment became apparent. Sekhran (1996) elucidates this discussion by 
contrasting two possible patterns of protected area establishment. Although ICAD 
methods are based on the limited use of natural resources in order to establish 
linkages between conservation and development, they tend to copy the Man and 
Biosphere concept in centring on a core zone, in which human impact is minimised. 
The surrounding buffer zones may be used for income generating forms of low-
1 8 According to the authors there was a remarkable level of consensus with regard to the identification 
of terrestrial sites of biological importance (Beehler 1993c; 206). This seems hardly surprising given 
that the areas identified by the CNA as having high to very high conservation priority covers almost 
50% percent of PNG's total landmass and are unlikely to lie within relatively densely populated areas 
(see also Brown and Holzknecht, 1993: 73 Footnote 11). 
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impact land-use. The size of the core area needed for meaningful biodiversity 
conservation should according to the CNA assessment consist of at least 80,000 to 
100,000 hectares (Beehler 1993a: 10, Beehler 1993b: 77). An area of such size is likely 
to be inhabited by a number of resource-owning groups who often show complex 
patterns of alliance, enmity and exchange. Conservationists aiming to establish one 
continuous conservation area will want all involved resource owning groups to 
jointly establish such an area, which can be very difficult in the fragmented social 
environment that characterises PNG. 
In addition to getting people to co-operate, there is the need to distribute the uneven 
proceeds from various forms of resource management over all involved clan groups. 
This requires a transfer of incomes from those exploiting their forests in a profit 
maximising way towards those that conserve their resources in the name of the 
public good (Sekhran 1996). In essence, the conservation agency thus has to take on 
the role of the nation state by 'taxing' those that make a living through the 
exploitation of their forests, while 'subsidising' those that conserve biodiversity (PC 
Scheuer July 2001, see also Sekhran 1996). In theory at least, the nation state has both 
the legitimacy and means to do so, but a project agency dependent on the voluntary 
co-operation of all involved landowners, does not. Thus, those maximising the 
benefits from resource exploitation are unlikely to be willing to share their incomes 
with other groups. It is every clan for itself. This leads to the inevitable conclusion 
that in a fragmented social environment, with landownership vested in local groups, 
and in the absence of a strong and effective state, such co-operative and benefit 
sharing arrangements are unlikely to eventuate. The best possible circumstances that 
conservationists can encounter consist of a situation characterised by small and 
cohesive groups of people, with limited development expectations, who own vast 
areas of land and resources and are willing to engage in conservation activities 
because of economic, territorial or cultural reasons (VanHelden 1998a & 1998b). 
A second, and different approach puts more emphasis on the social component of 
protected area design and takes local landownership and clan membership as its 
basis, asking each group of resource owners to apportion part of their landholdings 
to conservation through a process of land-use planning. The great advantage here is 
that groups do not need to work together to the extent required by the 'biological' 
model, and that complicated transfer mechanisms are not needed. The disadvantage 
is that the core area(s) of the conservation area become scattered and disconnected, 
while the much longer perimeter increases the risk of human encroachment. This 
latter situation is a foresight that does not please conservationists of the 'bigger is 
better' school. 
This same issue came to a head at the CNA workshop, as the assumptions from 
which the foreign conservationists spoke clashed with those of the groups claiming 
to represent the interests of communities and landowners (Brown and Holzknecht 
1993). The expatriate natural scientists assumed that: 
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'their own assessment of conservation values and priorities was an objective 
exercise based on detailed fieldwork; ... [that] it was up to the conservation 
planners... to make the 'tough decisions' and 'stirring calls to action' which 
would persuade other stakeholders to sacrifice the short-term benefits of 
development for the long term benefits of conservation; ... [and that] the 
planners and managers should therefore be responsible for the process of 
consultation with NGOs and local landowners, and for dealing with questions of 
social feasibility and political strategy'(Filer with Sekhran 1998:114). 
Opposed to this technocratic view, which put planning power in the hands of 
foreign biological experts, was the position of the local NGOs who argued that: 
local knowledge and practice was the only genuine basis for determining 
conservation values and priorities;... [and that] instead of creating the right mix 
of incentives for other stakeholders, conservation planners should be providing 
the information and resources required for landowning communities to make 
their own choices' (Filer with Sekhran 1998:114). 
As a result, the NGOs argued that the dominant top-down planning approach based 
on biological indicators leading to the implementation of spatial management 
regimes as favoured by international conservation agencies, had to make way for 
indicators of the 'social feasibility' of conservation in specific localities. This view 
meant that the conservation debate in a clan-based landscape is not so much a 
question of the rights and responsibUitles of local communities as holders of 
biodiversity which can be enforced by a coherent expert-led conservation strategy, 
but essentially about a variety of community motivations and priorities with regard 
to future resource management. In this view the state and the international 
conservation agencies, and the donors can only facilitate the choices of the resource 
owning communities by providing information on the consequences of short-term 
destructive development and - possibly - incentives for more long-term sustainable 
and conservation-oriented development. 
The claim that such an assessment was not to be made by biologists, but provided a 
role for NGOs who regard themselves as representatives of the 'grassroots' 
landowners is fundamentally opposed to mainstream conservation practice which is 
based on a conception of conservation area establishment as an essentially technical 
and managerial intervention coming from above. This discussion obviously not only 
led the NGOs to question the use of biological research as a tool in conservation 
prioritisation, instead proposing a more community-based approach, but also 
contained a sub-text concerning the question as to who was to control the direction 
of the PNG conservation agenda: The alliance of natural scientists working for the 
national government, foreign donors, and international conservation NGOs who 
compromise the autonomy of PNG landowning groups in the name of conservation, 
or the communities who own the natural resources in question in the first place and 
the NGOs who claim to speak on their behalf (Filer with Sekhran 1998). This 
position assumes that NGOs are best positioned to judge the needs of local people. 
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The debate on how to merge the biophysical criteria used to determine the 
'conservation value' of various areas with the specific social structure, motivations 
and priorities of local landowners, constitutes a recurrent theme in PNG 
conservation, and represents a clash between the biological narrative on 
conservation project development and that pushed by social scientists and NGOs. 
This debate, and the transition in thinking from biological to people's issues 
becomes clearly visible in the change in approach between the Lak project and 
Bismarck-Ramu ICAD projects. In the former the technical determinants of 
conservation as defined by outside experts and the strong wish to thwart a local 
logging company took precedence over local motivations and priorities, leading to a 
clash of agendas which finally forced the Biodiversity Program to give u p the Lak 
project. In the Bismarck-Ramu project, a remarkable shift in strategy meant that 
people's ideas and motivations were given higher priority, ultimately leading to 
grave questions about the conservation content and sustainability of the project. 
THE LAK INTEGRATED CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 
The approval of GEF funding for the Biodiversity Program in 1992 coincided with a 
request from the Metlak Development Corporation at Lak seeking technical and 
financial assistance to: 
'Assist our local company with technical expertise to monitor and control the 
logging operation to ensure that minimal environmental damage is done... to 
establish a Conservation Foundation for the [area] thus generating economic 
activities centred around conservation.... [and] to obtain funding for a Wildlife 
Management Programme incorporating profitable environmental activities' 
(Waisale 1992 in McCallum and Sekhran 1997:19). 
The letter, written by the Provincial Government Member for the Lak area and 
deputy chairman of the Metlak Development Corporation Management Committee, 
was passed on to the Biodiversity Program and became instrumental in legitimising 
the ICAD intervention in the Lak area. The purpose behind the letter was probably 
the simple desire to expand the number of economic options in the area in the hope 
of p r o w l i n g a source of development after logging would cease. This conclusion is 
supported by the fact that two of the three items described explicitiy refer to 
conservation-related economic activities. Later the provincial member would 
explain that he was indeed driven by political and economic motivations: 
'I brought them [the Lak people] logging, but we're not making as much from 
logging as we had hoped and the [environmental] costs have been too high. If I 
don't bring development then someone else will win the election - ICAD looks 
like the only real long term opportunity' (Waisale in McCallum 1996: 50). 
Whatever the case, the Biodiversity Program interpreted the letter 'as a social 
invitation from a unified group of landowners eager to explore alternative methods 
of forest development' (McCallum and Sekhran 1997; 19). 
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The die was cast when the Lak site was also found to meet the criteria for site 
selection established by the Biodiversity Program. These criteria were that the 
proposed conservation area should contain high levels of biodiversity and offer 
scope for establishing a conservation area of minimally 80,000 hectares, that local 
communities should have 'an acceptable means' of collective decision making, and 
that the area had to be under immediate threat (UNDP 1993: 3-4). The CNA exercise 
suggested that the Lak area met the first criteria, while the decision-making criterion 
was covered by the letter of invitation and the very existence of the Metlak 
Development Corporation. The threats issue was obviously addressed by the 
ongoing forestry operations. The underlying view of local people was that these 
were maybe not mtrinsicaTiy conseivahon-rninded, but that providing them with the 
correct information and the right set of incentives would certainly lead them to 
choose for conservation rather than logging. 
Intimations that the project was overly optimistic and highly selective in its reading 
of the local situation, and explicit warnings that the Lak population and its 
politicians were guided by short-term interests and in favour of logging were 
ignored (Filer 1991b). The suggestion that only a significant investment in 
development activities could sway Lak public opinion in favour of conservation 
(Filer 1991a), the fact that the formation of such a development package would take 
precious time, while forest harvesting was ongoing, and the fact that the invitation 
by the Metlak Development Corporation and the provincial member represented an 
apparent conflict of interest with their self-evident involvement in the forestry 
operations did not deter the project team either. On the contrary, the mandate to 
develop innovative methodologies was interpreted to mean taking a 'principled' 
stand by implementing the project in an area where logging was ongoing. The 
choice for the Lak as the site of the first ICAD project 
'was a deliberate move to 'take the fight to the enemy' by taking the local 
politician's words at face value, and seizing the opportunity to mobilise a re-
enlightened community against the forces of darkness which it had previously 
been so eager to embrace' (Filer and Sekhran 1998: 248-9). 
It was a choice through which the project manoeuvred itself in a situation of all or 
nothing. The only way to win was to compete head-on with the logging company 
for the favour of the local population. 'If conservation interests had tr iumphed over 
those of conventional logging, the victory would have been complete' (McCallum 
and Sekhran 1997; 52). 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE BlODrVERSITY PROGRAM 
From April 1993 onwards, while in Lak Niugini Lumber Merchants continued its 
harvesting operations, in Port Moresby the Biodiversity Program took shape. The 
emphasis on the natural sciences described earlier is visible in the make up of the 
expatriate project staff. The Program, led by a New Zealand Conservationist, was to 
recruit a conservation manager for each of its ICAD sites and had positions for a 
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project biologist and a resource economist A Conservation Resource Centre to 
house the program was established, equipped, and staffed as a separate unit within 
DEC's Nature Conservation Division. The latter was located in a rambling building, 
suffering from a chronic lack of funding, often even lacking the most basic amenities 
such as working phones, electricity and water. In contrast, the Conservation 
Resource Centre of the Biodiversity Program was located in a small but well-
equipped office next door. Its telephones, faxes, photocopiers and computers 
worked and other amenities that included air-conditioning and coffee, made it a 
pleasant place to work. During the design of the Biodiversity Program, the DEC had 
committed itself to providing basic infrastructure and amenities but the department 
would regularly fail to make the required funds available. The UNDP, however, had 
to get a job done and the money spent, and thus, against its own rules, simply paid 
for the office utilities of the CRC. Given the situation in the Nature Conservation 
Division, it is not surprising that the expatriate and DEC staff attached to the 
Biodiversity Program in Port Moresby, including myself when I was there, preferred 
to operate from the CRC. The notable exception being the American project biologist 
who set u p office witfiin the Nature Conservation Division itself. 
Within the CRC itself, DEC's role was limited. The expatriate staff dominated, while 
the stroppy PNG counterpart to the chief technical advisor went on Masters training 
for a period of two years. He was replaced by a much less forceful person. The result 
was that the Biodiversity Program operated as a self-contained unit rather than as 
part of the DEC. This situation led successive review teams to conclude that the 
linkages with DEC were poorly developed and that the aim of enhancing DEC 
capacity was not being met. When a new chief technical advisor came in by the end 
of 1996 things appeared to improve somewhat in this respect. As with most of such 
programs, the idea was that after the termination of the program, the DEC would 
absorb the CRC as a well functioning unit tasked with the further development of 
the ICAD strategy in PNG. Given the structural lack of funds and the lack of DEC 
'ownership' over the Biodiversity Program, however, the official 'handing over' of 
the centre simply meant that the CRC was stripped of its assets and closed. 
The administrative burden on the Biodiversity Program was further exacerbated by 
the complex institutional structure of the project. Even though the project was 
funded by the GEF, which at that time had the UNDP, the UNEP and the World 
Bank as implementing organisations, it was to be executed by yet another UN office, 
in this case the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). The UNOPS, 
with its headquarters in N e w York, executes and monitors donor funded projects, 
including those of the GEF. In PNG, as elsewhere, the UNDP Country Office acted 
as its agent. While the UNDP Resident Representative and his Deputy were 
officially only to act on behalf of the UNOPS, in practice they micro-managed the 
project, thus constituting an additional administrative and political layer between 
the UNOPS and the CRC. In doing so, they not only made very sure that every 
possible rule in the book was strictly followed, but also became an obstacle to the 
implementation of the Lak Project. 
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The resulting delays constituted a major source of conflict between the first Chief 
Technical Advisor of the Biodiversity Program and the UNDP Country Office as the 
former was continuously unable to respond to the urgent needs of his staff at Lak. 
The UNDP Country Office management, however, felt that he did not abide 
sufficiently strictly to UN financial rules and tended to refer to him and his project 
staff as a 'bunch of cowboys'. In practice, the administrative burden imposed on the 
Biodiversity Program and its staff at Lak, the lack of communications and the 
continuous sense of crisis under which the project operated, forced local staff to 
prepay all dally project expenses out of their personal accounts. A June 1995 Project 
Review Mission concluded that 'the Programme Management was ... made 
unnecessarily difficult by inflexible management procedures stipulated by UNDP'. 
This conclusion was reiterated by the next mission in November 1996 (PRM 1996:10 
&25). 
The gap between the perception of the project among the higher levels of the UN 
and the actual situation on the ground can maybe be most aptly described by the 
anecdote of a visit by the responsible project manager from UNOPS in New York, 
who upon arrival in Lak exclaimed that he 'could not believe the UN were 
implementing a project in a place where there was no flush toilet'. 
IMPLEMENTING THE LAK PROJECT 
The start of actual project activities in Lak was delayed until in early 1994, a 
conservation manager and a resource economist were brought on board. By March 
1994, the first PNG staff members were based in Lak, a year later followed by an 
expatriate conservation manager and his wife who set up camp in the area, oversaw 
the construction of a local base and conducted negotiations on the cessation of 
logging. By then, however, logging had been ongoing for some three years and the 
only way to stop the operations was to identify a number of breaches of forest 
legislation, which would subsequentiy empower the landowners to terminate the 
contract. 
Early work by the Biodiversity Program, however, was not focused on negotiations 
with local people but on conducting a so-called BIORAP, a multi-disciplinary Rapid 
Biodiversity Survey of local nature in order to get on the ground confirrnatlon of Lak 
as a an area of significant biodiversity. The focus of the Lak project lay on the Weitin 
Valley that runs between the Verron and Hans Meyer ranges, which the CNA had 
identified as an area of very high conservation priority. Although logging on the 
valley floor had already advanced 22 kilometres land inwards, the Valley was still 
thought to be of biological significance and was to constitute the core of the 
projected conservation a rea To its surprise, however, the BIORAP concluded that 
Lak biodiversity was much lower than expected. While McCallum and Sekhran 
(1997: 26) note that the team leader 'quickly moved to allay fears' that the project 
had been poorly sited, many years later an observer would state that 'based on the 
levels of biodiversity of the area' the Biodiversity Program 'should never have been 
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there in the first place'. At the time however, basing himself on the high numbers of 
endemic species found, and the fact that the interior upland forests of Lak 'are 
among the most complex, highest and least disturbed of any in the PNG Islands 
Region' (Beehler in McCallum 1996: 31), the BIORAP team leader recommended the 
development of an integrated land use plan for South New Ireland which was to 
'include a conservation area composed of the upland interior of this southern 
mountainous bulb of the island' (Beehler in McCallum 1996: 62). 
The fact that that the interior upland forests of South New Ireland were defined as the 
prime conservation object of the Biodiversity Program, throws u p the question to 
what extent this upland area was indeed under threat. Logging was certainly taking 
place and was being conducted in a manner which led a visiting forester to state that 
'this is the worst example of tropical forestry I have seen anywhere in the world' 
(Arentz in McCallum and Sekhran 1997: 25). The question of importance however, 
was to what extent these practices were affecting the hill resource. The Papua New 
Guinea Logging Code of Practice for example, stipulates the operational guidelines 
under which logging can take place. The main limitations include a prohibition on 
the harvesting of trees under 50-centimetre diameter at breast height, a ban on 
logging on slopes steeper than 35 degrees and above 400 metres, and the duty to 
observe 50 metre wide corridors on either side of a watercourse. Thus, where the 
floor of the Weitin Valley was largely logged even before the project team entered 
the area, the hill forests were intact. Even though the regulations of the PNG forest 
laws are routinely broken, it is technical and financial considerations usually keep 
the higher slopes from being logged, unless techniques such as helicopter logging 
are be used. Helicopter logging, however, is out of the question due to the costs 
involved. 
It appears to have been a classical case of the situation described by Hirschmann 
(1968), where once projects have invested time, resources and prestige, there is no 
way back. The show must go on, even if it involves downplaying relevant 
information. Had the BIORAP indeed concluded that the Lak area was not 
sufficiently rich in biodiversity to warrant further action, this would not only have 
affected the status of the involved institutions and individuals, but also cast a 
shadow over the 1992 Conservation Needs Assessment which u p to this day 
continues to be used as a main source of information for protected area siting. As a 
result it appears that the Lak project was in the first place driven by the wish to 
make a statement against destructive logging than by the need to safeguard an area 
of significant biodiversity from being wiped out . 1 9 
Following the BIORAP and the start of an awareness campaign, the Biodiversity 
Program proceeded to construct a base in the vicinity of the projected conservation 
18 One of the more indirect reasons why the Lak lowland forests were also deemed important, stems 
from the fact that these gain increasing conservation significance as many of the remaining lowland 
forests in the New Guinea Islands region are logged out (McCallum and Sekhran 1997). This, 
however, is no argument to specifically target the Lak area. 
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area. As the project required a formal lease arrangement before construction could 
start, a difficult and time consuming process in PNG at the best of times, the 
establishment of the base took large amounts of energy and time. UN guidelines, 
tendering requirements and administrative procedures, an inefficient Department of 
Lands and the need for multiple surveying visits all hampered progress to the great 
frustration of the staff. In the 1995 Project Progress Evaluation Report, the Chief 
Technical Advisor stated that the building of the Lak Base had 
'without question, been the most frustrating and unnecessarily time-consuming 
component that the project has undertaken. As much as 80 percent of the delay 
can be attributed to a lack of understanding, within the UNDP and OPS 
administration of the unusual logistical, climatic and other difficulties that are a 
normal part of putting together a construction programme in an isolated part of 
rural PNG. Both project and field office staff have experienced unnecessary 
bureaucratic hindrance during the tender process which resulted in a contract, at 
considerably inflated rate, being issued to the company that the project staff 
recommended to the UNDP (...) in April 1994. Construction work commenced in 
March 1995' (CRC 1995d: 5-6). 
In the status bar where a choice could be made between satisfactory or 
unsatisfactory, the chief technical advisor ticked the former box with the footnote 
that: 'the status-assessment is based on the current situation, not the process that led 
to the issuing of the construction contract'. 
In hindsight, it is unclear w h y the Biodiversity Program bothered putting in a base 
of such magnitude. It probably simply followed international conservation practice 
where conservation managers, after defining the conservation area of their choice 
construct infrastructure in order to manage the place from there. The Biodiversity 
Program started its base site selection and construction process almost immediately 
after the start of the program in January 1994, well before its was clear that a 
conservation area could indeed be established, and even before its staff was' on 
strength. In addition, the building program did not benefit local communities in any 
way. Where projects such as the EU eco-timber project in Kimbe built comfortable 
low-cost housing using local materials and labour and thus spreading the benefits of 
its presence among local people, the Biodiversity Program built a U$ 350,000 base 
for which most materials were shipped in from Rabaul. 
THE DYNAMICS OF PLENARY MEETINGS 
All the time that the team was assessing biodiversity and busy constructing the base, 
logging was continuing. In response, the project team undertook an ongoing 
awareness campaign to inform local people of the dire consequences of the timber 
operations, simultaneously attempting to define other, less destructive income 
generating activities. What became clear to the project once the staff was on the 
ground, was that notwithstanding the letter sent by the Metlak Development 
Corporation, they were far from welcome. Many people were receiving benefits 
from the timber operation and quickly came to see the ICAD project as a threat to 
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this source of income. As McCallum and Sekhran (1997: 27) noted, the project 'had 
entered a highly charged and immensely complicated cultural, economic and 
political environment in which its direct competitors for the forest resource, Niugini 
Lumber Merchants, had obtained a significant head start'. 
Over time, local communities would shift their affiliation from Niugini Lumber 
Merchants to the project as their forest was progressively being logged. Those still 
waiting for forest operations to take their trees and receive related royalty payments 
were dead against the ICAD project, while those that had seen their areas of forest 
logged out or that owned forest on inaccessible slopes, supported the conservation 
project as a potential source of income now that logging payments had ceased. As 
one of the Lak logging camp managers formulated it 'Really, I 'm all in favour of the 
ICAD.... I just think we should have logging first and then worry about conservation 
later' (Peini in McCallum 1996:7). People did not realise, or at least did not want to 
acknowledge, that conservation and forestry were mutually exclusive activities. A 
large group was thus characterised as 'fence sitters' that adopted a wait-and-see 
attitude to both project and logging company. Thus while some 80-85 percent of the 
local population supported the project, a similar portion of the community may 
have supported the timber company (McCallum and Sekhran 1997). 
The difficulty in assessing the real position of local people and communities became 
apparent during the deliberations between local people and the project team. In 
October 1994, the project team conducted the first of four large community forums. 
At this occasion some 180 landowners, representatives from the local and provincial 
government, the Metlak Development Corporation and the Biodiversity Program 
were present. The forum, a rather formal affair, produced a set of unanimous 
resolutions, which included an immediate attempt to cancel the logging agreement, 
the development of alternative income earning opportunities and the establishment 
of a Conservation Area Nolvvithstanding the unanimous acceptance of these 
resolutions, this and subsequent plenary forums failed to create a unified stance 
among the involved communities. While the team saw these forums as examples of 
its participatory and people-oriented approach, both the levels of participation 
expected from local people and the way in which these happenings were organised 
throws u p a number of questions. 
In the first place, the level of popular participation in problem definition was 
limited. The project put local people in a position where they either had to choose 
for a continuation of the timber concession which was providing them with an 
immediate source of income, or opt for the ICAD method promising to develop 
future sources of income. Both alternatives were defined and managed by outsiders, 
with the difference that the logging concession was the result of an 8 year campaign 
by local landowners to bring the company in (McCallum 1996). In contrast, the 
conservationists came largely uninvited. Whereas the main problem for local people, 
a lack of development and services', was directly addressed by the timber company 
with its handouts of money, the provision of jobs and the promises of more to come, 
the ICAD project defined the problem as 'a lack of conservation'. It then tried to 
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make conservation activities acceptable by linking them to 'development', in the 
process also redefining 'development' for people. Thus, where the people in Lak 
saw development as the receipt of 'free money' and the provision of goods and 
services, the Biodiversity Program talked about health, education, and community-
development. 
In the second place, such public settings are rarely a good means to assess the 'real' 
thinking of people. Mosse (1994) for example, notes that participatory methods and 
consultations emphasise the importance of 'informality'. Notions of informality are, 
however culturally constructed and context-specific and what appears irrformal to a 
westerner sitting on the floor of a bush material school may from the community's 
point of view be a highly formal activity, for which people have come together from 
long distances. In addition, people may be reluctant to speak u p against project 
personnel for fear of jeopardising their chances to benefit from project activities. 
Such public events thus tend to emphasise the general over the particular, while also 
suggesting a common interest among those present rather than higWighting the 
diversity of interests among them. In many communities an ethic of solidarity 
prevails in the face of outsiders, giving the project team the impression of a united 
community (See for example Bierschenk et Al. 1998, Pottier and Orone 1995). 
Already in September 1990, Filer noted that 
The strange thing about New Ireland, in comparison with many other parts of 
the country, is that it is very hard to tell what anyone really thinks about 
anything. To put it crudely, New Ireland is a place where everybody claims to be 
acting on behalf of someone else, where no-one really trusts anyone to act on 
their behalf, but no-one is prepared to say so publicly, for fear of being 
disrespectful. New Irelanders excel in the virtue of politeness, but the virtue of 
politeness can easily turn into the vice of dishonesty (Filer 1991b: 71). 
The team, however, took little time to understand the dynamics of social control in 
such plenary meetings, simply taking the things that people said at face value. The 
fact that the resolutions of the first forum were taken unanimously, while it was 
already clear that the communities were very divided over what to do, should have 
rang a bell. Instead, it was taken as a measure of the project's initial success. Five 
days after the first forum, a group of villagers argued that they felt pressured into 
agreeing with the tabled resolutions (McCallum and Sekhran 1997). 
THE 'SHADOW PLAY' OF PARTICIPATION 
A common, but naive view of participation, centres on the illusion that when both 
intervenors and the recipient populations are able to express their views and 
priorities, such leads to a solution for the differences in opinion and interests that 
characterise conservation interventions. The fact that the stakeholders involved in 
participatory project development, may 'agree to disagree' is seldom recognised. 
The implicit assumption is that 'participation' reconciles incompatible explanations 
of reality and allows conflicting interests to somehow be massaged away. A simple 
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reason for this state of affairs is the fact that both the intervening conservation 
agency and local people have a stake in keeping u p the appearance of mutual co-
operation. For the project team, it is almost impossible to acknowledge to its donors 
that the gulf between local interests and that of the project is too large to be bridged. 
The admission that it has not been able to bring the importance of conservation 
across and that it has not built the rapport with local people on which 'truly' 
participatory projects are supposedly based, has the connotation of failure, damages 
careers and harms the institutional interests of the involved organisations. 
To local people, the reason for perpetuating the illusion of mutual co-operation lies 
with the fact that project interventions virtually always bring some form of jobs, 
incomes, and opportunities to the target area. Even when local people have no 
intention whatsoever to comply with the demands of the project, there is much 
reason not to state such in an outspoken manner. Better to play the game of 
participation, in the mean time tapping into the resources and opportunities that the 
project's presence may bring. In addition, many communities have an ethic that 
forbids public conflict or disagreement. The resolutions of the first Lak forum with 
its unanimous and far-reaching decisions were only attacked afterwards. 
The result is a sort of 'shadow play' in which both project and people have an 
interest in not breaking the illusion of co-operation and participation. It results in a 
conspiracy of silence, which is only broken when the differences between people 
and project and within communities themselves become so glaringly obvious that 
they can no longer be ignored. It is only then, that local people tell the project to get 
lost or that project teams are forced to concede defeat. This is what happened at Lak, 
where the early warnings that the views of local people were not compatible with 
the development of a conservation area and the cessation of logging were ignored. 
The project team instead tried to polish these differences away through a 
combination of environmental awareness raising activities, promises of goods and 
services and a number of plenary meetings. People avoided having to make 
decisions by 'sitting on the fence' simultaneously supporting two mutually 
incompatible proposals. Project team and people thus played the 'participation 
game' until the resource targeted for conservation had been degraded to the extent 
that the project's failure could no longer be suppressed. 
PATRONAGE, EXCHANGE AND SOCIAL RELATIONS AT LAK 
Even though the issue had been raised from the start, only over time did the project 
come to realise the extent to which local support both to logging and conservation 
rested on the extent to which these initiatives provided immediate incomes. Local 
landowners actively played the timber company and the ICAD project team off 
against each other in attempt to both maximise returns from the presence of these 
two competing initiatives and to determine which of the two contained the 'best 
deal'. Niugini Lumber Merchants knew how to play this game. It provided funds to 
the directors of the Metlak Development Corporation with whom it had the logging 
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agreement, it paid royalties to local landowners, and maintained an extensive 
network of patronage relations witfiin the Lak communities and the provincial 
government. 
In contrast, the Lak project was approached from a biological and rather 
technocratic angle. The initial focus of the project lay on collecting data on local flora 
and fauna, the construction of a base and an environmental awareness campaign. A 
large number of foreigners would visit the area, conduct various studies, but in 
general have little contact with the local population, as their focus was on 
biodiversity, not people. Already during the first forays in New Ireland by the 
environmental task force, Filer (1991a: 20) noted that 
'Short visits to obscure places by large and diverse groups of experts are not a 
cost-effective way of achieving the aims of the Task Force. Too much time is 
spent in first-calls hotels and chartered aircraft: too little is spent with the land-
owners whose needs and views are critical to the outcome of the exercise'. 
The issue of conservationists spending too little time with local people, and having 
too little interest in people's perceptions of the world around them, their history, the 
way in which social relations are struck and maintained and a certain reflexivity on 
how local people might perceive the project and its staff, is one that recurrently pops 
u p in the history of the Biodiversity Program (See chapter 5). 
Cooke (1997) suggests that part of the reason why the company may have been more 
effective than the project in linking u p with local people had to do with the fact that 
the staff of the timber company engaged in culturally appropriate patterns of social 
exchange. Whereas westerners tend to make a distinction between gifts, perks and 
bribes, to the Lak people all of these have in common that they signify a social 
relationship between the donor and the recipient. The Lak project staff, however, 
was not in a position to 'give things away', as they were on one hand restricted by 
the accountability procedures of the UN, and on the other saw the donation of social 
and economic services as a final, rather than a first step in their dealings with local 
people. Where the Lak people would look upon the exchange of gifts as a material 
token of an underlying social relationship, and would see the absence of such as a 
denial of such relationship, the project staff saw the development of income 
generating activities and development services as the final outcome of a business-
like agreement between project and people. Before the flow of development related 
activities could start, people would have to sever ties with the timber company. 
While the logging company thus continued to provide gifts and incomes and had 
established strong patronage relations with a raft of local people and their 
politicians, the ICAD team mainly lectured. The Biodiversity Program conducted 
numerous studies and provided leaflets on the dangers of logging, but it did not 
offer any immediate source of gifts or income to local people. It was, however, this 
aspect which dorninated project-people relations and which, notwithstanding the 
ICAD principles underlying the Lak intervention, would prove to be a key weakness 
in the team's approach. Whereas the Biodiversity Program had U$ 5 miUion to 
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spend on the project team, consultants, studies, transport, and could afford the 
construction of a base, it had nothing available to offer to local people. The Final 
Review Mission in 1998 noted this discrepancy when it noted that: 
'The Project document states "a range of benefits will be provided to landowners 
in return for development rights forgone in conservation agreements. These 
benefits may include, but are not limited to: health services, education and 
training services, employment, agricultural development programmes, business 
development programmes, resource management decision-making forums, 
boundary identification, resource monitoring and management systems", yet 
though output 1.4 provided for the implementation of "ICAD benefit delivery 
methods", apart from a U$ 66,000 allocation for a consultancy to investigate 
economic development options there was no financial provision at all for 
economic or social development'(PRM 1998:11-12). 
As a result of this strange situation, the Biodiversity Program was not only unable to 
forge socially meaningful relations with the Lak population, but also structurally 
unable to compete with the benefits distributed by the loggers. In late 1994, the 
Metlak Development Corporation baited the program by suggesting that 
'the project demonstrate that there is sufficient investment capital to 
immediately facilitate the sustainable forestry initiative: and that the ICAD-
sponsored sustainable forestry initiative run in tandem with the Niugini Lumber 
Merchants logging operation to allow landowners to compare the benefits of 
each before committing to one or the other' (McCallum and Sekhran 1997:30) 
The project saw this comment as inspired by logging proponents, and dismissed the 
question by arguing that it was clearly impossible for two incompatible approaches 
to operate in the same area. The question, however, went straight to the heart of the 
problem: To development-oriented people, desperate for income from just about 
any source, the project team represented a lot of talk but little substance. 
ESTABLISHING CONSERVATION-RELATED DEVELOPMENT 
The project team, realising that it would have to offer people something if it were to 
compete with the logging company, soon started to look into local options for 
economic development Here they were hampered by the same constraints that local 
people had been experiencing in their attempts to garner development. Lak is a 
remote area with little infrastructure, few services and few income-earning 
possibilities. Its communities are fragmented and its labour force is largely 
unskilled. Marketing faculties are non-existent. A 1994 economic assessment 
revealed that a number of small-scale activities such as nut harvesting, crocodile and 
insect farming, pig and chicken husbandry and fishing could possibly provide some 
income, but that only a sustainable form of timber production had any chance of 
competing with the logging operation in terms of incomes. This defined the D of 
ICAD, and led the Biodiversity Program so vehemently opposed to logging, to try to 
develop its own timber enterprise. 
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During 1995, the project team developed an impressive number of initiatives in its 
efforts to dislodge the logging company. Central in this attempt stood the 
development of a Lak Conservation Area Sustainable Forestry Project and a related 
Carbon Initiative. The sustainable forestry project was an attempt to combine the 
planned conservation area with an income generating enterprise that could compete 
with Niugini Lumber Merchants. It aimed to selectively harvest trees using reduced 
impact logging techniques. Aim was to generate additional profits by entering into 
downstream processing and by marketing the resulting produce as 'eco-timber'. A 
financial analysis suggested that with an investment of some 1.5 million dollars a 
profitable exploitation of the Lak resource was possible (Sekhran et Al. 1996). As the 
project did not have these funds available, and was not certain that the financial 
bottom line was sufficient to meet the expectations of the Lak population, a second 
rather revolutionary proposal was developed. This proposal centred on the fact that 
the forests in Lak could not only provide a product in the form of timber, but also 
render a service in the form of carbon sequestration. This environmental service 
could potentially be turned into cash through the 'Joint Implementation Initiative' of 
the United States. The Joint Implementation Initiative is an outcome of the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change which allows greenhouse emitting 
industries in western countries to undertake mitigating activities in other countries 
than their own. Thus for polluting industries it may be more cost effective and 
technically more feasible to support the conservation and rehabiUtatlon of tropical 
forests in order to offset their carbon dioxide emissions, than to take technical 
measures in their own plants. This mechanism has led to the development of an 
international trade in carbon rights, whereby polluting industries invest in certified 
carbon offsetting projects. 
The Biodiversity Program, with the help of a Los Angeles-based carbon broker 
prepared a proposal for Lak in which the area was presented as a carbon uptake 
area due to its levels of conservation, the use of reduced impact logging techniques 
and the development of fast growing enrichment plantings. The argument was that 
without the project the carbon uptake capability of the area would be severely 
compromised and that the Lak project should therefore be certified as a carbon 
sequestration initiative. Based on the estimates prepared by the brokers and the 
Biodiversity Program carbon dioxide savings of some 3.78 million tons over a period 
of some 60 year could have translated in an investment of some U$ 2 to 4 miUion, 
sufficient to develop the LCASFP (McCallum and Sekhran 1997, Sekhran et Al. 
1996).20 This proposal was pre-approved by the Joint Implementation Initiative. 
2 0 It is highly questionable whether such an endeavour would be self-financing. The attractive idea of a 
'ethical' timber company financing community development, sustainable forest management and/or 
conservation area maintenance has been tried out in a number of forms in PNG and the Solomon 
Islands. None of these projects has even come close to reaching financial break-even, and many have 
had to be heavily subsidised for extended periods of time (See (Martin 1997; Salafsky et Al. 1997/98; 
Sekhran etAl. 1996; VanHelden 1996; VanHelden 1998d, VanHelden and Schneemann 2000). 
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THE END GAME 
As time wore on, the project team and local people entered into a gridlock. The 
Biodiversity Program tried to convince people and the Metiak Development 
Corporation that they should cancel the logging agreement with Niugini Lumber 
Merchants. The Lak people in contrast, found that it was time that the Biodiversity 
Program proved its point by bringing some form of conservation-related 
'development'. During 1995 the project tried to break the resulting deadlock by 
developing an Early Rewards Schedule worth U$ 150,000, which promised people 
the immediate implementation of a large number of small community projects upon 
termination of the logging agreement. 
Notwithstanding a recommendation at a third community forum to terminate the 
logging agreement, the directors of the Metlak Development Corporation refused to 
effect this decision and the stalemate continued. By November 1995, the Biodiversity 
Program had to conclude that the Weitin forest resource had become insufficient to 
support the sustainable forestry project and that its only option was to withdraw 
from the carbon initiative. For a while it would continue its attempts to convince 
people to terminate the logging agreement. Local people in turn, saw their 
suspicions concerning the project confirmed. They had since the first sorties in 1990 
argued for tangible 'developments' and only received words. The high levels of 
expenditure by the project on infrastructure were not given much credit as these 
costs had generally not produced substantial individual benefits. Logging in 
contrast had. McCallum (1996: 38) notes how the 2130 individuals that make u p the 
Lak population received a total of some Kina 400,000 (approximately U$ 500,000) in 
royalties between 1991 and 1995. This 'veritable fortune' led to a 'noticeable decline 
in the quality of food gardens' as people preferred to buy rather than grow their 
food, and a neglect of the few existing cash crops. There was no noticeable 
investment in other income generating activities. He also notes how 
It is difficult not to make value judgements in this regard. In 1994, [he] observed 
entire logging cheques spent on beer consumed in 3 - 4 day drinking bouts. 
Common 'investments' included 4 wheel drive vehicles - of the nine new 
vehicles [he] observed in 1994, all but 2 had been wrecked by 1995. At a meeting 
in Bakok Village in 1995, land owners said... 'we got paid over K 100,000. When 
asked where it was now, the community responded 'pinis. mipela wastim pinis. 
nogat olgeta nau' (It's gone. Its wasted. Its all gone - there's nothing left) 
(McCallum 1996: 38). 
In May 1996, the DEC and the UNDP together decided that the project should be 
terminated altogether. The decision to end the project was communicated at a fourth 
and final community forum in August 1996, after which field operations ceased. 
During 1997, international log prices collapsed, making many logging concessions 
unprofitable and leading Niugini Lumber Merchants to close its Lak operations. 
The game was not over because the resource which the Biodiversity Program had 
been aiming to conserve had been destroyed, but especially because the resource 
which was to constitute the basis for the project's sustainable forestry operations 
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had been logged out. The irony of the Lak project is that in actual fact, the hill area 
which had the conservation focus of the project, was never under significant threat, 
but that due to its ICAD methodology and the view of forestry as the only viable 
economic activity in the area the project had run out of options (McCallum and 
Sekhran 1997: 40). With the benefit of hindsight, it appears that the Biodiversity 
Program should have ignored Lak altogether as the conservation of its hill forests 
will probably take care of itself. 
PROCESSING THE L A K EXPERIENCE 
Planned interventions, such as that implemented by the Biodiversity Program in the 
Lak area, are justified and legitimised not only by the a-priory intervention 
strategies contained in project documents, but also by the periodical evaluation of 
the programme themselves. Thus, the BIORAP with which the Lak intervention 
commenced served to legitimise GEF expenditure by suggesting that nature in the 
area was indeed worth conserving. More general project evaluations, based on a 
methodical and retrospective analysis of the programme intervention, will not 
normally consider a project 'successful' unless the objectives stated at the outset 
have been achieved. In the case of the Lak project, the main objective of establishing 
a conservation area had not been met. Yet, even a 'failure' can provide the rationale 
for a reformulation of the programme in order to have another shot at achieving the 
original aim. Long and van der Ploeg (1989: 234) suggest that 
'Failure is seldom a reason ... to halt a particular intervention policy. Normally 
'failures' are the starting point for the elaboration of the next round of 
interventions. One could even argue that a certain degree of 'failure' is strategic 
in the reproduction of intervention itself. Irrigation schemes, integrated rural 
development programmes, or extension programmes can in fact go on for 
decennia, since every four years (or whatever time span is planned for periodic 
evaluation) it may be concluded that the established goals have 'not yet' been 
reached, or that new problems... have arisen'. 
Following the Lak debacle, however, the Biodiversity Program was not in a situation 
where a mere modification of its project strategy was enough to justify another 
round of interventions. The game was over. 
The simplest thing that the staff of the Biodiversity Program could have done under 
these circumstances was to maintain their presence at Lak and sat the program out 
until April 1998 before admitting defeat. To their credit, however, this common 
sense strategy, was not deemed acceptable by a majority of the staff who felt that 
they were wasting precious time, energy and funding. The decision to withdraw, a 
politically difficult resolution which had to be negotiated with the UNDP and the 
Government of PNG, and is at odds with Hirschmanns (1968) observation that 
projects tend to continue at all costs once serious investments have been made. It is 
also at odds with prevailing project practice in many development bureaucracies 
where spending money is a more important indicator for project success than actual 
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achievements on the ground. As the former environment officer of the UNDP 
country officer notes: 
'donors are mainly concerned in smooth operations, successful or not, and the 
need to report to HQ that the funds were spent. It is ironic that one of the biggest 
criteria for evaluation of a donor programme is the delivery of programme funds 
- not the success achieved on the ground. This leads to a pressure to push poorly 
designed projects, or projects which are not "owned" by the stakeholders, 
through the system, just to spend the funds' [Scheuer to VanHelden 12 August 
2001]. 
Whereas it took some time before all staff of the Biodiversity Program accepted that 
a withdrawal from Lak was the best possible course of action, over time the question 
how to explain this withdrawal gained importance. From halfway 1995 onwards, 
when the project team saw the likelihood of a teirnination of ICAD operations at Lak 
increase, a gradual process of digesting the Lak experience began. This process was 
poUtlcally sensitive for a number of reasons. In the first place it had to prepare the 
ground for a withdrawal from Lak, while at the same time avoiding the possible 
conclusion that the context of PNG land tenure, combined with the entrenchment of 
multinational logging companies, made biodiversity conservation impossible in 
those areas where logging operations had access, and unnecessary in those areas 
where they had not. In the second place, there was the implicit question as to who 
and what was to blame for the course of events in Lak. 
The question how a withdrawal from Lak could be best explained led to some 
discussion between those in favour of a careful and relatively open analysis of the 
Lak experience with the aim to do things better in the second ICAD site, and those 
that feared that such exposure would damage their careers. Those in favour of 
analysing and publishing the Lak experience, especially the resource economist of 
the Biodiversity Program and the environmental officer of the UNDP Country 
Office, were aided by a 1995 Project Review Mission. This mission, having its doubts 
with regard to the manner in which the Lak project unfolded suggested that 
'Lessons learned at Lak and other ICAD initiatives need to be evaluated prior to the 
adoption of a strategy for ICAD 2 implementation' (PRM 1995: 3-9). By the second 
quarter of 1996, the Lak conservation area manager and the resource economist were 
given the go ahead to produce a so-called 'lessons-learnt document'. In this they 
were aided by their interactions with a new community development trainer 
recruited for the Bismarck-Ramu project, who provided a more self-reflective 
perspective on the Lak experience, by arguing that projects trigger unrealistic 
expectations due to the way in which the project presents itself. In practice, the 
analysis of events at Lak, the examination of the first interventions in the Bismarck-
Ramu area, and the development of a new community-oriented strategy would take 
place concurrently (See chapters 5 & 6). 
This combination of considerations led to a brilliantly executed operation in damage 
control, in which the Lak project was projected as the 'pilot project' and 'experiment' 
which it originally was, while at least part of the blame for the project's failure was 
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placed on local people (see below). The key objective of the Biodiversity Program 
had been 'to establish two pilot Integrated Conservation and Development projects 
with the aim to develop innovative methodologies for the conservation of 
biodiversity'. In practice, the Lak team had focussed on the first half of this objective 
assuming that success in establishing the conservation area would have rendered its 
methods innovative. In the evaluation of its experiences, however, the team 
focussed on the second half of this objective, redefining the essential output of the 
project from establishing a conservation area to generating a number of valuable 
lessons. Two years later, the final evaluation mission would recognise this switch 
when it suggested that 
'to reflect the course taken by the Project, it would be appropriate to rephrase 
Immediate Objective 1 [from "to establish two pilot Integrated Conservation and 
Development projects to develop innovative methodologies for the conservation 
of biodiversity" to] "to develop innovative methods for conservation of 
biodiversity and establish pilot ICADs'" (PRM 1998: 36). 
The transformation in the treatment of the Lak project from a concerted drive 
towards the establishment of a conservation area in the face of a logging operation, 
towards that of a 'trial project' had been prepared by a July 1995 Project Review 
Mission (PRM). This mission paved the ground for this shift by arguing that 
'in the event that the Lak ICADP is scaled down or abandoned, it is important 
that it be seen as an experience, a trial, and not as a failure. The knowledge thus 
accumulated will be of great value not only for the development of the second 
ICAD site and other ICAD initiatives in PNG, but also on a broader international 
scale' (PRM 1995: 3-6). 
The interpretation of the experiences at Lak would eventually find its most tangible 
result in the writing of a lessons-learnt document called Race for the Rainforest: 
Evaluating Lessons from an Integrated Conservation and Development 'experiment' in New 
Ireland, PNG (McCallum and Sekhran 1997). The document explicitly adopts the 
strategy prepared by the PRM as becomes clear in the foreword by the UNDP 
Resident Representative: 
'Because the Lak Project was an ICAD project, it focused on development 
initiatives such as the design of a sustainable forestry project, however, because a 
commercial logging operation was already under way, the resource base for the 
sustainable forestry project dirninished rapidly. Hence the project turned out to 
be unviable and did not result in the establishment of a conservation area. Why 
therefore, is the Lak project considered as having been successful? The answer is 
simple: the programme was expressly mandated to experiment, design and trial 
innovative methods for gaining landowner support for conservation initiatives. 
In the case of Lak the experimental result may have been negative, but the 
outcome has been positive. The principal positive outcome of the Lak project is 
that invaluable lessons have been learned' (Witham in McCallum and Sekhran 
1997). 
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The failure, denied in the foreword of the official UNDP document, is however, 
prominently displayed in the title of a MSc thesis written by the Lak conservation 
manager: 'Analysis of an ICAD Failure: lessons for conservation managers'. While the 
failure to establish a conservation area was transformed into a number of successful 
lessons has been described, the question of how the project dealt with the question 
who and what to blame for Lak events remains to be dealt with. 
SHARING THE BLAME OF FAILURE I 
Schaffer (1984) suggests that policy documents always contain a variety of 'escape 
routes', which in the case of unforeseen events allow project proponents to shift 
responsibility for a project's failure. A well-known example of such a device is the 
separation of policy making from poUcy-implementation, allowing policy makers to 
blame project failure on the poor executing abilities of the field staff, while the latter 
may argue the impossibility of this task due to ^compatibili ty of the designed 
policies and the context in which they were to be implemented. The manner in 
which the emphasis with the first objective of the Biodiversity Program shifted is 
another. Some of the most common blaming mechanisms focus on abstract but 
usually negative qualifications of reifications such as 'administrative structures', 
'governments' and 'political systems' which are being branded as 'corrupt', 
'inefficient' or suffering from 'a lack of political will'. 
According to Schaffer (1984: 182) such statements hide that in fact that in reality 
there is 'a scatter of conflict and wills', which may be inconvenient for some, but not 
for others and which help to explain the specific outcomes of policy. The notion of a 
'lack of political will', for example, hides the fact that apparently there are political 
forces within the project implementing process which have prevented the project 
from achieving its aims. Such sweeping statements avoid having to make the 
analysis as to why this was so, and how such resistance can be overcome in the 
future. The use of such 'escape routes' therefore does not lead to solutions as they 
'do not lead to a working out of how the actual is to be coped with, or to taking it 
seriously' (Schaffer 1984: 184). Such mechanisms provide a rationalisation for 
failure, which shifts the blame away from the involved practitioners towards 
unforeseen events, a lack of information, opposing negative forces, the character of 
segments of the implementing apparatus or the specific socio-cultural traits of the 
recipient population. This latter aspect would come to play a role in the first 
explanations of the Lak failure. Only latter would the initial frustration with local 
society be transformed into the lessons contained in Race for the Rainforest. 
By the beginning of 1996, the Biodiversity Program was increasingly frustrated with 
the lack of commitment on the part of the Lak landowners. Decisions to cancel the 
logging agreement were not effectuated and became apparent that local people 
largely preferred to receive logging-related royalties than having to work on a long-
term sustainable development alternative. Not surprisingly, the specific traits of Lak 
society came to be seen as one of the main reasons for the project's failure. This 
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becomes especially visible in a number of internal documents used for a 'review of 
options in Lak' at the end of 1995 and a 'strategic planning workshop' in May 1996. 
The latter document lists under the heading 'Motivation, Attitude and Cultural 
Considerations' the following aspects which were found to be detrimental to 
successful project development: 
'Motivation: Motivation to work, particularly amongst Lak men, must be 
described as low. Men devote most of the day to customary activities and local 
politics and little physical labour is done... 
Custom: Everyone in Lak devotes enormous amounts of time to customary 
activities, the purpose of which is to maintain and further the status of ones clan, 
and in the case of men, oneself... 
Politics: Politics play a crucial role in determining people's allegiances to various 
activities and projects, most notably the ICAD project. The ex-Provincial Member 
was a staunch supporter of the ICAD Project and was the catalyst of the selection 
of Lak as the first ICAD site. The candidates he defeated in the last provincial 
elections see it as their responsibility to destroy activities that he may bring to 
Lak in the hope of undenriining his status and political power... 
Customary jealousy: Lak custom dictates that men must go through certain rites 
of passage in order to progress through the ranks of customary hierarchy and 
power.. If an entrepreneur becomes too successful he may be seen to be 
exceeding the entitlement of his customary ranking and the community will 
begin to work against him... The obvious fault in this system is that it completely 
stifles entrepreneurs.... 
Living for the short term:... The back bone of conservation theory is based on the 
premise that we should take actions now that will safeguard the future of those 
yet unborn. In Lak these attitudes do not prevail. Typically it is the older 
members of the community who desperately crave development so that they 
may amass as much wealth as possible in the short term to spend before they 
die. The attitude to their children, and to future generations, is one of 'let them 
make their own way... and take their own chances'. 
High expectations: Expectations in Lak are unrealistically high. These 
expectations stem from the perception of development as cargo, ignorance of the 
modern world and a failure to appreciate the value of money. The unrealistic 
expectations held by the people of Lak are potentially the most damaging 
cultural aspect to the future of the project. 
Failure to accept responsibility: ... People do not, not even after the extensive 
awareness campaign, accept that the ICAD project is their project, working for 
them to guarantee their future. Most people still view the project as a separate 
entity and often to ascribe to it a familiar status, e.g. a new church or a new kind 
of company. These attitudes are proving difficult to change and will prove 
difficult to eradicate completely. Examples of these attitudes are found in the 
theft and vandalism of ICAD project and Metlak equipment and machinery as 
the offenders do not appreciate that they are harming their own interests.... The 
failure of the people to accept some responsibility for the development attempt 
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and to link it directly to themselves, plays an important of this problem '(CRC 
1996c: 4-7). 
These attitudes, in combination with the difficult economic environment in which 
the project had to be developed and the presence of the logging company with its 
corrupt practices, patronage relations and 'easy money', made it difficult to achieve 
conservation success. 
The above summation reveals a number of implicit assumptions and expectations 
with regard to local society with which the project team entered the Lak area, and 
which later - to its frustration - proved false. The most obvious among these is the 
idea that people will be conservation inclined if they are provided with the 'right' 
information and incentives. The view of ICAD as a business-like relation not only 
assumes that project and people have the same mode of establishing social and 
economic relations, but is also impUcitly based on the assumption that communities 
are not made u p of a series of disparate factions and individuals, but act in a unified 
and collectively accountable fashion. As is clear from the above, this rosy picture 
could not be sustained in reality and was over time replaced by a more negative 
conception of local culture. 
The fact that the project had failed to take sufficient account of local culture meant 
that the team accepted blame for not investing more time and effort in assessing the 
social aspects of protected area establishment. The selection of the Lak area had been 
made on the basis of biological and political criteria without paying sufficient 
attention to the socio-cultural landscape and the warnings of the visiting social 
anthropologist As Race for the Rainforest notes: the Biodiversity Program had 
'seriously misjudged the complexity of the social, political and economic landscape 
for biodiversity conservation' (McCallum and Sekhran 1997: 51), and thereby its 
ability to dislodge the logging company. As a result of this analysis, the Biodiversity 
Program concluded that future ICAD projects should select their area of work on the 
basis of combined social and biological criteria, and that a separate social feasibility 
study was required to assess the 'conservation disposition' of local communities. 
Important to note, is that the program did not review the tenets of the ICAD 
approach itself. Race for the Rainforest for example noted that education on issues of 
development and conservation was of great importance, but 'an education 
programme alone will be insufficient. Material incentives will also be required' 
(McCallum and Sekhran 1997: 60) . It was thus a matter of doing the same thing 
better. Only later would the ICAD approach itself become a point of discussion. 
An issue which was not mentioned in Race for the Rainforest, but which obviously 
played a key role in the Lak failure, was the fact that even though the Biodiversity 
Program aimed to establish conservation areas through what was essentially a 
conservation for development transaction, it simply did not have the funds to 
develop meaningful development activities, leave alone activities of the size 
required to compete with the logging company. Thus whereas the Lak project had 
placed itself in a crisis situation in which it had to make immediate and substantial 
Conservation policy in PNG 103 
offers to local cornmunities, the Biodiversity Program by nature of its design was 
simply not equipped to execute its own project philosophy. In the light of the 
limited availability of resources it is thus not surprising that, whereas in the Lak 
project the D of ICAD was defined in terms of mcome-generating activities, the 
project philosophy in its second ICAD site would come to centre on a definition of 
development as a form of 'self-help' which required much lower levels of capital 
investment. 
The idea to write these lessons u p as suggested by the PRM, was in many way quite 
revolutionary as very few projects present their operations in such a candid manner 
as the Biodiversity Program did. The report was generally well received and has 
become something of a classic in international conservation and development circles 
over the past couple of years. 
I N T R O D U C I N G THE B I S M A R C K - R A M U AREA 
By the end of 1994, as the tension in Lak was increasing, the Biodiversity Program 
started to select a second ICAD site. After some considerations, which will be 
discussed in chapter 4, it chose the Bismarck-Ramu area on mainland PNG as the 
site of its second ICAD intervention. The resulting area of interest straddles the 
border of Western Highlands and Madang provinces, and encompasses a northeast-
oriented square of roughly 325,000 hectares. This area includes the largest possible 
altitude interval in Papua New Guinea, from 60 metres above sea level at the Ramu 
River to the 4500 metres high peak of Mount Wilhelm and contains most major 
Papua New Guinea vegetation zones. Its geographical differences allow - from south 
to north - for three main divisions of the area, each with its own physical and 
human geography. 
The Jimi Valley lies between the Sepik-Wahgi divide and the Bismarck Range and is 
shaped by the Jimi River that rises in the Mount Wilhelm massif and drains into the 
Sepik Basin. The Upper Jimi Valley is populated by some 7000 inhabitants who 
mainly speak a variety of the Waghi language. The relatively high population 
densities and the rough and steep terrain limit the land use options available to the 
local population and here are signs that the area is entering a process of degradation 
because of shortening fallow periods. The local requirement for cash is growing 
rapidly. Cash is not only necessary for supplementary foodstuffs, medicine, and 
school fees, but also the more traditional obligations of bride and compensation 
payments have become monetised. Especially those people familiar with the lifestyle 
in the Waghi Valley have come to regard access to cash as a way to solve many of 
their problems. At present, cash is mainly earned through coffee, peanuts, the few 
Government jobs available, and migration labour. Further into the Upper Jimi the 
growth of cash crops is hampered by a lack of infrastructure. 
The Bismarck Range forms the administrative boundary between Madang and 
Western Highlands provinces and is mainly characterised by a large number of deep 
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faults, intersected by numerous large rivers. The fall is covered by forest and has an 
extremely high range of different ecological systems. The area is virtually 
uninhabited, but used for the planting of pandanus nut, betelnut and fruit, hunting, 
trapping and fishing. A number of makeshift shelters and garden houses lie along 
the footpaths that lead down towards the Ramu floodplains. At the end of the sixties 
exchange started taking place between the Jimi and the Ramu people resulting in 
downhill migration by some 400-500 highlanders and increasing intermarriage with 
lowland peoples. The 'giving of women' to the Ramu groups is the main 
legillmisatlon used by various groups of Jimi settlers for their presence in the Ramu 
Valley and in contradiction to the dominant practice of virilocal residence in the 
area. The Ramu people, having experienced how intermarriage with the Jimi settlers 
encourages them to settle on their lands, have been Irying to adopt a policy of non-
marriage in order to prevent further encroachment. 
The Ramu floodplains vary in width as the river meanders through it and are 
dominated by swampy vegetation and wetland forest interspersed with sago palms. 
Other areas are permanently dry as they lie above the watermark and are covered in 
primary rainforest with an abundance of wild pigs and birds. Apart from the recent 
influx of Jimi settlers into the Foroko-Brimde not more than about 200 Ermerum and 
Musak speaking people live in five or six small bush camps along the Ramu River. 
Sepu is the most important settlement. Tension between the Ramu landowners and 
Jimi settlers is constant. The Jimi settlers see themselves as superior to their hosts 
and complain that the Ramu people are lazy, inhospitable and unorganised. While 
the Jimi are more or less sedentary horticulturists, who will move only when 
confronted with insoluble problems in the form of tribal war and epidemics, the 
Ramu people have a more nomadic disposition and a more rapid pattern of 
relocation. The Ramu people supplement their hunting and gathering with produce 
from their small gardens on the river banks. Apart from the possible construction of 
a road towards Foroko-Brimde and the rumoured arrival of logging companies, the 
most important change to the area comes from a nickel-cobalt mine which is being 
constructed in the Bismarck ranges to the east of the project area, and a oil drilling 
venture to the north of the Ramu River. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
This chapter has built on the previous chapter by discussing how PNG, as a result of 
its specific land tenure situation, takes a peculiar place in the conservation spectrum 
'between stick and carrot'. Notwithstanding its high levels of biodiversity, the 
Government of PNG and foreign conservation agencies lack the legal tools to 
enforce conservation mechanisms for the public good. The only way to go about 
conserving nature in such a situation is to make conservation attractive to the rural 
communities that own that nature. One such attempt constitutes the use of the 
Integrated Conservation and Development methods as a means to create protected 
areas. In doing so, conservationists have placed themselves in a position of direct 
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competition with the forestry companies operating in PNG. Both vie for the natural 
resources held by local communities, and both try to convince the involved 
stakeholders that their activities are important for a range of reasons. This 
discussion, and a examination of the debate over the combination of social and 
biological criteria used for siting potential protected areas, serves as a background to 
a description of the Biodiversity Program and its first ICAD intervention at Lak in 
New Ireland province. 
The Lak project was from the start approached from a biological and technical angle. 
The initial interventions focused on collecting biological data, the construction of a 
base and an attempt to convince local landowners of the importance of conservation, 
rather than focusing on the ability and willingness of local communities to absorb 
and carry such an undertaking. Not only did the project collect little socio-economic 
information, it ignored the warnings on the predisposition of local people towards 
logging by a visiting anthropologist. The choice for this area was a political one as it 
was deliberately decided to implement the first ICAD project in an area where 
logging was ongoing. This focus was maintained even in the face of indications that 
the resource was not of the biological significance initially assumed. It also appears 
that the hill forests, which were the focus of the project's conservation efforts were 
never under serious threat. Only when the lowland resource necessary for the 
sustainable forestry project which was to support the conservation area dwindled to 
the extent that an economically viable ICAD operation became impossible, and the 
chance to defeat the loggers was gone, did the Biodiversity Program withdraw. 
Obviously, the ICAD project team was aware that the Lak landowners held the key 
to a successful implementation of the project. The Lak community, however, was 
not expected to define the project according to its own needs and insights, but was 
simply presented with the choice between two ready-made options; logging or the 
ICAD concept. Both of these options, logging as well as the ICAD project, were 
defined and propagated by outsiders. On the one hand, there was the Malaysian 
logging company with its 'easy money' and its patronage relations. On the other 
hand, the abstract ICAD alternative with a promise of future rewards and the 
predictions of doom and gloom if logging would continue. In the middle, stood the 
landowners and their politicians. In hindsight, it is easy to argue that the 
communities, their big men, and the involved provincial politicians had already to 
such an extent become entangled with the timber company that it would have taken 
a Hercules to cut this Gordian knot. 
During the course of the project, the visions of local people held by project personnel 
would shift. Whereas initially the project team saw people as essentially inclined 
towards conservation if provided with the right incentives, this would later shift to a 
less positive view which emphasised people's short-term thinking, their lack of 
organising capability and their 'cargo mentality'. Anthropologists working at Lak 
however, have suggested that the project personnel tended to approach local society 
in economic terms, failing to establish meaningful social relations. The logging 
company in contrast, was well entrenched through a variety of exchange relations. 
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Even if the decision by local people to pursue conservation or logging had been 
made on purely economic grounds, it is unlikely that the project would have 
succeeded. Where logging paid immediate dividends, the project by nature of its 
design lacked to funds to pursue the 'D' of ICAD. 
A description of the respective social organisation in the Jimi and Ramu Valleys, 
Jimi migration patterns and the difficult relations between these two groups in the 
Ramu Valley is the topic of the next two chapters. These set the stage for the social 
and territorial conflict in which the Bismarck-Ramu project would come to play a 
role. 
Chapter 3 
FRAGMENTATION AND COMPETITION: A DESCRIPTION OF 
JIMI SOCIETY 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
This chapter 2 1 provides an ethnographic overview of the Jimi people living in a 
highly competitive, exchange-based and existentially insecure social environment 
The Jimi are highly competitive people, that continually strive towards establishing 
the most beneficial set of social, political and economic relations. A description of 
social organisation, leadership and co-operation makes clear that notwithstanding 
the segmented social organisation with an apparently clear-cut division of tasks and 
responsibilities, Jimi communities should not be seen as homogenous and discrete 
entities. The continuously sliifting patterns of co-operation and conflict between and 
within the various social units, the important role of local big men and their clan 
groups jockeying for position vis-a-vis one another, and the increasingly 
individualistic attitude of the Jimi people constitute a confusing environment for 
well-intending 'community-based' development interventions. 
I will dwell in some detail on the importance of kinship and marriage-based 
exchange relations. In the Jimi valley social relations simultaneously underpin and 
become expressed through economic transactions. Exchange and trade are an 
expression of the affiliation between two groups or individuals in which the quality 
of the gift 'indexes' the quality of the underlying relationship. Also present-day 
forms of economic co-operation such as found in the coffee trade and migration 
patterns are generally based on pre-existing social relationships. Where there is 
none, people make an effort to create one. While exchange relations with kin and in-
laws are guided by moral considerations and reciprocal duties and expectations, 
2 1 This chapter is based on Between Cash and Conviction (VanHelden 1998b). Material contained within 
it has also found its way into VanHelden (2000) and VanHelden (2001a). 
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relations with outsiders are notoriously unstable, easily sHding into deceit, theft and 
violence. The argument that the Jimi exploit their relations with outsiders in the 
form of strangers, the state, churches, companies and nowadays projects and the 
state, in an instrumental and opportunistic manner is illustrated by looking at the 
ways in which Jimi people responded to the arrival of the Australian administration 
and the missions in the 1950s. The Jimi people were far from passive as they 
'underwent ' colonisation, but actively exploited the opportunities offered by the 
new colonial order, enlisting the administration and the churches in their attempts 
to further their security, reputation and opportunities for trade. A similar attitude to 
the interventions of the Bismarck-Ramu ICAD project and the gap with the response 
expected by the project team is the topic of chapter 5. 
In this chapter will also look at the Jimi incorporation in the cash economy. Whereas 
the aim to maximise personal and group reputation has remained intact, the nature 
of reputation building projects has shifted. Reputation and leadership, previously 
connected to a number of personal attributes and the ability to manipulate exchange 
relations, are now being partially replaced by a new emphasis on cash and formal 
politics. At the same time the post-colonial decline of Government services has led 
to strong feelings of inferiority, prompting the Jimi to try harder then ever to capture 
what they see as 'their rightful share of development'. The disappointment with the 
state, and the new emphasis on cash has also had its impact on the way in which 
local people perceive the environment. Rather than being a source of subsistence 
production, the natural environment is now increasingly valued in terms of the cash 
incomes that it may generate. As a result of these issues Jimi images of 
'development' emphasise a complex combination of group status, individual 
achievement, cash incomes, and a highly political view of the development process. 
A DESCRIPTION O F THE J I M I VALLEY 
The Jimi Valley is largely shaped by the Jimi River which rises in the Mount 
Wilhelm massif and which drains to the north-west. In the Middle Jimi, the river has 
carved out a large valley between the Sepik-Wahgi Divide to the south and the 
Bismarck Ranges to the north. The 2,500 to 3,500 meters high Sepik-Wahgi Divide is 
the watershed of mainland PNG with the rivers in the Wahgi Valley draining on the 
south coast while those in the Jimi Valley drain to the north. The Jimi Valley is about 
72 kilometre's long and on average 13 kilometres wide (I. Hughes 1977: 67), but the 
upper part is hardly recognisable as a valley due to the deeply incised rivers which 
are separated by high mountains. Settlements usually he on top of these interfluvial 
mountains in an altitude band of 1600-1800 meters ASL. The Jimi River runs 
between 600 and 800 meters below them. The landscape becomes less broken as one 
travels downstream and as the valley gradually widens out. The Upper Jimi area 
between the settlements of Kol, Bubulsunga and Bubkile is the subject of this study. 
The geographical areas, in which the people of the Jimi Valley live, have often been 
given names relevant to that particular spot by patrol officers who built a rest house 
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there or by the missionaries that settled in the territory of a clan. In a few cases, the 
government or the mission had an airstrip buil t These strips still offer the easiest 
way into and out of the area and are used by the smaller third level airlines 
operating small aircraft. The most important settlement is Kol, which lies in a broad 
valley at the end of the road to the Wahgi Valley. The village contains the District 
Office, a grass airstrip, a small clinic, a community school and two mission posts. 
The gardens of the local population are located on the mountain slopes above the 
clusters of houses along the river. 
FIGURE 3: M A P OF THE UPPER AND M I D D L E J I M I VALLEY 
Further into the Jimi Valley, but still within the rim of the Bismarck Range, one finds 
Bubulsunga and Bubkile, two other villages of importance for this study. These 
settlements are located in the same altitude range of about 1600 to 1800 meters but 
are perched on the ridges overlooking the gardens and the Jimi River. These 
settlements, consist of a number of hamlets inhabited by the members of a variety of 
patrilineal and patrilocal clans and sub-clans. In pre-colonial times each clan in the 
Jimi had a dance ground for its ceremonial prestations, usually covering the little flat 
ground available. These grounds now serve as airstrips or marketplaces and have 
been used to construct schools, churches or health posts, thus becoming the 
combined administrative, economic and ceremonial centre of social life. Most other 
settlements in the Upper Jimi are small hamlets or compounds composed of the 
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male members of a sub-clan with their wives and children. Domestic groups usually 
include a man and his wife or wives, their children and possibly sisters, elderly 
parents and other dependants living in. In 1980 the Upper Jimi counted some 6,982 
people, resulting in a gross population density of about 19.1 persons per square 
kilometre Qoughin and Thistieton 1987:17). This figure does not reflect the fact that 
the Jimi Valley is an extremely rugged place with steep slopes and high mountains. 
Montane forest is used only for hunting and gathering, while lower areas suffer 
from endemic malaria. These constraints reduce the area suitable for human 
habitation, to an altitudinally compacted settlement zone between 1200 and 2000 
metres ASL. This zone is heavily impacted by subsistence activities, consisting of 
secondary forest, woody garden regrowth, planted trees and small patches of tall 
grassland. Due to population pressure and shortening fallow periods many 
settlements show signs of increasing erosion. There is little wildlife left in the Jimi 
Valley and people walk for hours to go hunting in the Bismarck Fall. 
Infrastructure in the Jimi Valley is very limited. There are two small airstrips which 
offer the easiest way in and out of the valley but the cost of flying is high. The road 
from the Wahgi Valley is often impassable due to land slides and does not cross the 
Jimi River leaving a large number of villages such as Bubkile and Bubulsunga 
without road access. Travel within the valley takes place on foot along a network of 
steep and slippery footpaths that make for backbreaking work when carrying coffee, 
pigs or large string bags of sweet potato. Several walking routes run towards the 
Wahgi and Simbai Valleys and across the Bismarck Range towards the Ramu valley. 
Government services in the Upper Jimi are poor. The few community schools and 
health posts are in a state of disrepair, understaffed and generally without 
educational materials or medicine. There is no electricity, no piped water supply 
and there are no telephones in the area. A single police officer based in Kol is 
expected to keep law and order. The lack of infrastructure and education and the 
absence of the most elementary medical services constitute a source of complaints. 
Kol and a number of settlements on the road count a half a dozen trade stores that 
sell basic commodities, foodstuffs and some clolxiing. Outside these there are a 
number of tiny trade stores. All villages have market days at which people meet, 
socialise and sell their produce. Often there are more than one market location and 
several market days in each village, reflecting the fact that each clan group has its 
own set of social and economic relations. Economically people in the ouuying 
communities of the Jimi Valley find themselves in a double bind. On the one hand, 
they have fewer opportunities to earn money and receive lower prices for their 
produce than the people on the road do, while the prices they pay for basic 
commodities are much higher due to the transport costs. This may partly explain the 
reluctance of Government officers to live in remote areas, where they not only feel 
geographically, socially and institutionally isolated, but also feel that seclusion in 
their pockets. 
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SOCIAL ORGANISATION IN THE J I M VALLEY 
The Jimi people know their valley and its river by a number of names such as 
'Kopon', 'Kon' or Konu' or - more recently - Jimi' . The Middle and Upper Jimi area 
contains four main language groups: Maring, Narak, Jiwaka and Kandawo. As in 
most of PNG, the borders between these languages are rather fluid. Jiwaka, standing 
for the 'Jimi, Wahgi and Kambia' is the dominant language used by the Upper Jimi 
population. The Jiwaka speakers of the Upper Jimi identify themselves with their 
southern neighbours in the Upper Simbu and Lower Wahgi Valleys, at the same 
time emphasising their distinctiveness from the Narak speakers to the west. Several 
commentators mention the extensive trade relations that the Jimi people had with 
the Wahgi and Simbu people before, and during the period of first contact (Burton 
1989,1. Hughes 1977, Healey 1990, Richardson 1958/59, Reay 1959). 
The Upper Jimi Valley boasts an elaborate segmentary lineage organisation of a 
similar nature as that first described by Evans-Pritchard (1940) for the Nuer (Cf. 
Kottak 1994). The largest social units are clan-clusters consisting of associations of 
exogamous patrilineal clans with extensive intermarriage relations, which in turn 
are made up of sub-clans and patrilineages. There are 5 Jiwaka speaking clan-
clusters in the Upper Jimi of which two, the Pala and the Kema are of importance for 
this study. Over time these clan-clusters have lost their unifying character and the 
association between the constituent clans 'is purely in people's conception of the 
past and has no significance for contemporary action' (Reay 1959:25). The role of 
clan-clusters and clans as political and ceremonial units appears related to 
population growth and group size. With the doubling of the population, the bonds 
of solidarity between the clans of a clan-cluster weaken. 
The patrilocal clan, counting several hundred people, is the central political, 
territorial and ceremonial un i t Every clan is tied into alliances with other clans 
through intermarriage, political co-operation and exchange. Membership of a clan 
confers the right to the use of land and resources, but also the obligation to defend 
that land and the interests of the group. Beneath clan level the sub-clan is largely 
independent in the forging of marriage links and the conduct of ancestral 
ceremonies. Every sub clan in the Upper Jimi has a sacred grove called where pigs 
are sacrificed to the ancestors. These locations can be seen as clumps of bamboo 
remaining on otherwise deforested slopes near the village and are often marked by 
clusters of large pines and plantings of Cordyline fruticosa. Unlike the clans of a clan-
cluster, the sub-clans of a clan do not intermarry. Often sub-clans have designated 
areas within the clan territory which they regard as their own and where they will 
concentrate their gardens. The name of a clan or sub-clan may be the eponymous 
name of its founding ancestor, the name of the place where he or his descendants 
lived, or the name of plant or ariimal (O'Hanlon 1989). The names of clans are 
usually made u p of people's names which have the suffix 'ka' or 'kan' indicating a 
'root' or a 'line' of descendants: e.g. the 'Maip-ka', the descendants of Maip. Sub-
clans in turn are made u p of a number of distinct patrilineages. 
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Jirni kinship terminology makes a distinction between matrilateral and patrilateral 
relations in the first ascending generation. This serves to separate those with whom 
one is related through the fathers side and shares one territory, from those with 
whom one is related through matrilateral ties and does not share territory. From the 
second generation and upwards a system of bifurcate merging terminology is used 
in which no distinction is made between mothers and fathers side, a process termed 
'genealogical amnesia'. In Ego's generation a distinction between patrilateral 
parallel cousins and cross-cousins is made. This serves to emphasise the agnatic 
nature of the local clan-group to which Ego belongs, as all ones paternal cousins live 
within the same clan-locality, but also gives Ego a set of affinal relations in the clans 
where his mother's sisters have married (Lowman 1980). Consequentiy, each 
individual has a spread of close relatives outside the localised agnatic clan, while 
marriage relations provide people and groups with a set of extra-local exchange 
linkages allowing for the exchange of land, labour and products, and the option of 
refuge in case of trouble. 
MARRIAGE RULES A N D THE POSITION OF WOMEN 
Marriage rules in the Upper Jirni Valley are best understood in terms of a number of 
prohibitions. Firstly, in line with the perceived blood-relatedness of the localised 
clan-group and the rule of exogamy, one may not marry within one's natal clan. 
Secondly, one may not marry into the natal clan of one's mother and thirdly, one is 
prohibited from marrying first cousins. Most marriages in the Jimi are 
monogamous, a norm emphasised by the churches, but many men like to have more 
than one wife as it serves as an indication of wealth and position. In the past men 
and women lived in separate houses, but nowadays people live in nuclear families, 
with only a few elders retaining their separate housing. Marriage patterns are 
poUtically sensitive for two reasons: In the first place the spatially dispersed affinal 
networks that result from marriage rules are of importance in extra-local trade and 
migration networks and provide allies in case of conflict and a refuge in case of 
disaster. In the second place the exchange of brides is seen as a way of managing the 
relative size of their clan groups. The fact that the groom and the bride play a minor 
role illustrates that marriage is in the first place an expression of a relationship 
between two clans. 
The social position of Jimi women, is generally characterised by hard work, poor 
health and widespread domestic violence between man and wife and between co-
wives. Highlands society is characterised by high levels of sexual antagonism. Like 
in all of rural PNG, the mortality among women is high. This is predominandy a 
consequence of the reproductive role of women, their social position, and their tasks 
in daily life. The risk involved in giving birth is huge, with one in 17 of all PNG 
women dying as a result of perinatal complications, a figure comparing with a rate 
of one in 1500 in developed countries (UNICEF 1996: 64). Women in their 
reproductive years are usually either pregnant or lactating which has a negative 
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impact on their health status. Women are by virtue of their social role as caretaker of 
children, pigs, the sick and the dying also more likely to be exposed to diseases. 
Finally, the hardships of married life lead a number of women to commit suicide 
(Buchbinder 1973, Lowman 1980, Wood 1980, Johnson 1982). Women play a key-role 
in the production of pigs and food, assets which constitute a crucial element in the 
forging of stable social and political relations between clans. As a result, polygynous 
marriage makes u p an important element in the investment strategies of status-
oriented males. Although women also contribute to the cash incomes of the 
household, they often have Utile to say over the way in which money is spent. In 
BubkUe, for example, one woman told me that if she were to control some of the 
proceeds from her coffee, she was better off selling it at a much lower price to the 
village buyer, than aUowing her menfolk to seU it for her. 
The virilocal marriage pattern dominant in the Jimi VaUey, implies that women 
become part of their husband's clan upon marriage. The women marrying into a 
clan are thus generaUy strangers to one another as they come from a variety of natal 
clans, a situation in which their status as woman, wife and clan-member is 
dependent on their fertility and the extent to which their productive labour 
contributes to the exchanges of their husband and his clan. It is through their 
husband that Jimi women have access to land, security and standing. This 
dependency is most clearly visible when a woman's husband dies or migrates, 
leaving the woman to head the household behind. The woman's natal relatives Uve 
far away, and she may find hersetf on her own in her husband's clan. Given the 
division of labour in the highlands, which requires men to clear the gardens and 
women to do the planting, households headed by single women have difficulty in 
obtaining sufficient support from male relatives. A Jimi man at Bubkile explained to 
me that in the view of the dead husbands brothers, widows are 'beggar women' 
who continually have to ask for support. 
Kolma, describes the situation when his father left to work on the coast in order to 
pay for the school fees of his children: 
With the father of a home away, most men would not bother to chop wood for a 
woman unless he was a direct relative of the woman. Otherwise, there would be 
'talk'... A similar sort of taboo extends to public pig killings, ceremonies and the 
like. Since it is the men who will decide whether to butcher a pig or not and after 
its killing who gets the choice pieces, we had three years of neglect when pig 
killings happened (Senge Kolma 1997). 
Even if single women get support from their husbands relatives, Joughin and 
Thistleton (1987:78) note that they may have to give out a disproportionate share of 
the final garden produce. In case of population pressure, widows are the first to find 
their access to gardening and coffee land restricted. This may force them to seek a 
situation of comparative security, either by returning to their natal clan, or by re-
marrying vvithin the clan of their late husband. 
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THE IDEOLOGY OF GROUP FORMATION 
From the perception of local social structure as stemming from a group of ancestral 
brothers it follows that the men of a clan and sub-clan regard each other more or less 
as 'brothers'. The emphasis on brotherhood between the male members of a clan is 
not only symbolised by the sharing of a common ancestry and the practise of 
exogamy, but also reinforced by an ethic of mutual support in which clan members 
are expected to support each other at all times. Fighting within the clan is to be 
limited to the use of fists as manslaughter would threaten the unity of the group. 
The brotherly solidarity between clan members stands in contrast to the social 
distance created by intermarriage. The denial of direct kinship not only enables 
exogamous marriage, but also emphasises the fact that the two mtermarrying clans 
may very well fight, a view expressed in the often heard dictum 'mipela maritim 
birua ('we marry our enemies'). The act of bridal exchange thus 'indexes' the 
separate identities of the two exchanging groups, defining the agnatic clan group are 
those with whom one shares bridewealth payments and receipts and can not fight, 
while classifying clans with whom the group intermarries as those with whom one 
exchanges pork and women and may fight (LiPuma 1988:119).22 
The contra-positlon of brotherhood and intermarriage becomes most clearly visible 
when the sub-clans of a clan identify themselves less and less as 'brothers', a process 
often triggered by an increase in physical distance between members of the same 
group following population growth, epidemics, tribal warfare or intra-clan conflicts. 
Given the role of adversity in the process of fission, Barnes (1962) calls it a process of 
'catastrophic segmentation'. Once the two groups are thought sufficientiy distant 
from each other, they may start to intermarry, transforming the relations between 
the involved sub-clans from that of a waning brotherhood into one of brother-in-
laws. The reverse, a process of fusion is a common strategy for clans and clan-
clusters which are in a state of decline due to falling population numbers. Such a 
fusion takes place when two groups, previously engaging in marriage come to 
perceive one another as brothers rather than in-laws. In that case the two clans 
become the component sub-clans of a newly formed clan, while the original 
constituent sub-clans come to act as patrilineages. The new unit is often named by 
combining the names of the two clans. The fact that kinship and group structure is 
largely ideological rather than strictly descent-based, facilitates the absorption of 
non-kin. In the Jimi Valley, the undiscrirnmating kinship terminology beyond the 
second generation, masks the fact that affines and allies, as well as adopted children 
and even whole sub-clans can be assimilated into the existing clan through the 
sharing of land and food. 
The social units that made u p Jimi society are thus not static but continuously in 
change, allowing room for the flexible interpretation of social structures and the 
22AfFtnal relations are friendly, with especially brothers-in-law having close relations. Men are 
generally allowed to refrain from fighting when hostilities break out with the clan of their in-laws 
(Lowman 1980; O'Hanlon 1989). 
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rules and regulations regarding alliance, marriage and exchange. Structural change 
is linked to demographic change as security, wealth, and status are closely related to 
clan size. The unequal demographic development of different social units leads to 
disparities between groups of the same segmentary status and affects the ability of 
the smaller clans to defend their territory and meet their exchange obligations. The 
obvious fact that larger groups rear more pigs, marry out more women, produce 
more food, earn more money and therefore gain in status and security, thus 
encourage clans to have many children (LiPuma 1988, Cook and Pflanz-Cook 1988, 
VanHelden2000). 
It is the task of the elderly men to keep count of the numbers of women 'given' and 
'received' in order to make sure that the demographic balance between groups 
remains intact. If one group were to attract substantially more women than its 
neighbours this would skew future population numbers, offsetting the precarious 
social and political balance, and constituting an existential threat to the clans that lag 
behind. A number of allied clans in the Bubkile area for example, recently decided to 
only marry amongst themselves, as they felt they were 'giving away' too many 
women and feared that neighbouring clans would increase in size at their expense. 
The modern equivalent of this drive towards an increase in population is the 
realisation that Government services will mainly be aimed at populous areas. 
Therefore, many clans regard the growth of population as a way of 'pulling in' 
much needed infrastructure and health and education services. Population growth, 
however, is stemmed by demographic, epidemiological, and ecological forces and, 
before the Australian imposed pacification, by military conflicts. 
The contradiction faced by social groups in the Upper Jimi is that, while a growing 
population improves the group's status and its ability to deal with external threats, 
this at the same time increases the risk of internal conflicts that comes with the 
growth of both human and pig populations, declining natural resources and 
increasing disease pressure (Rappaport 1968). Conflicts increase the risk of a break-
u p of the clan. Fission, however, would again increase the external threats faced by 
the resulting smaller social units (LiPuma 1988: 140ff). The pattern of increasing 
population both fuelled by and promoting success in warfare, followed by resource 
pressure, defeat and social decline is what Lowman (1980) calls 'the structure of 
impermanence' that underlies pre-colonial Jimi society. The colonial aclmMstration 
froze the existing clan boundaries, discouraged tribal fighting, and addressed major 
health problems, thereby reducing the volatility that marked Jimi social structure in 
pre-colonial times. 
THE CLAN/LAND COLLECTIVITY 
One of the most important features of the patrilineal clan group in the Bismarck-
Ramu area is that it constitutes the collective which owns the land and its resources. 
Landownership and clan membership are two sides of the same coin and while 
people may state that they 'own' the land, it is not uncommon either to hear the 
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view that the land 'knows' them. The view that people belong to the land, rather 
than the reverse also implies that a single owner cannot dispose of land and 
resources, as such action violates both the unity of the group and its relationship to 
the land. The main vehicle for the transfer of ownership/use rights within the clan is 
through patrilineal inheritance, and the most common form of private property 
comprises the trees which men and women plant during their life for coffee, fruit 
and nuts, firewood and housing. Game does not belong to anybody specific, but the 
right to hunt on clan land lies with the clan and, in the case of specific hunting and 
fishing localities within the common pool of resources, with individuals. Once game 
is caught, alive or dead, it belongs to the hunter, just as domesticated animals belong 
to their owner. Anybody cutting trees or grass, or hunting, fishing or trapping 
without permission of the landowners is trespassing and liable to pay compensation 
for damages done. 
The distinction between full ownership and temporary usufruct is expressed in the 
fact that clan membership bestows the right to 'talk about' the land in public. As we 
will see in the section on the absorption of non-kin this distinction is not clear-cut 
but socially and temporally defined. Inter-clan politics also play a role. Giddings 
(1984: 152) for example, remarks that the recognition of ownership rights by third 
parties is often dependent upon the granting of usufruct rights. By bestowing use 
rights on other people, the owners actually define themselves as the primary right 
holders and are implicitly recognised as such by those that benefit. The reverse case, 
where a land-owning group refuses to allow a group in need to use part of their 
land, may lead the latter to deny the ownership of the former and take it by force. 
Whereas use rights are bestowed by the land-owning clan, ownership rights are 
often also asserted by referring to past use. Thus, people will claim to be the 
landowners, to a certain area because they planted trees and gardens there, and 
because they buried their dead in such-and-such a place. Use and ownership rights 
thus reflect a range of different social relationships and are subject to differing 
interpretations. As relationships change over time, so may use rights. A man may 
ask a friend, an in-law, or an exchange partner for the right to temporarily use 
certain resources, or to accompany him on a hunting trip so as to legitimise his use 
of that area. In case of emergencies whole clans may be granted residence rights by 
allies when seeking refuge. On an individual level, men may leave their place of 
origin because of a lack of land, ongoing conflicts, sorcery accusations, or the 
expectation of a better life elsewhere. 
THE ACCEPTANCE OF MIGRANTS 
The position of a migrant is initially not a very secure one. He cannot assert rights to 
land or resources, is often not familiar with the clan's dialect and history, and is 
without support in times of conflict. Any serious digression, such as adultery, theft 
or violence, may see him expelled or even killed. In practice the migrant is 
supported by a local 'sponsor', an in-law, a trading partner, or a local big man who 
A description of jimi society 1 1 7 
wishes to expand his support base. This sponsor supports the irnrnigrant until he 
has built u p sufficient credibility with the local clan group, a process that may take 
many years. As the years go by, the migrant takes part in clan affairs, ranging from 
the day-to-day sharing of food and tasks in gardening, house building and huritlng, 
to defence activities and more ceremonial activities of paying bridewealth and 
contributing to pig kills. Whereas the original migrant will never be regarded as a 
full clan member and his children may be put in place by reminders of their 
'foreignness', grandchildren and subsequent descendants become accepted as full 
members. Children of migrants identify themselves by the clan name of their 'host 
clan'. With an increase in their status as full members comes a gradual increase in 
rights to resources (LiPuma 1988). 
Several factors facilitate the acceptance of a migrant. These include the relative 
abundance of natural resources of the host clan, its demographic situation and the 
qualities of the immigrant. If there is still ample gardening and hunting land 
available to a clan, and it has not all been carved u p into individual plots and 
limited hunting zones, than there is little difficulty in accepting an additional 
migrant and his family. Nowadays it is not only the relative abundance of natural 
resources that may induce a man to follow his wife's kin, but also access to the 
wider cash economy, education and health services. Following road construction 
into the Jimi Valley in the 1970s a large number of people with marriage connections 
with clans living nearer to the road, moved in to participate in the market economy 
and to enjoy the improved access to services. Land near the road has since become 
scarce, and land-related conflicts appear to be on the rise. A situation of increasing 
population pressure, however, tends to lead to a decrease in the rights of outsiders. 
With an increase of population and an increasing area under cash crops, individuals 
will start demarcating 'their' land in the communal pool of land, starting a process 
whereby communal land tenure becomes individualised to the extent that land is 
inherited buy one's children, may be traded between clan members, and in some 
cases, even with outsiders. 
In case of land shortage, people will strongly discourage the acceptance of 
immigrants and in-laws because they know the 'stranger's' share of land will have 
to come from the already limited pool of communal land. As a result, one finds that 
the practice of virilocality is strongly enforced in such densely populated provinces 
as Enga and Simbu. Here clan members, who resent the fact that a uxorilocally 
residing outsider uses their resources may label him derogatorily as 'meri man', a 
'women's man'. The relatively well-endowed fringe clans in the Jimi Valley, 
however, are happy to accept outsiders in an attempt to boost their numbers, 
standing and security and will explain the position of a uxorilocally residing man by 
saying that 'em i stap aninit long lek bilong lain bilong meri bilong en' ('he lives under 
the foot of his wife's people)'. In some cases, migrants will actually be welcomed or 
even invited as an addition to clan strength. When the prospective migrant is an 
exceptionally sWlful speaker, hunter or fighter, he may even be invited to stay a wife 
is given and assistance is offered in house building and gardening to make him feel 
118 Through the Thicket 
at home. As will be described in this study, similar overtures are visible in the 
colonial patrol reports (this chapter) and are also apparent during the interventions 
of the Bismarck-Ramu project, when many clans offered to build a 'base' in an 
attempt to affiliate themselves with the project 
INSECURITY, COMPETITION A N D P O S I T I O N 
Essential in understanding the competitive nature of Jimi society is its hostile social 
environment. In pre-colonial days people generally remained on their own territory 
as beyond the clan territory there were predominancy, enemies, strangers and wild 
spirits. Only strong and well-armed groups of men with trustworthy exchange 
connections usually through intermarriage, would travel and trade outside their 
territory. Most people had little conception of the world outside the direct circle of 
related clans, trading partners and enemies. When hunting in the Bismarck Fall, for 
example, the Jimi would turn back when seeing the traces of Ramu people, fearing 
these to be 'wild men'. It took exceptionally brave men to make contact. 
Before colonial rule the Jimi groups were preoccupied with their direct survival 
under circumstances of continuous inter-clan warfare and war-induced famines. 
Conflicts usually resulted from grievances over women, pigs, land rights, deaths 
and the related sorcery claims, theft and rape, often leading to a spiral of warfare 
and revenge. Warfare was an integral part of highland social life in which both the 
socialisation of young men into fierce warriors (Lowman-Vayda 1971), the 
resolution of conflicts with fighting as an intermediate phase (Pflanz-Cook and Cook 
1983) and the growth of pig and human populations (Rappaport 1968) play a role. 
The level of conflict does appear to be at least partly related to population pressure. 
Lowman (1980:124-125) for example, notes that in contrast to the Jirni Maring, 'the 
ten Maring groups residing on the sparsely settled margins of the Maring region not 
only lack clear-cut boundaries, but generally lack histories of recent involvement in 
wars ' . Rappaport (1968:116) mentions the growing 'irritation factor' that comes with 
the growth of both human and pig populations, declining natural resources and 
increasing disease pressure play a role 'irritation factor' that results from growing 
human and pig populations. Jimi settlers living in the little populated Ramu Valley 
too state that they see much less reason to fight than their uphill clansmen. Warfare 
was spatially restricted as belligerent clans fought across their common border, but 
would not usually engage in long distance warfare (Lowman 1980). The ritualised 
nature of fighting with bow and arrow from behind big shields and the low 
accuracy of the unfletched arrows limited the number of deaths during battles. 2 3 
2 3 The number of deaths as a result of warfare before colonial contact is hard to quantify. Estimates for 
the neighbouring Gainj suggest that 10 percent of male deaths could be attributed to warfare (Wood 
1980:120), while death rates from fighting among the Enga or the Hull is thought to have accounted 
for between 20 and 35 percent of male mortality (Meggit and Glasse quoted in Johnson 1982: 26). 
Sometimes tribal fights evolved into wholesale massacres. LiPuma (1988:20) mentions a Kauwatyi 
Maring raid in the Middle Jimi Valley, during which more than 100 people were killed. 
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Much more vicious were the sudden raids when women and children working in 
the gardens could be abducted, men would be singled out for assassination, or 
whole villages were raided in night time attacks. 
The old man Tai, of the Kema-Ageleka clan in Bubkile, recounted how his clan 
mainly fought with the Kondelka at Iawaramul and the Maipka at Bubulsunga 
across the Jimi River. He recalls how they would build a improvised bridge 
across the Jimi River and fought with the Maipka or Kondelka near what is now 
the village of Omin, a good 4 hours walking distance away. People would hide 
behind their big shields, while bowmen would discharge volleys of unfletched 
arrows from behind their back. People who stumbled were hacked to death, but 
those who were well-shielded were unfortunate to be killed or seriously 
wounded. After the fight, the warriors would return home and come back the 
next day. Sometimes this would go on for weeks on end. The raids were much 
more dangerous than the open fighting. Tai remembered how, after a fight with 
the Kondelka at Iawaramul, the Ageleka pretended to return home, but then 
turned around and raided the Kondelka men's house, setting it on fire and 
killing the 11 men inside. 
Defeated clans would seek refuge with allies while their houses, gardens and 
orchards were destroyed and their pigs, dogs and cassowaries killed. Warfare and 
subsequent exile often meant displacement, hunger and hardship for years on end. 
The colonial administration put an end to tribal fighting. Weapons were burnt, 
warriors locked up, and courts set u p to deal with conflicts. The fear of the Maps kept 
people from tribal warfare for nearly 25 years. Since Independence, however, many 
law enforcing institutions have lost their effectiveness and tribal fighting with the 
help of increasingly modern weaponry is again becoming an option. 
SOCIAL LIFE AS A ZERO-SUM GAME 
In order to reduce security risks, men in the past not only spent much of their time 
on defensive activities but also aimed to forge and maintain poUtical and military 
alliances with neighbouring clans. Those groups that managed to keep up with their 
neighbours in terms of population numbers, fighting prowess and exchange 
performance were in a position to forge stable political alliances, thereby improving 
their security and well-being of the group as a whole. In contrast, those groups that 
could not meet their social obligations because they lacked the numbers or did not 
have access to sufficiently fertile land would be relegated to the status of 'rabbis lain' 
('rubbish people') risking social isolation, military defeat and dispersal. The 
management of political alliances and exchange relations is thus closely related to 
the standing of the group and the bragging, ostentatious generosity, and display of 
strength and numbers that come with ceremonial exchange serve to advertise the 
attractiveness of the group as an ally. The pursuit of position through the 
management of exchange relations is not a matter of vanity, but in the first place 
part of the group survival strategy as the groups standing provides an index for the 
relative well-being and security of the group and its members (Cf. O'Hanlon, 1989). 
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As a result, feelings of well-being in the Upper Jimi are always relative to the 
performance of other groups and individuals, a conception akin to the 'image of 
limited good' generally attributed to peasant societies (Foster 1965). Viewing their 
world as finite with the most crucial resources such as people, natural resources and 
reputation being scare, this ideology suggests that clans and individuals can only do 
better at the expense of other groups and individuals. In the Jimi Valley, when the 
balance between groups is disturbed due to differing economic, demographic or 
political fortunes those on the down side, even if not experiencing any change in 
their own circumstances, will feel that the others are getting the better of them {'01 
winim mipela ) . The present-day feeling of losing out vis-a-vis the economically more 
successful people of the Wahgi Valley for example, give the Jimi people strong 
feelings of inferiority and insecurity, a pattern repeated within the Valley where 
groups with road-access feel superior to those without. 
The perception of society as a zero-sum game where the fortune of one always 
implies the misfortune of another not only leads groups and people to 'compete to 
remain equal' (Bailey 1971: 19), but also to jealously guard the existing state of 
affairs. If one can not keep u p with one's neighbours the alternative is to restore the 
balance by pursuing compensation claims against each other for various reasons. 
When people die or fall ill, for example, this may be attributed to sorcery, and a 
compensation claim may be lodged with the offending sub-clan or clan. Conflict 
between two clans or individuals, followed by death or disease within one of the 
two clans or individuals is enough to lodge a compensation claim or to commit an 
act of revenge, in Tok Pisin known as 'pay-back'. 
An example is the death of a Kema-Ageleka schoolteacher from Bubkile who 
drowned in the Jimi River days after a conflict with a member of the Owalka 
clan. The Kema-Ageleka lodged a compensation claim with the Owalka, which 
led to the payment of 10 large pigs and Kina 2000. By Western standards, these 
compensation payments appear to imply an admission of guilt on the part of the 
compensating party. The Jimi people do not share this notion. To them the loss 
of life in one clan has led to an unacceptable disturbance of the social balance 
between clans. Compensation can be a way of restoring that balance in a 
peaceful way rather than through outright retaliation. The compensating clan 
thus acknowledges the grief of the bereaved clan and somehow 'makes up ' for 
that loss. Whether there is indeed a causal relation between the actions of the 
compensating clan and the death in case is less important. 
Compensation payments are to a large extent aimed at dampening unacceptably 
large swings in the relative well-being of neighbouring clans and at defusing the 
violence that may result from such swings. 
BIG MEN A N D EXCHANGE RELATIONS 
Bailey (1971: 23) notes with regard highly competitive societies such as the Jimi 
Valley that they end u p being relatively equal because 'paradoxically... the strivings 
cancel one another out and, with few exceptions, everyone remains equal to 
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everyone else... they run hard in order to stand still'. Leadership in the Jimi Valley is 
based on the ability of influential men to escape from the pull of competition-based 
equality, and to build u p a reputation which sets them apart from the rest. Big men 
do so by attempting to control exchange relations in order to build u p a reputation, a 
'name' or a 'number' for themselves and their clan group. As Reay (1959: 96) notes: 
"The Kuma 'big men' or 'men of strength'... control the flow of valuables 
between clans by making fresh presentations on their own account and choosing 
whether or not to contribute to others. Their profit in these transactions is 
incremental reputation... The aim is not simply to be wealthy, nor even to act as 
only the wealthy can act: it is to be known to be wealthy'. 
Big men are important to their clan group as they weld communal action out of the 
many independent segmentary groups. Patrilineages and sub-clans operate to a very 
large extent independently within the clan group, the former acting as more or less 
independent economic units, the latter responsible for bridal exchange and ancestral 
ceremonies. Big men, being good speakers, strong fighters and adept at 
manipulating exchange relations cajole people into co-operating with their plans for 
exchange, warfare and marriage. It is not so much the membership of a clan that 
gives a man a reputation, but the individual performance of one or more big men 
that makes a local group dominant (Barnes 1962, de Lepervanche 1968). 2 4 
In order to control the flow of valuables, big men need to be prolific producers of 
pigs and garden foods themselves, a process which often starts with marrying two 
or three wives. Having more than one wife is an investment which will hopefully 
provide the labour to cultivate larger than average gardens and breed many pigs, 
and which increases the range of potential exchange partners and the variability of 
valuables to which one may have access. By supporting other men in the payment of 
bridewealth and other exchange obligations they build u p a network of supporters 
obliged to assist them once their own ceremonial presentations are to be made. 2 5 The 
extra labour availability, and the resulting 'conspicuous production' for exchange is 
the basis for one's reputation. Aspiring big men are more than generous with their 
food, their pigs, their labour and nowadays their money. As they make continuous 
exchanges and aim to give more than they receive they build u p a name. Those 
people that can not reciprocate because the resources and gifts of the aspiring big 
man are greater than theirs, default on their obligations thus becoming socially 
2 4 Marilyn Strathern argues that notions of personhood and leadership are culturally determined and 
that in contrast to African cultures where personhood is largely associated with notions of 'office', in 
which people 'take up' certain positions offices and 'play' particular roles, in New Guinea status, rank 
and position are not permanently attached to certain individuals, but subject to continuous challenge, 
negotiation and in need of continuous reaffirmation (in Long 1992: 26). 
2 5 Bigmenship is predominantly achievement-based as it is the quality of the individual big man, his 
oratory and fighting skills and his ability to cajole people into joining his exchange 'projects' that make 
him a big man (Kottak 1994, Sahlins 1963). The fact, however that the sons of big men may capitalise 
on the exchange relations, name and wealth of their fathers, gives them head-start over clan members 
of the same generation and brings a hereditary component into patterns of bigmenship (Standish 
1978). 
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indebted and obliged to contribute to the ever grander future exchange projects that 
he may harbour. 
Much of the position of big men and their clan groups is thus related to the extent in 
which clans produce food and breed pigs as a means to establish social relations, 
resolve conflicts and purchase women. Pigs belong to individual households and are 
mainly taken care of by the women. They are no longer kept in people's own houses 
or breast-fed by lactating women as was the case in the past. Most pigs are confined 
to pens or kept outside garden areas, while aggressive boars are usually castrated 
and blinded to make them more docile. The increasing population densities and the 
large number of pigs found in villages are a source of conflicts between the owners 
of damaged gardens and the owners of the offending pig. Pork is not routinely 
consumed within the household. Instead, it is earmarked for ceremonial occasions. 
By the laws of gift giving, however, it follows that those who give much pork will 
eat much pork (Lowman 1980). Nowadays pigs are also sold for cash, a practice that 
clashes with the need to reserve pigs for exchange obligations. 
The highpoint of exchange from clan to clan, where both the elements of 
competition and political alliance become visible is during the ceremonial pig kills 
which accentuate the association of clan groups. These pig kills are known as kongar 
in Jiwaka, and require years of advance planning in order to arrive at the largest 
possible number of fattened pigs at the moment of donation. The Kema-Ageleka of 
Bubkile for example in the beginning of the 1990s killed more than one thousand 
pigs and donated the pork to the other Kema clans. Cuts in the tree on the central 
market place in Bubkile still served as an 'account book' of the occasion and the 
Ageleka were now waiting for their exchange partners to get organised and 
reciprocate. The implicit rule that reciprocating groups will always have to u p the 
ante leads to a spiralling process of inflation in which groups work hard to get 
ahead of their neighbours. Competition, however, is not only visible at the level of 
the clan against other clans but also takes place within the segmented lineage 
structure. 
During a pig kill witnessed at Minj in the Wahgi Valley, it became clear that the 
display that comes with pig kills is not only used to show off towards those that 
are on the receiving end, but also used to ascertain the relative contributions of 
the different segmentary groups that make up the donating clan. Thus when the 
pigs have been slaughtered and cooked, the various households that make up a 
patrilineage line up their pork bellies and compare and discuss their relative 
donations. Then the patrilineages which make up a sub-clan get together to 
compare their pigs, a procedure followed when the various sub-clans compare 
their contributions before all the pigs of the clan are finally lined up. They are 
then counted and after speeches which emphasise the alliance between the 
donating and the receiving clan-groups presented to the allied clan. This is also 
the moment to emphasise the superiority of the donating clan and its leading big 
men. As the big man Kawelka expressed it following a pig kill near Mount 
Hagen in 1974: 'I have won. I have knocked you down by giving so much' (A. 
Johnson 1989: 65). 
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The gift is not made in lump-sum from group to group but each and every 
individual in the donating clan, offers parts of his pork to those people within the 
receiving clans that he considers most deserving. Thus when the moment of 
donation has come people will call out the names of their in-laws, friends and 
exchange partners within the receiving clan, giving them 'their' share of the pork. 
The pork received, is in turn not fully consumed by the individuals within the 
receiving clans, but distributed amongst their kin, in-laws and friends, leading to a 
situation where the pork is distributed across the valley in a network of ever-smaller 
and out-branching gifts. Important to note is that the quality of a social relationship 
is expressed in the quality of the gift. Thus important exchange partners receive 
larger shares of pork and nuts than less important relatives, and these moments of 
celebration go accompanied with a lot of disappointment. The gift is thus both an 
expression of the underlying social relation and the consumption of that social 
relation. To the pragmatic Jimi, the absence of a material expression of such 
association may be interpreted as the absence of a relationship. The emphasis on 
generosity as part of the exchange ritual makes it inconceivable that those well-off 
do not donate their pigs on behalf of the clan, as stinginess not just reflects the 
mability to meet one's obligations, but even worse, the unwillingness to do so. 
Even though the ceremonial prestations involving large amounts of cooked pork are 
the most ostentatious forms of exchange, food production and exchanges of other 
food products and seedlings between groups are important as well. In the Kol area 
in the Upper Jimi, for example, two sections of the Pala-Ageleka clan exchange 
karuka and marita nuts. Reay (1959: 86-87) describes nut festivals held in the Wahgi 
Valley where enormous amounts of fruit, groundnuts, pandanus nuts and sugar 
cane were exchanged between clans. 
Whereas the exchange between groups has received much attention in the 
anthropological literature, reciprocal exchange between individuals is much more 
common and at least as important as it defines the social relations between 
individuals. Very important for the status of households, for example, is that there is 
always enough food. Many Jirni people will, as a matter of honour, emphasise that a 
shortage of food is not one of their problems. The sharing of food is an important 
part of daily life in the Upper Jimi which denotes the goodwill of all those that sit 
and eat together. As Reay (1959: 23) notes for the neighbouring Kuma of the Wahgi 
valley: 'a man is a 'rubbish man', of no consequence if he has not enough food to 
offer friends and relatives as well as meet his personal requirements'. Not offering a 
guest something, however small, is impolite, refusing it even more so, as one rejects 
a friendly relationship with the host. When gossiping about the Ramu people, for 
example, the Jimi assert that these people will let their guests go hungry. 
More spatially dispersed networks, which enable extra-local trade, travel, access to 
resources elsewhere and the possibility of refuge in case of trouble mirror patterns 
of intermarriage as men will mainly trade with the clan members of their wife, 
mother, sister and - later in life - with the husbands of their daughters. These 
marriage linkages allow ample room for interpretation and manipulation. When the 
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Ramu Nickel-Kobalt mine was planned in the Bismarck Fall, a man from the Upper 
Jimi, far away from the mine site explained to me, that he had in-laws among the 
Ramu groups at Pimbum and that they in turn had marriage relations with the 
people living around the new mine. As a result of this link to the afflnes of his 
affines he asserted the right to work at the mine once construction started. 2 6 The 
choice of extra-local exchange relations both for groups and individuals is highly 
strategic. Those men that make wise exchanges build u p a name as big men, a 
reputation from which also the sub-clan and clan benefit. 
BIG MEN, DECISION-MAKING A N D COMMUNITY COHESION 
A moot point in the literature on leadership wilhin highlands communities is the 
question to what extent big men have the ability to influence group decisions. The 
literature on leadership in the Jimi Valley suggests different patterns of decision-
making and roles of big men within clan decision-making processes. The first is a 
more or less egalitarian model in which there are no hereditary, formally appointed 
chiefs or political offices and the role of individual big men is diluted, the second is a 
model in which certain men achieve high levels of influence through the 
manipulation of reciprocal relations, the ability to organise pig feasts, their 
knowledge of tradition, oratory skills, and fighting-prowess (Lowman 1980). Both 
patterns have their relevance for understanding leadership in the Jimi communities, 
but the first appears the more important in the present-day Jimi Valley. 
According to Rappaport, the Maring of the Middle Jimi Valley are more or less 
egalitarian in the sense that all men participate in decision making. Women rarely 
play a role in public decision-making. There are so-called big men who contribute 
disproportionally to the welfare, standing and security of the group, but their ability 
to influence people in the making of decisions rests principally on persuasion rather 
than on their position and status. Rappaport (1968: 29) suggests that big men 'may 
perhaps be defined statistically they are those who more frequently than other men 
initiate the courses of action to which a group commits itself. It is the personal 
attributes of these big men that give them the powers of persuasion. Maring big men 
are said to have 'talk' on all issues relevant to the clan such as fighting, ceremonial 
prestations, women, pigs and gardens and tend to have knowledge of the rituals 
that are involved in fighting, exchange and other exploits. While the participation in 
ceremonial prestations and the possession of historical knowledge may confer status 
2 6 The consequence of the close link between economic and marriage relation is not only that the level 
of economic activity between two clans is closely related to the extent to which these clans intermarry 
but also that the geographical nature of these marriage based networks shifts with the relative 
economic fortunes of the different groups. Healey (1973: 188) notes how in the past intermarriage 
between groups living in the Sepik-Wahgi divide and those further away in the Upper Jimi may have 
'resulted from a desire to establish ties with groups ... from whom, in future transactions, plumes may 
be obtained'. My guide Seina commented on the fact that the people from Kol nowadays were 
reluctant to many the 'bush people' from further in the Jimi valley, preferring to marry their 
daughters and sisters into the coffee owning Wahgi clans. 
A description of Jimi society 125 
upon people it does not allow them to make decisions for others, or enable them to 
coerce others into following their wishes (Rappaport 1968). 
The resulting structure of decision-making is amorphous. Meetings are aimed at 
reaching consensus, 'making the talk one', rather than at taking cut and dried 
decisions. The pattern is one of public discussions concerning a particular subject, in 
which small groups of men debate the issues, wander around or speak to the 
meeting at large. Finally, people wander off, without a decision seemingly being 
made and without action being initiated. It is u p to anybody who believes that some 
form of consensus has been reached to initiate the course of action that the perceived 
consensus suggests. Even important men may sometimes have to persevere to have 
their initial action followed u p by others: 
'In late 1962 there was much talk of the need to build a house on the periphery of 
the dance ground to shelter visitors to the pig festival, and one morning Yemp, 
who is... recognised by the people to be a [big man], called out that construction 
would start immediately. Absolutely no one joined him. Undeterred, he 
proceeded to the forest and began to cut poles and gather pandanus leaves for 
the structure. He continued to work for three days, complaining bitterly to those 
who passed by about the worthlessness of Tsembaga men, their sole interest 
being gardening and copulating. On the fourth day, others, perhaps out of 
shame or perhaps because Yemp had stimulated their sense of public duty, 
finally joined him in the work' (Rappaport 1968:31). 
In contrast, Lowman-Vayda (1971) found that certain men amongst the Fungai and 
Kauwatyi Maring achieve much more decision-making power due to a number of 
personal abilities and attributes. Depending on their properties, she distinguishes 
four different types of Big Men: The Unvanquished Men, the warriors noted for 
their aggressiveness in battle, the Splendid Men noted for their height and beauty 
and importance for the clan in terms of forging affinal relationships, the Ancestor 
Spirit Men, those men that have the ability to communicate with the ancestors, and 
the Fight Medicine Men, who are responsible for the conduct of rituals during tribal 
fighting. In particular the position of Ancestor Spirit Man is a political position in 
the clan, as it is one of the few offices representing the interests of the clan as a 
whole. His role is especially marked when dealing with other clan groups during 
ceremonies and conflicts. 
In the contemporary Upper Jimi the role of the Big Men is limited to a small number 
of activities, and does not extend into daily decision-making. Opo (1996) 
distinguishes three categories of leadership among the Jimi: 
The Kangipye have special oratory skills and are especially important at 
ceremonial occasions. Their skills include the possession of a powerful far-
reaching voice, the ability to memorise past events, and the ability to reproduce 
these events in 'sweet speeches'. Their role differs from the function of clan-
spokesman as the Kangipye is mainly involved in customary issues, while the 
latter deals with the Government. 
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The clan fight leaders known as the Opiye. ('fight-men'). Although fighting is 
less prevalent than it used to be, these men are known for their bravery, and 
knowledge of battle strategies and have the duty to instruct the younger men. 
The Yir-ndop-alamb: the 'smoke-fire people', or magic man who uses tobacco to 
divine the status of sick people. Because of his importance in clan affairs, he is 
likely to be a target of magic or ambushes by other clans, and will have to take 
special precautions (Cf. O'Hanlon 1989). He is not expected to participate in the 
fighting but uses his special skills to imbue his clan's fighters with strength. 
These roles have nowadays waned in importance. Indigenous valuables such as bird 
of paradise feathers as well as shells, stone axes and salt have been replaced by 
money. The role of the magic man has been eroded due to the arrival of the churches 
and western medicine. The nature of fighting has changed due to the use of guns, 
and external relations now include dealings with the government bureaucracy. 
Education, new political roles, and the replacement of local objects of wealth by 
money and commodities have undermined the standing of these influential men, 
and have rendered indigenous responses inadequate to the pressures of modernity. 
This was evident in 1997 when eight drunks murdered a young Maipka man in Lae 
a few days before he was to go to teachers college. 
Siwi Takep was one of the few young Pala-Maipka men who had been able to 
acquire a high level of education and his death was a great shock to the clan. 
Directly after the news became known in the Jimi, rumours were spread that a 
Jimi boy from the Pala-Ageleka clan had been involved in the killing and tension 
rose with the Ageleka retreating to one of their safe compounds to prepare for a 
possible attack. The rumours proved to be unfounded and tension subsided. 
These rumours were most probably an attempt to come to grips with the 
situation as the reasons for fighting known to the Maipka failed to explain the 
case of a random and senseless murder by a mixed group of drunken individuals 
in an urban setting. The customary responses of payback, negotiations and 
compensation did not apply either. It put the Maipka clan-leaders at a loss as to 
how to deal with the situation as they went through the options of demanding 
compensation from the 'Lae'. The bringing of the body from Lae to the Jimi 
proved to be difficult as well. After days of deliberations, hampered by 
impossible communications, the Angau hospital at Lae agreed to allow one of 
the hospital ambulances to travel all the way to Kol. The driver, however, 
refused to go further than Kundiawa. The Jimi escorting the body became angry 
and chased the driver off, hijacked the ambulance and drove it themselves up to 
Kol. At Kol, it was decided to keep the ambulance as compensation for his death, 
but when an armed police squad came to Kol, it was given up without further 
trouble. 
The present-day role of the customary leaders appears confined to ceremonial 
occasions, the outbreak of hostilities, or when disease and sorcery strike. Their 
qualities do not bestow the right to make decisions on behalf of the group, as 
outside their areas of specific competence they are just another, albeit respected, 
voice in the crowd of men that discuss the issue at stake. Many men would like to be 
seen as big men, want more than one wife, and aspire a political career. 
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Consequently, communities appear to have increasing numbers of self-appointed 
leaders of various sorts, with the net effect that few of them have any real ability to 
influence community decisions. Many men and their households pursue their own 
interests, even when it comes at the expense of the community as a whole. 
In recent years money and participation in politics have become important sources 
of status. Young people nowadays acquire respect through their education, income 
and understanding of wider society, instead of building it u p through a history of 
participation in local clan affairs. The conflicting sources of past and present status 
represent a thinly veiled generation conflict. Whereas the elder men will argue that 
they as cornmitted clan members, staying in the village in both good and bad times, 
assisting people whenever necessary and familiar with its history and customs 
should be respected and trusted as leaders, younger men emphasise their 
understanding of the modern world and their ability to 'bring development' to the 
remote Jimi Valley. 
To the dismay of the elders, villagers increasingly regard themselves as dependent 
on these younger, more educated and wealthier people for the organisation of 
community initiatives, the harnessing of 'development', and their dealings with the 
Government. In doing so they hope that these younger educated people have the 
collective rather than personal interests at heart. This is especially clear in times of 
national elections, when many voters distribute their loyalty based on gifts and 
promises rather than on the qualifications and past performance of the candidate. As 
a result, the election often turns out to be a source of frustration when the respected, 
more educated, and relatively wealthy person they voted into office, runs off to Port 
Moresby, not to be seen again. It explains why in rural PNG, the abbreviation MP 
often stands for 'Missing Person' rather than 'Member of Parliament'. 
COMMUNITY WORK AND MUTUAL CO-OPERATION 
Within the segmentary lineage organisation that characterises Jimi society the basic 
principle of solidarity is that the closeness of the descent-group relationship, 
determines the level of mutual support. The more distant the perceived relationship, 
the greater the risk of hostility (Kottak 1994). Thus although people of the same clan 
are expected to refrain from violence against each other, one may fight with the 
clans with whom one intermarries, while, as we will see below, relations with 
outsiders and strangers are not necessarily guided by moral considerations at all. 
This structure also implies that the 'we-group' that is invoked is dependent on the 
segmentary level at which the conflict is taking place. A conflict between two men of 
the same sub-clan will be solved at the level of the sub-clan, a conflict between two 
men belonging to two different clans will lead to a conflict between those clans and 
all involved lower segmentary units that make u p these clans. This leads to a 
situation in which the larger groups with a higher position in the social structure are 
less likely to exhibit co-operative patterns of behaviour than the lower groups. 
Under certain exceptional circumstances the high levels of competition that 
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characterise Jirni society may lead to considerable joint effort on the part of a 
number of clan groups. This can be illustrated by the story of the Kol High School 
where non-Jimi groups threatened to get the better of the clan groups living at Kol, 
forcing the Jimi to make an unprecedented joint effort: 
Until 1997 there was no secondary education available in the Jimi valley, with 
the nearest high school at Banz in the Wahgi valley. For this reason, many Jimi 
people, wishing to get an education, moved closer to the road but this situation 
still restricted the number of children that could obtain secondary education, and 
for the last fifteen years, there has been talk of the construction of a high school 
at Kol. The idea of the high school was first coined by the then MP James Kuru in 
the 1980s and he managed to get funds allocated to the construction of the 
school. His defection from the political party to which he belonged in 1985 led to 
the funds being withheld when that party came to power in 1987. Since then, the 
idea of a Jimi High School had been lingering. 
With an eye to the upcoming elections, the MP of the time temporarily revived 
the idea, and the Government allocated Kina 800,000 for its construction. The 
state of the road and bridges between Banz and Kol, however, did not allow 
construction materials to be brought in. Two weeks before 140 students and 6 
teachers were due to arrive there was still no school or housing, and the 
planning and construction of the institution seemed to become a disaster. 
Consequently, the Kol community was becoming increasingly anxious that 
another village would claim the high school if the school was not established 
before the elections took place. Community leaders therefore met and decided to 
ask the different clans to assist in the building of a temporary school building 
while lodging the students in one of the aid post wards and an empty police 
house. The whole idea was framed in terms of competition with the other 
possible contenders for the high school. 
This request resulted in a spectacular procession on a Wednesday morning in 
January 1997 when different clans came marching into Kol station, carrying cane, 
wooden posts and thatching. The different groups entered the school grounds 
one by one singing and yelling, the young men with bare torsos, and a few with 
painted faces. In waves of mock attacks and withdrawals, with the first men 
brandishing bush knifes they forced the spectators aside. Each clan heaped its 
materials separately, allowing for comparison, and waited to see what would 
come next. It was clear, even to an outsider, that the competition was not only 
directed at other potential claimants of the Jimi High School, but was also 
between the clans themselves as to who would mount the most impressive 
display and contribute the most in building materials. A number of men made 
speeches, emphasising the importance of education and the benefits to Kol 
students who could live at home and study for 150-250 Kina a head each year, 
while students from further away would have to fork out as much as 500 Kina. 
They also emphasised the fact that the Jimi could not let other communities 'win' 
this piece of 'development'. 
The work was divided between three clan groups keeping the competitive 
element alive. The Maipka and Aiboka clans were to build the kitchen and mess, 
the Kumka and Okulka clans were to build a double classroom while the 
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Ageleka clan had to dig ten pit latrines. There appeared to be no real plan or 
overview of the construction activities and I did not see any nails, tools, hinges 
or other hardware which one would expect to be required. Food, furniture, 
kitchen equipment, bedding, washing facilities, cutlery, books, blackboards and 
the like were not mentioned. The main thing was to get the buildings up in order 
to confront the outside world with a fait accompli. 
Such forms of co-operation are an exception to the rule. In the past, the importance 
of group solidarity to niimmise security risks enforced a hierarchy of rights wittiin 
the segmented social structure, where clan interests went before sub-clan interests, 
while the latter overruled the interests of the patrilineage and individual (LiPuma 
1988: 23). 
Nowadays the conduct of joint community activities is difficult. The various groups 
participating in community work contmually worry whether other groups are not 
benefiting disproportionately from the public good that is being built or maintained. 
Issues such as the number of men taking part, the regularity with which they take 
part in maintenance work, the location of the aid post closer on the territory of one 
sub-group rather than another, constitute a continual source of conflicts. These 
conflicts again give aggrieved clans a reason to stop work and pursue a 'free-rider' 
strategy whereby they do not participate in community work, while making use of 
the available service in times of need. This in turn generates a new set of grievances. 
In addition to the fear of an uneven distribution of work and benefits, community 
development appears to have become a highly politicised issue in the Upper Jimi. 
Many local politicians build a career on basis of their ability to organise community 
projects, making others suspicious of their 'real' motives and reluctant to join in on 
the work. 2 7 
The high levels of competition, suspicion and jealousy mean that clan groups will 
only co-operate fully when it is clearly in the interest of all lower units to do so. This 
is usually only the case when another outside group is seen as a competitor, as was 
the case with the building of the High School. The occasions when solidarity is 
required are limited to land issues, ceremonial activities and tribal conflicts. They do 
not necessarily include community work, campaigning for political office or 
resource management. All other activities are the concern of the lower units and are 
managed at that level, with economic activities co-ordinated at the level of the 
patrilineage while marriage relations and ancestral sacrifices are conducted at the 
level of the sub-clan. Only large ceremonial prestations, inter-clan fighting and inter-
clan politics take place at the level of the clan when the largest numbers of men and 
their pigs are required. 
2 1 An example is the airstrip at Kosap which was being constructed by the Owalka under guidance of a 
local big man. Although its construction would benefit thousands of people living on the slopes of 
Mount Oipo and although few other localities suitable for an airstrip exist, the Kema clans preferred 
not to join in as they suspected it was a attempt to increase the status of the big man as a future 
political candidate. 
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The High School was exceptional in that it enabled a number of clans to co-operate 
in a single joint effort.28 Resource issues tend to be confined to the clan level, as the 
hunting domains possibly targeted for timber production tend to be owned at the 
level of the clan group. 
In the past solidarity in clan matters was a precondition for survival. This solidarity, 
however, also required that conflict within the clan and sub-clans be avoided as a 
fission of the group could expose all of its members to the danger of military defeat 
and dispersal. Consequently, groups will always rally in favour of their man during 
conflicts, no matter what the issue is, which leads to a situation where social control 
over deviant behaviour within the descent group is limited. 
In 1997 the Bubkile Ageleka clan had a serious fight between two of its sub-clans, 
the Kolangkan and Kipingkan. It ended in full tribal warfare and several men 
received arrow wounds. Everybody agreed that the fault lay with a young man 
from the Kolangkan sub-clan who two years previously had stolen a bag of 
coffee, worth 30 or 40 Kina, from a Kipingkan woman. When her brother went to 
look for the bag, the thief slashed him on the head with a bush knife. The 
Kipingkan responded by attacking and burning several Kolangkan houses and 
were later paid 1000 Kina and four pigs for the wounding of their man. The 
troublemaker thought it better to leave for a while and stayed with relatives 
elsewhere. In the mean time, his wife who stayed behind had an affair with a 
man from the Kipingkan sub-clan, but was forced to confess when her child 
died. In highlands society hidden offences cause bad luck to the clan and it was 
clear to all concerned that the adultery had caused the child's death. This led to 
renewed fighting, this time with the Kipingkan sub-clan as the culprits. The 
Kipingkan finally agreed to pay their opponents 200 Kina and five pigs in 
compensation for the adultery. Within the Kolangkan sub-clan, however, people 
were fed up with the troublemaker, firstly, because he had started the initial 
fight two years before, which had seen several houses burnt and had forced 
them to pay compensation, and now because he had not been able 'to control his 
wife', which had seen several of them wounded. No sanctions were taken 
against him, however, as mutual support vis-a-vis outsiders is automatic, no 
matter the nature of the conflict. 
This lack of social control is also apparent in the perception of pre-colonial 
community work. People speak wistfully of the colonial period when the Map would 
threaten free-riders with jail or punishment if they did not participate in other forms 
of community work. They state that in those pre-1975 days, the patrol tracks were in 
good shape and people did not drown because the bridges were rebuilt if the 
flooding river took them out. Nowadays, many people have simply given u p 
participating in community work. The younger men especially, do not care. They 
prefer to play cards, and want to be paid for their work. Next to the absence of Map 
control, the most common explanation of this behaviour is that the community is 
2 8 Ivarature (1993) argues that co-operation in PNG communities is cyclical. High levels of co-
operation are required and achieved for single events such as marital or ceremonial exchange, warfare 
or trade. When the goal is met however, the involved communities naturally fragment into the 
smaller units that are more meaningful for everyday living. 
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made u p of 'bighets' ('recalcitrants'). In many instances, this 'bigheadedness' leads 
existing community assets to fall apart. In Bubkile, for example, the aid post orderly 
left after seventeen years because people were no longer prepared to help him 
maintain his gardens, house and aid post in return for his services. He has since 
moved on to the road, leaving between three and four thousand people at 5-10 
hours walking distance from the most basic medical care. People who do wish to try 
and improve the existing situation in their communities, have no other choice than 
to simply start work in the hope that their example will eventually be followed. As 
concern with clan solidarity weakens, a fragmentation of communities takes place. 
T H E 'MORAL COMMUNITY' A N D THE OUTSIDE WORLD 
F.G. Bailey (1971) uses the concept of 'reputation' to explain the notion of 
'community', arguing that the 'moral community 'is the group of people that know 
each other or at least know about each other 'as people in the round' . Having a 
reputation within the community, either good or bad, makes one a member of the 
group. Outsiders, however, 
'are likely to be judged in an instrumental fashion, not 'in the round'. They are 
not human beings to the same extent as those of us who belong within the 
community. This is the world outside where moral judgement becomes less 
important... where men ... are mere objects to be destroyed or employed in 
whatever fashion serves our interest' (Bailey 1971: 7-8). 
Mantovani (1984) argues in a similar vein that the ethics and morals that apply 
within the group to which one belongs, do not necessarily apply to outsiders or 
strangers. Thus, it is not the very act of killing that is right or wrong, but it is the 
question who is being killed and how this benefits or harms the killer and his group, 
that makes the action morally acceptable or not. The 'social order' and its normative 
rules fade out the further one gets away from home, and the interactions with 
outsiders become more and more subject to opportunistic considerations. 
This view is closely linked to the perception of the position of the human 
community within its social, spiritual and physical surroundings. At the core of the 
community, is the human clan group to which one belongs, whose members are 
related by kinship and common descent and who are considered 'real people'. 2 9 
Outside the human community one finds the individuals and groups with whom 
the clan exchanges brides, pigs and other objects of wealth, and one step further lies 
the circle of enemies, the people with whom one does not enter into exchange 
relationships and can only fight. People close to the community, trusted exchange 
partners and in-laws, may be afforded moral consideration, but strangers and 
2 9 Many groups in New Guinea consider themselves to be the only 'real people', implying that all other 
peoples are less than that. The Jiwaka speakers of the Jimi, for example, also refer to themselves as 'Yu 
we', meaning 'real men' (VanHeldenl998b: 53). 
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enemies are not subject to an ethical attitude and interactions with them will be 
governed by opportunistic considerations. 
Kinship-based exchange constitutes the main stabilising mechanism in the violent 
and envious economy of the Jimi highlands as these ties connect clans and their 
members with other groups and individuals. Every Jimi belongs to a number of 
increasingly inclusive agnatic collectives but also acquires a set of spatially 
dispersed relations through marriage. Extra-local relations are characterised by a 
high level of reciprocity and at important moments punctuated by the exchange of 
women, pork, valuables and trade goods. These exchanges both symbolise and 
strengthen an underlying social relationship, tying people into economic and social 
networks which stabilise the volatile social relations and existential insecurity that 
characterise highlands society. Exchange mechanisms take a variety of forms and 
cut through space and time, tying groups and individuals into lasting alliances. 
Important in conceptualising the notion of 'exchange' is that it constitutes the 
circulation of goods on the basis of social relations. Unlike economic attempts to 
analyse the flow of goods as part of a neutral and mechanistic 'market' driven by 
supply and demand between strangers it is not useful to separate economic from 
social and political considerations in the Upper Jirni. Social relations enable and 
stabilise economic activities, while economic activities give meaning to social and 
political ties. Trading traffic was in the past always handled through social 
relationships, and lacking a contact a man may not be able to get what he wants at 
any price' (Sahlins 1974: 298). 
The convergence of economic transactions and social relations, however, does not 
apply to dealings with groups outside the boundaries of the moral community and 
the extra-local relationship maintained with kin and in-laws. According to Sahlins 
(1974) tribal societies in which reciprocal exchange serves as an important 
constitutive element, can be characterised by a series of concentric circles in which 
the level of reciprocity decreases with social distance from the centre. Within the 
inner circle of relations a pattern of 'generalised reciprocity' (where one gives and 
receives without keeping records) is found, which the further one gets from the 
immediate kin group shifts to a pattern of 'balanced reciprocity' (where one receives 
as much as one gives) and the onwards towards an attitude of 'negative reciprocity' 
(where one aims to take as much as possible even at the expense of the other). 
Between related clans and among in-laws the emphasis is thus on balanced 
reciprocity, exchange with strangers and outsiders, however displays a tendency to 
slide into 'negative reciprocity'. 
As a result of the inverse relation between social distance and morality, relationships 
with strangers and outside groups, are governed by pragmatic and instrumental 
considerations. In contrast to sharing or balanced reciprocal exchange, transactions 
guided by considerations of 'negative reciprocity' are devoid of moral and social 
content. Such transactions can be regarded as archetypal 'economic' in nature as it 
entails the self-interested exchange between utility maximising strangers. In these 
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cases exchange easily develops Into an 'attempt to get something for nolxiing with 
impunity.. . evolving into 'haggling' or 'barter', 'gambling', 'chicanery', 'theft', and 
other varieties of seizure' (Sahlins 1974: 195). Under such circumstances trade 
becomes a delicate undertaking exactly because there is no moral basis for the 
behaviour of the trading partners. Many anthropological accounts of trading 
expeditions attest to the risk of trading ventures, the dangers of being on foreign 
territory and the ease with which trade evolves into warfare. In the case of trade 
with strangers 'the circumstances are radically Hobbesian, not only lacking that 
'common power to keep them all in awe', but without even that common kinship 
that might incline them all to peace' (Sahlins 1974: 302). 
Before colonisation it was difficult to deal with people not related through kinship 
or marriage, as trade with strangers was a risky and unstable affair. Social relations 
in the Jimi opened u p in the wake of the arrival of the Australian Administration 
whose emphasis on suppressing violence solved the Hobbesian problem niling 
trade with strangers. Nowadays trade with non-related people is a common 
experience in the shops of Mount Hagen, while within the Jimi Valley there is more 
room for friendship, trade and co-operative relations across pre-colonial social 
boundaries. Thus people may have friends from other clans or even other parts of 
the country with whom they went to school, worked on the plantations and now 
hunt, garden and trade. The pattern of socially embedded economic transactions, 
however, remains dominant, leading to a situation in which one first establishes 
friendly relations, and a feeling of mutual trust, which is in practical terms 
expressed through the undertaking of a joint effort or exchange. The cultural logic of 
this approach is clear in the light on the previous discussion on in security, social 
distance, morality and exchange. 
The forging of social relations, in order to subsequently conduct economic relations 
is visible in the earlier discussion of the tenuous position of migrants, but also in 
many day-to-day transactions throughout the Jirni valley. A coffee buyer from the 
Wahgi for example, explained that before entering into commerce one had to spend 
time, eat and exchange stories with the people of the villages in which he wanted to 
trade. Once people knew you and a modicum of trust had been built up, they would 
be happy to sell their coffee. Wandering into a village and simply offering a price 
would never work. In similar terms Jimi people buy their goods preferably from 
stores owned or operated by 'wantoks' (kinsmen: 'those that share the same talk') or 
in-laws. The economic relationship is thus embedded in a social bond, while the 
failure to maintain economic ties directly questions the nature of the social 
relationship and generates strong feelings of resentment. Reay for example, notes for 
the Kuma that: 
'In Kuma trading there are two distinct forms: institutionalised transactions 
through trading partners, and casual encounters along the routes. In the former, 
a man is content to conform to the ruling scale of values... but in the latter he 
haggles for a bargain trying to gain a material advantage' (Reay 1959: 106). 
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Similar patterns of socially-based economic relations are visible in Jimi migration 
strategies towards the Wahgi Valley. In some cases Jimi migrants returning from the 
plantations use their earnings to acquire coffee blocks in the Wahgi Valley where a 
sizeable monetary investment may buy legal title to a coffee block with access to the 
highlands highway. Often these new coffee farmers base their economic activities on 
a social relationship with the local landowning clan. They either marry into the local 
land-owning clans or marry one of their sisters or daughters into these clans. 
The phenomenon that 'civic sense' (Bailey 1971: 8) is a consequence of the intensity 
of social relations, is not only helps to understand the attitude that people take with 
regard to non-community members, but is also of importance in understanding the 
way in which the Jimi people deal with outside intervenors such as the colonial 
state, the churches and 'projects' of various kinds. In the remainder of this chapter, I 
will argue that Jimi connections with the state and other outsiders generally lack the 
element of generalised and balanced reciprocity kept for their direct kin, in-laws and 
trading partners and are perceived in instrumental terms where the overriding 
interest is to capitalise 'with impunity' on the presence of state agents, companies, 
churches and - nowadays - development and conservation projects. 
JIMI PEOPLE AND THE STATE 
The well-known expedition by the Leahy brothers, Jim Taylor, Ken Spinks and 12 
'native' policemen coming from the eastern highlands was the first to enter the 
Simbu and Wahgi Valleys in March 1933. The expedition cleared an airstrip near 
Hagen, allowing supplies and shell money to be airlifted in. In May and June 1933, 
the party made two expeditions into the middle and lower Jimi Valley. During their 
encounters with the Jimi people, Taylor and the Leahy brothers found that the Jimi 
people had no interest in steel tools but preferred to be paid in shells for their pigs 
and food (I. Hughes 1977: 52-56). This in contrast to the Ramu people who used to 
have steel axes and knives well before the Jimi. Shortly following these discoveries 
two Catholic missionaries were killed in the Wahgi Valley prompting the 
administration to close all areas not yet under administrative control from entry by 
Europeans. 
This did not mean that the Jimi people were unaware of the changes taking place in 
the Wahgi valley. Walking routes from Simbu into the Upper Jimi Valley run past 
Kerowagi where a rest house had been established in the first half of the 1930s and 
as members of the Pala clan-cluster inhabit both Kol and Kerowagi, people in the 
Upper Jimi were conscious of the advent of the white man before the Second World 
War. Elderly men remember carrying cane to Kerowagi for the construction of 
offices and kiap houses. They were paid in salt, cloth and steel axes. A 1944 patrol 
report notes that 'KUNU natives continually visit Kerowagi and Banz bringing in 
their sick for treatment' (Jones 1944/45). With the Japanese invasion of February 
1942, civil ao!rninistration was suspended and the Australian New Guinea 
Administrative Unit (ANGAU) was established to administrate the parts of the 
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country not in hands of the Japanese. During the war, patrol activities were 
primarily aimed at gaining military inteUigence and the ANGAU had little reason to 
inspect the Jimi Valley.3 0 
The first available report referring to the Upper Jimi, describes a patrol undertaken 
in December 1944 by a new ANGAU Assistant District Officer to investigate the 
impact of a dysentery epidemic sweeping through the highlands (Cf. Burton 1983). 
Lt. Jones found little evidence of dysentery. On his return to the Wahgi valley the 
patrol was ambushed by a group of Njembuka warriors, three of whom were taken 
prisoner. Following the attack, the District Officer at Mount Hagen concluded that 
'with the present staff available it is impracticable to intervene' and that the Jimi 
valley should not be patrolled until his aorriinistrative capacity was strengthened 
(Jones 1944/45). It thus took until 1948 to dispatch the next patrol consisting of 
inspector Wakeford with 16 Royal Police Constabularies after reports of tribal 
% h t i n g in the Jimi were received. The patrol proceeded from Kerowagi to Kol and 
after arresting four men for murder, moved on in westerly direction where this 
patrol too had to fight off a band of attackers (Wakeford 1948/49). 
After World War II patrols into the Jimi Valley were mounted from a newly 
established patrol post at Minj in the Wahgi Valley. In 1950 a patrol from Minj was 
the first to cross the Jirni River to solve a conflict between the Owalka and Kema 
groups living in the shadow of Mount Oipo. The Owalka had enlisted the help of a 
Chimbu constable and his gun, leading to the capture and torture of a number of 
Kema men of whom one died (Linsley 1950/51). In august 1951 different two 
officers crossed the Jimi River to be received in style. They were 
'lifted bodily by a screaming lusty band of natives, shouldered and raced up 
amid shouting and singing to the Rest House. Food in enormous quantities had 
been made ready for us and suitable return gifts were made (Corrigan 1951/52). 
From 1950 onwards the patrol reports abound with comments on the eagerness with 
which the Upper Jimi people received the various patrols, and built roads, bridges 
and rest houses: 
'[The Rest House] at TENGA was more of a mansion than a Rest House... to 
make a level plane... the ground was levelled down some nine or ten feet 
'(Linsley 1950/51). 
'Natives never previously contacted constructed a magnificent bridge over the 
Kon [Jimi] River' (Wakeford 1949/50). 
'A feature of patrolling in the Kuno [Jimi] area and a fact that excites one's 
admiration are the roads which now cross the rough valley system. I am given to 
3 0 Even though there are no records, at least one patrol, probably coming from Kundiawa, must have 
come through the Jimi valley during the war. Reference is made to a patrol in 1943 (Jones 1944/45). 
The only other reference to outsiders entering the Jimi Valley during the Pacific War comes from a 
1951 patrol in Madang Province which mentions how newly contacted Gainj speakers east of Aiome 
recall the killing of three Europeans by Maring groups during the war (Worchester 1952/53). 
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understand that notoriously bad tracks were, up to a few years ago, a feature 
which left a lasting impression but now all this has gone and roads replace them. 
And all of this road-building programme has sprung from a spontaneous 
voluntary effort on the part of the Kuno people' (Corrigan 1952/53b) 
At one stage, a patrol officer even complained that the 
'natives in this sub district Qimi] have one fault regarding building roads. They 
make them too wide. This in itself is hard work and means many hours spent in 
maintenance. Where new roads were planned Luluais and Headmen have been 
give sticks of about six to seven feet long. They have been asked to use them as a 
guide for their tracks' (Wakeford 1949/50). 
A search for suitable land for the building of one or more airstrips in the Upper Jirni 
started in 1957 leading to the identification of a suitable spot at Kol. In February 
1959, work on the airstrip commenced with the construction of six 'native-style' 
houses to shelter the different clan groups coming to work for two weeks at the 
time. The work schedule for the different groups was based on the existing patterns 
of alliance and enmity and as with all other public works the response to the request 
for labour and the men's enthusiasm was 'very satisfactory'. At the end of the two 
weeks people were paid in salt, beads, face paint and small mirrors (Richardson 
1958/59). Apart from these airstrips, an extensive network of footpaths through the 
Jimi and into the surrounding valleys was constructed. These routes were 
maintained by the various communities at the behest of the patrol officers. 
The great enthusiasm shown by the Jimi people appears at odds to opportunistic the 
view of outsiders presented above. It can be understood, however, when one notes 
that the Upper Jimi people quickly realised that they had little chance of offering 
armed resistance against the colonial patrols and that capitalising on the presence of 
these patrols proved much more fruitful. The eager attempts by various groups to 
build roads, bridges, airstrips, mission stations and rest houses can therefore be 
understood as attempts by individual groups to attract the aanTinistration towards 
their territory with an aim to increase their status and the opportunities for trade. By 
inviting the patrol officers and the churches in, by making them welcome through 
the building of accommodation and the presentation of great heaps of food, the Jimi 
copied the pattern reserved for influential and powerful migrants described above. 
By aiming to make the Gavaman ('government') feel at home, they aimed to forge a 
special relationship, no doubt hoping that such would give them preferential access 
to trade goods, security and reputation over neighbouring clans. The fact that the 
administration did not wish to build a special relation with any one group in 
particular was an alien concept in the competitive clan-based political landscape of 
the Jimi Valley. 
FROM ENTHUSIASM TO ENROLMENT 
Becoming increasingly aware of the military strength of the Australian 
ao!rninistration, local groups aimed to enlist the administration and its personnel for 
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their security purposes. In one instance, the Owalka group enlisted a Chimbu 
constable and his gun to raid the neighbouring Kema groups at Bubkile. More usual 
was that patrols were asked to intervene in tribal conflicts. The 1948 Wakeford 
patrol, for example, was the result of such request. These requests obviously came 
from the defeated or weaker parties who would make 'the story of the attack seem 
so treacherous that it cried to Heaven for vengeance' (Corrigan 1952/53b). 
Interventions in tribal conflicts were the only instances when clashes between the 
administration and groups, who saw a victory over the neighbours thwarted, 
ensued. In the Middle Jimi Valley for example, things were far from quiet as no less 
than four tribal wars were taking place simultaneously. In April 1956, pilots flying 
from Mount Hagen to Madang reported seeing whole villages on fire. The 
Department of Native Affairs responded by sending an armed patrol which reached 
Kwiop, where the Manga clan-cluster had just been routed by the neighbouring 
Yimban group. The patrol proceeded into Yimban territory and following an 
ambush on the patrol 7 Yimban warriors were killed. Once the Yimban had fled, the 
Manga proceeded to burn the Yimban houses and destroy their gardens and trees in 
turn (Pflanz-Cook and Cook 1979). The superior force of the patrol established the 
reputation of the Australian aaxninistration and fighting quickly subsided. The use 
of weapons became an offence in its own right, regardless of the underlying reason 
(Pflanz-Cook and Cook 1983:191). 
Once the last belligerent groups had been pacified, a number of patrols censused the 
Jimi groups and appointed luluais, local headmen, and tultuls, their assistants. These 
leaders were elsewhere issued with badges which became a much coveted status 
symbol worn on a string around the head. The Upper Jimi big men had to wait a 
long time before they received their badges and many took offence at the fact that 
Wahgi people known to them were issued with such insignia while they had none: 
'At each of my camps this question was almost immediately raised: we have 
stopped fighting, we have left behind us the bad customs of our forefathers and 
we build roads and we hear the talk of the government. We know that the 
people in the grasslands of Mt. Hagen and Chimbu have Luluais and Tul-tuls 
[headmen and their assistants], why not us. Are we so very different from these 
people?' (Corrigan 1952/53a). 
Others tried to pay the Map with pigs in the hope of receiving the distinction 
(Walters 1952/53). 
In the 1960s, the Australian Administration would create the begirtning of the three 
tiered government system which still characterises PNG Government today. The 
bottom layer of the system, the Local Government Councils (LGC) was created with 
the aim to educate villagers in the workings of democracy while simultaneously 
serving as a local-level development mechanism. This entailed the abolition of the 
'Muai - tultul' system and the setting u p of local council elections. In 1966 a LGC 
covering the whole Jimi Valley was established at Tabibuga, but in the mid-1970s 
the Upper Jimi broke away to form its own council at Kol (Maclean 1984: 39). The 
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Kol LGC consisted of 25 councillors and a separately elected president. Every clan 
also had its clan magistrates, land mediators and so-called peace and good order 
committees, who would mete out justice and solve conflicts. Severe offences meant 
the arrival of constabulary from the Wahgi Valley, arrest and imprisonment. Open 
violence became increasingly rare and patrol officers expressed their satisfaction 
with the situation. 
The churches dealt with the 1934 prohibition of entering uncontrolled territory by 
framing local pastors, and sending them in to pave the way for future mission work. 
The position of these native evangelists could be a difficult one. Whereas the local 
leaders combined skills in production, politics, public speaking, religious and 
cultural knowledge as well as fighting prowess in one, the church put a man in a 
position of authority with regard to one sphere of life: that of worship and church 
matters. This man, however, did not necessarily command the respect of the 
community at large. Often he was young, would not take part in non-Christian 
ceremonies, was opposed to tribal fighting and was not necessarily a strong speaker. 
Also nowadays, many church leaders mainly command respect by the way they 
lead by example. They do so by combining their church work with their local 
responsibilities, in what is basically a double workload. In many cases, earlier 
sources of status, resulting from a knowledge of tradition, a daily involvement in 
clan affairs, the ability to grow one's own food, and the ability to stand one's ground 
during arguments, determine the success of their church work. 
Once the Jimi Valley came under adrninistrative control, Catholics and Lutherans 
scrambled to demarcate their relative territories from May 1958 onwards. The 
churches quickly became enrolled in the political projects of the Jimi big men. In 
1959, at Iawaramul in the Upper Jimi, for example, a Lutheran church worker filed 
complaint against the arrival of a Catholic cathechist who was building a house 200 
meters from the well-established Lutheran Mission Station there. Although there 
was certainly competition between the individual missionaries, in the competitive 
highlands this was exacerbated as religion provided a new source of rivalry in clan 
relations. In the Iawaramul case mentioned above, the investigating Map, for 
example, concluded that the tultul: 'of Iawaramul has a long-standing feud with his 
Muai, a Lutheran sympathiser, and by importing a Catholic cathechist of his own, 
hoped to even the score' (Richardson 1958/59). Other reports note that 'the natives 
give one the impression that they are not greatly interested [in religious education] 
except for any material gain that may be formcorning' (Corrigan 1952/53b). 
A similar instrumental attitude in which the contacts with the government were 
immediately made useful is visible in the trade relations between government and 
the Jimi. Like other Highlanders, the Jimi were keen to trade for shells, salt and steel 
tools. In some cases the patrol officers felt that information on how to get from one 
place to the other was deliberately being withheld in order to retain the patrol. 
Patrol officer Worchester, visiting Jimi settlements in the Bismarck Fall, for example, 
noted that the people 
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'were quite friendly, but most unhelpful when it came to finding out the 
whereabouts of other groups in the vicinity. It seems that their idea was to get 
the patrol to camp with them for a week or two and to get their hands on all the 
trade goods' (Worchester 1952/53). 
The eagerness to trade for shell and other items is noted in many reports, as is the 
rapid change from the welcoming gift of food to visiting patrols to a form of 
bartered exchange: 
'In most places visited by the patrol it was the custom to make a heap of food ... 
On completion of the heap the headmen then made lengthy speeches, emphasis 
being placed on their joy at seeing the patrol and also how short food was but 
that they were willing to share what little they had with the Government, the 
final gesture being the outright gift of the heap. It has been usual practice with 
past patrols to return the gift with suitable items of native currency. The usual 
heap previously consisted of one or two pigs, several bunches of bananas, sugar 
cane and other native produce, the payment ... would be one or two gold lip 
shell, a knife or a tomahawk, and paint, salt or tambu shell. The amount of each 
item would naturally depend on the size of the heap of food... This was 
acceptable to all parties and there was no further talk or haggling (Walters 
1952/53). 
This form of gift-exchange would, however, rapidly shift to a form of barter in 
which the terms of trade were far from clear to those involved, and in which 
opportunistic considerations became more apparent to the great frustration of the 
involved patrol officers. 
However ... the heap of food now appears to have lost its significance as a 
friendly gesture and has developed into ... a means of obtaining native currency 
from the Government whom they think are bound to purchase the assembled 
goods at the owners price... The heaps of food or 'mountains' as the natives refer 
to them developed to such an extent that it was embarrassing for me to accept 
them as I only had a limited supply of trade items... 
An incident at Kubura will serve to illustrate the size that these heaps have 
reached. On one heap alone there were eight live pigs and nine small cooked 
pigs... The gift was accepted by me, but on return of the gift, which in my 
opinion was quite a fair one, five pigs were collected by the owners and carried 
off but none of the pay that I had made was offered back... I immediately 
recalled my pay and informed all concerned that under no circumstances would 
I accept their gift if they were going to employ these underhand tactics' (Walters 
1952/53). 
These instances show glimpses of what can be termed the 'instrumental' attitude of 
the Jimi people towards the government and churches. In their aim to remain 
'neutral' and 'above the parties' the patrol officers refused to identify themselves 
with one or more Jimi clans, thereby in the eyes of the Jimi defining themselves as 
permanent outsiders who could be subjected to opportunistic behaviour whenever 
such was deemed advantageous. 
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SECURITY, CASH A N D THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT 
By the end of the 1950s tribal fighting in the Jimi Valley had been suppressed. 
Restrictions on entering the area were lifted and missionaries began a number of 
mission posts and schools. The cessation of tribal fighting had a significant impact 
on the local economy and the use of natural resources. It allowed people to take 
previously indefensible land into production, and especially men to spend more 
time and energy on the welfare of their families. Several elderly men mentioned that 
the interruption of tribal fighting had banished the farnines which had characterised 
their youth, when they had to flee from attacks by neighbouring groups and ate 
wild yams for survival. Improved security also led to a great increase in local trade 
(Corrigan 1952/53b), while the arrival of trade store goods increased the fertility of 
the population: the same elderly men recalled, how after the administration came 
women started bearing many more children. 
An important change took place with the introduction of steel axes, bush knives and 
spades into the highlands in the 1930 and 40s. These tools facilitated the efficiency of 
forest clearing and migration into primary forest.3 1 The combined effect of the end of 
the Pacific War and its associated epidemics, the arrival of steel tools, improved 
nutrition and western medicine and the Australian injunction against tribal fighting 
led to an in crease in the growth of the population. It is estimated that the growth of 
the population in the Upper Jimi averaged about 0.96 percent per annum between 
1959 and 1980 and increased to about 2.2 percent per annum around 1980 
(VanHelden 1998b: 126-127). 
To the Jimi people the 'development' problem lies in the first place with their 
growing wish to take part in the m o d e m consumptive society, with the hard work 
necessary to earn a little money and increasingly with the need to meet customary 
obligations through monetary payments. People generally conclude that 'The Jimi 
valley is a good place for growing food, but a hard place to earn money'. Over the 
last few decades the Jimi people have become increasingly dependent on cash 
incomes and there is no household that exists without at least some money to 
purchase basic household items. 3 2 Money is also necessary to access the run-down 
Government health services, for transport, and to pay school fees. With the 
3 1 Salisbury (1962:108-110) suggests that with the use of steel tools the time spent on subsistence 
activities by the Siane of Simbu Province fell from 80 to 50 percent. Godelier (1973: 210), Clarke (1993; 
241) and Townsend (1969: 199-200) calculate a tripling to more then quadrupling of the speed with 
which large trees could be cut Macaulay (1976) notes in Simbu that garden size increased as the new 
tools were introduced while Clarke (1971) and Golson (1981) describe how the use of steel axes 
accelerated the speed of forest clearance and gave especially men, who are responsible for the clearing 
of gardens, extra time to engage in social, ceremonial and political activities. 
3 2 The most important items of purchase are tools such as axe-heads, bush knives, shovels, nails, pots 
and pans, potato peelers, and Items like clothes, soap and salt In households with a little bit more 
cash, people may add kerosene, batteries, string for the production of netbags, rice, noodles, and 
tinned fish. Sugar, coffee, tea, and alcohol are considered luxuries. Notwithstanding the limited cash 
incomes many households in the Jimi Valley own a number of durable household items such as 
hurricane lamps, radio-cassette players and sewing machines to shotguns, portable coffeepulpers and 
musical instruments. 
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instigation of user-pay policies around the country under the World Bank led 
Structural Adjustment Program and an increasing number of people cannot muster 
enough financial support among their clan members and relatives to send their 
children to school. Cash incomes are also closely related to dietary improvement, as 
items like beef, dripping and tinned fish form an important supplement to the local 
diet Qoughin and Thistleton 1987: 32). Nutritional studies suggest that the increased 
consumption of trade store goods is related to a reduction in stunting and wasting 
among children, and that higher levels of cash income are associated with higher 
birth weights and an increase in adult size. Food purchased from trade stores may 
assist in evening out seasonal fluctuations in food availability (Allen etAl. 1995). 
An important drain on the cash earnings are the exchange relations and obligations 
between individuals and clans. Whereas in the past bridewealth, mortuary and 
compensation payments used to be made in pigs, shells and feathers, many of these 
payments have at least partly become monetised. Pigs continue to be socially 
important, but other valuables such as shells and feathers have lost their value. The 
role of shells at first diminished as a result of the large amounts of shell that were 
flown into the highlands from the 1930s onwards to pay for local labour and 
supplies. Their value declined rapidly and their use as a trade and exchange item 
vanished in the 1960s (Salisbury 1962). Until well into the 1970s the Jimi Valley 
remained an important source of Bird of Paradise feathers. Patrol officer Richardson, 
for example, recorded in 1959 that: 
'Considerable trading takes place between Chimbu/ Kerowagi/ Nondugl/ 
Minj/ Banz areas and the Jimi Valley, the bird-of-paradise and his plumes being 
exported from this area. Axes, tomahawks, spades, bush-knives, pigs and 
sometimes cash are the mediums of exchange for the much sought-after plumes 
for decoration by the Chimbu and Wahgi people.... the numbers of birds killed 
in the JIMI area must have reached tremendous numbers. One observer 
estimated that at a sing-sing at Nondugl, at which perhaps 500 natives were 
present, the plumes of about 7,500 birds were used as decorations'. 
At first the monétisation of the trade in bird feathers and the use of shotguns 
increased the hunting rates during the colonial period (Healey 1973, Healey 1990), a 
development which the Australian Administration tried to control by restricting 
hunting to the use of 'traditional' technology and by reducing the number of gun 
permits. This trade has since lost its importance in bridal payments in the Wahgi 
Valley (Heaney 1982) and the use of feathers is increasingly limited to tourist-
oriented cultural shows. In some cases chicken feathers dyed-red are replacing the 
feathers of the Vulttirine Parrot (O'Hanlon 1989: 142). As a result of the dwmcfling 
trade in bird of Paradise feathers, it appears that the pressure on these bird species is 
no longer a result of hunting, but has more to do with the conversion of habitat 
(VanHelden 1998b: 188). 
These days bridewealth payments consist of considerable cash payments of about 
Kina 2000 (U$ 1000) and 10 pigs. As the role of money is becoming increasingly 
important, women in the Upper Jimi are at risk of being traded as commodities. 
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Whereas in the past it was u p to the groom's clan to make payment according to its 
own ability and status, clans providing the bride now give an indication of their 
expectations. Clans in areas with large resource projects see themselves faced with 
excessive claims, which they can not easily ignore for the risk of losing face. The 
chairman of the School Board at Kol, for example, has a daughter married into a 
landowning clan in the Gobe gas concession. As the Jimi know of the 81 million 
Kina compensation agreement between the mining multinational and the Gobe 
landowners, the chairman in 1997 asked 50,000 Kina (U$ 25,000) and a four-wheel 
drive landcruiser as bride wealth. 3 3 Compensation payments have also become 
monetised and vary between several hundred Kina for smaller grievances, to 30,000 
Kina (U$ 15,000) in case of murder. 
SOURCES OF INCOME 
The growing importance of cash in daily economic and social life in the Upper Jimi 
Valley is closely related with the arrival of the Australian Administration, the 
construction of the road from the Wahgi Valley and the arrival of the coffee 
economy. The first Maps to visit the Jimi Valley in the 1950s already commented on 
its limited suitability for the growing of cash crops, with the main constraints being 
the steep slopes and the lack of roads. Important was at first that the increasing 
presence of the colonial state brought a number of employment opportunities with 
it. Up to this day the main wage earners, within the valley are those who take home 
a salary in their capacity as carriers, guides councillors, magistrates, peace officers 
and land mediators and later teachers, aid post orderlies, police officers, extension 
officers and district managers. 
The first large-scale opportunity to earn cash incomes in the Jimi Valley stemmed 
from migration, and especially the introduction of the Highlands Labour Scheme. 
This scheme was instigated by the Australian Administration in the 1940s to meet 
the high demand for labour in the coastal districts after the Pacific War. Thousands 
of men from the highlands savoured the new opportunity to travel and aspired to 
the wealth that could be earned by joining the scheme. Many of the first to go, spent 
their wages on wealth items such as shells and feathers which boosted their 
standing within the community. Enthusiasm for the Labour Scheme waned when 
increasing numbers of bighlanders preferred to grow coffee on their own land once 
this became possible at the end of the 1950s (Howlett 1973). 
For the Jimi, however, there were few such possibilities. There were no extension 
and marketing services and the first coffee was planted by Jimi people who obtained 
their seedlings from Simbu. After two airstrips were constructed at the end of the 
This is a worrying trend for women, as they can no longer return to their families in case of 
mistreatment How is their natal clan ever going to repay her bridewealth if her marriage fails? The 
pressure on women to return to their husband, whatever the circumstances in their new clan is 
enormous, often leaving only the option of suicide open. 
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1950s, some back-loading of coffee started to take place. This state of affairs changed 
radically when the valley became accessible by road in 1970. Once the road was in 
place those communities living close to it quickly started growing coffee and the 
first harvests in 1975 and 1976 coincided with a sharp rise in world coffee prices. As 
a result coffee quickly became the mainstay of the Jimi economy accounting for 
roughly 60 percent of total valley income Qoughin and Thistleton 1987). After coffee 
was introduced many food gardens were no longer allowed to revert to bush but 
were converted into coffee plantings. The main staple crops continue to be grown by 
households themselves, and larger areas of land per household were consequently 
needed to satisfy both subsistence and cash needs which has had a severe impact on 
the remaining stretches of forest. 
As a result of the growing population and the arrival of coffee as a cash crop, most 
of the forest in the Upper Jirni nowadays consists of secondary bush land and is 
interspersed with gardens, houses and patches of grassland while gardens are being 
made u p to 2200 metres ASL for the production of vegetables and greens. The only 
forestland still intact in the Jimi Valley, lies either above 2200 metres ASL or at the 
far end of the valley on the inner rim of the Bismarck Range. This stands in contrast 
to earlier descriptions which note that the Jimi Valley is 
'almost completely devoid of grass ridges, and tall timbers rise from the river 
banks to the crests of the ridges. Native agriculture is possible in clearings in the 
forest' (Walters 1952-53). 
Hanson (1998) suggests that nowadays a fallow period of around six years is 
practised, while the time needed to recover fertility after a planting cycle is 
estimated to lie between 10 and 15 years. Communities in the more densely 
populated areas respond to the degradation of their soils and subsistence system by 
taking mitigative action through tilling, mulching and ditching, while the planting 
of nitrogen-fixing and fast-growing trees helps to restore soil fertility and provides 
timber and firewood. Hunting and gathering has virtually ceased. People complain 
that the cassowaries and wild pigs have 'run away' to the other side of the Bismarck 
Range. The old men recall that in their youth, they would have plenty of game in the 
vicinity, but now, they say, there are people and gardens everywhere, and their land 
has turned into 'redpela gratm tasol', eroded red sub-soil, because of the continuous 
cutting of the vegetation. 
For the more remote communities across the Jimi River, there continue to be very 
few opportunities for intensive cash cropping. Most people grow some coffee and 
sell their coffee to local buyers or carry it to Kol themselves. Up until 1987, Kina 
Coffee Pty used a helicopter to lift large quantities of coffee out of the remoter 
villages, but the fall in coffee prices, and the cost of this form of transport have made 
it uneconomical to do so since. Food crops suffer from the same transport 
constraints as coffee. People hope that the new high school at Kol will provide them 
with an outlet for their garden produce. A more important source of funds is the 
rearing and sale of pigs to those wanting to meet their social obligations. Pigs are 
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sold for anywhere between 50 and 500 Kina, depending on the size. In the Ramu 
area, Jimi settlers walk or even fly piglets u p to the highlands for sale there. Apart 
from pigs, chickens are sold for a little cash, but larger chicken projects have not 
been very successful in the Upper Jimi Qoughin and Thistleton 1987: 28). 
THE POST-COLONIAL IMPLOSION OF THE PAPUA NEW GUINEAN STATE 
The period of pre-independence optimism described above stands in stark contrast 
to the present feelings of frustration with the state of decline in which the Jimi find 
themselves since the 1980s. Nowadays if one arrives at a village in the Bismarck-
Ramu area, the conversation inevitably starts off with people apologising for the fact 
that the outsider has come to such a 'rabis pies', such a rubbish village. This initial 
remark is then followed by a litany of comments relating to the total lack of 
government services, 'sevises' having become the catch-all word for better roads, 
health and schooling but also for economic opportunities, money in one's pocket, a 
second wife for many men and a reduced workload for all. Whereas the Jimi people 
in the outlying communities will state that those on the road in Kol already have 
services, those along the road will compare themselves to the Wahgi Valley and 
complain in similar terms. This introduction is often followed by the complaint that 
PNG was made Independent much too soon {'mipela dring susu yet': 'we were still 
being breast fed') and that the Jimi would have been much better off without 
Independence in 1975. The Jimi people blame the 'coastals' in general, and Michael 
Somare, the first Prime Minister in particular, for the speed with which PNG became 
independent and for the lack of services since then. 3 4 
Colonial times were a period of great change for the Jimi valley, which brought 
exciting new possibilities, products and services. In contrast post-independence is 
seen as a period of decline. The council system proved expensive and cumbersome 
and failed to provide much needed services to the rural areas after 1975. Money 
made available at the top often did not reach the lower levels as the needs of the 
National Government and the urban population, rather than those of the rural 
population, dictated priorities. As a result rural services and infrastructure are in 
decline and the Jimi people are increasingly losing faith in the Government's ability 
to provide them with basic necessities in terms of market access, infrastructure and 
health and education services. Roads, bridges, clinics, schools, government housing 
M Such expressions are highly strategic and have to be taken with a grain of salt, as the Timi have a 
tendency to blame the absent party for the present state of affairs. Thus while talking to a visiting 
expatriate sociologist they will present the colonial period as an example of how things should be 
done. When talking to local officials, however, they may very well refer to the colonial period as the 
'dark ages' from which they have failed to emerge. In October 1997 the people of Kosap vented their 
anger to the new Jimi MP, arguing that the people on the northern side of the Jimi River still lived 'in 
the colonial days'. Because of a lack of road access people were not 'receiving services like education, 
health and business and the five community schools were without teachers and nine aid posts without 
medical staff. The teachers and medical staff do not come here, because of no road. As a result they 
stay away in Mount Hagen or their places and get paid while the children of Kosap are deprived of 
education and sick people suffer to death' (The National 23 October 1997). 
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and other infrastructure have collapsed, or are on the verge of collapsing. 
Government personnel are demoralised, law and order has deteriorated, and many 
salaried positions have been abolished. Although civil servants are generally much 
better off than the non-salaried population, the few remaining civil servants feel 
increasingly abandoned and isolated due to the lack of funds and the lack of support 
from their superiors. The few newly initiated 'development' projects are politicised 
along clan lines and in many cases are a simple disguise for large monetary 
handouts and political favouritism. Up to 1995/96 the churches in the area were led 
by foreign missionaries, but these have now left, leaving the church district to its 
own devices. 
This experience of decline is increasingly linked to feelings of inferiority. For many 
Jimi the development in the Wahgi Valley, only 80 kilometres away, with its cash 
economy based on coffee plantations, tarmac roads, hospitals, schools and the urban 
centre of Mount Hagen accentuate their own failure to muster development. This 
sense of 'missing out', of not being part of the wider world in which development is 
taking place, of being 'beaten' by other, more successful, groups engenders deep 
feelings of frustration and a contradictory attitude towards the State. On the one 
hand the State is seen as failing its duty towards them, while at the same time 
politics are perceived as one of the few remaining opportunities to access the status, 
money and services associated with the idea of 'development'. 
THE ROAD AS IMAGE OF 'DEVELOPMENT' 
In geographical terms the Jimi feelings of isolation are very real. The low extent and 
quality of local infrastructure constitutes a major obstacle to further integration in 
the cash economy, a situation reflected in the fact that whenever the Jimi people 
discuss 'development' people start by talking about 'the road'. Whereas during the 
1970s the road and the coffee economy that came with it were the very image of 
'development', the road nowadays has become a symbol for the way in which the 
Jimi have been betrayed by the Government. The road to the Wahgi Valley is 
narrow, unsealed, and frequently destroyed by landslides, as a result of which it 
takes around five hours to cover the 80 kilometres to Banz. Up to the early 1990s 
buses used to run, but in the last few years the condition of the road has deteriorated 
to the extent that only four-wheel drives and trucks get through. The number of 
vehicles travelling has been reduced and the cost of travelling is high, forcing many 
people to walk as their ancestors did. 
The disparities between the 'road-people' and the 'bush-people' are an ongoing 
source of frustration and friction between the different clan groups. For the more 
remote communities little has changed in terms of cash earning opportunities since 
Independence in 1975 and many of these people can be regarded as 'functionally 
landless' in the sense that they are largely unable to participate in the market 
economy due to the lack of infrastructure and market access (Howlett 1973). Not 
surprisingly the construction of new roads, rather than the upgrading of the existing 
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one, is the main concern for the bush-people during the election campaigns. The lack 
of road access as the dominant problem has lead to a widespread perception of road 
access as a means to earn money and as the dominant characteristic of a state of 
'development'. It is a vision in which the Government, responsible for buUding and 
mamtaining infrastructure is increasingly seen to fail its duty. Some people say that 
they need the road to bring mining or logging companies in, but very often this type 
of reasoning is reversed: in the light of the Government's failure to do its duty, 
people need a logging or mining company to build roads. 
The limitations on their participation in the cash economy force large numbers of 
young men to seek work on plantations in the Wahgi and Markham valleys and in 
the coastal regions. In some cases, large number of men leave the village at once 
through the efforts of a labour recruiter, as was the case in 1987 in the Koinambe 
region in the Middle Jimi, when about one thousand men left. Obviously this has a 
major impact on the women and children remaining behind Qoughin and Thistleton 
1987: 30). Many people from Bubkile and Bubulsunga have moved into the Ramu 
valley, to follow a dual cash strategy of planting coffee in the highlands and betelnut 
in the lowlands. Another way of making use of the fringe location of these clan 
groups consists of the smuggling of alcohol and the cultivation and sale of 
marihuana. The first is made possible due to the liquor ban in Western Highlands 
Province and the availabiUty of alcohol in Madang Province. A carton of 24 small 
bottles of cheap gin carried u p through the forest in four or five days can be sold at a 
large profit. Marihuana may be the crop of the future for the fringe communities of 
the Upper Jirni and may actually traded for weapons. The risk of being caught is 
marginal, as the Jimi Valley is huge, and as no police officer will venture beyond the 
relative safety of the road. 
T H E ABSENCE OF STATE LAW 
The receding State not only leaves its marks in the form of a lack of road 
maintenance and health and education services, and but also in its failure to fulfil its 
archetypal role as conflict mediator and holder of the monopoly on the use of 
violence. When the Australian patrols entered the Jimi and Ramu Valleys, their first 
aim was to suppress violence, disarm the various clan groups and instil the 'rule of 
law'. It is from that basic step that all other Government and church activities 
followed. The post-colonial state, however, has been unable to maintain control over 
the use of force and no longer plays a significant role in the resolution of local 
conflicts. This results partly from the fact that the whole Upper Jimi has but a single 
police officer. The officer, who originates from the Sepik, lives in Kol, but has to 
make do without a car, radio communications, lock-up, but is expected to look after 
a population of 7,000 in a very rough area of 550 square kilometres. 
Like many of the government personnel who have spent a long time in the rural 
areas, he has married a local woman and has gradually been incorporated into the 
local social structure, much in the same way that Jimi men may choose to reside 
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uxorilocally or live with other clans. He is a well-respected man and the clans 
around Kol station contributed to his bride wealth payment. The result of this 
inclusion in the local clan structure is that he has to walk a tight-rope between his 
duties as an officer and the expectations of local people. In such a situation, it can be 
hard to arrest an in-law even in the case of a serious offence. This does not matter 
too much in practice as following an incident in Kosap and Bubkile, most of the 
Upper Jimi is considered off-limits to the Provincial Police Command anyway: 
In 1987 a police patrol visiting the Upper Jimi ran amok. Women were raped, 
people were forced to undress and parade in front of other villagers, and 
children were strung up by their legs from the branches of trees. Local villagers 
decided that enough was enough when one of the officers shot at a respected 
elder man grazing his head with a bullet. People from all villages in the area, 
armed with bows and arrows, home-made guns and axes marched to the house 
where the officers were staying and forced them to surrender their weapons. 
Their uniforms torn up, the officers were humiliated by being forced to frog 
march and laugh on command. At night, they were told to count the stars. Many 
people wanted to kill them, but were restrained, and in the end the officers were 
only beaten up. They were told to send the Provincial Police Commander to 
discuss the behaviour of his men and to retrieve their weapons. The Police 
Commander first sent several carloads into the Jimi Valley, but when they 
arrived and saw the terrain through which they would have to walk they turned 
back. The Police Commander himself then came by helicopter, but local people 
were afraid to face him and fled, leaving the guns for him to take away. Since 
this incident, no police officer has been to Bubkile. 
The Jimi thus have to solve their own conflicts with the help of the village courts 
introduced by the Colonial Aclministration. This allows for a procedure which turns 
two-sided conflicts into a triadic situation where neutral councillors and magistrates 
with judicial authority mediate between the disputants (Cf. Pflanz-Cook and Cook 
1983). Each clan has its own magistrate and peace officers that can be called upon to 
resolve the conflicts of clan to which they are not affiliated. Due to the high level of 
intermarriage, it can be hard to find a magistrate acceptable to both parties. 3 5 For 
land disputes there are so-called Land Mediators, who negotiate conflicting land 
claims, but both the Land Mediators and the Peace and Good Order committees 
were decommissioned in September 1995 due to a lack of government funds. The 
remaining judicial officers are demoralised due the failure of the government to 
3 5 Village courts officially only deal with minor issues, while more serious offences are to be referred to 
the National Court In practice, however, the administrative and logistical difficulties involved in 
prosecution, arrest and detention provide a strong incentive to also solve the more serious issues 
locally through compensation negotiations. After the 1993 war between the Kiluwa and Milintse clans, 
which left three people dead no arrests were made, but compensation was paid. The wounding of a 
Konkilmanka man went by without police action, but a killing at Olnar on the road happened when a 
provincial police detail was at Kol and led to the arrest of a suspect. This specific conflict was difficult 
to resolve by local means anyway, as it involved two brothers within the same family. In such a case, 
the usual repertoire of clan-based retaliation and compensation negotiations does not apply. As 
people explained 'Justice had to take its course, because we can not fight'. 
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provide them with their allowances, stating that 'the Government's money is 
finished' and that 'therefore they don't work very hard'. 
THE PURSUIT OF POLITICS 
The growing disappointment with the performance of the national state and its local 
representatives has, however not led to a reduced interest in politics. To the 
contrary. In an environment with limited opportunities for socio-economic 
improvement, many people and clan groups see participation in local, provincial 
and national politics as one of the very few opportunities for 'development'. This 
view is a result of the fact that political office has become a direct source of funds. 
These flows of funding not only stem from political patronage relations that keep 
the fragile national coalitions that characterise PNG political life intact, but have 
increasingly become institutionalised. In an attempt to generate development in the 
rural area's all 109 parliamentarians are yearly allotted large sums of money to 
implement 'projects' with. These so-called Electoral Development Funds allow MPs 
to reward their supporters. This has engendered a political culture in which aspiring 
candidates zip around the district ceremonially Wiling pigs, making speeches and 
leaving a trail of promises, cash and gifts. 
Jimi settlers living in the Ramu Valley make use of the proximity of the Madang-
Western Highlands Provincial border by playing politics on both sides of the border. 
The Jimi settlers Hving in the Ramu Valley are part of two provincial political and 
aciministrative systems and proved adept at organising the construction of an 
airstrip, a school and an aidpost at Foroko-Brimde in the Ramu Valley by 
supporting a local candidate for the Madang Governor's post. During elections 
many Jimi register in both provinces and would vote for their candidate in the 
Western Highlands Province as well as their man in Madang, allowing them tap into 
the political system on two ends. This was practically possible as voting takes place 
during a number of weeks and as people simply have to make the trek u p to the Jimi 
Valley after having voted in Madang Province, or make the trek back to the Ramu 
valley after casting their vote in Bubulsunga and Bubkile. This went on for almost 
twenty years, until the inevitable happened in October 1997, when two helicopter-
borne polling teams, one from Madang and one from Western Highlands Province, 
met each other in the Ramu valley to take the votes of the Jimi communities there. 
The officials not knowing what to do, allowed all present to vote in both ballots. 
In the Jimi Valley the political importance of roads and cash incomes come together 
in the so-called 'hand-outs' that characterise local political patronage. Unlike wage 
labour, this important form of 'income' is aimed at whole clans and consists of 
payment for road building duties. The previous Jimi MP for example, commissioned 
a number of road projects. Amongst these was a failed attempt to build a road link 
to Simbu Province and the successful buuding of 4 kilometres of road from Kol to 
his own house. Although in September 1995, a total of K 288,500 (U$ 145,000) was 
paid out to local clan groups for these road works it appears that the district got 
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very little value for money. The problem, according to some local people, was the 
lack of planning and especially the absence of a clear relationship between the work 
done and the size of the sum paid out as many of these payments were in the first 
place a reward for political support during the elections rather than a concerted 
attempt to improve local infrastructure. Arguments arose when those clans that had 
worked well, saw rival groups get paid even larger amounts for less work. 
A second issue of importance in looking at the local perception of the political 
system is the fact that politicians across the country are actively involved in 
'bringing development' to their constituencies by opening the doors to international 
mining and logging ventures. This plays on the strongly held idea that companies 
provide roads and cash incomes. Many remote areas in PNG have - at least 
temporarily - been opened u p by timber and mining companies in order to gain 
access to the resources of their choice. In the Jimi too, people would like a company 
to construct a road so that they make a Uving like their neighbours further south. 
The fact that most Jimi politicians run on a platform of promises to construct roads 
to the various isolated communities even though few of these promises are realistic, 
leave alone economically justifiable, means that frustrations run deep when those 
that win their seat do not make their promises good. 
This became evident to the previous MP for the Jimi during his re-election 
campaign in 1996. As a candidate in 1992, he had promised the construction of a 
road to Bubulsunga and Bubkile when elected. In anticipation of the coming of 
the road a number of young men planted large numbers of coffee trees at 
Bubulsunga. The road, however, was not built, much to the anger and frustration 
of the Bubulsunga community, who proceeded to drag the MP of his helicopter 
when he landed for a short visit in October 1996. They demanded to know why 
he was flying when he promised them a road. He was lucky to have landed 
among his in-laws, because people from Bubkile stated that he would have been 
killed had he touched down there. Following the incident the member had to 
campaign with the assistance of an armed police detail. He lost the elections. 
In recent years money and participation in politics have become increasingly 
important sources of status. People use money to build up a reputation as a leader 
on the basis of their education, their understanding of the 'modern' world, their 
ability to link up with the modern state rather than through participation in clan 
affairs as was the case in pre-colonial society. The fact that politics, status and 
money have become so closely linked makes elections in PNG increasingly violent 
and leads to a fragmentation of groups which would previously work together in 
political affairs. This became especially visible during the Local Level Government 
elections of October 1997, when widespread fighting broke out between sub-clans 
and even rathin extended families leading to widespread disagreement and 
conflicts in which houses were burnt and a large number of people got hurt. 
Status and the ability to secure the welfare and security of one's group thus continue 
to be the driving motivation within Jimi society, but the manner in which this 'social 
capital' is being expressed has shifted towards participation in national politics and 
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the access to the monetary economy. These shifting views of what makes a leader 
and his clan prestigious and how to achieve development have also affected the 
values that people hold with regard to their natural environment. 
C H A N G I N G VALUES A N D T H E ENVIRONMENT 
The increasing intégration of the Jimi in world markets and the waning role of the 
State has since independence lead to a number of contradictory impacts on the 
natural environment. On the one hand, cash crops like coffee and vegetables have 
increased the pressure on land. On the other hand, the growth of the cash economy 
has provided opportunities for productive work outside the Jimi Valley, leading to a 
net outflow of migrants and reducing the impact of population pressure. As of yet, 
however, population growth still outstrips out-migration and leads to increasing 
population densities. In the past, the value that people attached to their environment 
was mainly dependent on the extent to which nature provided direct resources and 
services to local communities. 
With the increasing monétisation of the rural economy, and the growing consumer 
aspirations of the population at large, the nature of environmental values is 
changing. Whereas nature was previously a source of provisions on which people 
depended for their livelihood, these provisions are now regarded as second rate. 
The Jimi people no longer wish to eat bush foods; they prefer the 'white man's food'; 
tinned fish, noodles and rice. Similarly they are losing their knowledge of, and trust 
in, local medicine, and need money to access health services and purchase modern 
medicines. Young men no longer aspire to be good farmers and hunters on their 
own lands, but hope for a paid job in the Wahgi Valley. They despise the daily 
drudgery of working on the land, walking long distances with heavy loads for little 
money, and prefer to relax, chase girls, and play cards. Many are bored with village 
life and try their luck in town. The older people have become increasingly frustrated 
and impatient with the development process. Their circumstances have not 
improved, but have been declining since the 1980s and continue to do so. As a result 
of these frustrated expectations, money has come to be seen as the key to a better life 
and a means to meet one's obligations and a source of social status. As long as one 
has money to spend, one can acquire the things that make life worth living. 
Over the last 30 years, there has been a gradual shift in consumer orientation from 
what the bush and gardens can provide to what is for sale in the shops. Money has 
come to be seen as the key to a better life, new opportunities, a means to meet one's 
obhgations, and a source of social status. The result of this focus on the purchase of 
manufactured goods and services, rather than the exploitation of nature for direct 
use, is that the environment has lost many of its previous functions and much of its 
previous use-value. Instead, the environment now becomes valued insofar as it can 
provide financial rewards and better services to people. This shift from use-values to 
market values for a number of environmental products is most clearly visible in the 
forestry sector in Papua N e w Guinea. Where forests previously provided a range of 
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products and services with direct use-values, they have, as a result of the 
intervention of multinational logging companies and the increasing frustration of 
local people with the development process, increasingly come to be regarded as 
storehouses of wealth. Landowners across the country wish to convert their forests 
into money as soon as possible. In the Jimi Valley, due to the inaccessibility of the 
terrain, the absence of minerals, the extensive degradation of its forests and the lack 
of infrastructure, logging or rnining is not an option, leaving the Jimi people in a 
difficult quandary as to how to improve their lives. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
This chapter has provided an introduction to the Jimi Valley and its people. The 
overview of the elaborate segmented social organisation, the fragmented 
communities, the present and past forms of leadership, and the complex brew of co-
operation and confrontation presented above, illustrates how Jimi 'communities', 
usually made u p of a number of clan or sub-clan groups living in dispersed 
settlements can be characterised by fluid borders and overlapping allegiances. The 
different strategic groups continuously negotiate, co-operate and battle for 
reputation, economic advantage and security. Communities do not operate as 
homogenous entities but in temporary alliances established with regard to a specific 
problem or situation as it arises. The 'community' with which outsiders have to deal 
is thus dependent on the issue at hand. 
The description of Jimi society and more specifically the practices that the Jimi big 
men employ with regard to exchange relations in their pursuit of reputation, 
political alliance and security provides a background for the argument that - in 
contrast to the behaviour reserved for trusted kin-related trade partners - the Jimi 
people perceive and exploit their relations with outsiders in the form of strangers, 
the state, churches, companies and 'projects', in an instrumental manner. The patrol 
reports illustrate how the Jimi actively responded to the presence of administrative 
patrols in an aim to make use of new opportunities. Repeatedly patrol reports give 
the impression that the advent of the atdministratlon was much desired, with officers 
invited to visit uncontacted groups, paraded up the mountains, provided with large 
amounts of food, cooked pork and long speeches, while rest houses, bridges and 
footpaths were built with tremendous energy. 
The reasons for this enthusiasm vary, but appear to lie with two issues. Firstly, the 
access to wealth in the form of shell money, consumer goods and the resulting 
increase in status for those groups and big men associated with the administration 
and churches. Secondly, the relative security and thereby economic wellbeing that 
the arrival of the administration brought. The high levels of enthusiasm with the 
initial arrival of the Government, however, were not necessarily reflected in a 'moral 
attitude' towards the patrols and the missionaries that followed in their wake. In 
many cases these outsiders and the goods and opportunities that flowed from their 
presence simply became yet another issue over which the Jimi clan groups compete. 
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The colonial administration and the missionaries thus initially did not so much 
change the local social scene, but rather became part of it. 
The Colonial Administration appears to have fulfilled some of the many 
expectations that it generated. Airstrips were built, footpaths mamtained under the 
supervision of district managers, health patrols instigated, conflicts mediated and 
violence suppressed. Opportunities for trade increased, coffee became the mainstay 
of the economy and the road provided access to more advanced schooling. This 
period of optimism is sharply contrasted by the post-colonial period which by many 
Jimi is seen as a period of steady décline. In recent years rural people throughout 
PNG feel increasingly betrayed by the post-colonial state as educational and health 
services have declined, coffee prices have boomed and crashed and the state of the 
road has deteriorated. Whereas in the 1970s the road was the image of a better 
future, its deterioration nowadays symbolises the failure of post-independence 
governments. 
The failure of the state to maintain its presence and services, has paradoxically not 
led to a reduced interest in politics. To the contrary, it has increasingly led the Jimi 
to see the government and the pursuit of politics as one of the few ways left to make 
meaningful change. Politics are closely associated with the flow of funds into the 
rural areas through various parliamentary financing schemes, projects and -
sometimes dubious - investment schedules, and many influential men make 
attempts to get elected into parliament in order to serve their private needs and 
those of their clansmen. Similar to what Nuijten (1998) has noted for Mexico, the 
State in PNG can be viewed as a 'hope generating machine', which generates 
expectations with its elections, its grand investment schemes and development 
plans. In the zero-sum economy of the highlands, however, there are always more 
losers than winners. 
The growing disparity between the isolation of the Jimi valley and the relative 
'development' of the neighbouring Wahgi Valley generates feelings of inferiority 
and existential insecurity among the Jimi people. As a result of the increasing 
importance of cash incomes, the environment becomes valued in so far as it 
generates cash. The increasing monétisation of social life has not changed the 
driving force of Jimi society, which is the pursuit of status vis-à-vis other groups and 
people. The nature of status is, however shifting. Whereas rank was in the past 
connected to personal attributes such as age, fighting, speaking as well as the ability 
to mamtain and manipulate and advantageous set of exchange relations, these 
sources of status are now being partially replaced by a new emphasis on formal 
education, cash incomes and national politics. Chapter 5 will deal with the first 
interventions in the Jimi area along the lines of the Lak approach, showing how here 
too, a combination of a lack of socio-cultural information and a number of implicit 
and rosy-tinted assumptions with regard to the make-up of local society, led to a raft 
of problems between Jimi people and the project team. 
Chapter 4 
MIGRATION, MARRIAGE AND SOCIAL CONFLICT: 
INTRODUCING THE RAMU VALLEY 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
This chapter describes the second group of people with whom the project would 
come to interact. 3 6 The Ramu people, inhabiting the Ramu floodplain display a very 
different and much less instrumental attitude to life than the Jimi described above. 
Ramu society consists of small, loosely structured groups, displaying a much less 
competitive attitude to life with much lower levels of monétisation than found 
among the Jimi. 
In recent years the Ramu people have seen themselves confronted with growing 
numbers of Jimi migrants moving through the Bismarck Fall into the Ramu 
floodplain to benefit from the better services and economic opportunities there. The 
Ramu people have invited the first Jimi in an implicit brides-for-land deal. In the 
case of Foroko, the Ramu clans have enlisted the Jimi connections with a local 
politician to secure the building on airstrip, aidpost and school. Nowadays, 
however, the Ramu landowners see themselves confronted with much larger than 
expected numbers of migrants. These migrants cultivate gardens, hunt on territory 
which the Ramu landowners regard as theirs, and thereby trigger a conflict in which 
the Bismarck-Ramu conservation project would come to play a role. 
This chapter will start off with a description of the Ramu Valley and the Jimi settler 
groups hving there. It will follow with a more detailed description of Ramu society, 
marriage rules and community cohesion, which will be used to explain the social 
patterns by which the Jimi have gained access to Ramu resources through the use of 
a number of intermediary clans. I will end this chapter with a discussion of the 
3 6 This chapter is based on VanHelden (1998b), while an earlier version of the section on local attitudes 
to the environment was first presented in VanHelden (1998a). 
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western idea of conservation in relation to local resource management practices 
arguing that for a number of reasons neither the Jimi, nor the Ramu people can be 
seen as 'natural conservationists'. 
A DESCRIPTION O F THE B I S M A R C K FALL A N D THE R A M U FLOODPLAINS 
Although two-thirds of the Bismarck-Ramu area of interest selected by the project 
lies in Madang Province, only 10 percent of the population targeted by the ICAD 
project live in the Ramu Valley. For a long time the Bismarck Fall on the north side 
of the Bismarck Range, constituted a natural barrier between the many thousands of 
highlanders occupying the Jimi Valley and the much smaller lowland groups living 
on the Ramu River. Notwithstanding the classification of the Bismarck Fall as a 
'Potential National Park' in the 1970s there used to be a sizeable settlement in the 
middle of the fall (for a few comments see Clarke 1971; Healey 1973; I. Hughes 1977: 
80). This settlement and the area around it were abandoned in the beginning of the 
1980s when these people, known as the Aidem, moved down to live at Pimbum. At 
present, there remain four to five small permanent settlements in the central part of 
the Bismarck Fall, mainly inhabited by Jimi settlers. It is unlikely that there are more 
than 300 people in the Bismarck Fall suggesting a population density of less than 0.5 
person per square kilometre. 
The low level of occupancy of the Bismarck Fall does not mean that Jimi and Ramu 
people do not use the Fall. The area is used extensively for the planting of marita 
pandanus, betelnut and fruit, the hunting and trapping of game, and fishing for eel. 
Rappaport (1968: 273-7) mentions the following wild resources being taken from the 
Bismarck Fall; wild pigs, cassowaries, marsupials, rats, snakes, eel, birds and their 
eggs, bats, grubs, insects and spiders. One could add plant products as timber, cane, 
kunai grass, wild betelnut, fruits and medicinal plants. Bird feathers, and animal 
skins, were important for trade towards the Wahgi, while pots, axes and shell came 
across from Bundi. Sodium salt came from Simbai Valley and a spring in the 
Bismarck Fall (Healey 1973,1. Hughes 1977). The importance of this trade across the 
Bismarck Fall has dwindled in recent times. People in the Upper Jimi orient 
themselves towards the coffee economy of the Wahgi Valley and those in the Ramu 
Valley sell betelnut, peanuts, crocodile skins and birds in Madang Province. Only 
the smuggling of liquor following the recent liquor ban in the highlands offers new 
economic opportunities to enterprising young men. 
A number of makeshift shelters and garden houses lie along the footpaths that lead 
down towards the Ramu Valley. Even before contact was established between 
highland and lowland communities Jimi people hunted in this area. The Kema clan-
cluster from Bubkile for example, used to have a hunting camp of considerable size 
in the Bismarck Fall during the 1960s. This camp was used as a base for hunting 
expeditions aiming both for meat and Bird of Paradise feathers (See also Healey 
1973: 79). The Jimi would, however, avoid contact with the lowland groups and 
would turn back when seeing the border marks or traces of the Ramu people. The 
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Jimi had no reason to meet these people anyway as their main trade route with 
Madang ran further eastward through Bundi (I. Hughes 1977). Only at the end of 
the 1960s, did exchange start taking place, finally resulting in large scale Jirni 
migration towards the Ramu floodplains. 
FIGURE 4 : M A P OF THE R A M U VALLEY SECTION OF THE BISMARCK-RAMU AREA 
The Ramu River floodplain lies between the foothills of the Bismarck Range from 
where the Jimi came, and the much lower Sogeram hills further to the north. The 
plain varies in width and the river meanders through it with a minimal altitude 
differential. During the wet season, the Ramu water level rises as fast flowing 
streams running off the Bismarck Range feed the river. In the wet season the 
riverbed becomes filled with trees and debris washed off its soft banks and is 
dangerous to navigate even by motor canoe. Occasionally banks are cut away, 
closing off loops of former riverbed, which provide ideal breeding spots for 
crocodiles and fish. Protein is provided through hunting and fishing, which are 
much more important here than in the highland valleys. Other areas are 
permanendy dry as they he above the watermark and are covered in primary 
rainforest with an abundance of game. 
The people on the Sepu pat of the Ramu River are known as 'Kumula' by their 
neighbours from Begesin and Bundi, with whom they maintain extensive trade and 
intermarriage relations. The Kumula consist of a number of small groups of 
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Ermerum and Musak speakers, who numbered 1,098 people in the beginning of the 
1970s, (Z'Graggen 1973) and of whom not more than 200-300 live in the area of 
interest to the Bismarck-Ramu project. The Kumula inhabit five or six villages and 
bush camps between Sepu and Karisanga where the river enters the Middle Ramu 
district. Population densities are very low at about 2 people per square kilometre. 
People often move from bush camp to bush camp and are much less sedentary than 
the Jimi. In the past people would move around in canoes, puJling their way u p 
against the current or floating down to reach their destiny. Nowadays, canoes 
equipped with outboard motors ply the river and provide an entry and exit to the 
Madang town, where people to sell their betelnut, peanuts and other produce. Most 
boat operators, known as 'pilots', are Sepik settlers. 
There are two important social divisions among the Ramu River people. The People 
from Foroko speaking a mixture of the Musak and Gainj languages, are allied to the 
Gainj living on the western side of the Simbai River and are the traditional enemies 
of the Kumula people living at Sepu. In 1952, the patrol officer Worchester 
investigated a conflict that resulted from the fact that the Foroko groups abducted a 
number of Sepu women (See below). Up to this day few Sepu people will venture 
into Foroko, while few people from Foroko will visit Sepu. The second division lies 
between the Aidem of Pimbum and the other Ramu groups. Although all agree that 
they originate from the same lowland groups, the long period during which the 
Aidem lived in the Bismarck Fall, and the fact that this cluster has incorporated a 
number of Jimi clans has made relations between them somewhat difficult. 
JIM VILLAGES IN THE RAMU VALLEY 
Further inland, southwest of the Ramu River and just beneath the foothills of the 
Bismarck Range, lie the villages of Brimde and Pimbum which, previously inhabited 
by small groups of Ramu landowners, have swollen as a result of the arrival of 
several hundred Jimi settlers. Foroko-Brimde has quickly become the largest 
settlement in the Ramu River floodplains and the original Ramu landowners live 
together uneasily with a large group of Kema settlers from Bubkile. The Jimi settlers 
inhabit the neighbourhood of Brimde, their Ramu hosts live in Foroko a few 
kilometres away. The village is clean and well looked after with the houses sitting 
on stilts as the Jimi settlers have adopted the lowland style of building. The village 
boasts an aidpost, a school and an airstrip. The use of the latter constitutes the 
easiest form of access into the area, meaning that most outsiders, also those wanting 
to progress to Pimbum or the nearby Ramu River settlements come through Foroko-
Brimde. With the exception of Foroko-Brimde, social and economic services in the 
area are non existent. 
Access to the few services in Foroko-Brimde is largely guided by social relations 
between the Jimi migrants and their Ramu hosts. The Ramu people generally do not 
participate in community affairs in Foroko-Brimde, arguing that the Jimi 'go first' in 
everything, and that services such as the school, the airstrip, and the aid post belong 
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to the Jimi rather than the Ramu communities. Consequently, Ramu children do not 
go to school, although they could easily do so, while the aid post is only called upon 
in emergencies. A complaint made by the Ramu landowners is that they need their 
'own' school at Sepu, even though for some Sepu is three hours upstream by motor 
canoe and Foroko-Brimde only an hour 's walk away. The village of Pimbum a day 
east of Foroko-Brimde is much smaller and is inhabited by a complex mixture of 
Jimi and Ramu clans. The main group of Jimi settlers come from Bubulsunga and 
belong to Pala clan-cluster. The rivalrous nature of relations between the Pala of 
Bubulsunga and the Kema of Bubkile is copied in the competitive relations between 
the Jimi villages of Pimbum and Brimde. 
One of the most remarkable features of Jimi horticulture in the Bismarck-Ramu area 
is the lack of major differences in the gardening system across an altitudinal range of 
almost 1900 metres. Jimi gardens in the Ramu Valley, are not fundamentally 
different from those in the Upper Jimi, but the soils in the Ramu floodplains are 
alluvial and much more fertile and deep, and the combined effect of soil fertility, 
higher temperatures and higher radiation makes for much faster growth rates than 
in the highlands. The speed and ease with which crops grow on the higher grounds 
of the Ramu Valley as compared to the Upper Jimi is one of the reasons many 
highland settlers give for their move into the lowlands. The obvious explanation is 
that the Jimi have simply transplanted the highlands gardening system lock, stock 
and barrel down to the Ramu, and are in the process of adapting it to the 
opportunities that the lowlands might offer. The Jimi have shown a remarkable 
adaptation to the lowland situation in other respects, including the adoption of 
betelnut, coconut and sago, as well as fishing and boating technology. 
The Ramu floodplains suffer from extensive flooding during three months of the 
year and therefore have little agricultural potential, with the exception of a thin 
band of better-drained alluvial soils between the foothills of the Bismarck Range and 
the Ramu River. This is the area in which the Jimi settlers have built their villages 
and gardens. The only cultivation along the Ramu River takes place on the higher 
riverbanks, which are drier than the hinterland, and on small well-drained ridges. 
The fertility of these soils is higher than in the Jimi Valley and Bismarck Fall due to 
the deposition of silt by the river, but floods also happen to destroy crops, and 
gardens still last only one year before reverting to fallow. The Ramu people in Sepu 
generally have multiple gardens, which serves as a risk avoidance strategy and 
allows different crops to be grown in different places. The Jimi settlers in turn see 
themselves as superior to their Ramu hosts. They complain that these people are 
lazy, inhospitable and unorganised. The Jimi are more or less sedentary 
horticulturists, who will move only when confronted with unforeseen problems in 
the form of tribal war and epidemics. In contrast, the Ramu River people focus more 
on hunting and gathering, supported by their gardens on the riverbanks and sago 
palms in the forest and will move more often 
By local standards, the area between the Ramu River and the footrrills of the 
Bismarck Range is among the most densely populated. Tension between the Ramu 
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landowners and the settlers is constant as the former feel overrun by the large 
number of Jimi coming down from the highlands. The Jimi in contrast regard the 
Ramu valley as a place with abundant resources. The population pressure is much 
lower giving the relatively low intensity of conflict over resource as a reason for 
moving down towards the Ramu. As they say 'Mpela bwainim pasin bilong nambis', 
'we follow the lowlands customs [and do not fight]'. This, in contrast to the Upper 
Jimi Valley, where no man will leave his territory without his axe, and where fights, 
murders, accusations and compensation claims, not only between clan groups, but 
also within groups and families, are rife. 
Such statements about the peacefulness of the Ramu Valley stand in contrast to the 
fact that the social situation is rather unstable due to the tensions between the Jimi 
settlers and the Ramu landowners on the one hand and among the Jimi settlers of 
Pimbum and Brimde on the other. Jimi relations with the Ramu landowners are 
punctuated by a fear of witchcraft and Jimi continue to discuss the options of 
moving back up . As time goes by, and as an increasing number of Jimi people are 
born in the Ramu Valley, the likelihood of people moving back u p becomes smaller 
and smaller. As the Jimi migrants stay, their claims to rights over local land and 
resources become stronger and their claim to the tide of 'true landowner' more 
difficult to dispel. The Ramu landowners dispute these claims arguing 'graun i no 
save long ol', 'the land doesn't know them', thus labelling the Jimi as strangers. 
These patterns of downslope migration were thought to impede conservation and 
was the main reason w h y the DEC abandoned the pursuit of a National Park in the 
Bismarck-Ramu area in 1986 (Antiko 1986). Oddly enough it is exactly the threat of 
Jimi migration which would lead the Ramu people into the arms of the Bismarck-
Ramu ICAD project. 
SOCIAL O R G A N I S A T I O N A M O N G THE R A M U PEOPLE 
The structure of the Ramu groups is much looser and less territorial in nature than 
that of the Jimi groups. Lawrence (1967) writing on the Garia in the Begesin area 
further north of the Ramu River, suggests that the Garia have no real descent groups 
based on an ideology of kinship as found in the highlands. Instead, they are made 
up of the overlapping 'security circles' that each individual household creates out of 
its contacts with kin and in-laws as well as with trade, hunting and gardening 
partners. As a result the Garia are often found to garden and hunt on land not 
belonging to the natal clan. 
Conton and Eisler (1976) find a different territorial structure for the neighbouring 
Usino groups. These groups are loosely structured in 'parishes' with clear 
ownership rights to tracts of land and with patrilineal inheritance being the main 
form of transmissions of ownership rights. On the Ramu River a number of 
relatively small clans claim ownership to vast tracts of land with fixed boundaries. 
Unlike the highlands situation these clans are not part of an elaborate segmented 
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structure. Most of the groups in question are very small, consisting of no more than 
a few male members, their wives and offspring. 
The Ramu people live in scattered homesteads which move depending on the 
wishes and needs of the household and the availability of resources. Housing is very 
simple, consisting of a sleeping platform and roofing and can be broken u p and 
constructed in a matter of hours. Only under colonial and missionary influence did a 
number of groups congregate in small villages on the Ramu River and adopt more 
elaborate styles of housing. This process started under the influence of the Annaberg 
Catholic Mission Station in the 1930s and gained momentum with the opening of a 
Government patrol post at Usino in 1967. The resulting hamlets, however, are very 
small, usually consisting of three to five houses, the only notable exception being 
Sepu with some 25 houses. In times of conflict, people tend to set u p camp far away 
from these villages, and hunt and garden on their own. In some instances people 
purposely set u p camp at the other end of their territory, in order to reinforce their 
rights to land and resources. 
The Ramu clans are patrilineal in their structure, but put much less emphasis on 
group membership and the exclusion of outsiders than the Jimi do. This is probably 
a direct result of the low population densities found in the Ramu flood plains and 
the resulting low pressure to secure rights to land and resources. Usufruct rights 
and even ownership rights are easily passed on to relatives and non-relatives and, in 
general, clans are eager to recruit new members to their asgratm ("place of origin' 
literally 'arse-ground': i.e. clan group). There is much less emphasis on blood ties 
within the groups and a real or imagined brotherhood ideology emphasising the us-
against-the-rest feeling so strongly present among the Jimi. Every man belongs to a 
group and derives rights from that group membership, but will cultivate other 
friendships with exchange, hunting, gardening and fighting partners. In many cases, 
close friendships may overrule strict kinship obligations in a way unthinkable in the 
highlands. This is encouraged by the scattered pattern of settlement which allows 
individual households to cultivate ties with whomever they please without being 
seen to compromise the group's interests. 
MARRIAGE AMONG THE RAMU RIVER GROUPS 
In broad terms, marriage rules on the Ramu River are similar to those in the 
highlands, albeit that marriage exchange is much less politicised and less monetised 
than among the Jimi. The Ramu clans in the Bismarck-Ramu are generally 
exogamous patrilineal and predominantly virilocal. As Katinga of Wara Laplap 
explained, 'men are the bow and women the arrows'. The rules, however, are less 
stricdy enforced and more flexibly interpreted in the light of the falling population. 
In some cases men even marry women from the same clan, and with the same 
totemic sign. This is frowned upon along the Ramu and unthinkable in the 
highlands as 'a father' does not marry 'his daughter', but most probably a reflection 
of the lack of eligible marriage partners. In 1972 a patrol officer also reported that 
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the impact of migration and the lack of able bodied men in the villages led to 
'adultery of various kinds', while 'a general breakdown of the native laws and social 
controls is evident' (Spencer 1971/72b). 
In such cases the general rule of clan exogamy is violated, a practice more or less 
condoned as long as the two marriage partners are not too closely related: the main 
marriage rule among the Ramu clans prohibiting marriage with anybody closer than 
first cousins. In contrast to the highland communities, the Ramu people show a 
distinct preference for marriage within their own group or with neighbouring 
groups (Conton and Eisler 1976). Most clans perceive a need to keep women within 
the clan or at least exchange a woman for a woman, as in the case of sister exchange, 
rather than just marrying them out. This, so as not to give offspring away to other 
clans, but rather keep it to themselves. As one person in Sepu expressed it: 'Giving 
away women is like giving away future children'. The Ramu people have the same 
pre-occupation with population as the highlanders. The difference, however, is that 
the communities in the Jimi Valley face a continuously growing population, 
combined with a growing pressure on natural resources while the Ramu people, 
having abundant natural resources are in a state of decline. 
Whereas marriage is a way of forging political, ceremonial and trade links with 
distant clans among highlanders, the Ramu people, with their small number and 
closely knit marriage patterns, rarely use marriage to initiate new political and 
economic links (Conton and Eisler 1976: 139). The political lack of importance of 
marriage in the Ramu Valley is illustrated by the fact that there are no marriage 
negotiations among clans. The family of the bride simply accepts what the bride's 
family gives and immediately returns the equivalent of a third to one half of what 
was given to the family of the groom. According to Conton and Eisler (1967) the size 
of the bridewealth is not considered relevant in terms of status, and generally 
forgotten once the payment has been made. This is also visible in the much lower 
bridewealth payments, which he around Kina 600 and a small number of pigs. Wild 
pigs are deemed unsuitable for bridal payments. 
This stands in contrast to the highlands, where the size of bridewealth payments is 
an important indicator for the status of the grooms sub-clan and clan and where 
bridewealth amounts to several thousands of Kina. In the Ramu Valley the children 
of a man and wife become members of the husband's clan only when he has offset 
his marriage payments. In practice this may not be an issue, with sons cultivating 
land and having hunting and gathering rights in land belonging to both their 
father's and mothers' clans, regardless of the extent to which commitments have 
been offset. 
DECISION-MAKING AMONG THE RAMU RIVER GROUPS 
In comparison to the Jimi communities, the Ramu River communities are much 
simpler in structure and decision-making patterns. The Ramu groups are not part of 
a segmented structure, in which the larger social units lay claim to the support of 
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lower units. And most decisions are made by three or four elderly men. In this sense 
the Ramu people know a more centralised decision-making pattern in which age 
conveys status and the right to make decisions on behalf of the group. In addition, 
the social climate among the Ramu groups appears to be much less competitive. The 
sources of status and leadership in the lowlands of Madang Province are différent 
from those in the highlands. In the highlands status is gained through participation 
in clan affairs and politics fighting prowess and rhetorical skills, and the ability to 
manipulate pigs, brides and other items of wealth. 
In the Ramu floodplains, however, leadership is the result of magical and ritual 
skills, which some elderly individuals possess, while others do not. Lawrence (1967) 
describes the neighbouring Garia leaders who possess the ritual skills to make a 
garden thrive but can also withhold these rituals from those gardeners that do not 
properly follow their instructions. Because of the ritual nature of leadership, 
breaches of regulations or a lack of respect for the rules laid down are not punished 
by members of the community but simply thought to lead to failure, to misfortune, 
illness or even death. The fear of the consequences of more serious breaches of ritual 
regulations may act as a deterrent to trespassing and socially deviant behaviour 
among the Ramu groups. 
A example is a Sepu man who went hunting in the bush of his Yawetama 
relatives without asking permission and without the appropriate ritual of 
whispering spells in the ears of the dogs that he borrowed. He was unsuccessful 
that day, and blamed it on the fact that he had failed to ask the two men for 
permission. The old men thought it was funny and laughed at him because he 
should have known the importance of being 'introduced' to an area. If a person 
is not properly introduced to the local spirits he may fall ill, and the spirits must 
have sensed the unease of the land-owning elders at his lack of respect. 
These sources of respect and leadership have been much less influenced by 
education, politics and money than is the case among the Jimi people. Education 
levels are low, and the monétisation of the local economy, as well as production for 
the market, is much less pronounced than among the Jimi. Politics is hardly an issue 
on the Ramu River. In fact, the Ramu clans at Foroko invited the Jimi to the Ramu 
Valley in order to assist them in their dealings with the Government as they felt 
unable to do so themselves (see below). 
In contrast to the disparaging views held of the past by many Jimi youngsters, many 
Ramu people retain a strong pride in their pre-colonial cultural practices, myths and 
ceremonies while relying on the subsistence economy for most of their daily needs. 
Each clan on the Ramu River has a totemic sign referred to as its 'bisnis', a situation 
also found on the Sepik River. The Ramu people are generally reluctant to discuss 
these issues because of the general fear that malevolent people may make use of this 
knowledge, and the fact that some of the churches have told them to get rid of those 
heathen myths. In Sepu, however, people take pride in their customs and oral 
history and discuss them much more openly. As a result there appears to be much 
less of a generation conflict within the Ramu communities. Younger men have little 
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access to modern sources of authority which enable them to challenge their elders 
and appear to support a revival of past practices. 
Important factors are the small size of the clan-groups and the relatively large areas 
of land they own. In some cases, there is no question over who is the clan leader and 
for what reason, as only one or two men remain. These two men may than make 
joint decisions with regard to the way in which they wish to use their resources. For 
example, the two remaining men of the Akum-Akum clan in Foroko own huge 
tracts' of forest in the north side of the Ramu River and are in favour of inviting a 
timber company in, because logging will bring them a road and money. Similarly, 
the only remaining man of the Numeregu clan, is in favour of the establishment of a 
National Park such as that proposed on the 1970s. 
To outside intervenors with a resource focus, be it loggers or conservationists, this is 
a decidedly more orderly situation than that which exists in the Jimi communities, 
where one has to deal with a range of mutually competing views within one and the 
same clan or sub-clan. Although the social environment is outwardly much less 
competitive than among the Jimi groups, there is a strong preoccupation with 
distributive justice (Togolo 1982) meaning that the relative fortunes of different 
groups are closely monitored and are a continual source of discussion and conflict. 
Unlike the Jimi situation, the differing fortunes of clan groups do not lead to 
compensation claims or large scale fighting, but are kept in check through the fear of 
sorcery and poison. People who do well, for whatever reason, will have to make an 
effort to share their benefits lest they become the targets of sorcery by envious 
individuals and groups, or are accused of sorcery themselves. This leads to a 'tall 
poppy syndrome', where people make sure that nobody runs too far ahead of the 
pack. 
THE NEEDLE AND THE THREAD: JlMI MIGRATION INTO THE RAMU VALLEY 
Migration is a common response to the conflicts and declining health status that is 
associated with communities under resource pressure (Lowman 1980). In a 
subsistence system under stress due to the declining avauability of resources, such 
as is found in the Jimi Valley the rate and intensity of conflict increases. The increase 
of population, the reduction in distance between groups, the burgeoning pig 
populations, the adoption of perennial cash crops which take u p land previously 
under fallow or subsistence crops, all increase the 'irritation factor' (Rappaport 1968) 
between people and clans. The increase in population pressure leads to conflict, 
compensation claims, manslaughter and all-out tribal fights. Where an increase in 
population pressure may lead to increasing levels of conflict, the risk of epidemics 
also increases with higher population densities. 
Within the Jimi Valley, residential movements are a common occurrence and the 
countryside is littered with abandoned and flattened ridges planted with Casuarina 
indicating areas of former settlement which were abandoned after rnisfortune befell 
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the group Uving there. There is much anecdotal evidence of illness that caused large 
numbers of people to die and many of the more recent migratory movements in and 
around the Jimi Valley have also been precipitated by epidemics. 3 7 With the growth 
in population, the option of moving away after misfortune is being closed off, as 
most land suitable for cultivation in the Jimi Valley is now occupied. The only 
exception to this pattern are the clans living on the edge of the Bismarck Fall, a 
number of whom are moving into the Ramu floodplains. For these people one 
reason for migration into the forest, and away from the cash economy, may stem 
from the fact that they lack the education, skills, and contacts to succeed in the 
'modern' market economy, and are unable to find productive, income-generating 
work. This leads to the development of an increasingly marginalised group of 
people, some of whom may choose to live of the natural resources which the forest 
still provides, and take the absence of services in the form of schools and health 
facilities as a fact of life. In return, they have relatively abundant resources, plenty of 
game, and a lower incidence of conflicts and disease as these that are often 
associated with dense populations. 
The option of moving into new areas, however, is only made under circumstances of 
extreme duress. This results from a number of cultural and technical features of local 
society. The first is that Papua New Guineans exhibit a very strong attachment to 
their land. Land is essential, not only in the economic terms of subsistence and 
nowadays cash crop production, but also in socio-cultural and political terms, as a 
source of identity, history, unity, status and security. The second reason stemmed 
from the dangers associated with unknown territory, people, and spirits (Rappaport 
1968, Healey 1973). As recounted in the previous chapter, travel and trade were 
extremely dangerous undertakings in the pre-colonial period usually only 
conducted by strong and adventurous men. The final reason making it unattractive 
to move into new territory stemmed from the stone axe technology available to the 
traditional highland communities. These cumbersome tools limited the extent to 
which households could bring primary forest into cultivation, as the men would 
have to cut full-grown trees to clear their gardens rather than much triinner 
secondary regrowth. Consequently, most highland peoples probably preferred to 
stay within the central highland valleys, moving only after warfare, epidemics or 
when general resource pressure forced them to venture into unknown areas such as 
the Ramu Valley. 
3 7 Burton (1983) describes the dysentery epidemics which swept through the Wahgi Valleys In 1943-44, 
while Rappaport (1968: 8-9) states that up to 30 percent of the Maring died in the same epidemic, 
known by the name of sftman ('sick man'). The main reasons for a flurry of patrols staged from 
Kundiawa into the Wahgi, Jimi and Bundi areas in 1944 and 1945 was to investigate the impact of the 
epidemic there. In 1965, meningitis is known to have swept through the Jimi Valley (P. Johnson 1982; 
36n), while the Gainj lost 6.5 percent of their population to an influenza epidemic and resulting out-
migration in 1969 (Wood 1980). Such epidemics are not a thing of the past. Cook and Pflanz-Cook 
(1988: 74) estimate that in 1980 about 5 percent of the Manga died of influenza Lowman (1980) 
mentions how varieties of the malaria-bearing Anopheles mosquito thrive especially in degraded and 
densely populated environments, which may have forced people to seek out new settlement land 
above 1600 meters ASL. 
164 Through the Thicket 
The oral history of groups in the Jimi Valley reflects the misfortune or conflicts that 
led people to flee into new territory. A common example is the story of a fight 
between two 'brothers'. In a social environment in which solidarity within the group 
is synonymous with safety and security, a conflict within the clan is a threatening 
situation to all members. The taboos on fighting within the groups may have led 
people to decide to each go their own way, rather than risking conflict and murder 
between them. Other oral histories of migration into the Jimi Valley relate to the 
breaching of taboos or promises, which force the unhappy transgressor to try his 
luck elsewhere (VanHelden 1998b). 
The choice to move into the forest is not always a negative one. In some cases, 
groups of people have simply followed the good hunting opportunities provided by 
the forest, and have ended u p on the edge of the inhabited world, as they know it. 
'Mipela bihainim lek bilong muruk' ('we followed the footprints of the cassowary'), 
councillor Aik of one of the Kema clans explained as he pointed out how his clan 
had originated from the Wahgi Valley and ended u p at Foroko-Brimde in the Ramu 
Valley. Others, corning down on their hunting expeditions, and making small 
temporary gardens, realised how fast crops grew in the Ramu floodplains in 
comparison with the Upper Jimi Valley, and how little labour was needed to 
cultivate them. Migration is part and parcel of life in the Bismarck-Ramu area, and 
continues to play an especially important role in the Ramu Valley, where hundreds 
of Jimi have settled in the last two decades. 
THE KEMA-ASBAN AND PALA-AIDEM CONNECTIONS 
Jimi migration into the Ramu Valley has been facilitated by two clans who play an 
intermediary role. These clans, the Asban and the Aidem have in common that they 
left the Ramu Valley following conflicts, moved u p into the Bismarck Fall where 
they established contact with the Jimi. The Asban met with the Kema clans at 
Bubkile, while the Aidem established linkages with the Pala clans at Bubulsunga. 3 8 It 
is through these connections that the Jimi established themselves in the Ramu 
valley, with the Kema settling at Foroko- Brimde and the Aidem followed by the 
Pala at Pimbum. This intermediary role was nicely illustrated by the Kema who 
explained that the Asban had been the 'needle', and that they, were 'the thread' that 
had followed them into the Ramu Valley, where three Kema brothers established 
contact with the Foroko clans in the middle of the 1960s. They became friends and in 
the next 10-15 years the Kema brothers regularly visited Foroko. When one of them 
became a councillor at Bubkile, the Foroko clans asked him to assist them with 
building an airstrip. The poUtically astute Kema brothers settled at Foroko-Brimde 
to help 'pull in' services in the form of an airstrip, school and aid post. They put 
their cards on a local politician, who after securing a seat in parliament rewarded 
3 8 For simplicities sake, I denote the Jimi settlers in this chapter by the name of their clan-cluster; the 
Kerna from Bubkile and the Pala from Bubulsunga, as adding the name of the various clans involved 
would be unnecessarily confusing (See VanHelden 1998b). 
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them by funding the airstrip and the health post at Foroko-Brimde. Dallye and his 
brothers, however, were soon followed by the rest of their clan when a epidemic 
struck in Bubkile in the early 1980s. As a result, the Foroko landowners who had not 
realised that so many settlers would follow, became increasingly disenchanted with 
their Jimi guests. 
The Kema settlers have built large gardens, converted land into betelnut and peanut 
plantations and have decimated the game in the area. There is an increasingly open 
conflict between the two groups and an active discussion among the Ramu people 
about the option of throwing the Jimi people out. Among the Kema settlers 
themselves, concern centres on the fact that their population grows satisfactorily in 
the highlands, with many children being born and staying alive, but that the 
population in Foroko-Brimde is stagnant, with fewer surviving children. Many of 
the big men blame malaria and the Ramu sorcerers for the high death rates and 
some suggest that they should return to their place of origin near Bubkile. The 
younger Jimi, however, do not feel like returning because they do at least have some 
services in Brimde, and more economic opportunities than in the Upper Jimi Valley. 
A similar intermediary role as that played by the Asban for the Kema of Bubkile, 
was fulfilled by Aidem for the Pala from Bubulsunga. 
The Aidem, living in the Bismarck Fall the beginning of the 1930s or 1940s comprise 
of several different clan groups some of which originate from the Ramu valley, 
while others come from the Jimi Valley around Mount Wilhelm (Cf. VanHelden 
1998b). The return of the Aidem from the Bismarck Fall, and with them parts of 
related Jimi groups is to a large extent the doing of Katinga Sanazga, one of the 
Foroko leaders. Katinga was born around 1935. His father belonged to one of the 
Ramu River clans, while his mother came from one of the groups living around 
Pimbum. At that time, the Ramu groups did not have contact with the Jimi people. 
When Katinga was still a young boy, two of his clan 'fathers' were killed by 
members of his mothers clan. The tribal fight that followed forced his mothers group 
to seek refuge with the Aidem living in the Bismarck Fall. In the 1970s, Katinga, a 
natural intermediary by nature of his descent, visited his mothers group in the 
Bismarck Fall and asked them to return. This group, however, had by now been 
absorbed in the Aidem group, and when Katinga's maternal group returned to take 
possession of their ancestral lands around Pimbum several other clans, including a 
number of Jimi migrants came with them. 
The main group of Jimi settlers are Pala from Bubulsunga who followed the Aidem 
when these moved down into the Ramu at the behest of Katinga. The link between 
the Aidem people in the Bismarck Fall and the Pala of Bubulsunga was a result of 
the zeal of a Pala pastor, whose religious work among the Aidem, led to 
intermarriage between the Aidem and the Pala (Opo 1996). When the Aidem finally 
returned to their ancestral lands near Pimbum, a large number of Pala followed 
them. Although parts of the Aidem clan cluster trace their ancestry to the Sepu 
clans, relations are somewhat uneasy due to the long time that they have been 
separated. The Aidem for example, are linguistically closer to the Jimi settlers than 
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to the Sepu Kumula. Like the in the Foroko case, the Ramu landowners are upset 
about the arrival of the Jimi clans. Katinga argues that he only asked his relatives to 
return, but is now confronted with a growing group of Jimi settlers living at 
Pimbum. The Aidem themselves are increasingly marginalised due to the large 
number of Pala settlers living around Pimbum. 
A PALA INVENTION OF TRADITION 
In contrast to the Kema who confirm the important role of the Asban, and appear to 
accept that the Foroko landowners are the 'true landowners' in the Ramu Valley, the 
Pala settlers at Pimbum, do not emphasise the intermediate role of the Aidem in 
their downward migration. They increasingly assert rights to land in the Ramu 
Valley, and such a recognition would it ft wilMn their drive to be seen as 
landowners. In doing so they draw u p their own history as to how they came to live 
in the Ramu valley. In these stories it is not only emphasised that they 'bought' the 
land by paying money, killing pigs and providing women: 
Poko Mogol, one of the Pala settlers from Bubulsunga, is a friendly man of about 
50 years old who lives at Yangal between Foroko and Pimbum and certainly 
regards himself as a landowner. During the 1960s and 70s Poko and his brothers 
travelled a good deal across the northern slopes of the Bismarck Range, and 
made small gardens in the bush. One of those gardens was close to his present 
house in the Ramu valley where they planted some taro to see how it would 
grow. They returned up to the Jimi for a while. On coming back to the Ramu 
valley they noted that their taro had become very large. This convinced him to 
stay in Yangal, because as he put it 'taro grisim mi' ('the taro seduced me'). In 
1987, Poko and Siwi paid K 1000 and 12 pigs to the landowners, and a woman 
was married into one of the Foroko clans. 
The story presented by Poko, however also rewrites the oral history of the Pala clan 
cluster in order to legitimise the Pala presence in the Ramu Valley. The Pala 
originate in Simbu province in the highlands, and have subsequently migrated into 
the Jimi Valley, only in recent decades moving down into the Ramu Valley (For the 
migration histories see (VanHelden 1998b). Poko on recounting this story of origin 
of the Pala clan-cluster reckoned that before bis ancestors left Simbu province they 
must have come up through Bundi from the Ramu Valley. And that thus he had 
become full circle. This statement is highly strategic as it implies that his ancestors 
must have come from this place and that he is therefor a true landowner. When the 
ICAD project intervened, this reinvention of the past was used to claim Jimi 
landownership in the Ramu Valley (See chapter 7). 3 9 
3 3 Poko's theory is not only at odds with Pala oral history as recounted in the lirni Valley, but also not 
in line with the current understanding of highland migration patterns based on the dissemination of 
highlands languages and crops. Robbins (1963) suggests that the highlands were settled from the east 
through present day Morobe province and that a population explosion took place in Eastern 
Highlands Province triggering various migrations into Simbu Province, the Wahgi Valley and 
eventually more marginal areas like the Jimi Valley. 
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Unlike the Kema from Bubkile and the Pala from Bubulsunga who have moved 
down en bloc, a small group of other Jimi from other clans co-exist relatively well 
with the local landowners at Pimbum. Their numbers are not (yet) large enough to 
be threatening, and a number of them have made payments in exchange for land 
rights. The Pala settlers are more hostile towards these other Jimi probably because 
they are long-standing enemies from the Upper Jimi, and because all of them 
compete for the favour of the Ramu landowners. The Pala for example claim that 
unlike themselves, these other Jimi people are not 'true landowners' in the Ramu 
Valley. Obviously none of the Jimi groups are landowners in the eyes of the Ramu 
communities. 
'OPENING THE DOOR': PATTERNS OF JIMI-RAMU INTERMARRIAGE 
Marriage patterns have played a key role in facihtating the above mentioned 
migration movements and deserve special attention as they introduce the reader to 
the conflict between Ramu and Jimi people in which the Bismarck-Ramu project 
would come to play a role. As already recounted marriage rules in the Ramu Valley 
are similar to those in the highlands, albeit that marriage exchange is much less 
politicised while exogamy is less strictly enforced in the light of the low population 
numbers. The interpretation of marriage rules between the much more strict Jirni 
settlers and the laid-back Ramu River communities is sometimes a source of conflict. 
Highlanders and Ramu people alike practise polygyny, but in November 1996 
there was a fight which led to the stand-off between Jimi migrants and Ramu 
landowners over a Ramu man's wish to marry the younger sister of his Jirni wife. 
He probably slept with her and wanted her as his second wife, which is not 
possible by highlands marriage rules. This led to a conflict in which the offender 
stood on his rights as a 'true landowner' and accused the Jimi of trespassing and 
not compensating him for the use of resource by providing him with a second 
wife. The Jimi replied that he could marry the younger sister if he first divorced 
the elder sister as one can not marry two women from the same sub-clan. This he 
was unwilling to do, and in turn the Jimi demanded compensation for his 
sleeping with the younger sister as this had now to be considered rape. The 
discussion escalated into a serious conflict when the Ramu clans called in their 
Gainj neighbours to support them and was only subdued through the 
intervention of the Simbai Counci president. 
Similar to the Jimi preoccupation with population growth most Ramu clans perceive 
a need to keep women witfiin the clan or at least to exchange a woman for a woman, 
so as not to give offspring away to other clans. The difference, however, is that the 
communities in the Jimi Valley face a continuously growing population and 
outward migration while the Ramu people are in a state of decline, leading them to 
invite the Jimi down in return for brides. 
Whereas marriage is a way of forging political, ceremonial and trade links with 
distant clans among highlanders, the Ramu people, due to their small number and 
closely knit marriage patterns rarely use marriage to initiate new trade links (Conton 
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and Eisler 1976: 139). Due to their small size and their closely-knit pattern of 
intermarriage, the Ramu groups suffer from a lack of eligible marriage partners. In 
this situation it is a rational choice to provide newcomers with use, or even 
ownership rights to a proportion of one's resources, if this safeguards the long-term 
continuity and security of the clan. This appears to be the dominant pattern in the 
Bismarck Fall, where Jimi groups acquired rights to land in the Bismarck Fall and 
the Ramu Valley in return for brides (cf. VanHelden 1998b). 
To the Jimi such strategic marriages engender a relationship, or strengthen an 
existing one, so that both groups can claim access to each other's resources and 
support, a situation obviously on the mind of Jimi settlers seeking access to 
resources in the Ramu Valley, and which they pursue with a great deal of 
assertiveness and occasional acts of aggression. As one Jimi settler explained: 'You 
know us highlanders. W wen a door is ajar we will walk in'. The Ramu groups 
'opened the door' by marrying Jimi women, and found to their astonishment that, 
rather than just acquiring women and having the occasional Jimi visitor, hundreds 
of Jimi people preferred life in the Ramu Valley and actively started competing over 
resources. Only a few of the present Jimi settlers appear to have actual marriage 
relations with the Ramu groups, as most of them have followed their kin when 
migrating into the Ramu Valley. 
Some of the Ramu River people are angry about the way in which the Jimi marry 
out daughters and then follow them to settle on the land of their new in-laws. They 
profess that nobody ever expected this to happen and that the local people along the 
Ramu River would not do so. This is a somewhat skewed representation of reality as 
the Jimi were invited to settle down at Brimde to assist with the development of the 
airstrip. Intermarriage with the local Ramu clans was a way of strengthening ties 
and establishing more permanent rights to the use of land and resources, through an 
implied land-for-brides deal. In addition, the Ramu people follow the same custom: 
at Sepu for example, the Banam clans from an area further north followed their 
married daughters to live at the river. It is thus not so much the marriage 
mechanism that differs, but the sheer number of Jimi settlers that use it to legitimise 
their arrival and the aggressive way in which they claim ownership and use rights 
that constitute the problem. 
The only peaceful option open to the Ramu people to reduce further encroachment 
by Jimi settlers is not to marry their daughters. This option is propagated by the 
Ramu elders, but not much appreciated by the younger Ramu men looking for an 
eligible marriage partner, and leads to conflicts between the generations. One of the 
early 1999 patrol reports notes how at Foroko the local literacy teacher was 'not 
teaching because he is arranging his marriage and his father does not want him to 
marry a woman from Jimi' (BRG 1999a: 11). In practice the younger men tend to 
ignore the demands of their elders, and even the son of Katinga, the old man so 
annoyed with the arrival of the Jimi settlers, would marry a second Jimi woman 
during the time of the project. 
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RESOURCES, DEVELOPMENT A N D THE STATE I N THE R A M U VALLEY 
As recounted in the previous chapter, the colonial period was one of considerable 
enthusiasm and optimism for the Jimi. Whereas colonial rule in the Ramu area 
started fifty years earlier than in the Jimi valley, the impact of the colonial 
administration in Madang Province was mainly confined tot he coastal areas. Even 
the Pacific-war, during which the Japanese made it u p to nearby Aiome, had little 
impact. The only patrol report dealing with the southern bank of the Ramu River in 
the project area, for example, dates from the beginning of 1952. 
Aim of the patrol, led by the patrol officer Worchester to investigate and suppress 
reported cargo cult activities in the Bundi area, after which he was to find his way 
from Marum to Aiome. This area is largely congruent with Bismarck Fall section of 
the ICAD project area. Worchester started from Marum and reached the Aidem 
village, but had to return as the terrain proved extremely rough and as there were 
no further tracks leading in the direction of Aiome. He then moved on to Sepu to 
investigate recent attacks on a number of Ramu groups by 'uncontacted natives' 
from the south bank of the of the Ramu River: 
'According to the Sepu people, nomadic peoples from the far side of the Ramu 
[probably the Foroko groups], a couple of days by canoe downstream, have been 
periodically harassing the villages on the North side for many years. The 
nomads are aided by 'little men' or 'arse tankets' in these raids. The 'little men' 
inhabit the mountains at the south of the nomad's preserves [the Gainj allies of 
the Foroko clans]. The reasons for these raids are said to be the nomads desire to 
capture women, get steel implements, and to kill off the menfolk. The last 
successful raid was in 1949, when a murder was committed at Sepu, and women 
from Musak and Sepu carried off.... It was decided to try and contact the swamp 
dwelling nomads first, and enlist their services as guides to the places of the 
mountain peoples, but the Sepus were extremely dubious about our chances of 
success, bearing in mind the loose footed habits of our 'quarry' and the fear in 
their minds that this was a punitive expedition to bring them to account for their 
previous misdemeanours. The Sepus pessimism was justified, and great 
difficulty was encountered in locating the swamp dwellers. The patrol set off 
down the Ramu per raft and canoe towards the area from which the nomads are 
reputed to come' (Worchester 1952/53:16). 
After departing from Sepu the patrol proceeded downstream the next two days but 
found it very difficult to establish contact with the groups in what is now the Foroko 
the area. The patrol team continued onwards to Aiome and flew back from there. 
There are no records of other patrols into the Andalarum sub-division, since that 
first patrol, nor have reports been found relating to the establishment of the Simbai 
National Park in the area. The small semi-nomadic populations on this section of the 
Ramu River, and its isolated location between the patrol posts of Usino and Aiome 
kept the area in isolation until very recently. Unlike in the Jirni where the 
Administration faced a mixture of resistance and enthusiasm, the response by the 
Ramu people was marked by evasion and pessimism. Tribal conflicts such as that 
described above between the Foroko and the Sepu/Banam people dwindled with 
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the establishment of government posts in Usino in the 1950s and in Aiome in 1967, 
but did not affect daily life of the Ramu people. There was no need for Government 
violence in the Ramu valley and people generally kept to themselves. The Bismarck 
Fall, did not fall under any of the six Ramu councils established by the Australian 
Administration in the 1960s as the area was regarded as uninhabited and destined to 
become a National Park. 
Attempts to further the economic development of the area did not make much 
difference either. Introduced crops like rice failed due to a lack of marketing 
opportunities and the patrols mounted from Usino had a large area to cover and 
generally failed to reach Sepu. The Sepu people in turn were expected to walk to 
Banam to pay their annual headtax. Many patrol reports note that the unfavourable 
perception that people had of their council, which, given the fact that people were 
expected to pay taxes but did not receive any services, is not surprising: 
Generally the people in the Igoi-Sop census Division appear unenthusiastic 
towards the Usino Local Government Council. The majority of the villages here 
seem isolationist to an extreme and it is difficult for a Council with strictly 
limited resources to benefit these people in a way they can recognise instantly— 
There is a general tendency to expect too much ... over too short a period and to 
think of the tax system as a lottery whereby if a Ward produces a good tax, a 
reward in the form of an outboard motor or some such is expected. The villagers 
do not seem interested in the more staple works of the Local Government 
Council (Spencer 1971/72a). 
From the end of the 1960s onwards contributions to community work were to a 
large extent voluntary and, like in the Upper Jimi, suffered when the system of 
government patrols was abolished and Local Government Councils were 
established. These councils, however had Utile influence on local people. 
In the beginning of the 1970s, plans were drawn u p to build a road between Usino 
and Sepu on the Ramu River. The stretch of 24 kilometres was marked and cleared 
but the road never eventuated, further reducing the already limited confidence in 
the working of the formal Government system. In Sepu village, however, people 
have organised themselves better than elsewhere in the area. Several of the patrol 
reports from the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s mention the energy 
with which the Sepu people engaged in road building, rice growing and other 
ventures. All of them were to fail, in a pattern of repeated attempt, failure and 
increasing disillusion that continues unto this day. 
BUSINESS ACUMEN A N D CARGO-CULTS I N THE R A M U VALLEY 
In contrast to the Jimi groups, the Ramu River people hardly engage in any cash 
cropping. There is a Uttle bit of cocoa and robusta coffee grown near Usino, but no 
cash crops have been seen in any of the other villages including Sepu. A number of 
men work on a logging concession near Sogeram or on oil and mineral exploration 
activities in the Ramu Valley and the foothills of the Bismarck range. Crocodile 
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hunting was until recently the main wage earning activity, but the declining 
numbers of crocodiles have put an end to this source of income. Generally there 
appears very little interest in local income earning ventures as people are largely 
self-sufficient. As one kiap wrote in 1972: 
"There is a complete lack of business initiative or inspiration, no one dreams of 
looking to local resources. There are three kinds of business according to 
villagers, coffee, cattle and peanuts, and if you can't manage any of these three 
that's the end of business thinking' (Spencer 1971/72b). 
The lack of business interest among the Ramu people stands in sharp contrast to the 
way in which the Jimi actively pursue a wide variety of options to make a living and 
earn an income. This is a source of concern to the Ramu people who complain that 
the Jimi cut their trees, hunt their game and trap their birds for sale in Madang. 
Issues of economic development found an expression in local cargo cults of which 
some influenced the Ramu area. Allen (1981) describes how the introduction of rice 
by the colonial government in the 1950s and 60s and the wave of cargo-cults which 
swept through Madang and Sepik provinces were closely related. Cargo-cultism 
does not appear to have played a very large role among the Ramu River people 
covered in this study, but played a more important role in nearby areas to the north 
and west of Sepu. One of the defining aspects of these cults is that they are all 
attempts to come to grips with the wide disparities in wealth and technology which 
Papua New Guineans experienced in their contact with the white colonial settlers. 
All were attempts to explain through the use of local concepts how it was possible 
that the 'white man' had access to such wealth while indigenous people did not. The 
various explanations have in common that they do not so much see European 
wealth and technology as a product of organisation, management, investment and 
work, but as a stemming from a secret knowledge which allow those that posses it to 
gain access to uxilimited resources and wealth. 
The various Ramu cultists described in various patrol reports (VanHeldenl998b: 45-
47) all claimed that they had somehow discovered the white mans 'trick' thereby 
being able to copy him. The rituals that were developed in order to gain access to the 
white men's wealth often consisted of a complicated mixture of ancestral 
propitiation and imported notions stemming from western business. Often these 
rituals mean that daily subsistence work was neglected in favour of building the 
necessary ritual houses, and airstrips, or even involved the destruction of food 
gardens and houses. For this reason the colonial Government actively aimed to 
suppress such cultist activities. The Worchester patrol for example, was exphcitly 
aimed at defusing cargo activities on the Upper Ramu river, where a movement had 
been instigated in an 
'attempt to propitiate the spirits of their forefathers, with incessant singsings and 
food offerings. A further step taken to please the spirits was the forbidding of the 
womenfolk to drink water between sunrise & sunset, indeed a hardship on the 
hot, dry kunai flats of the Upper Ramu. Houses were built... in the villages for 
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the purpose of receiving the cargo. These houses were inspected, and were 
found to have a table inside, on which was a plate containing food for the 
'spirits', and a place set aside where the money was to be put. The houses were 
surrounded by a fence, and decorated with flowers. (...) The houses were 
ordered destroyed, and strenuous efforts were made to dispel the illusions of the 
people' (Worchester 1952/53: 4). 
The Yali or Yaliwan cult which swept through Madang District after the Second 
World War never appears to have taken hold of the Bismarck-Ramu area (Lawrence 
1964, Stent 1977), although various patrol reports from nearby Aiome describe a 
variety of local cults on the Middle Ramu (VanHelden 1998b). The term 'cargo' as in 
'cargo cult', however, would come to play an important role in the Bismarck-Ramu 
project, where it came to denote the way in which many rural people in PNG define 
'development' as the receipt of goods and services without taking into account that 
such may be a product of self-reliance, community organisation and hard work. 
T H E 'BUSHFIRE OF DEVELOPMENT': COMPANY ACTIVITY I N THE R A M U VALLEY 
Even though the Ramu people show relatively little interest in cash earning 
activities, company activity in their area is much more influential than in the Jimi 
Valley and constitutes an additional reason for Jimi downslope migration. Apart 
from the possible construction of a road from the Sogeram River in the north to 
Foroko-Brimde and the rumoured arrival of logging companies along that road, the 
most important change to the Bismarck-Ramu and its economy may come from the 
Ramu nickel-cobalt mine which is being developed in the Bismarck Fall, and a oil 
drilling project in Banam to the north of the Ramu River. 
In 1996 the Ramu mining project started work on the nickel-cobalt resource in 
response to an improvement in world prices for nickel. The exploration camp is 
about a two days' walk from Pimbum and one day walking form Sepu. The mine 
will comprise an open-cut operation, which will feeding a benefaction plant 4 
kilometres to the northwest. After the first separation in the plant, the ore sludge 
will be transported to a processing facility in Astrolabe Bay though a 78 kilometre 
long pipeline. This prospect is generating a lot of excitement as people throughout 
the Bismarck-Ramu area aim to find work there. It is likely that a number of 
settlements will be abandoned once income-earning activities become available at 
the mine site. People at Pimbum stated that they would migrate across to the mine 
as they have marriage relations with the Bundi people. A number of people from 
Sepu are already working at the mining camp. 
Another activity which will have a major impact on the local economy, is the oil 
exploration being undertaken in the Banam area since 1992. The company has 
established a camp at Sogeram, and is drilling holes in which charges are offset to 
determine local soil structure and the possible presence of oil and gas. In November 
and December 1997 the project employed virtually all able-bodied men in the 
immediate vicinity, paying them the locally unbelievable sum of between Kina 110 
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and Kina 200 per fortnight. As a result of these experiences, people's expectations 
have shot up . The companies with their helicopters, equipment, free food and 
medical supplies, leave a strong impression on people's minds. Men are paid 
salaries which are very high by local standards, and are supplied with safety boots, 
work clothes, gloves and other equipment. When people compare this with 
government or project interventions that they have experienced in the past, they 
readily conclude that they themselves and the government cannot make changes for 
the better but that only the company can. The kampani thus becomes a role model 
and the closer the contact with the 'company', the more likely that the future 
development expectations will be framed in the context of this experience. 
Many Ramu people, however, take an ambivalent view of the changes around them. 
While the Jimi are generally enthusiastic about any type of 'development' coming 
their way, the Sepu people profess to be worried about the future and the way in 
which their lives might change. Their village on the Ramu River, lies in between the 
oil and the rnining projects and is likely to be affected by both of them. May Sepu 
people are worried by the rapidity of change taking place, describing their 
community as 'a tree' surrounded by the 'bushfire of development'. Later they 
would present their interest in the old idea of a national park on the Ramu River in 
terms of 'showing' their children how they lived, what they ate, where they came 
from, what their roots were. For them 'conservation' acquires the added notion of 
preserving an identity and a style of life, a notion which is much wider than the 
conservation notion used by western environmentaUsts, but not necessarily 
incompatible with it. 
W E S T E R N CONSERVATION A N D LOCAL SOCIETY 
In the opening chapter of this study I have presented the basics of western 
conservation trunking, arguing that now common sense ideas such as that contained 
in the dominant conservation narrative, are of fairly recent origin and largely a 
product of western society. The goal of the Biodiversity Program in the Bismarck-
Ramu area, which was obviously based on these western ideas, was to achieve 
biodiversity conservation through the establishment of a large protected area cutting 
across a number of different ecological and vegetational systems with a mimmum 
size of 50,000hectares. This area was to be kept more or less free of destructive 
human interventions in the form of logging, gardening and hunting, in order to 
maintain the integrity of its ecological systems. A number of other uses, such as 
scientific research, non-destructive recreational activities and for example the 
sustainable, harvesting of non-timber forest products are possibly acceptable 
(Sekhran 1996: 16). This view presupposes a number of things: firstly, that nature is 
vulnerable and that man has to take responsibility for its wellbeing, and secondly, 
that nature excluded from most forms of human exploitation still fulfils an 
important role and still has value. This view of conservation, however, is 
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fundamentally different from the way in which both the Jimi and the Ramu people 
look at the relationship between man and nature. 
This section will discuss local views of the environment, arguing that firstiy people 
in the Bismarck-Ramu have little experience with environmental degradation and 
generally don' t perceive the 'problem' that western conservationists present. 
Secondly I will argue hat local communities generally take a utilitarian view of 
nature, regarding it as something to be used, not set aside, and finally that due to 
their specific outlook on the forest and the sprits that inhabit it, they don' t feel 
responsible for its maintenance. Not surprisingly, this section will argue that there is 
very limited evidence of intentional management of the environment by local 
people, and that the use of protected areas as proposed by the project team appears 
fundamentally at odds with local perceptions. 
A LACK OF DEGRADATION AND A UTILITARIAN ATITTUDE TO NATURE 
One of the key difficulties that western conservationists are facing in bringing their 
message forward is that until now, many PNG societies have simply not had to 
seriously look at the long-term implications of their economic behaviour. The 
generally small populations with their low-impact technologies, either did not 
profoundly affect the ecosystems on which they were dependent, or were able to 
adapt due to the relatively slow rate of environmental transformation. As a result, 
people do not think of their forests as finite resources. Environmental degradation is 
a recent phenomenon with population growth probably not accelerating until after 
the Second World War. It is only since the 1950's that the introduction of cash crops 
is taking up increasing amounts of arable land out of garden production and that a 
growing road network enables an increasing conversion of previously forested areas 
into agricultural land (Allen et Al. 1995). In certain areas the forestry companies 
facilitate this process by opening u p previously inaccessible areas. As a result of 
their dependence on their natural resources for their livelihoods, Papua New 
Guineans tend to be highly pragmatic people who take a utilitarian attitude towards 
their environment. They have very real social and economic needs and tend to be 
more concerned with the immediate yields of their gardening and hunting, and 
increasingly with their ability to earn cash by selling and exploiting elements of the 
environment, than with questions of future sustainability. They are also 
predominantly concerned with the welfare of the small group of clan members and 
relatives to which they belong, rather than with the well-being of elusive entities as 
'the nation' or 'humanity'. 4 0 
m In this respect they are no different from other peoples across the world conservation awareness in 
Western countries too, is a relatively recent phenomenon, which is still mainly restricted to the 
educated urban middle classes, whose members may harbour romantic notions of 'natural' and 
'indigenous' lifestyles. Filer (1994), argues that a conservation ethic such as that sought for by western 
agencies is most likely to arise among the urban middle classes of PNG, where people have escaped 
the oppression of village life, whose exposure to education, electronic media and western ideas has 
given them 'the capacity and motivation' to absorb western ideas. 
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The preoccupation with the direct use value of natural resources among the Jimi for 
example is evident in local knowledge systems. In the first place people only have 
detailed names and classifications for those elements of the environment that are 
useful and important in fulfilling their daily needs, but lack specific names for the 
elements that are less important from a utilitarian point of view. The Jimi, for 
example, have individual names for the various Birds of Paradise which they used 
to hunt and trade, or for the varieties of marita which they plant and eat. In many 
cases, local taxonomies may be more elaborate than Western scientific classifications. 
In contrast, they will use generic names for several less important species of birds 
such as parrots (See VanHeldenl998b: table 22). 
In the second place this knowledge, is aimed at the exploitation and use of natural 
resources, rather than at understanding the interdependence of ecological systems. 
People have extensive knowledge of the key linkages that sustain their game and 
fish, in terms of animal behaviour, breeding cycles, and migratory patterns, but it 
takes biological and agricultural training to clarify the eco-systemic mter-linkages 
that he outside the realm of direct observation. Buhner (1982: 66) for example, warns 
that whereas local environmental knowledge may be distinctly impressive, the 
religious beliefs associated with the natural world may also 'inhibit observation and 
logical inference from observation' and 'negative mystical associations may support 
dogmatic assertions about animal behaviour that are contrary to scientific evidence'. 
Local interest in the functional and therefore 'named' elements of the environment, 
has meant that only those individual resources needed for survival have been the 
subject of resource management measures. 
In the Bismarck-Ramu area one such restriction involves discriminating between 
adult male Birds of Paradise in order not to affect future population growth. Next to 
the conservation aspect, however, there is an important aspect of ownership here. 
An owner of a display tree was likely to see his tree abandoned if he shot all 
displaying males, because the remaining females and immature males would move 
to another display tree and thus become the property of the owner of that particular 
tree. It is therefore preferable to spare the bikmaus, the dominant male. Other 
voluntary restraint systems apply to the capture of adult cassowaries. By only 
capturing the chicks that are reared in captivity, villagers would not deplete their 
breeding stock (Healey 1973; 107-09). Cassowaries are notoriously difficult to breed 
in captivity. All such conservation measures are aimed at the management of a 
specific resource and can thus be regarded as elements of an indigenous resource 
management system, but differ in nature from biodiversity conservation, in that the 
latter aims to conserve the ecosystem as a whole, rather than a number of specific 
and useful elements for their future use. 
DEFINING CONSERVATION 
Because rural Papua New Guineans make use of a large variety of subsistence 
resources and have an impressive knowledge of their environment Western 
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observers sometimes presume that local people therefore must be 'natural' 
conservationists. This romantic view of the 'noble savage' (Ellen 1986, Redford 1990, 
Milton 1996) does not appear to hold true for the Jimi people who generally take an 
instrumental and utilitarian attitude to their environment. The Ramu people may be 
a little bit more reluctant to relentlessly exploit their environment. They are so, 
however, not because of a fear of environmental degradation, but in the first place 
because they see themselves hemmed in between a number of outside forces which 
will change their lives and autonomy in an unpredictable manner. 
Alvard (1993) notes that simply observing a group of people living at eqtulibrium 
with its environment is not sufficient evidence to label them conservationists. Over 
the years conservationists have defined the basic properties of 'conservation', 
allowing me to come u p with three basic criteria, which together define the 
conservation concept. 
• In the first place, the conservation act must be intentional and thus based on -
an assumed - causal relation between the action undertaken and the intended 
conservation effect. Although certain actions of communities may have an 
environmentally beneficial impact, closer analysis makes clear that these are 
usually not the result of a conscious effort to preserve resources for future 
use, but the unintended consequence of labour and risk minimising strategies 
or religious beliefs (Buhner 1982; Alvard 1993). Such incidental outcomes 
have become known as 'epiphenomenal conservation' (Hunn 1982), or 
'conservation by default'. 
• In the second place, conservation has to be costly in the short term, even if it 
may be beneficial in the longer run. By preventing or mitigating resource 
depletion or habitat degradation, people forgo a certain resource use and thus 
incur an opportunity cost. The idea that this opportunity cost needs to be off-
set in order to make conservation palatable lies at the heart of the ICAD 
philosophy. 
• Thirdly and finally, the conservation act must have a demonstrable effect in 
conserving the resource. Ruttan and Borgerhoff Mulder (1999: 635) note that 
often assumptions are made about the conservation impact of certain 
indigenous practices without 'conclusive evidence over time' that such is 
indeed the case. 
Conservation in this perspective, thus has to be the intentional management of 
natural resources which imposes an opportunity cost in the present in return for a 
demonstrable conservation effect in the future. 
EPIPHENOMENAL CONSERVATION I N THE BISMARCK-RAMU AREA 
There are many examples of human practices in the PNG and also in the Bismarck-
Ramu area which have conservation effects. Most of these, however, are a by 
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product of other considerations. An example of environmentally beneficial labour-
minimising behaviour arises when people prefer to cut secondary regrowth for their 
gardens rather than primary forest, because the latter is much harder to clear. The 
resulting reduction of human pressure on the forest ecosystem, however, is not what 
drives the relevant decision, and can thus not be regarded as a proof of a 
'conservation ethic'. 
Another example of such epiphenomenal conservation, is related to erosion control. 
Many people in the Upper Jimi Valley farm on steep slopes, and some may take 
mitigating measures by putting logs across their gardens in an attempt to avoid soil 
slippage and a loss of crops. Once the crops are harvested, however, the same 
people allow their pigs into the garden to eat the remaining tubers and foliage. This 
leads to widespread run-off of the loose topsoil. Again, the erosion control measures 
are part of a risk rninimising strategy and not part of a long-term strategy to 
mamtain soil fertility. 
A similar argument can be made with regard to ownership and use rights. In the 
Bismarck-Ramu area, for example such aces rights extend to garden and hunting 
land, fruit and nut trees, display trees for Birds of Paradise, fishing locations, the 
nesting sites of megapodes, crocodile swamps and sago stands. These measures are 
effectively aimed at guaranteeing continued access to the natural resources 
concerned by a specific individual or group, and may have an environmentally 
beneficial side effect for as long as the owners are able to exclude other groups from 
using these resources. Once a group is unable to enforce its ownership rights a 
depletion of wudlife may be the result. Ownership rights, however, have little to do 
with the existence of a 'traditional' conservation ethic, and rather more with a desire 
to keep resources for oneself. The assertion of ownership rights for example, may 
also have a negative environmental impact. Buhner (1982: 64) mentions the case of a 
man in the Kaironk valley who cut down several acres of mixed-oak forest in order 
to stake his claim to the underlying land. 
In the past, religious restrictions on resource use may also have had a beneficial 
impact on the environment. Many communities had restrictions with regard to the 
type of game that could be taken and eaten at certain times and places. In some 
cases, rituals are thought to have regulated the periodic staging of pig festivals to 
reduce the pressure on scarce resources. In the case of the Tsembaga Maring, for 
example, a prohibition on hunting and trapping during the pig festival 'permits 
marsupial populations to recover from exploitation that may otherwise decimate 
them' (Rappaport 1968:151). Similar beliefs may play a role in the case of protected 
areas which are focussed on certain culturally important animals, like the cassowary 
in the Kaironk Valley, where the Kalam people regard this bird as classificatory kin 
or in the case of totemic ancestors such as certain turtle species in Gulf Province. In 
the Ramu people mentioned a number of food taboos concerning the totemic 
animals of their various clans. One of these taboos states that, when such an animal 
is caught, either the men or the women in the family may eat it, but never both. It 
also seems to be the case that if the eldest son ate the totemic animal, his siblings 
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were not allowed to do so. It is, however questionable if such restrictions should be 
interpreted as evidence of a conservation ethic. 
Other examples are the general prescription that people have to take care not to be 
too successful in their hunting lest they would anger the masalai, which could lead 
the hunter and his household to misfortune, disease and possibly death. Misfortune 
could be averted by lolling a pig or chicken for the spirits after a successful hunt. In 
the past these beliefs may have served as an internal restriction on over-hunting. 
The definition of 'too successful', however, was not defined by the community or 
some religious authority, but was defined retrospectively and depended more on 
the future fortune or misfortune of the hunter. If something went wrong in his 
household, it could always - in hindsight - be attributed to a breach of rules vis-a-vis 
the spirits of the forest or, in other cases, the ancestors. Usually the local magic man 
would determine the nature of the breach and the procedures needed to redress the 
situation, including the possible killing of pigs or chickens in the sacred grove of the 
sub-clan. It is important to emphasise, that these magico-religious restrictions were 
not aimed at specifically preserving the forest and its resources, but were aimed at 
safeguarding the wellbeing of individuals and groups. The environmentally 
beneficial impact of these systems was a side effect, not the basic aim of the exercise 
(Buhner 1982: 68). 
The sacred groves in which people make ancestral sacrifices, for example, are 
sometimes regarded as having a positive conservation impact because they function 
as reserve areas. Such a case ahs also been made of India by Chandrakanth and 
Romm (1991) and Apfell Marglin and Mishra (1993). In the Upper Jimi Valley, 
however, these places appear to have little significance for nature conservation, 
since they are very small and generally found close to centres of population. In 
addition, people's ideas about these places bear little relationship to the Western 
idea of conservation. Clarke (in Filer et Al. 1995: 20) writes about the Maring of the 
middle Jimi Valley. 
'Certainly, the groves had a ritual, magical meaning, but I've seen Maring 
chopping down 'sacred', or spirit-inhabited trees. When asked if there was some 
danger in this they said that [it] had been eliminated by saying spells. Perhaps 
consciousness has changed [since 1965] but I don't think the Maring cared much 
about the actions causing 'overhunting' or 'environmental degradation'. 
Even though the Bismarck-Ramu project would use the example of such areas as a 
means to explain western conceptions of protected area management, it is unlikely 
that these can be seen as proof conservation in a 'western' sense. 
CONSERVATION THROUGH CULTURAL REVIVAL 
Still there is a strong cultural survival movement which bases itself on the idea that 
if the 'traditional' cultures that practise such forms of conservation are maintained 
such will also be beneficial in environmental terms. In PNG there area a number of 
rare cases, where indigenous beliefs may indeed provide the point of entry for 
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discussion of conservation from a 'Western' point of view. In Collingwood Bay, for 
example, the initial reason for the Maisin people to refuse entry to the logging 
companies was the fear of the destruction of their sacred sites. These so-called tambu 
('taboo') places are the spots where their forefathers fought to take possession of the 
land, and where the dead were buried. Once the decision had been made to preserve 
these locations, the idea of 'looking after' these sites could be reinforced, and thus 
adapted to include more 'modern' notions of environmental conservation. 
In most cases, however, environmental beliefs are based on complex mystical 
explanations which are increasingly alien to the younger, more educated members 
of the community, incompatible with Christian doctrine, and often in direct 
competition with the modern creed of market production and income maximisation. 
Even if attempted, it would as Buhner (1982: 69-76) writes, 'require a culturally very 
weU-informed extension officer to mearimgfully relate selected factors of traditional 
explanation to modern environmental resource management ' He also points out 
that 'artificial attempts to halt social change or revive traditional cultures cannot 
achieve conservation'. Dwyer (1982: 184) comes to a similar conclusion, noting that 
practices with a positive environmental impact are likely to wear away in the face of 
modern ideas. Although he also notes that 'isolated but deeply held beliefs may 
persist for longer periods' he also thinks that 'it is doubtful that they could provide 
major input into a modern conservation programme'. It may prove especially 
difficult to link the abstract idea of 'biodiversity', a blanket term for all living plants 
and creatures in the environment, to mythical stories. Biodiversity education may be 
more usefully approached with notions emphasising man's custody over creation, 
his dependency on natural resources and services, and the interdependency of 
global ecological systems. 
One of the main changes that is taking place in PNG rural communities is the 
increasing segmentation and desacralisation of daily life. In pre-colonial society 
aspects of production and exchange, the regulation of access to resources, food 
taboos, leadership, religion and social structure were all mter-linked. With the 
arrival of the colonial powers, Christianity and Western education, questions of 
religion have become increasingly separated from production and consumption and 
many of the restrictions that were associated with them have been dissolved. 
Restrictions on the times and places for hunting and corourning game have largely 
disappeared. Dwyer (1982) for example, describes how the Rofaifo and Etolo people 
have abandoned their sex and age class restrictions on the eating of mammals and 
are now eating foods which they would formerly not eat at all. 
Such a process of démystification is taking place In a spatial sense among the Jimi 
Valley. Where respondents in Bubkile still professed a deep fear of the forest spirits 
at the beginning of the 1970s, and attributed a large number of deaths to them 
(Healey 1973), these fears have lost much of their meaning nowadays. The three-day 
trip through the forest is now a regular occurrence, and has allowed for the 
construction of a number of semi-permanent shelters. Young people especially, seem 
less mtimidated by the forest than their elders. They are no longer afraid of sleeping 
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there during their hunting expeditions, and even single women travel through the 
bush with their children. The previously feared 'wild men' of the Ramu Valley have 
become known as the rather less mtirnidating Ramu clans. The gradual 
disappearance of these beliefs does not have purely negative consequences for the 
environment. On the one hand, it removes some of the previous restraints on 
hunting, gardening and the cutting of trees; on the other, it opens the door to 
explanations of ecological interdependency and environmental decline, with 
remedies focusing on human behaviour and responsibihty. 
T H E GUARDIANS OF THE FOREST 
An additional reason why people in the Bismarck-Ramu area can not be regarded as 
conservationists is related to the fact that they do not feel responsible for the bush. 
Among the Jimi, the pattern of reciprocal exchange relations stabilised by moral 
guidelines which fade with social distance, is not only confined to relations between 
human groups and individuals but also extends to the ancestors, the environment 
and its guardian spirits. Hughes (1988) in her description of Simbu spirit beliefs 
draws a similar analogy of concentric circles. The village, its gardens and immediate 
surroundings are at the core of the community, with the ceremonial grounds as its 
social centre where the ancestors are honoured during pig feasts. The community 
also includes the spirits of the ancestors. People often emphasise the mter-linkages 
between themselves, their ancestors, the land for which their ancestors fought and 
their customs, language and identity. All of these together make u p their pies 
(village) and people who die are not gone, but are thought to remain within the 
community, be it within another, ancestral realm. The communal hunting grounds 
are controlled by the masalai, the capricious forest spirits which may cause harm to 
man and which either have to be appeased or tricked into surrendering game. 
The spatial division between the human and the spirit realm is also visible in the fact 
that many highland groups refer to wildlife as the 'pigs of the masalai' as opposed to 
the 'pigs of man' . As in human affairs, relations with the spiritual world are 
reciprocal in nature, where man propitiates his ancestors and the bush-spirits and in 
return hopes for success in pig breeding and hunting game. As in human affairs, 
donating pork helps to stabilise the difficult relations with unruly ancestors or 
dangerous bush spirits. The Kuma of the Wahgi Valley divide their pigs into two 
groups, the 'real pigs' for presentation to people and the 'spirit pigs' aimed at 
satisfying the ancestors and spirits (Reay 1959:142). Custom on the Ramu River 
dictates that the hunters cut the belly of their game and leave the intestines and 
blood behind to thank the spirits of the forest for the game that they have been 
allowed to take. When a wild pig is killed, the ears and tail are left behind. Once the 
game has been cooked it is divided between the different families and the visitors. In 
Yawetama village on the Ramu River after a successful hunt two extra plates of food 
were placed on a shelf near the fireplace. One was for the 'people of the forest', the 
masalai, the other for 'the people of the village', the ancestors. 
Ramu society and Jimi migration 1 8 1 
The further one gets away from the village the more troublesome and antagonistic 
the relations with people and spirits become. Outside the circle of known hunting 
lands is an unknown realm containing malevolent spirits and 'wild' people to whom 
one has no obUgations and from whom one cannot expect any favours. In general 
the places where these people and sprits live are better avoided. The Jimi for 
example, used to fear the spirits of the forest in the Bismarck Fall who were thought 
to inhabit certain remote areas in the forest, known as pies nogut ('dangerous 
places'). If the person hunting does not belong to that area or does not appease the 
spirits properly, the masalai may strike him with illness or bad luck. Some of the 
most dangerous spirits in the Bismarck Fall are thought to abduct humans and pigs, 
and are considered especially harmful to women and children. One of these spirits, 
the Kip-kange or Kondol-kange. is said to roam the Bismarck Fall, where it 
approaches travellers in the shape of a man and entices them to follow it. People go 
spak, ('drunk'), or long-long, ('crazy'), and when they recover, they find themselves in 
a place where they did not intend to go. When the Kip-kange kills, it does so by 
swelling the limbs of its victim until they burst. The victim will see his blood run but 
will not feel any pain.'" The relations with these wild spirits vary from outright 
avoidance to reciprocal exchange through propitiation to trickery, depending on the 
self-confidence of the person involved. 
The separation between the realms of the village and that of the forest suggest a 
dichotomy between the 'social world' of the village, with its people and their 
ancestors, and the 'natural world' of the spirits (Buhner 1982, Rappaport 1968). This 
dichotomy implies a worldview in which the spirits of the forest own and look after 
the forest, while the ancestors guard and take care of the village. 4 2 According to 
Hughes (1988) the village can be regarded as a place of relative order and 
predictability, as opposed to the chaos ruling the bush. The forest is regarded as 
alien, as something that needs to be kept at a distance by clearing space for houses 
and gardens. Only when game or other resources are taken out of the forest, do the 
masalai need to be propitiated for surrendering the things needed by man. Under all 
circumstances, however, man is an intruder and a coloniser, who has to watch his 
step and work hard to carve his place out of the endless expanse of the surrounding 
forest. It is man that is vulnerable, not nature and people speak with respect of the 
strength and endeavour of men that venture far into the bush to cut new gardens. 
4 1 Kange is reminiscent of the Simbu and Bundi kanggi spirits (Hughes 1988, Zimmer 1985) Kanggi as 
described by Hughes (1988; 67), are very similar as they also inhabit forest areas, swamps and 
hillsides, through which men will travel but where they will not make settlements. The Kanggi spirits 
are territorial by nature, have the ability to change shape, and may leave a trail of dog or marsupial 
footprints. Healey (1973:106-107) records similar spirits among the Narak and Kandawo, while Reay 
(1959:131-32). describes them for the Kuma. 
B Whereas some anthropologists take the dichotomy between culture and nature as a universal one, a 
number of ethnographers have wondered whether this contrast, which reflects the modernist 
separation of culture and nature, has the same symbolic significance to New Guinean peoples (See 
Strathern 1980 for an overview of this discussion). 
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Whereas at face value this distinction appears to mirror western conceptions of 
human society and wild nature, there are still a number of differences. In the first 
place the distinction between human society and wilderness as used in Western 
conservation discourse is expressed in spatial and temporal terms. There is a place 
where man belongs and also a 'primordial' and 'pristine' place where man does not. 
This distinction is absolute. There is no such thing as nature which is a 'Utile bit' 
pristine, or 'relatively' primordial. It either is, or it is not. In the second place, it 
entails a subject-object relationship in which mankind observes, looks after and 
defends the environment, while nature is being observed, looked after and 
defended. Nature is a thing. Papua New Guineans tend to conceptualise the 
distinction between the viUage and the wilderness in terms of a cont inuum In 
addition, they see their relationship with nature as a social one. One can enter into 
exchange with the masalai that own the forest, one can trick them, or be tricked. It is 
the absence of stable social relationships makes an area wild, whether it is inhabited 
by people or not. Thus big forest is not per definition 'wUd', while Port Moresby, the 
countries' capital with its many amorphous and undefined social relationships may 
be very 'wud' indeed. 
The most important difference, however, comes with the notion of responsibility. 
Whereas western conservationists continue to emphasise the responsibiUty that man 
has to take in looking after nature, the western idea of conservation is 
fundamentaUy contradictory to the worldview of local people in the Bismarck-Ramu 
area, who regard the Masalai as the owners of the forest and its game. It constitutes 
'almost an impertinence', as it is neither man nor his ancestors, but the spirits which 
are in control of the bush (Buhner 1982: 69). If the masalai are the owners of the forest 
and its game, than a declining yield from hunting does not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion that the game is diminishing because of over-hunting. It may simply 
mean that the spirits are no longer being propitiated properly by the younger 
generations. Such beUefs may thus obfuscate the causal relationships between 
human action and environmental degradation brought forward by western 
conservationists as they provide competing explanations in terms of sorcery, the 
wrath of ancestors or the actions of the masalai. 
Not only the relative balance of power between man and nature is perceived in 
fundamentally different terms by local people and western conservationists, there is 
also Uttle reaUsation among conservationists that in the context of communal land 
tenure in PNG, not using land and resources weakens one's ownership rights to 
land. In many cases the use of land and the bestowal of use rights on other parties 
reaffirms the ownership of its owners over the land, and it is by reference to past use 
that people claim ownership (Giddings 1984). On the Ramu River, this for example, 
means that clans keep small groups of relatives Uving in remote parts of their 
territory as spiman (spies), to make sure that no strangers settle on their land as these 
are seen to be used. 
In the Ught of the above discussion, it is probably fair to say that there is not much 
evidence in the Bismarck-Ramu of a conservation ethic which prescribes the 
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concerted management and conservation of environmental resources. There never 
was much need to do so due to the relative abundance of the environment and the 
fact that the notion of looking after' the environment is not self-evident within Jimi 
and Ramu society. Setting land aside for the sake of biodiversity preservation is 
probably sUghtly ridiculous in the eyes of utility-oriented local people as it is not 
clear who is to use the local resource and what for. Future generations, 'humanity-
as-a-whole' and the 'intrinsic' or 'unknown' value of nature, are not easy notions to 
identify with in a society where ones neighbour's neighbours are strangers and thus 
enemies. 
In addition many westerners tend to have a static conception of indigenous 
communities, underestimating the extent to which social change and the 
monétisation of the economy are going to change local perceptions of the 
environment While these changes are most visible among the Jimi communities, 
there is no doubt that these also affect the Ramu people. 
POLICY OPTIONS FOR CONSERVATIONISTS 
At face value the conclusion that biodiversity conservation ideals per se are not likely 
to exist in the area of intervention leaves a number of possible responses open to the 
proponents of conservation projects. In the first place project teams could simply 
conclude that because people have no direct interest in biodiversity conservation 
through protected area establishment, and given the extraordinary power that 
landowners have in P N G , there is therefore no real opportunity for conservation in 
the area of their choice. This is a disheartening, but potentially valid conclusion 
which would apply to all of P N G with the exception of those land groups that opt 
for conservation on their own account. In this view, P N G should no longer be a 
target for uninvited biodiversity conservation efforts. 
Secondly, conservationists can respond by stating that people do not possess the 
right frame of mind for 'genuine' biodiversity conservation and therefore need more 
and better conservation education in order to build such conviction. Once local 
communities accept 'western' notions of biodiversity conservation, resource scarcity 
and the need to look after nature, they may be prepared to bear the responsibilities 
imposed on them as custodians of world biodiversity. This view by-passes the fact 
that people in the Bismarck-Ramu have real and more immédiate needs than 
biodiversity conservation for the sake of humanity and future generations. 
Expecting people to forget about their poverty, the existing malnutrition, the lack of 
employment opportunities and the high number of women that die in child birth in 
order to embrace an abstract western notion of biodiversity conservation is not 
realistic. It, however, a notion which is implicit in many environmental awareness 
programs. 
A third, more long-term and evolutionary view, also known as 'weak' or 'indirect' 
conservation regards the development of a conservation ethic as a product of 
increasing welfare. Conservation according to this view will gradually come about 
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as Third World populations improve their standard of living, while at the same time 
experiencing the environmental decline that comes with the economic exploitation 
of natural resources, in much the same way western countries have. The 
demographic transition leading to smaller families, higher education and basic 
social security will eventually trigger an expanded sensibility to the needs of nature 
and the enjoyment of the natural environment. A consequence of this evolutionary 
type of thanking is that environmental interventions first focus on the management 
of resources for utilitarian purposes, later developing towards setting cherished 
landscapes aside for recreational, aesthetic and ecological purposes. It is this view 
which allows Nash to define of conservation as a 'full stomach syndrome' (in Guha 
1989: 79). This evolutionary view ignores the fact that in many cases poor people do 
actively manage their resources, and confuses the many different varieties of 
environmental management with the preservation of wilderness. This creates a view 
of poor people as being caught in a static, and environmentally destructive way of 
life which can only evolve towards a more 'modern' developed and supposedly 
more rature-respecting life-style in which large areas of wild nature are set aside 
through the intervention of well-meaning outsiders. 
Policy recommendations based on this view call for a redirection of development 
initiatives towards those rural areas and productive systems that are geographically 
removed from the areas that are to be conserved. Poor people, being rational actors, 
will move to where the opportunities for a better life are being created, thereby 
reducing the pressure on valuable environments and eventually coming to love 
nature as 'Westerners' supposedly do. According to this view, policies aimed at 
increased urban and rural welfare through an intensification of economic 
development are more effective in protecting the environment than the 
preservationist policies revolving around protected areas. 4 3 This option suggests that 
the project should wait until such time that people in the Bismarck-Ramu can afford 
to think about other, more long-term issues than immediate survival. It is obvious 
that such a waiting period and the social and economic development required to 
trigger a conservationist ethic may lead to the depletion of natural resources. 
The final approach constitutes the use of development projects as a tool to achieve 
conservation. This view, also known as 'strong' or 'direct' conservation, opposes the 
evolutionary view of conservation, fearing that such conservation may be too little 
too late. Instead this view, propelled by the notion of crisis, actively aims to 'make 
conservation pay'. In practice this is achieved by developing conservation-related 
activities, which aim to meet the mcome-earning aspirations and other welfare 
objectives of the involved communities in such a way, that a destruction of natural 
resources also leads to a loss of economic opportunities and services. It is this 
4 3 Shiva (1991a: 7-8) disagrees wholeheartedly, calling this a 'schizophrenic approach' as it, is based on 
the destruction of agricultural diversity in productive areas coupled to a policy of preservation based 
on set-asides. In her view such an approach is fundamentally flawed as 'biodiversity can not be 
conserved unless production itself is based on a policy of preserving diversity'. 
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C O N C L U S I O N 
This chapter has introduced the social dynamics that characterise the Ramu Valley, 
starting with an introduction to the area and some of the key characteristics of the 
Ramu clans with regard to their size, internal divisions, marriage patterns and 
decision-making patterns. In contrast to the Jimi how have actively engaged the 
colonial administration in their economic and political endeavours (see previous 
chapter), the Ramu can be characterised by an attitude of avoidance. In recent year 
they have watched with mixed feelings how a variety of changes are taking place 
around them. These changes range from new logging concessions and associated 
road building, the development of an open-cut min in the Bismarck Fall, oil drilling 
in the Banam area, and the growing number of Jimi settlers entering their lands. 
I have subsequently described how these small Ramu groups have entered into 
marriage and exchange relations with the much more numerous and forceful Jimi 
highlanders and have thereby opened to door to large scale migration. This chapter 
details how marriage relations have given the Jimi access to Ramu resources, and 
the role that two intermediary clans have played. Due to the impact that the Jimi 
have on the environment and resource availability, the Ramu landowners would 
prefer them to move back tot the Jimi Valley but have little means to force them back 
up. The Jimi are aware that they are no longer welcome, and are worried about high 
levels of disease, especially malaria, and the risk of sorcery by Ramu sorcerers, but 
do not really want to return. Especially the younger men, who have been born in the 
area argue that they should be seen as 'true landowners'. It is in this complex 
situation that the Bismarck-Ramu project would come to play a role, first by 
affiliating itself with the Jimi settlers, later switching to the Ramu landowners as 
their interest in defending their resources from further Jimi encroachment appeared 
compatible with the project goal of estabhshing a protected area. 
The final pages of the chapter have looked at resource management practices in the 
area. The reason to do so stems from the fact that the idea that local people are 
natural conservationists would come to play a key role, in the philosophy of the 
Bismarck-Ramu project. The above discussion illustrates how the notions of man's 
relationship with nature as used by the international and PNG environmental 
philosophy which lies at the heart of the ICAD approach and which suggests the 
policy of trying to identify those groups of people that have an interest in 
conservation in order to achieve objectives that can be supported by the project. 
There where there is a juncture between the needs and wants of local people and the 
conservation objectives of the project there is room to look at the establishment of a 
protected a rea Whereas the Biodiversity Program initially defined such interests in 
purely economic terms, the development of a participatory community entry 
approach would create room for other motivations finally leading to a 'middle 
ground' between conservation-minded CD workers and a number of territorially-
minded Ramu clans. 
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constituency are not the same as those used by the people whom own the 
biodiversity. In 'western' eyes nature is vulnerable and its maintenance the 
responsibility of mankind. In many PNG communities nature is seen as powerful 
and all surrounding, and as lying outside the social world and the responsibilities of 
man. Conservation follows logically from the first view, it is incompatible with the 
second. 
The value of nature for local communities lies with the extent to which local people 
can make use of resources to meet immediate needs. Biodiversity conservationists 
claim that its value lies in its benefits to mankind and the biosphere as a whole and 
in potential, but presently unknown, future uses. The first view implies a need to 
use resources to access their inherent value for the local group, the second the need 
to leave them alone for the well-being of mankind and future generations. 'Western' 
ideas of biodiversity conservation are restrictive and tend to he close to the idea of 
preservation of resources by restricting their use to non-destructive uses only. Local 
notions of conservation may be much wider, emphasising a continued use of 
resources and may imply a partial cultural revival, a passing on of traditions and 
language and, possibly, the preservation of part of the bush to show future 
generations what life was like in the recent past. In the next half of this s tudy I will 
look at the various attempts by the Bismarck-Ramu ICAD project to come to a 
common understanding with local people. 
Chapter 5 
THE NATURE OF 'GOOD BUSINESS': CONSERVATION PATROLS 
AMONG THE JLMI PEOPLE 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
This chapter 4 4 describes events as they unfolded with the start of the project 
interventions in the Bismarck-Ramu area. It starts with a discussion of the process 
used to select the Bismarck-Ramu area and the inconsistencies between social and 
biological criteria for site selection that became apparent in the process. Work 
commenced in April 1995 with a reconnaissance patrol during which members of 
the project team presented their intentions to a number of Jimi communities on the 
eastern and northern fringes of the project area. A detailed account of these first 
interactions shows how patrol teams and Jimi people, although ostensibly agreeing 
to work together in the field of conservation, were in fact talking and thinking about 
different things. Whereas the team's focus lay on safeguarding biodiversity, people 
in the Bismarck-Ramu area were mainly interested in the extent to which the 
project's presence could become an immediate source of income, status and jobs. 
Five months after this first patrol a biological survey was conducted to determine 
the biological significance of the local natural resource. The survey and its 
preparatory patrol led to a number of problems that partly resulted from the fact 
that the survey team seriously misjudged the social complexity of the Jimi Valley. 
The survey team took little time to become acquainted with the area and its people 
and based its intervention on a number of untenable premises concerning local 
society and the position of the newly appointed Jimi community facilitator. 
Although the survey team focused on the logistical and technical aspects of 
sampling local biodiversity, it saw the survey itself as the first step in what was to 
become a long-term collaborative relationship with local communities. 
The team members perceived themselves as offering a viable opportunity to 
communities in this remote area and assumed that local people too would take a 
long-term view in their dealings with the project. Instead, the project became 
A much shorter version of this chapter is forthcoming as VanHelden (2001c). 
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entangled in a series of messy discussions with a bewildering variety of people and 
groups who made persistent and opportunistic attempts to extort additional wages, 
money and jobs. This triggered a range of negotiations and conflicts between Jimi 
people and the project team. These discussions required the project to shift the onus 
of discussions from conservation and development issues, towards the nature of 
working relations between people and project. During the various patrols not only 
issues of 'conservation' and 'development' but what the team considered to be the 
'proper' meamng of agreements, the 'appropriate' level of wages, the 'correct' use of 
money, the nature of 'good business' and the occurrence of violence became the 
topics of discussion. At the same time that the team tried to structure the people-
project working relationship by lecturing on the need for mutual trust and a long-
term commitment to co-operation, it became increasingly entangled in the strategic 
projects of local individuals and communities. 
The background given in the last chapter will be used to analyse the Bubkile 
incident and the conflicts that arose. It will be argued that the specific social 
structure of the area, the short-term economic aspirations of the Jimi communities, 
the instrumental view of transactions with outsiders and the unhappy experiences 
with post-colonial Government, help to understand why people responded to the 
project as they did. The feelings of disappointment that arose on the part of the 
project team were a result of the fact that the Biodiversity Program operated from a 
number of stereotypical and simplifying premises with regard to the make-up of 
local communities. These rosy-tinted preconceptions, coupled with a tendency to 
take public statements at face value, led to an overly optimistic reading of the first 
encounters between project and people, and subsequent disappointment when 
people acted in unexpected ways. These disappointments and the hardening conflict 
at Lak necessitated a radical revision of its project strategy. 
SELECTING THE B I S M A R C K - R A M U AREA 
The decision to choose the Bismarck-Ramu area as the next ICAD site was based on 
number of considerations. In the first place on the basis of a review of existing 
literature on areas of potential conservation interest in PNG, in the second place on a 
number of biological criteria and in the third place on a number of socio-economic 
and strategic considerations. This incorporation of social criteria was a consequence 
of the Lak experience. Even though the selection document argues that 'it is 
extremely important ... that social and economic criteria play a critical role in the 
actual site selection process' (DEC 1995: 5) the choice for the Bismarck-Ramu area 
would predominantly be taken on the basis of biological criteria 
As a first step a literature study provided 17 sites of potential conservation interest 
in PNG (DEC 1994). This selection was subsequently reduced to 13 as it was decided 
to limit the selection process to the mainland of PNG by 'administrative request' 
(DEC 1995: 2). The latter request probably was a consequence of the extreme 
logistical difficulties encountered in developing the Lak project. Following this first 
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assessment, the project biologist assessed these 13 areas in terms of species richness, 
the presence of endemic species, the presence of species of special concern and a 
habitat and terrain gap analysis. These data and the calculation of non-weighted 
scores allowed for the prioritisation of these areas vis-a-vis each other in terms of 
biodiversity (DEC 1995). According to all of these criteria the Bismarck-Ramu area 
did well, an outcome which confirmed its status of "Very High Priority' accorded by 
the 1992 Conservation Needs Assessment. Especially its altitude gradient rurining 
down from PNG's highest summit to one of its richest alluvial lowland forests and 
the inclusion of swamp forest make it an important depository of terrestrial 
biodiversity (Beehler 1993c; 201). A fly-over conducted in February 1995 to assess 
village density and forest structure gave a favourable impression of the area. 
The next step consisted of the selection of a more specific site for the actual ICAD 
intervention, as the project team noted that nearly all priority areas were too large as 
in PNG the complexity of working on customary land makes managing areas of this 
size extremely difficult. Instead, the Biodiversity Program suggested that the 
preferred conservation area had to be between 50,000 and 80,000 hectares large and 
had to be preferably circular in shape as a low perimeter to area ratio reduces the 
opportunity for encroachment. The area was to cover lowland sites and lower hill 
forests in the proximity of higher elevation areas in order to allow for the 
conservation of mobile species that need a variety of habitats as part of their 
life-cycle. 
It was at this stage that a number of non-biological criteria such as operational, 
demographic and social considerations and the experiences at Lak started to play a 
role. Operational considerations mainly had to do with access to the area and the 
presence of government service. Demographic and social considerations such as 
population densities and the resulting levels of human disturbance of native forests, 
the presence of existing and future logging concessions, as well as regional history, 
local social structures, law and order, and the local predisposition to conservation 
were also to be included. Little information on these latter issues was available, 
however, other than that there was no immediate logging threat. The lack of road 
access and the presence of highlands settlers in the Ramu valley were the major 
negatives (DEC 1995: 35).4 5 
Due to lack of socio-economic information, in the end the choice for the Bismarck-
Ramu area was made based on biological considerations. Biologically the area was 
considered important, an assumption which would prove correct when the results 
of the 1995 Bubkile Biological Survey came out. 
4 5 It is interesting to see that the lack of road access was regarded as a negative feature of the Bismarck-
Ramu area. One would expect that in terms of biodiversity conservation the rough terrain and the 
large rivers which hamper the construction of roads and therefore the access by extractive resource 
projects would actually make the Bismarck-Ramu area more interesting. In the United States the 
environmental movement fights monumental battles to restrict road building into wilderness areas. 
The absence of roads, however would also hamper local enterprise development, which constitutes a 
key element in the ICAD strategy. 
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TWO PARK INITIATIVES 
One important 'social' aspect that influenced the decision for the Bismarck-Ramu 
area was the fact that during colonial times and afterwards two attempts had been 
made to establish national parks at different sites in the a rea In the first case, a 
substantial part of the Bismarck range and the Ramu river floodplain had been 
proposed as a Potential National Park Area (PNPA) by the Australian colonial 
aclmtaistration. The proposal for a Simbai National Park was originally done in 1969 
by the Wildlife Division of the Department of Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries 
which would later become the Office and subsequently the DEC (DEC). At the time 
of this early proposal, census and language maps showed it as being urunhabited. 
Present PNG census maps continue to show this area as 'National Park' although 
hundreds of people have moved into the area since the beginning of the 1980s. 
The initial proposal for a National Park reached a stage of agreement between the 
landowners, the Madang Area Government and the National Park Service in 1969, 
but was never gazetted and subsequently remained under consideration during the 
1970s and 1980s. In 1986, a DEC patrol found that the presence of settlers in the 
PNPA presented an obstacle to its implementation (Antiko 1986). This reflects the 
usual idea that only empty areas should be designated as national parks. As the 
government of PNG had no means to evict people, it therefore shelved the proposal. 
The Bismarck-Ramu ICAD project did not aim to implement the old PNPA but did 
recognise that this area was initially selected because of its extensive primary 
forests, its altitude differential and its low population pressure. In October 1995, a 
formal biodiversity survey undertaken in the Bismarck Fall confirmed the high 
levels of biodiversity in the area (Hedemark et Al. 1997). 
A second attempt to establish a national park in the southeast corner of the 
Bismarck-Ramu area took place in 1981 when the Government of PNG through the 
DEC purchased an area of 810 hectares around the summit of Mount Wilhelm. The 
land was bought from the landowners for the sum of K 12,563 (U$ 12,000) with the 
intention of declaring it a National Park. Although this intention was gazetted in 
May 1990, the final declaration of its status was postponed due to conflicts between 
the landowners and the Government. During the selection of the second ICAD site 
DEC officials expressed an interest in combining the search for a solution on the 
planned Mount Wilhelm national park with a possible ICAD initiative in the area 
(Filer et Al, 1995: 4). In October 1995, the project team visited Mt. Wilhelm to talk to 
landowners and their interest in a possible extension of the park into the Ramu 
valley. They found that the park infrastructure was in a poor state, while local 
people noted that they had no control over what was going on in the area. The only 
local benefits derived from the area came from compensation payments received for 
the positioning of three radio repeater stations on its summit (CRC 1995c). 
The presence of two sizeable park initiatives in this one area is rather exceptional. In 
the site selection analysis these past attempts were classified under the heading 
'conservation predisposition' and regarded as a positive criterion for selection (DEC 
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1995). Whether these past attempts should classify as positive or negative, however, 
would seem largely dependent on the perception of the landowners in those 
proposed national park areas. The fact that the implementation of the Mt. Wilhelm 
National Park stalled as a result of landowner troubles should probably have been 
regarded more of a negative. The fact that nothing ever happened in the Ramu 
National Park at that stage an unknown. In hindsight, however, the choice for this 
area, partly because of these earlier park initiatives, may have been the stroke of 
luck which led to the inclusion of a group of landowners along the Ramu River with 
a strong predisposition towards the establishment of a national park as a result of 
their earlier exposure to the concept (Cf. VanHelden 1998b). 
The general lack of socio-economic information and the growing realisation from 
Lak that such information was essential to the project prompted the Biodiversity 
Program to change strategy. It decided not to narrow itself down to a specific area of 
50,000 to 80,000 hectares, but deliberately selected a wide 'area of interest' of some 
325,000 hectares as the site for the second ICAD project that was to be executed 
between early 1995 and April 1998. This innovative selection strategy, in which 
social criteria were later to be 'superimposed' on an area of high conservation value, 
was a result of the realisation that the project would be dependent on local people 
for the success of the project. In contrast to what one would expect on the basis of 
this site-selection procedure and the professed emphasis on social criteria, however, 
the first interventions in the Jimi Valley and Bismarck Fall were not used to become 
thoroughly acquainted with the local social and economic landscape. Instead, they 
became dominated by the conduct of a biological survey. 
T H E APRIL 1995 PATROL I N T O THE M A R U M A N D R A M U SECTIONS 
The first patrol into the Bismarck-Ramu area was held in April 1995 when a team led 
by the project biologist, also mcluding a British social anthropologist from the NRI, a 
historian from UPNG who was from the Bundi area and two DEC personnel visited 
the Marum and Ramu valley sectors of the project area. The objective of the patrol 
was to gauge the interest of local residents in a possible ICAD project and to put a 
set of questions to knowledgeable informants with regard to biological, cultural and 
economic features of the area. The patrol flew into the Marum Mission station and in 
the following 10 days travelled northwards on foot to Tigari, from where it was 
airlifted to Pimbum where an airstrip was under construction and walked past a 
number of villages to Foroko-Brimde. 
The mountains in this area are extremely rugged and covered with primary forests. 
Large rivers cut through steep valleys and can make river crossing a hazardous 
experience. The villages surrounded by gardens and secondary forest are few and 
far between and usually consist of about 5 to 20 houses. Education and health 
services are non-existent in most places and although Government officers may now 
and then pass through, they never return to bring the lasting change that they often 
promise. The arrival of a group of outsiders, using helicopters, displaying wealth 
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and including 'whiteskins' was a momentous occasion in these villages and 
generated a lot of excitement. 
The aim of the patrol was to get a first impression of the biological and social 
landscape, while also s t a t i n g its environmental awareness campaign. To do so, an 
opening speech was held in every community, which was followed by a question-
and-answer session with the public. The contents of this opening presentation are 
interesting as they reveal key aspects of the ICAD approach taken during the 
opening stages of the Bismarck-Ramu project The public meetings between the 
project staff and villagers usually took place in the village square and were followed 
with more detailed 'storying' sessions at night in the men's house. When the 
meeting started, under a tree or underneath a house on poles, the respected elderly 
men and younger men with some education would sit in front, smoking and 
chewing betelnut and lime with at the back the other onlookers and women and 
children. Groups of youngsters would sit on the edge of the meeting playing cards, 
pretending not to be part of it all. These public meetings were often chaotic with a 
number of conversations in Tok Pisin, and 'tok pies' going on simultaneously and 
the different speeches punctuated with comments by bystanders on the appearance 
and behaviour of the newcomers. With the exception of the Big Men listening 
attentively up front, people wandered in and out of the meeting as it unfolded. 
Women especially had difficulty understanding Tok Pisin and had household 
chores to attend to and children to look after. 
The opening speech prepared by the team was held in every village contacted on the 
way and introduced the team and the intentions of the project. It also started with 
some awareness raising about the potential impact of resource projects on the 
environment. The presentation was held by the American patrol co-ordinator and 
project biologist, and was translated into Tok Pisin and the local language by one of 
the scientists or interpreters that came with the patrol. The speech usually started off 
with a discussion of three different groups of people and their interests with regard 
to land use and development: 1) those that wish to exploit local natural resources, 2) 
those that wish to conserve them and 3) the customary landowners, i.e. the 
onlookers during the speech. The villagers were told how different types of land-use 
and resource exploitation in PNG are linked to different rates of development. If 
development comes 'too slow' then people will get frustrated with the speed with 
which their lives improve and the old people will complain that they will die before 
having received any benefits. However, if development is 'too fast', it may be short-
lived and unequally distributed. In other presentations the choice was presented as 
between 'big' development and resource depletion on the one hand or gradual and 
'small' development with conservation on the other. 
People were told that in the near future, they would need to decide which rate and 
form of development would be best for their purposes and which type of 
development would maintain a balance between their present needs and those of 
future generations. Outsiders such as logging and mining companies that come and 
bring 'big and fast development' may have no interest in the long-term impact of 
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their activities and whether the benefits are lasting or not. The interest of the project, 
however, was to assist people in getting the right balance between 'conservation' 
and 'development' and the project team wanted to know what the people thought of 
about the idea of 'exchanging' conservation for development 'in ways which bring 
gradual but long-lasting benefits to the community' (Filer et Al. 1995; 9). The speech 
held during these initial patrols was clearly influenced by the Lak experience as its 
main topic was the possibility of logging and mining companies cheating local 
people out of their natural wealth by making grand promises with regard to the 
developments, services and cash that they would deliver. The 'gist' of the speech 
went as follows: 
"Thank you for accepting us warmly and allowing us to spend the night here. We 
are not representatives of any mining or timber companies. Unlike the mining 
and timber companies, we have not come to exploit and destroy your resources, 
but rather because we want to help you to protect your resources for yourselves, 
for PNG and for the world at large, and for your future generations. We are 
interested solely in conservation and do not support the unscrupulous 
exploitation of the environment. We want to ensure that your pandanus trees are 
protected, your hunting grounds safeguarded, your rivers not polluted and your 
sacred sites not disturbed. In fact, we want to help you conserve the area 
between Mount Wilhelm and the Ramu Valley so that little disruption occurs to 
the eco-system as it now exists. If you agree to work with us and support our 
conservation plans then our project will assist, obviously not straightaway, but 
gradually over a period of time, to bring various 'developments' such as roads, 
schools, health clinics or walkabout sawmills to the area, however, and most 
importantly, any 'development' brought to the area will always be at the specific 
request of the people of the area. Our project will on no account initiate projects 
on its own' (Filer et Al. 1995: 27). 
It is doubtful whether this presentation was understood as it was intended. In the 
first place many of the terms, when translated into Tok Pisin, lose the specificity that 
they have in English. Concepts such as 'nature', 'biodiversity' and 'ecosystem' 
become 'olgeta samting i stap insait long bus na graun na wara' ('everything that is in 
the bush, on the land and in the water'). 'Conservation' becomes 'lukautim bus na 
graun na wara' ('looking after bush, land and water') something which landowners 
regard themselves as already doing, be it that they interpret it mainly in a territorial 
sense by mamtaming their claims to the land that their ancestors used. Nature itself 
is not something that people easily take responsibility for (See last section of chapter 
4 for a discussion of local attitudes to nature). 
In addition, the speech is based on a number of premises. In the first place the 
project team assumes that those hstening share its analysis that natural resources are 
under threat, a questionable assumption in large parts of the Bismarck-Ramu area 
(VanHelden 1998b). In the second place, the project assumes that if people do not 
yet understand the vulnerability of their environment, they can be made aware of 
the problem and their essential role in the sustainable management of nature. 
Instilling a conservation ethic is thus in the first place a communicative problem in 
which people, once they are aware of the 'facts', are expected to do the right thing. 
194 Through the Thicket 
Thirdly and finally, the team assumes that ultimately the interests of all 
stakeholders, the onlookers, the nation, the world and future generations coincide 
and Ue with the conservation of natural resources. As the experience in Lak had 
shown, however, villagers in PNG may prefer to see the 'unscrupulous exploitation' 
of their environment as an opportunity to adopt a different lifestyle.46 
The project also makes clear that its interests he with conservation of the ecosystem 
and does not have development as its prime concern. The project team primarily 
wants conservation from and by local communities, with the bringing of 
development to local communities as a means to achieve conservation. This 
approach reflects the fact that in the context of PNG land tenure the only way to 
conserve biodiversity is by going through the local communities that own that 
biodiversity. While the speech underlines the authority of local people over 
resources and makes clear that it will on 'no account initiate projects on its own' it 
also implies that people may loose out if they do not co-operate. Those that agree to 
work with the project will benefit, those that do not, obviously will not. 
'Development' is here presented as the sweetener that is to make 'conservation' 
palatable. It is a deal, in which the project brings local people some form of 
'development' and local people give the project give 'conservation'. The notion of an 
'exchange' of conservation for development, the crux of the ICAD concept, would 
pop u p in all village meetings: 
At Gulno the Tunka people 'said that they are prepared to offer their bush for 
conservation and would be happy to work closely with the ICAD team for any 
small development that would come in the future (CRC 1995b: 10). 
At Pimbum DEC staff stated that 'If you offer us your bush to look after, we will 
look out for small developments for you in the future'(CRC 1995b: 39) 
From these meetings it appears that people may not have perceived 'conservation' 
as something done for and by themselves but rather as something that is done for 
and by the DEC in exchange for which they are rewarded with 'development'. The 
Jimi community facilitator for example, stated at Bubkile that: 'If we [the Jimi people] 
look after our bush for them [the DEC] in the long run they might help us with some 
small developments e.g.: aidpost, school, e t c ' (CRC 1995b: 33 my italics). This 
reflects the 'economic' premise underlying the ICAD method, namely that people 
are only willing to conserve if the opportunity cost of their conservation efforts is 
off-set by income generating activities and the provision of services. 
4 The choice of words between 'fast' and 'big' development on one side and 'slow' and 'small' 
development on the other is a tricky one. Any rural PNG asked out of the blue which variety he 
would like better would probably like it 'big' and 'fast'. People like big pigs and big kaukau (sweet 
potato), take pride in making large gardens and prefer to belong to populous tribes. 'Big' is often 
synonymous with 'good'. People are tired of waiting for change: they want a hugely better life, and 
they want it right now. 'Small is beautiful' remains a difficult message to get across' (Weeks in Brooks 
1996:27). 
Conservation patrols among the Jimi people 195 
During the Bubkile biological survey of October 1995, the team went a step further 
in illustrating its commitment to conservation by making a short speech about the 
origin of conservation monies. It illustrated this with a map showing PNG in the 
middle surrounded by 4 countries called USA, Europe, Australia and New Zealand, 
with arrows labelled 'Kina' denoting the flow of conservation funds from these 
countries to PNG. The report explains: 
'We reviewed the concepts of extinction and went on to explain that many 
people were concerned about the problem. These people are willing to send 
money to do conservation and this conservation money comes from many 
places. The most important place is money from PNG. This money comes from 
the Government. The DEC is part of the government. Money also comes from 
different countries outside PNG. Here men and women ask their governments to 
protect all plants and animals in the world. When they send money they also 
send people to help to do the work. That is why [we]... have come to help the 
government of PNG to protect animals and plants. Response from the people 
'now we understand you better. Thank you' (Hedemark et Al. 1997: 57). 
The emphasis on development and money attempted to clarify why foreigners are 
prepared to pay for international conservation, but also introduced a 
misunderstanding around the notion of value. Whereas the conservationists tried to 
explain the importance, 'the value', of biodiversity in terms of its benefits to 
humanity and future generations, local onlookers interpreted the fact that other 
people were prepared to pay money for conservation to mean that leaves and 
animals had cash value. In Gulno, following the biological survey local leaders stated 
that until the conservation team came in 'they did not tiiink the bush was worth 
anytxring other than subsistence to bush people' (Hedemark et Al. 1997: 57). Thus 
while the team in its presentations also emphasised the importance of conservation 
for local Uvelihoods, the team also fed into the growing perception of rural Papua 
New Guineans that minerals and natural resources provide a short-cut to 
'development'. Following the start of more intensive patrol work and the biological 
survey, the money issue would come to play a prominent role in the discussions 
between people and project. 
In addition, by focusing on the issue of exchange, without taking time to become 
acquainted with local people the team went against the grain of Jimi culture where 
reciprocal exchange is based on the existence of a social relation which becomes 
expressed through gift-giving and mutual collaboration (VanHelden 2001a). To have 
a group of outsiders suggest a novel form of exchange, without spending 
considerable time together and without establishing a modicum of mutual trust is 
anathema in the Jimi Valley, where economic transactions are always embedded in, 
and constitutive of social relations. Relations with strangers, however, are devoid of 
a social relationship and - as a result - open to treachery, haggling and violence. 
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PEOPLES PESPONSES TO THE PROJECT'S ENTRY 
It is obvious from the above that the first patrol members who made this speech and 
their onlookers were talking at cross-purposes. On the one hand there is a set of 
underlying notions with regard to the concepts of 'development', 'conservation' and 
the complicated relationship between them. These notions are buttressed by the 
assumption of a shared perception of the vulnerabiJity and value of nature and the 
need to 'conserve' nature from the ill intentions of business-minded outsiders. It is 
doubtful whether much of this conservation idea meant anything to the onlookers, 
with the exception of one or two more educated and travelled people. On the other 
hand, however, there is the bait that is presented in the form of the talk about money 
coming for conservation, the provision of services, and small 'developments' in the 
form of jjifrastructure and income generating activities. During the speech as 
presented here, there was mention of income-generating activities such as 
walkabout sawmills, while on other occasions chicken farms, orchid farming, 
butterfly fanning, crocodile breeding and eco-tourism were mentioned. This 
reflected the ICAD approach. 
People's responses to these presentations wavered between pragmatism, scepticism 
and excitement but were obviously in favour of the project. Many may not have 
been entirely clear as to what the project wanted, but the possibility of some change 
was enough to make people want to co-operate. For many rural communities in 
PNG, the nature of 'development' has become less important, as long as there is 
some hope for change. The first patrol report notes how 'the people of Marum are 
now mclined to say 'yes' to any kind of proposal which offers the faintest hope of 
'development', but without any confidence that this will actually materialise' (Filer 
et Al. 1995: 45). At Akiai, Mr. Kavare pragmatically noted that as there was no way 
of getting a logging company into their rugged area, the people had nothing to lose 
by supporting another form of development. They might, however, wish to allow 
logging on the more accessible portions of their homeland. He noted that people in 
Bundi knew how to look after the environment and thought that they could kill 'two 
birds with one stone' by continuing to practise their 'traditional' conservation 
methods while at the same getting some kind of development from the project (Filer 
et Al. 1995; 44). Some of the Bundi people further down the valley were rather more 
sceptic. The polite Mr. Nogonda from Tigari for example 
'said he had no problems in understanding and supporting the proposal for a 
conservation area, but he had some difficulty in comprehending the commitment 
to bring 'integrated development' projects into the area, because outsiders had 
made similar undertakings in the past, but the people had noming to show for it. 
As a leader concerned for the long neglect his people had suffered, he had on 
each occasion expressed interest in such proposals - whether for a mine, a road, a 
school, a health clinic, even for a church - in the vain hope that 'development' of 
some kind might come to his homeland. But, however well-meaning the 
proponents, none of these promises had been fulfilled, so even if he desperately 
wanted to believe that something would finally happen before he died, he could 
surely be forgiven for remaining sceptical until it did' (Filer et Al. 1995: 45). 
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Mr. Nogonda may have been right in his judgement for the project would only 
return to Tigari four years later. By then the talk of 'bringing development' had 
ceased as a result of a change in philosophy. 
The Jimi settlers living between Pimbum and Foroko-Brimde in the Ramu Valley 
responded with more enthusiasm and clearly saw an opportunity in inviting the 
project in. The helicopter dropped down in the bed of a river near Pimbum and 
people welcomed the team by slaughtering a pig for them. One of them, a 
hardworking contributor to all following patrols, would later be employed as a 
radioman. It also turned out that a Jimi geology graduate from the University of 
PNG played an important role in the search for development opportxmities in 
Pimbum. He was responsible for co-oro!mating the building of an airstrip there and 
local people had built him a house to live in. The Pimbum people did not tell the 
project team that his other intention was to bring a logging company in, but referred 
the project to him for further questions. The graduate was later tracked down in the 
Jimi valley and recruited as community facilitator to work for the project. During the 
next visit in September 1995 when he was present, the Pimbum people would 
officially agree to work with the project. The new community facilitator had his own 
reasons for being part of the project, as he would use it to run for office in the 1997 
national elections. 
During discussions in Pimbum the Jimi settlers argued among themselves about 
their understanding of 'conservation' and 'development'. Some suggested that they 
had come down from the Jimi to hunt for birds, although others asserted that these 
were now 'finished'. They now had to look for some other form of 'development'. It 
follows from this discussion that the hunting of birds for sale was equated with 
'development' (Filer et Al. 1995). One man in the area knew about the history of the 
1970s Proposed National Park and was able to explain better what a conservation 
area meant. He mainly wanted to know how local landowners were to be involved 
in the project and how and where the project was going to set u p offices. He also 
suggested that a local 'cornmittee' had to be set up. The report notes that 
On one hand this meant that he was able to clear up some of the confusion which 
had been evident in the responses to the ... speech at PIMBUM. One the other 
hand, it meant that he was keen to hear our answers to some of the more delicate 
questions involved in the establishment of an ICAD project, most notably those 
concerning the organisation of landowner participation and the spatial 
distribution of material resources' (Filer et Al. 1995: 56). 
Issues such as the location of the base, the establishment of 'cornmittees', the 
participation of landowners, would become a recurring theme in all future patrols as 
the different clan groups tried to pull the project and its resources towards them. It 
has to be noted that most of these discussions were confined to the Jimi settlers 
Uving at Pimbum and Brimde as the Ramu landowners generally kept their distance 
from the public meetings. At Foroko, the NRI Anthropologist had a separate 
evening discussion with one of the few remaining Inja landowners, as the man 
preferred not to speak in public. This discussion made clear that although the Jimi 
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settlers were much more numerous and aggressive in their public presentation, the 
Ramu clans regarded themselves as the 'true landowners'. The report noted that 'the 
most obvious priority' would be to conduct meetings with the Ramu landowners 
(Filer etAi. 1995: 59). 
T H E SEPTEMBER 1995 PATROL: M O N E Y , TALK A N D VIOLENCE 
Five months later a second patrol was organised to walk down from Bubkile in the 
Upper Jimi towards Pirnbum in the Ramu valley. The patrol team consisted again of 
the Project Biologist, a newly recruited New Zealand Conservation Area Advisor, 
the recently employed Jimi community facilitator and two DEC staff. The objectives 
were the same as in the first patrol, with the additional objective of identifying sites 
for a formcoming biological survey in the Bismarck Fall. The team was air lifted to 
Bubkile by helicopter from the nearest road, where the provincial radio station had 
advised the people of its pending arrival. It was market day and there were as many 
as 200 people to welcome the team. The meeting took much the same shape as it had 
during the April patrol, but the group of onlookers was much larger. After the team 
had been introduced, several team members made speeches starting off with the fast 
versus slow development speech by the team leader followed by speeches by the 
community facilitator.'17 After these speeches permission was requested to hold a 
biological survey in the area in the following month. 
As during the first patrol, people were very welcoming to the team and a big man, 
who claimed to speak on behalf of the whole Kema clan-cluster, gave permission for 
the survey to proceed. Other big men among whom one was a councillors and 
another a peace officer agreed. They insisted though on being informed of anything 
happening in the area and emphasised that the team could not forbid the 
community to talk to logging companies, a statement, which was readily 
acknowledged by the patrol team. The team interpreted these responses as 'signs of 
considerable enthusiasm toward the ICAD notion', noting that they were later 
presented with a well-prepared dinner of vegetables and chicken. The report states 
that 'traditionally this practice [of sharing food] is a sign of welding a lasting 
relationship and acceptance by the community' (CRC 1995b: 32). 
T H E NATURE OF 'GOOD BUSINESS' 
During the next week the team, accompanied by 12 carriers, travelled down the 
Bismarck Fall past a number of small hamlets in which the ICAD project pitch was 
repeated. Along the patrol track a number of potential helicopter pads were marked 
and partially cleared for the forthcoming biological survey. During the patrol, there 
4 7 A DEC team member unexpectedly went into his experiences with police brutalities at the Porgera 
mine. This latter speech seems to have had little bearing on the ICAD ideas that were presented and 
the array of ideas conveyed must have been quite bewildering (CRC 1995b). 
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were continuous discussions about the rate of pay and the number of people that 
were to be recruited. On departure the team 
'negotiated for 8 carriers. The carriers were selected from every tribe. During the 
discussion on pay rates the carriers said the packs were too heavy and that they 
wanted to take extra men to switch the loads. We ended up with 12 men. At the 
start of the trip we also had 4 women, 2 pigs, 3 dogs, 6 young kids and 2 girls. 
[This]... resulted in about 40 people. Included in the cargo of the locals were one 
homemade shotgun, a rock hammer, a baby and a gold pan' (CRC 1995b: 6). 
It was decided that the carriers would be paid 8 Kina per day, substantially more 
than the Government rate of 5 Kina per day. The next day, however, there was the 
first wage dispute, as the carriers wanted to be paid more than the agreed rate, while 
two of them opted to return to Bubkile. The original rate was maintained and the 
returnees were each paid the stipulated s u m Three days later, when the weight of 
the provisions had been reduced, three carriers were sent back to Bubkile and a 
discussion over their pay ensued. The carriers stated that the job had been much 
harder than expected, but were told 
'that 8 is 8 and that we provided food and that we had hired extra men to help 
with the load. We also told all the carriers that if all equipment was present at 
the end we would pay them all an extra K10. The three returning carriers should 
therefor receive 4x8+10 = 42 Kina. During this [one of the carriers] became very 
animated and vocal, pulling individuals aside to talk and moving from one to 
another. He was especially argumentative and seemed to be the main one 
pushing for a change in the original agreement. During the pay out [one of the 
DEC employees] paid each man the equivalent of 10 per day plus the bonus 
(total K50). When [the team leader] determined what had happened, it was too 
late to recall the money' (CRC 1995b: 14). 
Later that day, the team leader came back on the wage argument. His concern was 
that the success that the three carriers had had at haggling for more money would 
influence people's attitudes to the forthcoming biological survey when a larger 
group of workers was needed. He told the carriers: 
'you cannot change your minds after you make an agreement. This is not good 
business. Let me tell you a story. Suppose you want to buy this rucksack. You 
say how much. I say 40 Kina. You say that [is] too much so I say 30 Kina. Now 
you say OK and you go get the money from your friends. Now when you come 
back I change my mind and say 40 again. Now you should be mad and you 
should say I will not pay because we made a deal.' (CRC 1995b: 37). 
The term 'good business' is revealing as it illustrates the basic assumptions used by 
the project team in its dealings with the Jimi people. Although its presentation to 
local communities is framed in economic terms as an exchange between 
conservation and development, the underlying notion is that this exchange, the joint 
development of an ICAD project, is grounded in mutual trust, respect and co-
operation. Business based on mutual trust is the basic premise from which the team 
operated. This view, however, does not automatically apply to the highly 
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competitive social organisation of the Jimi people whose sense of morality is in the 
first place related to social distance. An outside body such as the project, affiliated 
with a state that has let them down is not necessarily subject to moral 
considerations, but more likely to be treated in an imtrumental and opportunistic 
manner. 
In addition, the Jimi notion of 'business' is fundamentally different from that used in 
western society. Whereas the Western concept is based on notions of long-term 
investment and continuity, to many Jimi business enterprises are short-term 
investments aimed at meeting a temporary need for money. Consequently, 
agreements tend to be short-lived and permanently open to renegotiations. 
Especially transactions with strangers are open to what in pidgin is know as 'traim 
tasol' (just try), a short-lived opportunistic attempt to maximise immediate benefits 
at the expense of long term relations. In rural PNG, a 'bisnis' that results in the 
achievement of a set goal and then ceases to exist is considered a success. People talk 
about 'doing bisnis' as opposed to 'having a business'. Bisnis is not necessarily seen 
as something ongoing and the life of an individual may thus include many 
successful acts of 'bisnis' none of which last for very long (Brooks 1996). Here again 
the implicit assumptions of the ICAD project team, that its economic proposal of 
exchanging conservation for development would not only be based on mutual 
respect but also on a long-term view proved at odds with locally held conceptions. 
Opportunistic behaviour aimed at a short-term gain was not only displayed by some 
of the carriers. At one stage, as the party camped by the river 
'a young man called Konmo Buka walked into the camp swinging his bushknife 
and demanding 30 to 50 Kina in compensation for camping and cutting down 
saplings to make our shelters... [The community facilitator] tried to talk to the 
man but he would not listen... After 45 minutes [the patrol]... gave Mr. Buka 30 
Kina' (CRC 1995b: 10). 
Two of the carriers of the party each contributed 10 Kina to the compensation 
payment. The next morning a local magistrate visited the camp. The party explained 
the trouble with Mr. Buka and called on his duty as government official to resolve 
the conflict. 
'The magistrate then went to the top of the hill and called out to Konmo. Konmo 
eventually came down and a long discussion ensued. [Later]... the situation was 
resolved. Konmo gave the money back and joined the expedition as a carrier. 
[The community facilitator] said that he was able to convince Konmo that he had 
initiated the patrol and that we were not miners and had no timber interests 
even though there were whiteskins in the group... [and] told him we were 
interested in working with him in the future because he was young and his 
father was old' (CRC 1995b: 11). 
This short passage shows a number of people jockeying for position vis-a-vis the 
project. In the first place, Mr. Konmo Buka sees an opportunity to extort some 
money by claiming that he ought to be paid for the party camping in his area. 
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Swinging a bush knife always helps to make one's point. In the second place, the 
community facilitator, recruited by the project with the task of dealing with local 
people and communities initially sees no other option than to give in. Two local 
carriers sensing that this might affect the willingness of the project 'to work with 
them' chip in. 
After lengthy discussions in which the magistrate and the community facilitator will 
no doubt have invoked the possible benefits that are to be derived from the project's 
presence and the risk of chasing the 'whiteskins' away, Konmo Buka agrees to pay 
the money back. Instead he becomes a carrier in the party thereby earning the 
money he needed. The community facihtator now claims both credit for solving the 
issue towards the Biodiversity Program and towards Konmo Buka and the 
magistrate by arguing that he has taken the initiative for the whole patrol and 
project. The argument that basically he is responsible for all the good derived from 
the project would constitute the basis of his election campaign. Thus in the short 
time that the patrol team passes through the area the community facihtator 
establishes some sort of cUentahstic order by incorporating outspoken and 
belligerent individuals into the ambit of future project activities. The team leader 
and the conservation manager, have no choice but to await events. They do not 
speak the local language, find themselves in the middle of the jungle three days 
walking from the nearest village of any size and are totally dependent on their 
carriers, personnel and local people. 
An issue, which the expatriate patrol members found hard to deal with constituted 
the level of violence, encountered during the patrol. On the second day of the patrol, 
a fight erupted between the first and second wife of one of the carriers during which 
the first wife threatened the second with a bush knife. When the men restrained her 
and took away the knife she took a big stick and used that to drive off the second 
wife. A few days later a similar event took place when it appeared that Papa Kol, a 
Jimi settler residing in the Ramu Valley and returning home with the patrol, had 
taken a new and second wife with him. He went ahead to prepare food for the 
patrol but before arriving at his house the patrol was met by Kol rurining back u p 
the road, a short while later followed by his first wife, who was brandishing a huge 
stick and bush knife. The report recounts how: 
When we arrived at the house, Kol had circled around and was now leaving... 
He told us to rest and enjoy [the food] that had been prepared and left. Two 
minutes later the wife came into the house clearing and followed Kol towards 
the river. A few minutes later we heard yelling and screaming and several of the 
carriers ran to investigate... .The wife returned with a very swollen right eye and 
cheek. (We could not tell at the time if the eye had been removed)... A few 
minutes later a carrier came back and said that Mrs. Kol had opened a huge gash 
in Mr. Kols head' (CRC 1995b: 30). 
The team leader was so disgusted with the violence that he refused to eat the food 
that he was offered. He did not want to be seen as condoning domestic violence and 
went as far as saying that the food was poisoned. By Jimi standards, where the 
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sharing of food is a part of building u p relationships the refusal to take part in a 
meal is a serious insult and a culturally appropriate manner to make one's 
displeasure felt. The team was thus not only discussing issues of conservation and 
development, but also actively aimed to modify the behaviour of the people it was 
working with. 
Just before reaching Pimbum the team leader decided to pay the carriers as it is 
never a good idea to do so when many people are around. People who have not 
carried loads become envious, those with money in their pockets will be unable to 
keep it from the claims of their kin and some people may get the idea that the patrol 
can be relieved of its money by force. The team leader, remembering the April patrol 
when he had seen how carriers used their money to play cards, decided that he 
should give a lecture on the role of money in development: 
'Remember our talk in Bubkile about fast and slow development? Today we will 
pay you. What you do with your money is your business, but the members of the 
first patrol were very unhappy to see the Gende men gambling with their money 
when they reached Foroko. If you want development you have to use your 
money to make life better for you. Drinking and gambling will make it worse 
and this is not the kind of development we want to bring you. You should buy 
tools, clothes, medicine and pay school fees' (CRC 1995b: 38). 
Upon arriving at Pimbum, the patrol team emphasised the fact that it wanted to 
build a good relationship with the community, but that it was annoyed by the 
continuous attempts by some people to extort money out of the team. 
BACK AT PIMBUM 
The people at Pimbum were happy to see the patrol leader and his team and 
emphasised that they had not really believed that he would come back. Their 
experiences with Government personnel were such that people came once, made 
speeches with big words and many promises and were then never to be seen again. 
They also welcomed the university graduate in his new role as project community 
facilitator. N o w that their clansman was there, they could say that they were very 
interested in 'working together' with the ICAD project. The patrol report then shows 
how the Pimbum people immediately started to enrol the project team into assisting 
them with the building of the local airstrip, a project with which the community 
facilitator had been involved u p to that moment. One of the local Jimi Big Men, 
pointed out that 'as you can see, this project is incomplete and your access to the 
area will continue to be difficult until we have the airstrip completed.... ' In 
response, he was told by the patrol team that 'we can help you and [the community 
facilitator] find money and talk to people about completing the project' (CRC 1995b: 
39-40). Later the project would fund the survey of the airstrip. 
In addition, the people offered land for the project headquarters at Pimbum and 
wanted to know how local landowners were going to 'participate' in the project. The 
team responded that it could assist with the building of the Pimbum airstrip, but 
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that it would discuss the establishment of a base only later. The team however, was 
suitably impressed with the friendliness of the local people and the opportunities of 
establishing a small base near a future airstrip in the middle of the area of interest. 
The lack of access had been one of the main drawbacks of the area during the site-
selection process and a recommendation of the September patrol report thus 
suggests that: 'the airstrip project should be given ... support to expedite 
completion' (CRC 1995b: 40-41). 
The team moved on towards Foroko-Brimde, but did not spend any time in that 
village, flying out the same afternoon. Nolwithstancling the recommendation from 
the April patrol to give priority to the position of the Ramu landowners ' in the area, 
the team did not meet representatives of these clans. Instead, it relied on information 
provided by the Jimi settlers and especially the Jimi community facilitator. This 
reflects the focus of the patrol, which although collecting sociological information, 
was in the first placed used to organise the upcoming biological survey. The reason 
for this focus on nature lay with the fact that in contrast to the April patrol, the team 
was dominated by biologists and conservation managers with a professional 
inclination to focus on nature rather than on its users. In addition, the process was 
under pressure from the poUtical-administrative requirements of the donor. Without 
a strong scientific assessment of local biodiversity, the Biodiversity Program in Port 
Moresby would be in a difficult position to justify its expenditure of GEF money. 
Only when the significance of local biodiversity has been confirmed could the 
project make a firm commitment to the Bismarck-Ramu area. Consequently, the 
technical detemrinants of conservation and the legitimising requirements of the 
donor went before the need to establish a working relationship with local 
communities. 4 8 During the October biological survey, the question whether 
conservationists 'make money' by doing whatever they do, became a source of 
problems. 
W H O IS BAITING WHOM? A REVERSAL OF ROLES 
Before the October 1995, biological survey started something interesting happened. 
PNG is a large and geographically highly fragmented country, but news travels fast 
and many communities and landowner companies take every possible opportunity 
4 8 This focus on nature would also become explicit on two other instances. During the patrol the team 
members were much impressed by the natural resources and bird life that they saw, emphasising its 
beauty and uniqueness during their community speeches. The focus on nature, rather than people 
became a source of friction and misunderstanding on a number of occasions. The first such instance 
happened when a bird watching patrol member admonished a local youngster at Kol to be quiet and 
not to shoot birds with his slingshot as he was trying to look at them Instead of shooting at birds the 
youngster shot stones at the bird watcher for telling him off. The patrol report noted that a man 
present during the incident 'seemed powerless to use adult authority to discipline another person's 
child' (CRC 1995b: 30). A second instance happened when the same bird watcher told two women 
walking behind him in the forest to be quiet because he was trying to look at birds. This behaviour 
shocked bystanders, whom for a start had no idea of bird watching as a past time and did not expect 
married women on their home territory to be addressed in such a manner by strangers (PC Konda). 
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to draw the attention of government organisation and aid agencies. Well before the 
survey had been planned in detail, a letter addressed to the Biodiversity Program 
offered the project a one rniUion hectare conservation area in the Middle Ramu, west 
of, and well outside the designated area of interest. The letter written by a clearly 
educated person from that area requested 
'your urgent support in arranging for a biotic survey team for specimen 
collections. We therefore need to inform you that, you contact us for advance 
schedule for the survey of this 1,000,000 hectares conservation. Could you prefer 
to arrange for an early date in the month of October 1995 for the biotic survey' 
(Ade-ik Gulali to CRC 18 August 1995). 
The letter ended with the comment that 'prior to the commencement of the survey, 
we also need to agree in principles as requested by us ' and a flourishing 'For the 
Earth' above the signature. The team leader replied by asking for more details, 
which arrived after the September patrol conteining the name of the village, a sketch 
map of the Middle Ramu area and the comment that 
'It is important that you consider arranging this 1,000,000 hectares conservation 
through a landowner company group for support and participation from this 
area which I also represent' (Ade-ik Gulali to CRC 03 October 1995). 
The issue was not pursued by the Biodiversity Program and it is unknown how this 
local group had gained its information. The timing and contents of the letter betray a 
detailed understanding of the issues at play witriin the Biodiversity Program, and 
suggest that the group had a contact within DEC who saw the possibility of his 
home area linking u p with the Bismarck-Ramu project. What is interesting is that 
this approach mirrors that of the project team. Whereas the project patrols presented 
'development' as a means of exchange to achieve conservation, this landowner 
presents a huge conservation area in a remarkably conservationist and participatory 
terminology as bait to the Biodiversity Program. Obviously it is 'important' that the 
author of the letter and his landowner company 'facilitate' local support to the 
project, based on 'principles as requested by us ' . This phrase that makes clear that 
conservation is not the only issue at stake here and that the landowners company 
intends to control the resulting activities and benefits. 
T H E BUBKILE BIOLOGICAL SURVEY 
The Bubkile biological survey of October 1995 was an impressive logistical feat. A 
team of biological experts of both expatriate and PNG origin and their support staff, 
which included the Jimi community facilitator, were airlifted into the Bismarck Fall 
to conduct a survey of local biodiversity. Whereas the project area had initially been 
selected on the basis of a number of comparative biological indicators, it was now 
time to confirm the expected high levels of biodiversity on the ground. During the 
September patrol the team had identified four camps and cleared three helicopter-
landing places to enable sampling at altitudes ranging from 2600 down to 200 
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metres ASL. The camp and sampling sites were located on an existing trail from 
Bubkile to the Ramu valley and were thus accessible to the carriers that would shift 
large amounts of gear and samples between the camps. The first and highest camp, 
located on the ridge above Bubkile village provided the starting point, after which 
the team moved downwards, spending five days at each of the four sampling sites. 
A helicopter ferried the team and its gear in and out of the Bismarck Fall and would 
re-supply the team halfway during the survey. 
The total operation lasted 24 days and started from the road near Kol. From here, the 
helicopter airlifted staff and gear across the Jimi River onto a ridge above Bubkile 
Village. The helicopter did not stop at Bubkile to inform local leaders of what was 
happening as this had already been done during the September patrol. As the team 
made camp on the ridge, it started to rain and there was no time to carry the goods 
to the designated campsite. The next day sampling started, while the camp was 
being expanded along the narrow ridge. By noon, the camp was full of spectators 
from Bubkile hoping to work. As it was pouring with rain the onlookers tried to find 
shelter in the kitchen house and the patrol leader found himself standing in the rain 
without anywhere to go. According to local stories there was one instance where he 
lost his temper, sending people back to their village. As the patrol moved away from 
the Jimi Valley and the weather improved, the problem of having large numbers of 
people in the camp became less acute. 
When the survey started, a number of local people, some of them known from the 
last patrols and considered reliable were recruited. Haggling about the number of 
people needed and their pay continued throughout the survey, and were dealt with 
by the community facilitator. The original plan had been to recruit 15 men from the 
clans on whose land the survey was working, so that they could be trained in certain 
aspects such as trap and net setting, specimen preparation and general maintenance. 
Those present, however, insisted on men being recruited on a daily basis so that 
employment opportunities would be spread wider. This was accepted but made the 
logistics much harder. Firstly, because ttaining in the specific tasks had to be 
repeated over and over again, in the second pace because the wage schedule became 
complicated, and thirdly because bonus payments for good behaviour at the end of 
the patrol failed to work when a rotational labour schedule was applied. 
A source of frustration to the patrol would be that there were continuously 
'workers' and 'watchers' hanging around, but that simple things like having the 
plates washed and extra working tables erected were not done. Where men did 
'volunteer' to work this was not always a success: three men from Bubkile cut five 
birds out of mist nets thereby destroying two nets, but still expected to be paid for 
their services. They were instead told to pay compensation for the ruined nets, 
which they refused. The resulting discussion at least meant that for the remainder of 
the survey the nets were left alone. People, however, continued to find ways to have 
more men recruited. At the first camp for example there was the rumour that 
strangers had been seen and that 5 men should be made responsible for general 
security and be given five shotgun shells each. It is very unlikely that any 'stranger' 
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in the area would have presented a threat to the survey with its many participants, 
but the team bought the story and five additional men were recruited and each 
provided with two shells . 4 8 
If it were difficult to find a reason for extra people to be recruited, local clans would 
insist that they be given the right to work when the survey entered their clan land. 
Thus at the Kanel River when moving from camp one to camp two, the survey team 
was met by a large group of people from Gulno who were adamant that the Bubkile 
carriers be sent home and that they, the ' true' landowners of that area, be given the 
job to do. This is common practice in PNG and often goes accompanied with loud 
and intimidating discussions and - from the point of view of local people -
preferably involves the patrol team paying both groups for the same day's work. 
These discussions about the level of wages and the right to work reflect the fact that 
the survey was regarded as an interesting source of cash earnings leading the 
various clan groups to assert their right to work in the face of competing claims. 
The team was not prepared to find that local labourers were poorly equipped for the 
cold weather. It rained a lot during the survey, a time when people usually do not 
work and simply stay at home, but the team was surprised to find that none of the 
workers had warm clothes to wear at higher elevations. This constituted not only a 
problem for the local men but also for the scientific staff in their sleeping bags and 
tents as 
'it appears that the means to deal with cold weather is to sit up all night around a 
fire and sing. This has the deleterious effect that the men are tired in the morning 
and cannot work and that the scientists are also tired from being kept awake. As 
the patrol progressed the men did become more organised, yet many were found 
sleeping in the sun during the day' (Hedemark etAl. 1997: 59). 
As a lack of sleep began to take its toll, the team leader had to ask the men to be 
quiet so that the scientists could get some sleep. 
Five days after the survey had begun the survey leader and the community 
facilitator went down to Bubkile village to explain to local people once more what 
was going on. As a token of appreciation the team presented the sum of Kina 50 (U$ 
62) and a flag of PNG to the school at Bubkile. Local people were also asked not to 
steal traps. A maternal uncle of the community facilitator hving at Bubkile was 
asked to store the specimens in his house for the duration of the survey. The work 
and pay schedule for carriers and other workers were also discussed. The next day 
the patrol moved on to camp two, employing no less than 42 carriers to shift all the 
gear. Camp was set u p in the clearing made during the September patrol and 
sampling continued. Here a new dispute over pay rates ensued in which Konmo 
Buka, the same angry man from the September patrol, 'held a loud and animated 
4 8 What may have played a role in this assessment was the fact that local people are known to grow 
marihuana and that the team had difficulty assessing the extent to which this activity constituted a 
threat to its activities (See section on law and order in chapter 4). 
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discussion'. At least this time he did not wield a bush knife (Hedemark et Al. 1997: 
59). 
Theft was a problem during the survey. With the earlier patrols, this problem had 
been dealt with by promising a bonus if all gear proved complete at the end of the 
trip. This strategy worked reasonably well as the September patrol report notes that 
when a bush knife went missing 'it was found in ten minutes after a reminder of the 
loss of bonus agreement' (CRC 1995b: 14). With a daily turnover of workers, 
however, such strategy did not work, and over the course of the patrol boxes of 
cheese, cans of bully beef, a big bag of rice, two shotgun shells, bat food and spoons 
and bowls went missing. The item most regularly lost were rat traps of which 13 
disappeared, possibly as bandicoots ran off with them on the end of their noses. The 
community facilitator, however, recovered four traps from Bubkile as a number of 
'small boys had found them and carried them off (Hedemark et Al. 1997: 63). 
In camp three the helicopter dropped off a bat scientist who had been unable to join 
in from the start and took out the specimens that had been collected from camps two 
and three. The specimens of camp one stayed in Bubkile for the time being. The 
helicopter had difficulty finding the camp in the forest and the team had to guide 
him in by radio. Its arrival led to a great deal of commotion and at one moment 
became very dangerous when people, unaware of the danger of the rotor blades, 
rushed towards the helicopter. A man from Gulno, who was ill with malaria, was 
allowed to fly out with the helicopter with one other person to accompany him. In 
the melee, people who wanted to fly back to Kol besieged the team leader with 
requests. Eventually a councillor was let on in the confusion. This led to a discussion 
between the community facilitator and the team leader, the latter angry by the 
constant demands on his attention and frightened by the potentially lethal risk that a 
helicopter landing in the midst of a group of excited people entailed. A casualty 
during the survey would not only have meant the end of the project but could also 
have led to immediate physical retaliation on the team members. 
No t^ th s t a nd ing these annoyances and the logistical difficulties that resulted from 
the extreme remoteness of the area, the survey progressed well. In total 28 species of 
mammal, 108 species of bird, 5 species of reptile, at least 18 species of amphibians, 
51 butterfly species and 730 plant specimens were collected and recorded 
(Hedemark et Al. 1997).50 On the evening before departure, the Tunka people from 
Gulno village near camp four expressed their appreciation by presenting the team 
5 0 Later analysis of the specimens revealed 15 new plant species, a finding which in terms of 
biodiversity contrasted favourably with the 2 and 8 novel species described from comparable surveys 
in New Ireland in 1994 and the Lakekamu basin in 1997. Most impressive was the rediscovery of the 
black-spotted cuscus (Spilocuscus rufoniger). This species of tree kangaroo is PNG's largest mammal 
and its collection by the biological survey was the first time that such specimen had been collected in 
50 years. Only 15 specimens of this species are kept in the world's scientific collections and its 
discovery meant that the animal was not extinct in the eastern ranges of New Guinea as previously 
believed. All species were handed over to the National Museum in Port Moresby and the Herbarium 
inLae. 
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with a meal of vegetables and chickens, while also giving each member of the team 
an arrow. 
'James ... said he spoke for the people of his area [and] repeated the message that 
[they] ... did not think we would really come back after the first visit. He 
repeated the notion that they did not think the bush was worth anything other 
than subsistence to bush people. James went on to say that all the problems we 
had experience were caused by other clansmen and none of their group and that 
they wanted us to come back. He also said that a baby boy was born two days 
ago and that they named him after [the team leader]' (Hedemark et Al. 1997: 57). 
It had not been a bad three weeks for local people as more than Kina 2500 had been 
paid out in wages. The next day the equipment, specimens and staff were flown out 
from the Bismarck Fall to the road near Kol. 
T H E BUBKILE INCIDENT 
Based on this experience, the team felt it had established some sort of working 
relationship with the Bubkile people. It saw the biological survey as the starting 
point of many years of joint collaboration, and assumed that the Jimi people, as had 
been the case in Gulno, were happy with the manner in which the survey had been 
conducted. This view, however, was rudely shattered during the final hours of the 
survey. As the whole team had been lifted out of the last and lowest camp in the 
Bismarck Fall and had been dropped off on the road, the plant scientist flew by 
helicopter to Bubkile to pick u p the specimens. The report, however, notes how he 
'came back unexpectedly informing us that the landowners of Bubkile would not 
give up the samples because they wanted K 350. [The plant biologist] ... asked 
that [the community facilitator] and [the team leader] go back and straighten 
things out'OHedemark etAl. 1997:60). 
On arrival, a discussion ensued between the team leader and several local residents 
who wanted to be paid additional money. The team leader initially refused, 
knowing full well that if the project set a precedent this time round, it would be 
open to blackmail in the future. After defiriing where the complaints came from, the 
team leader instructed the helicopter pilot to shut the engine down and asked the 
community facilitator to translate his feelings. He recounted how the team had 
donated money and a flag to the school, that the samples were worthless in terms of 
money, that the team had agreed to hire as many people as possible, and that it was 
difficult to work together with communities that used blackmail in their relations 
with outside agencies. This argument was countered with the comment that there 
had been a gift made to the school, but that no money given to them, the 
landowners. This again was followed with a discussion over the nature of 
community-based projects and the need to stick to agreements in line with the 
speech that the patrol leader had made during the September patrol. 
During the course of the discussion, a number of men in the crowd intervened on 
the side of the project and became annoyed with those demanding money. 
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Consequently, the price that was being asked came down. The elder men in 
particular, were concerned that the project would pull out leading to a loss of future 
opportunities, while the younger men appeared predominantiy interested in 
squeezing money out of the situation. One of the older men made his point by 
picking u p a bundle and throwing it in the helicopter, but other bundles were being 
held by men who refused to let go before they had been paid. Finally, three men 
were paid an undefined sum of money, to which the community facilitator and his 
uncle contributed, as they felt ashamed of the situation. Different men now started 
loading the helicopter until a boy no more than 15 years old, jumped out of the 
crowd, took hold of two pandanus fruits and shouted that they were his and that he 
wanted payment before he would let go. Survey staff would later express their 
amazement at the way in which a young man thus contravened the growing group 
consensus. The team, however, refused to pay additional money, and told the 
helicopter to leave seeing the pandanus fruits thrown on in the last seconds before 
take-off (Hedemark etAl. 1997 and PC Hedemark). 
As the project leader flew into Mount Hagen, he was happy to have salvaged the 
specimens, but also felt increasingly disenchanted with the communities that he had 
been working with. Later the Bubkile incident would be recorded under the heading 
'Community Un-appreciation or Misunderstanding' and changed the positive views 
of Bubkile, where the earlier acceptance of the speeches, the provision of dinner and 
the co-operation during the survey had been interpreted as a signs of enthusiasm 
toward the ICAD project. That evening he called his wife to report that they had all 
made it safely out of the field, only to hear that the PNG National Intelligence 
Organisation was questioning the intentions of the survey. 
T H E BUBKILE COMPENSATION CLAIM 
Shortly after the start of the biodiversity survey a letter sent by one of the Kema 
communities would make it to the Provincial Government and the National 
Intelligence Organisation. The letter written in name of the 'Kerma tribes', and dated 
while the survey was still in progress brought to their attention the fact that four 
expatriates and four PNG nationals who 'are believed to be from the environment 
and conservation have entered the area and are comniitting serious damage' (Kema 
tribes to NIO, October 1995). This information made it onwards to the DEC, the 
Prime Minister's Department and the Internal Revenue Commission alerting them 
that a group of four expatriate 'smugglers.. . operating under the pretext of being an 
environmentalist group' had collected a range of animal species and plant samples 
(NIO to DEC on 17 October 1995). The intervention of the Secretary of the DEC and 
the Resident Representative of the UNDP were necessary to defuse the situation at a 
government level, but the compensation claim which followed, would continue to 
sour relations between project and local people. 
A Mr. Gabriel Kenzegna from the Kema-Komnoka clan pushed the claim as he saw 
an opportunity to ask for compensation from the Biodiversity Program. It appears 
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that the attempt to pressure the team for compensation money was well thought out 
as he even tried to get photographic evidence. Three days after the letter had been 
sent to the NIO, a Bubkile man named Kanjip Kumia came to the survey team at 
camp 3 after the letter to the provincial government had been sent. Mr. Kumia 
carried a new camera, which according to h im belonged to Gabriel Kenzegna and 
with which he wanted to take a group picture as 'a reminder for the Bubkile School'. 
Unfortunately the film jammed, but ironically the survey team willingly sold him a 
new film at cost price (Hedemark ef Al. 1997). 
The Biodiversity Program never got to see the mcrimtaating photographic evidence 
but was presented with a copy of a letter to a PNG community rights group some 7 
months later. The letter, written by Mr Kenzegna, stated that he himself was a local 
member of the Melanesian Environment Foundation, an environmental group active 
in rural PNG. In this capacity, he informed the Individual and Community Rights 
Action Forum (ICRAF) of the fact that the survey team had 'collected wild lives [sic] 
... and chopped down trees' (Kenzegna to ICRAF on 12 May 1996). He then went on 
to explain in true conservationist prose that the landowners were 
'concerned that the chopping down tress and palmnuts have effected our daily 
lives. These tress helped us to provide tree food and some tress provide homes 
for the animals that we hunted for. They [the survey team] also collected some 
medicine plants such as leaves, flowers and fruits ... that we used ... as local 
medicine.' 
He also elaborated on the survey work explaining how 
'On these mountains they [the survey team] used 13 net traps and collected 
birds. These birds were skinned... They also took 30 rat traps and used it for 
traping rats. They killed many rats and injected with drugs and remove only the 
skin and threw the meat away' (Kenzegna to ICRAF on 12 May 1996). 
In other words, the conservationists of the Biodiversity Program had severely 
jeopardised the livelihood of local people through their damaging and wasteful 
practices, and the Kema asked for assistance in bringing their concerns to court. The 
second half of the letter contained a list of damages done. According to the letter no 
less than 9.6 hectares of trees, valued at Kl 13,700 and 5.6 hectares of pandanus trees 
worth K5.900 had been cleared. In addition a 100 different types of mice, worth K10 
each had been killed and skinned, 50 lizards good for K8 a piece and 3 snakes worth 
K20, as well as 198 frogs at K15 each had been taken, while 10 tree kangaroos valued 
at K50 each, 200 different insects worth K10 each and 86 different types of birds 
worth K30 each had been killed. The total value of damages done amounted to Kina 
129,100, a sum roughly equivalent to U$ 100,000. Although the Biodiversity Program 
received a copy from the ICRAF, it felt that as the correspondence was not directed 
at them there was no reason to respond. 
A month later, Kenzegna wrote to. the survey leader at the Biodiversity Program 
telling him that he as 'President of Oipo-Ramu', wanted to know 'your future plan 
and your dreams at the site, are any development going to be taken place ... or [did] 
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you and your team just come to visit' (Kenzegna to CRC on 3 r d of June 1996). The 
survey leader responded in a non-committal fashion, stating that the team was 
looking into the options of establishing a working relationship with local 
communities in the area. Nothing was heard for a while until the first of a new series 
of community development patrols entered the Bubkile area in September 1996. 
More than a year later, after patrols resumed with the use of a much more open-
ended approach, these patrol teams were presented with copies of the letters to 
ICRAF. This was seen as a demand for compensation for the damages suffered on 
the part of the Kema-Komnoka. Based on this compensation claim, the Biodiversity 
Program decided to put visits to the Kema-Komnoka near Bubkile on the back 
burner, while the project continued to work with the Kema-Ageleka. This claim put 
the project team in a difficult position though, as a patrol report notes: 
the biological survey may have been organised without proper permission of the 
councillors of the three clan groups (Ageleka, Komnoka and Darlka-Tunka-
Asban) that live around Bubkile. The people generally felt that what the 
Biodiversity Program did was illegal. ... Although the villagers were happy to 
work and earn money at the time, this is now backfiring on us as it makes the 
Biodiversity Program and DEC susceptible to outrageous compensation claims, 
and is a concern for the safety of its [personnel]. It was decided that for the 
moment nobody of the project would go to the village in question... It would also 
be worthwhile ... to determine whether it was in fact illegal what happened, or 
whether we could reasonably expect that people agreed with the survey work as 
they themselves cut the trees and carried the specimens for which they were 
paid very well by local standards' (BRG 1996c: 37). 
G O O D GUYS/BAD GUYS 
A visit that I made to the area in April 1997, brought to light what appears to have 
evolved into a sort of good-guy/bad-guy strategy on the part of the Kema-Komnoka 
and Ageleka clans. The Ageleka on the one hand claimed to feel very bad about the 
problems with the survey, they even gave the first camp the name of the patrol 
leader. At the same time, the Komnoka tried to play hardball by claiming 
compensation. As I wrote in a letter to the Biodiversity Program: 
'Camp (one) is on land above the Bubkile and the Molu-Tabiap ridges in a saddle 
between the mountains Ngantsmang and Mount Oipo. Mount Oipo is joint 
hunting ground with pandanus plantations of both the Ageleka and Komnoka 
clans... The area to the west . . . is Komnoka land, the area to the East and North 
... Ageleka territory. This means that the landing pad [at camp 1] is on Ageleka 
land. This was corifirmed by several people present... Gabriel Kenzegna of the 
Komnoka clan is thus staking a claim for damages to land which is not his. What 
I don't believe for one moment is that the Ageleka are not aware of this, or do 
not allow this to happen without them having a stake in the US$ 100,000 [claim]. 
The whole thing stinks, and is as far as I can see simply a case of 'traim tasol' 
from the side of Gabriel [Kenzegna] to which the Ageleka have no objections. If 
they don't win, they don't loose either. If payment were made, however, they 
212 Through the Thicket 
would certainly receive a large share of the money, all these groups being Kema 
and intermarried and all that. This way of thinking seems corifirmed by the fact 
that I saw a freshly cut tree at the camp ... They've got to keep that ridge suitably 
damaged haven't they?' (VanHelden to Hedemark, 31 May 1997). 
This strategy may not have been intentional but may have been the practical 
outcome of the diverging strategies of the Ageleka and the Komnoka clans, and of 
Mr. Kenzegna's tactics. The project did not have to make a decision as to how to 
respond as communications with Bubkile ceased when fighting erupted with the 
onset of the national elections in June 1997. The ongoing tensions led to several 
casualties in the area and put an end to all patrol work for a period of four months. 
At the end of 1997, the fighting over the elections, the ongoing misunderstandings 
between project and people and the findings of the social feasibility s tudy 
eventually led the project team to decide to pull out of the Jimi Valley altogether. 
In July 1998, however, the tenacious Mr. Kenzegna visited the Bismarck-Ramu 
project office in Madang with a raft of questions referring to the biological survey. 
Presenting himself as the President of the Oipo-Ramu Association, he stated that the 
project had failed to get permission from the landowners before conducting the 
survey and that they should therefore be compensated. The new PNG conservation 
manager, however, explained that the survey had obtained permission before the 
survey in September 1995. Kenzegna also wanted to confirm the rumour that the 
specimens collected during the survey had been sent overseas for sale. When told 
that the specimens were in Lae at the Forest Research Institute and in Port Moresby 
at the National Museum, he said he still wanted compensation as the government 
was now making a lot of money from visiting tourists. The explanation that these 
specimens did not have monetary value but were simply kept as vouchers and not 
on public display failed to satisfy him. 
The fact that the samples were 'worthless' as they were only intended for learning, is 
obviously difficult to accept by people who can not conceive of any other reasons for 
the project's interest in local resources than that these possess monetary value. The 
emphasis of many rural communities in PNG on resource exploitation as a means to 
'development', the earlier talk by the team on the exchange of 'conservation' and 
'development' and the origin of conservation monies, and the expenditure of money 
on the survey were only comprehensible if the samples taken during the survey 
were seen to have cash value. The project's surveying activities were thus equated 
with the activities of logging companies. To Kenzegna it may certainly have looked 
as if the conservationists got whatever they wanted, but were now reneging on their 
part of the ICAD 'deal' that they proposed in the first place. 
A N ANALYSIS OF THE BUBKILE SURVEY 
The Bubkile incident illustrates a number of social features prevalent in the Upper 
Jimi valley, most notably the lack of central authority and social control, and the 
welcoming, but simultaneously opportunist attitude taken towards strangers. 
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Although there is no defense against the opportunist behaviour encountered by the 
team, one can conclude that the Biodiversity Program made too little effort to 
understand the local situation. Instead, it operated on the basis of a number of 
implicit and simplistic assumptions with regard to the local social and political 
landscape. 
The first problem lay with its conception of the notion of 'community'. The team 
assumed that because people shared the same locality, they therefore shared a sense of 
commonality. In Bubkile, however, the present clustering of houses is not a sign of 
unity, but a recent artefact of the colonial administration. Whereas people used to 
live dispersed throughout the Jimi valley, present-day villages are usually centred 
on the few flat areas selected by patrol officers and missionaries to construct schools, 
churches, health posts and airstrips. These became the combined administrative, 
economic and social centres of the present-day villages. The enforcement of the Pax 
Australiana meant that different clans could now live in each other's vicinity without 
fear. It does not mean that these different groups also act in unity. 
The second problem lay in the fact that the team acted from a homogeneous view of 
local society. Following the September meeting, the team assumed that it had 
secured the commitment of the Bubkile community 'as a whole'. The meal that they 
were given was not seen as mere friendliness on the part of their host, but 
interpreted as a token of appreciation by the entire commune. This uniform view of 
the Bubkile community was not only read into the situation by the team, but may 
also have been a consequence of the way in which people present themselves to the 
project in public. In many Jimi communities an ethic of solidarity prevails in the face 
of outsiders, temporarily suppressing the conflicts that simmer under the surface 
(VanHelden 1998b). In addition, it is important to realise that public meetings are 
rarely a good means to assess the cohesion of a community or the 'real' thinking of 
people. As has already been mentioned such public events tend to emphasise the 
general over the particular, concealing the diversity of interests among local people 
(Mosse 1994, Pottier and Orone 1995, Bierschenk et Al. 1998). 
In fact, the different units of Jimi lineage organisation only co-operate under rather 
restricted circumstances. Economic endeavours and the organisation of household 
work are mainly restricted to palrilineages, consisting of nuclear families and their 
direct kin. The unifying character of the sub-clan centres on the exchange of brides, 
the conduct of ancestral sacrifices and migration decisions following disease, defeat 
or misfortune. The clan acts as the main territorial unit playing an essential role in 
'external' issues: e.g., those relating to security treats, political alliances and 
ceremonial gift exchange. These issues affect the security and standing of all clan 
members alike and require intensive co-operation and social control. The alliance 
between the clans of the Kema clan-cluster exists mainly in people's conception of 
the past, and has little significance for present-day action (VanHelden 1998b). 
The poUtically naive assumption of the homogeneous community also blinded the 
project team to the position of the Jimi community facilitator. He was recruited 
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because the team perceived him as somebody who by nature of his Jimi identity 
should have a natural rapport with people in the area. During a later presentation in 
the Ramu Valley two project members would refer to him as 'a spokesman from the 
people from the Upper Jimi River and he was their choice' (CRC 1996b: 5). Just as 
the image of 'communify' obfuscated the essential divisions between the various 
Bubkile clan groups, so in the case of the community facilitator, the notion of 'Jimi' 
came to represent a homogenous conception of all people living in the Jimi valley. In 
fact, the community facilitator belongs to one of the Pala clans of the neighbouring 
village of Bubulsunga, who are the traditional enemies and wedding partners of the 
Kema. He had a maternal uncle in Bubkile whose house was used to store the 
specimen collection, but the Kema were certainly not prepared to see him as their 
representative. When the survey was finished, the rumour that the community 
facilitator was selling land and wildlife to the World Bank illustrated the lack of 
trust in his intentions (BRG 1997a). The suggestion that the Bubkile people might 
perceive the community facilitator as 'one of them' was thus a result of the team's 
homogenising perception of Jimi society, but far removed from the social reality on 
the ground. 
A tfiird premise, closely related to the assumption of the homogenous community 
lay with the team's perception of local leadership in the Upper Jimi. During the 
group discussions, the patrol teams focused on the leaders present, assuming that 
when a big man spoke out, his word was given on behalf of all and regarded as 
bmding by the other community members. In this view, leaders are not seen as 
individual personalities with private attachments, commitments and priorities, but 
as representatives of homogenous and well-defined communities. The tendency to 
take public statements at face value and as collective expressions of interest, without 
sight of the possible political, strategic and personal nature of such statements, set 
the stage for the recurring disappointments on the part of the project team. 
The September patrol report for example, notes that only the councillor of the Kema-
Ageleka was present during the speeches at the market. Although he claimed to 
speak on behalf of all 5 Kema clans (CRC 1995b), it is unlikely that the other 
councillors would agree with him doing so. Later, Mr. Kenzegna, would argue that 
he claimed compensation 'because the project did not get permission from the 
landowners' (Chitoa to DEC 30 July 1998). Leadership in the Jimi Valley is highly 
competitive and fluid and takes a variety of forms. In general, there is an excess of 
leadership as many men have leadership aspirations, seriously diluting the 
influence that anyone individual can expect to have. Formal salaried leaders such as 
councillors and magistrates are not necessarily more influential than their non-
formal counterparts, and such a status sensitive environment, forgetting to include 
one or more self-styled leaders in discussions may lead to unexpected opposition. 
Thus a good knowledge of the community, its essential divisions and main 
characters and a range of contacts within it, are essential for any project aiming to 
establish a 'working relationship' with local people. 
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DEFINING THE 'RELEVANT' COMMUNITY 
A more careful analysis of divisions wilhin the Bubkile community would have 
shown that the Kema clan-cluster is divided in five different clans that constitute 
three political units as the three smaller clans generally operate together. These units 
are the Kema-Ageleka, the Kema-Komnoka and the Kema-Darlka-Tunka-Asban. 
These different units are largely intermarried, but also in constant competition with 
each other and are driven by the fear that others may do better than they do 
themselves. Consequently, the different units only co-operate under rather restricted 
circumstances. The clan, for example, acts as a unit when it faces external issues of 
importance in the form of security threats, political alliances and ceremonial gift 
exchange. These issues affect the security and standing of all clan members alike and 
require intensive co-operation and social control. The management and defence of 
land and resources are typically a issue which is deterrnined at the clan level and 
garden and hunting lands are generally divided along clan lines. The unifying 
character of the sub-can is mainly limited to the exchange of brides, the conduct of 
ancestral sacrifices and decisions regarding disease, misfortune and migration that 
affect the group as a whole. Economic endeavours and the organisation of 
household work are mainly restricted to nuclear families and their direct kin, the so-
called palxilineages. Competition over income earning opportunities and land and 
labour between these various units is concealed by a ethic of mutual help and 
support, but is extremely intensive, and may erupt into all-out conflict. 
The relevant 'community' with which outsiders have to interact thus depends on the 
type of issue at hand. In the case of the biological survey, the project team did well 
to ask permission to enter Kema territory. It did so, however at the highest possible 
level, that of the clan-cluster containing five different clans and three territorial 
units, by addressing a large group of people that happened to be present at one of 
the Bubkile markets. The team, however, did not specify on whose clan territory it 
was going to work and, by extension, which clan group it was going to work with. 
The September patrol notes that only the councillor of the Kema-Ageleka was 
present during the speeches. In his reply the Kema-Ageleka councillor claimed to 
speak on behalf of all 5 Kema clans, but it is far from certain that the other clans 
would agree with him doing so. The patrol, however, presented with the image of a 
coherent homogenous community, did not take time to secure consent from the 
leaders of the Kema-Komnoka and Darlka-Tunka-Asban clans (CRC 1995b). 
Once the survey had started, the team made an effort to spread the employment 
opportunities as far and wide as possible, but did little to look at the way in which 
the benefits of its survey work were distributed amongst the different groups, and 
whether the landowners of the sampling sites were given preference over relative 
outsiders. Sampling sites were chosen on the basis of altitude and access 
considerations, not because of landowner-ship. When the survey team arrived in the 
area, it did not discuss the organisation of survey work in the selected sampling sites 
but simply flew into the first camp, triggering a flood of spectators hopeful to find 
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work. Later landowners in the Bubkile area would complain that the survey came 
'like a thief in the cover of night' (BRG 1996c: 20). 
If one looks at the location of the four sampling and campsites, it becomes clear that 
the first camp lay on a ridge that overlooked the garden lands of the Kema-Ageleka 
and Komnoka of Bubkile. The Ageleka and Komnoka clans share hunting land and 
are close allies. The allied Kema-Darlka-Tunka-Asban group living in the Bismarck 
Fall is the product of a merger between the Darlka and the Tunka clans, who come 
from the same Kema ancestry as the Komnoka and Ageleka, and the Asban group 
coming from the Ramu Valley. The three clans commonly function as a united group 
witfiin the Kema clan-cluster (VanHeldenl998b: 235). Thus at the location of the first 
camp especially the Ageleka and Komnoka men from Bubkile were allowed to 
work. The three other sampling sites lay on land belonging to the Tunka-Darlka clan 
and their Asban allies, who were therefore by far best positioned to benefit from the 
survey and they made sure that they did. The patrol reportrecounts how 
'where the trail crossed the Wara Kanel, we were met by a large crowd from 
another clan and were told we had to change carriers. [The community 
facilitator] sorted things out. It was resolved that the Bubkile carriers would get 
the K8 for the day while the Gulno men would carry the bags to the next camp 
for free [and be allowed to work the next couple of days]. The conversation got 
very loud at one point but it was settled' (Hedemark et Al. 1997: 60). 
Two days later, Tunka men asserted their rights to work and voiced their discontent 
because they were not being trained to do the skinning and preparation of the 
specimens which other men, trained in camp one, were seen to be doing. The team 
decided to train two of the Tunka men from Gulno in the skinning of rats and birds. 
This led to a situation in which the Bubkile people, while contacted about the 
biological survey in the first place, felt excluded from work. The Tunka-Darlka-
Asban, however, were not as successful in excluding the Komnoka and Ageleka as 
they would have liked to be. In April 1997, Magistrate Aik of the Darlka group told 
me that the way in which the biological survey had been conducted was not 
acceptable as many men from other clans had entered the Tunka-Darlka-Asban 
grounds and had worked there. In future, he insisted that if the project worked in 
their area it had to use his people. Aik also explained how they had heard stories 
about the World Bank land registration and structural adjustment programme (SAP) 
and thought that the Government had sold their land through the project's 
community facilitator because it could not pay its debts. 5 1 He gave this as a reason 
for the Bubkile incident and asked why the project had collected leaves and animals. 
S1 This rumour stemmed from the fact that PNG was in the grip of a World Bank enforced Structural 
Adjustment Program. Part of this program was a drive towards the registration of customary 
landownership which lead many land-owning groups in rural PNG suspected that outside agencies 
were trying to take their land and resources. The conduct of the biodiversity survey in October 1995 
led a number of communities to believe that the Bismarck-Ramu personnel too were cronies of the 
World Bank aiming to 'steal' their land and wildlife. 
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Once told that the PNG Government and its donors did so to gain knowledge and 
not with the intention to earn money, he appeared satisfied (BRG 1997a). 
T H E DISTRIBUTION OF SURVEY BENEFITS 
A more likely reason for the incident at Bubkile than the World Bank and the role of 
the community facilitator stems from the distribution of the survey spoils. While the 
Tunka-Darlka-Asban did well, the two other Bubkile groups had been used as a 
point of entry by the team, but were largely marginalised during the remainder of 
the survey. This became apparent at the border between Ageleka-Komnoka and 
Tunka-Darlka-Asban territories, when the former clans were asked to hand over 
their baggage and jobs. The first patrol and the survey both started from Bubkile 
territory and in making its presentations no doubt spoke foremost to the Ageleka 
and Komnoka groups. The team may thus have raised expectations that were not 
met when the first camp was abandoned after five days and the patrol moved into 
Darlka-Tunka-Asban territory for the next 15 days. Consequently, especially these 
clans did well. The results from a split u p of wage payments between the five Kema 
clans, provided by the community facilitator shows that the earnings from the 
survey were highly skewed. The three smallest landowner groups counting some 
150 people earned Iwo-thirds of all wages, while the neighbouring Ageleka and 
Komnoka clans, together counting some 1050 persons, had to do with the remaining 
one-third. 
TABLE 1: EARNINGS PER KEMA-CLAN DURING THE BIOLOGICAL SURVEY 
Clan Ageleka Komnoka Tunka Darlka Asban 
Sum K662 K234 K1136 K270 
1 
K232 
Joint Size 1050 people 150 people 
Received Sum Kina896 Kina 1638 
Source: Adapted from Hedemark et Al. 1997: 63 and VanHeldenl998b: 215. 
In hindsight, it is probable that Ageleka and Komnoka people who felt left out 
because they were either absent or not selected for work, held on to the specimens. 
A possible explanation is that they saw how other people had been paid for work, 
were envious and regarded holding back the specimens as the last opportunity to 
get 'their share' of the survey spoils. This action was not contravened directly by 
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other people present, as there is no accepted authority w t h i n the village to solve the 
issue there and then. Other people expressed their dissatisfaction with the 
troublemakers by starting to load the helicopter, a type of decision-making also 
described by Rappaport (1968) for the nearby Tsembaga-Maring (Cf. VanHelden 
1998b). As with the other compensation claims, those intent on keeping good 
relations with the project team chipped in to meet the cost. 
T H E EARLY 1996 PATROLS 
In the first two months of 1996, two more patrols were made with the aim to present 
the project to local communities and to gain a better understanding of local physical 
and human geography. The patrol teams concerned were much smaller than on the 
first patrols and were warmly welcomed. The report noted that - possibly as a result 
of the small patrol size - people's attitudes were more relaxed than with earlier 
patrols and suggested that more frequent but smaller patrols would be more 
effective. The patrol started in Ambulluah just east of Kol and travelled through the 
upper Jimi visiting the village of the community facilitator at Bubulsunga on the 
outer fringe, before retiirning to Kol. The patrol did not visit Bubkile. Meetings were 
held at various villages during which the slow/fast and small/big development and 
conservation speech was used. 
As on earlier occasions, the speech was responded to in favourable terms with a 
number of leaders commenting on the need of the project to establish a project base 
on their land. As elsewhere, there was the comment that local people should carry 
during patrols and as elsewhere there were the assertions of local authority over 
resources, a claim readily acknowledged by the patrol team. A man at Bubulsunga, 
probably having heard of the biological survey, commented that the carriers of the 
project should not take birds and game from their area. A councillor near 
Ambulluah told the team that he controlled hunting in his people's forest area and 
that people going hunting had to report to h im first (CRC 1996a). The team also 
noted that the social structure of the area was much more complex than previously 
thought as not only people from the villages of Bubkile and Bubulsunga, but also 
people from other Jimi villages claimed hunting rights in the Bismarck Fall. Several 
of these clans have small groups of people hving there as well. The report reiterated 
the April 1995 suggestion that the Ramu landowners needed to be visited by 
concluding that the presence of the settler communities 'makes the need for a visit to 
the people on the Ramu River a high priority' (CRC 1996a: 13). 
T H E LOCKING-UP AT FOROKO-BRTMDE 
In February 1996, another patrol was made to Foroko-Brimde and Pimbum in the 
Ramu Valley. The recommended visit to the Ramu River communities was 
postponed until later, but the recommendation to establish a temporary base at 
Pimbum was followed up. The Biodiversity Program had decided that as a token of 
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its interest in working with the Pimbum community it would pay for the surveying 
of the local airstrip, a task which took place at the end of 1997. The idea was that 
once the airstrip would be pegged out, local people could finish the levelling and 
clearing themselves. 
In addition, the project team had decided that the project's operations would benefit 
from estabhshing a temporary presence in Pimbum. The community facilitator 
owned a house in Pimbum, which was built for him two years earlier and which he 
had offered to the project as a 'base'. The team, although not wanting to establish a 
formal base such as had been done in Lak, thought that by equipping the house it 
could establish a temporary and low key set-up which would be helpful for its 
planned patrol work in the Ramu valley. It was therefore decided to equip the 
community facilitator's house with a radio and some household utensils and 
sleeping materials, allowing future patrols to rest there while staying in touch with 
the office at Madang. In addition the team asked the community facilitator to recruit 
two local people to look after the house and the radio and to guide and assist future 
patrol teams. The community facilitator promised to choose two hard working and 
committed people. One of them turned out to be the Jimi settler hving in Pimbum 
who had proved very helpful during all of the previous patrols and the biological 
survey. The other man was one of the community facilitator's clansmen. Both were 
Jimi settlers, a choice that would later lead to problems with the Ramu landowners. 
The community facilitator brought the first load of materials and household 
equipment to the house in Pimbum in late January 1996 and waited for the 
conservation managers to install the radio. The PNG conservation manager and his 
New Zealand counterpart arrived in February 1996, on a visit that would also allow 
them to check up on the progress made with the construction of the airstrip since the 
last visit in September. They landed at the airstrip in Foroko-Brimde, where the new 
radioman awaited them and told them that a problem between the people of 
Foroko-Brimde and Pimbum prevented them from moving on that day. A young 
Kema-Darlka man in Foroko-Brimde had died, and the Pala people from Pimbum 
were accused of sorcery and told to pay compensation. The patrolmen were told 
that they could go no further until the Pimbum people had done so and the rest of 
the day was spent talking to the local people about the area and the events going on. 
During the discussions: 
'we attempted to point out that the problem was between people at Pimbum and 
Foroko and had nothing to do with us. The logic of such an argument, however, 
was overshadowed by the more practical advantage of using the patrol as a lever 
to speed the resolution of the conflict... [After much discussion] the landowners 
told us that we could go to Pimbum and that they would guarantee us safe travel 
through their territory, however, they said all our equipment would be kept in 
Foroko. While thanking them for allowing us to leave we pointed out that we 
had come to work and without the equipment we would be unable to do so. We 
felt that our only option was to stay with the equipment' (CRC 1996b: 4). 
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Following this stalemate the two were given a house and all the equipment was put 
inside. The patrolmen were the only occupants, which is not normally the situation 
as the houses where the patrols stay are usually full of spectators. The next morning, 
they found that during the night the door had been locked and that they were being 
held prisoner. Later in the morning, a group of men came to the house and again a 
long discussion ensued. 
'It was explained to them who we were and our reason for being there. We were 
asked why our base was being set up at Pimbum. They were told that a 
temporary base was being set up at Pimbum because it was in a central position. 
More patrols with different people would be coming in future to talk to all the 
communities and although they would not stay all the time at Pimbum it would 
be used as a staging point. The radio there is for the safety of the future patrols... 
It was explained to them that we would like to help them save their bush... 
(CRC 1996b: 4-5). 
They also questioned the community facilitator's role in the work at Pimbum to 
which it was explained that the PNG conservation manager was in charge of the 
project, while the community facilitator was seen as a spokesmen for the people 
from the Upper Jimi as 'he was their choice' (CRC 1996b: 5). This statement was 
made to Jimi settlers of the Kema-Darlka clan, who as I have already mentioned 
were certainly not prepared to see the Pala-Maipka community facilitator as their 
representative. Finally, however, the villagers allowed the team and their cargo to 
move on to Pimbum under the usual condition that Jimi carriers from Foroko-
Brimde would be used. Eight carriers were employed, the radio battery was slung 
onto a pole and the whole party, consisting of the two shaken conservation 
managers, the carriers with the cargo, and the radioman started to move eastwards. 
At the river which marks the boundary the Brimde men were paid off and carriers 
from Pimbum took over and the patrol continued its way to the community 
facilitator's house, arriving well after dark. 
ESTABLISHING THE 'BASE' AT PIMBUM 
At Pimbum, the next two days were used setting u p the radio and its aerial, with the 
help of a lot of eager hands. Two 10-meter poles were put u p for the aerial and the 
solar panels to charge the battery were installed on the roof. When installation was 
complete the two new radiomen were trained in its use. The house was crowded 
with people for the first turning on but - as it was a Sunday - the new radio failed 
to establish contact with Port Moresby. The next morning contact was made, and 
during that day large groups of people came to work on the levelling and clearing of 
the new airstrip. After a day spent in neighbouring hamlets, the two conservation 
managers returned to Foroko-Brimde (CRC 1996b). 
The newly established radio had an unintended side effect, as it not only allowed 
patrols to contact the Biodiversity Program in Port Moresby, but also allowed the 
two radiomen to contact the Biodiversity Program on behalf of the Pimbum people 
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with the request for further assistance in the construction of the airstrip. In March 
they told the Biodiversity Program they needed four wheelbarrows and 50 spades 
and picks. The Biodiversity Program, however, regarding the Pimbum airstrip as a 
'community project', and now emphasising 'self-reliance', noted that it had already 
provided surveying assistance and that considering the tiny sum required which 
could very well be furnished by local people themselves, simply passed the message 
on to the community facilitator in his capacity as airstrip co-ordinator. The refusal of 
the project to supply further assistance and the community facilitator's unsuccessful 
efforts to secure tools from other sources led to a halt of work on the airstrip. 
On the return trip from Pimbum, the two conservation managers held a meeting at 
Foroko-Brimde to discuss the reason for the patrol's coming and to explain people 
that they were interested in helping them with the conservation of their bush (CRC 
1996b). Following the usual big versus small development and conservation talk, the 
discussion centred not so much on the conservation themes contained therein, as on 
the actual establishment of 'the base' in Pimbum. 
Question by a Foroko man: If you would set up a base here with an office and a 
radio we could work together' Answer: 'Were are setting up a temporary base at 
Pimbum. No decision has been made on the location of bases. The area we are 
looking at is very big ... When we have talked to everyone after many visits the 
location of bases will be decided. Pimbum was chosen for the location of a radio 
because it is in the centre of the lowland part of the area we are looking at'. 
Questions by a Ganz Man: 'Who is going to take care of your base?' and 'do you 
think you can set up your base in the Ganz-Simbai area to cover Ganz, Maring, 
[Ramu] and Jimi?' Answer: That has not been decided, but for now [the 
radioman] ... will be taking care of the radio' (CRC 1996b: 6-7). 
Both were obviously interested in seeing the base established in their own area. In a 
fragmented and competitive society like that in the highlands of PNG this is a 
typical response aimed at attracting potentially beneficial activities, people and 
institutions. In some instances, for example, if a man from another clan were 
regarded as an exceptionally sldlful speaker, hunter or fighter he would be a 
welcome addition to the clan. In certain cases houses are built, a wife is given and 
assistance is offered in gardening to make the person in question feel at home (cf. 
VanHelden 1998b). A local leader at Foroko-Brimde took a similar but subtler tack 
by explaining during the discussion that 'there are four different languages and two 
different districts in the area. The Ganz and Maring languages in one and the Jimi 
and [Ramu] in the other. The base should be at the boundary of these two districts' 
(CRC 1996b: 6-7). As Foroko-Brimde is on the boundary between both the districts 
and the language groups, this explanation was really an argument to locate the base 
at Foroko-Brimde and not at Pimbum. The conservation managers responded that 
they would consider such issues, but in the eyes of local people that decision had 
obviously already been made. 
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The next day the two flew out, leaving the house of the community facilitator, by 
now locally known as 'the base', and its radio and equipment behind. Relations with 
local people in most of the Bismarck-Ramu area, however, proved difficult and the 
mutual understanding that the project team was looking for largely absent, with the 
exception of Pimbum where the joint efforts of the community facilitator and local 
people had secured the presence of the project in their a rea Work on the airstrip 
appeared to progress well, but would halt shortly after the two conservation 
managers had left. 
CONTINUITIES WITH THE PAST 
The responses by the Jimi people to the project's intervention show many of the 
same patterns that they displayed in the 1950s towards the patrols of the Colonial 
Aclminislration. As described in the chapter 3, outsiders were seen as offering an 
opportunity that needed to be grasped and moulded to meet local aspirations. As 
was the case in the 1950s, the first contacts between Jimi people and conservation 
patrols was generally very positive. People welcomed the colonial administration 
and the project, and expressed their willingness to co-operate. The dominant 
question, however, immediately revolved around the issue with whom the project 
was going 'to work together' and how local people would benefit. In the competitive 
environment of the Jimi Valley, linking up with powerful outsiders may constitute a 
useful strategy in the struggle for reputation. One way of enticing outsiders is to be 
more hospitable, more welcoming and more enthusiastic than rivalling clans. 
This pattern is also visible in the migration strategies where influential big men 
considering migration may be enticed to come and reside uxorilocally or with their 
trading partners by assisting them in buUding a house and cutting gardens. It is the 
pattern displayed by the Jimi settlers at Pimbum who built the community facilitator 
a house in order to keep him there and who in return expected him to assist them 
with the construction of the airstrip. Just as the earliest patrol officers were 
impressed by the enthusiasm with which the Jimi groups erected rest houses and 
built foot paths, the first patrols of the Biodiversity Program were happy with the 
many welcoming speeches and the promises to build 'a base' in the areas visited. 
These promises had little to do with an enthusiasm for conservation and much more 
with the fear of losing potential development opportunities to other clan groups. 
Once the presence of the outsider, be it in the form of a big man, project, mission 
post, or government, station has been secured, the next step is to capitalise on its 
presence. Such an instance has been recounted in the section on the shift from gift 
exchange to bartered trade where patrol officers bemoaned the opportunistic ways 
in which Jimi people tried to alter the terms of trade in their favour. Similarly the 
patrol team, believing that local communities expressed a genuine interest in co-
operation, was shocked to find itself locked into endless debates over rights to 
employment, wage schedules, workloads and compensation payments. To the 
project staff, aiming to establish a modicum of mutual trust, people displayed a 
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disappointing propensity to opportunism and short-term gain, which was 
incompatible with its wish to find long-term joint commitment to community-based 
conservation and development. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
During the first patrols in the Jimi valley, the duration of contact with people was 
largely limited to a speech and question and answering session on issues of 
conservation and development. This speech, in line with the ICAD approach at Lak, 
was framed in terms of an exchange. People were to 'do ' conservation and the 
project would help them with some form of 'development' in order to curb the 
destructive activities of logging and mining companies. The only logical conclusion 
for any villager taking part in the first patrol meetings was that there was nolliing to 
loose from asking the project team to return. One never knows whether the project 
could actually bring some form of 'development' to their extremely remote area or a 
measure of cash labour that would benefit local people. People may not have 
understood exactly what 'conservation' entailed but they were certainly aware of the 
reciprocal nature of the 'conservation-for-development deal proposed. These initial 
expressions of interest, however, can not be interpreted as a commitment to 
conservation or even as an expression of the willingness to co-operate as the project 
team had so strongly hoped. 
In practice, project interventions were based on a number of untenable premises 
with regard to local society. In the first place the team had a rather naive view of 
local communities as it assumed that communities, approached during a one day 
discussion session would act as a homogenous entities. A second premise, closely 
related to the perception of the monoUthic community lay with the tendency to take 
public statements at face value and as collective expressions of interest, without 
sight of the possible political and personal nature of such statements. The lack of 
understanding of local social fragmentation, the assumption of the homogeneous 
community and the focus on formal leadership not only clouded the biological 
survey, but also blinded the project to the position of the newly recruited 
community facilitator. As an educated locally born person, he was seen as a useful 
go-between between 'the Jimi people' and the project team. In reality he could at 
best act as a broker between his own Pala-Maipka clan and the project team, but 
could not possibly speak on behalf of other Jimi clans. 
Fundamental to these perceptions is the focus on nature rather than on people. The 
project had learnt from the Lak experience that it could not ignore the views of local 
people but, with the exception of the first patrols, the encounters with local people 
were primarily aimed at organising the biological survey, and at setting u p a base at 
P imbum The reason for this bias lay with the fact that with the exception of the first 
patrol, the team consisted entirely of biologists and conservation managers with a 
professional mclination to focus on nature. As a result, the technical determinants of 
conducting a biological survey and the legitimising requirements of the donor went 
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before the need to establish a working relationship with local communities, because 
as the project biologist would later explain: 'why establish a working relationship if 
the biology is not there?' (Hedemark to VanHelden 23 July 2001). 
The team did not realise that in doing so, it went against the grain of Jimi culture, 
where one preferably first establishes a social relationship, which subsequentiy 
becomes expressed in economic and political terms. In line with the earlier argument 
made about the inverse relation between social distance and morality initial interest 
in the project was mainly a result of people's eagerness to secure the short-term 
economic opportunities that the project might offer on the presumption that 
relations were short-term and unstable as relations between strangers always are. 
This led a number of individuals to try to extract whatever resources they could lay 
their hands on. On the basis of their past experiences with Government.officers, 
these people may not have had reason to believe that the project team would return, 
and saw no loss in aUenating the team by continuously claiming higher wages and 
compensation for the use of local resources. Later many people expressed 
amazement at the fact that the project actually kept coming back. 
In addition, the project immediately became an asset in the struggle for reputation 
and opportunity between the various Jimi clan-groups. Where the project was 
talking in terms of the need to conserve the environment in the face of rapacious 
companies, local people framed the discussion in terms of the distribution of jobs, 
benefits and reputation. Especially the location of the 'base' became an issue of 
particular importance, as to local people the best means to maximise the access to 
project benefits was to get the project to stay with them. Over time, several groups 
offered to build houses or a 'base' with an eagerness mirroring that earlier displayed 
towards the mcorning colonial patrols. The location of what the team saw a 
temporary 'base' at Pimbum, however, immediately led to new problems as it was 
regarded as an indication for the project's political affiliation within the clan-based 
landscape of the Bismarck-Ramu area. 
The Pimbum people, coached by the community facilitator, successfully enlisted the 
project, getting it to accept his house as a 'base', and thereby scoring an important 
victory over neighbouring Jimi clans in Foroko-Brimde. To the latter, the strategic 
location of the airstrip at Foroko-Brimde gave them the opportunity to strike back at 
Pimbum by witiiholding the cargo for the base and by locking u p the conservation 
managers. The attempts by local people to enlist project personnel and resources in 
their own strategic projects meant that soon after the project started, the line 
between the 'interveners', the conservationists attempting to establish a 
conservation area in the area, and those 'intervened', the communities owning the 
resources in the area, started to blur. Whereas initially the initiative for proposing 
some form of development for conservation deal was with the project as its patrols 
wandered through the area, within a matter of months local people were baiting the 
project with the promise of a large conservation area in the Middle Ramu and 
several offers to build a 'base'. The community facilitator in turn would define the 
project as the prime vehicle for his upcoming election campaign. 
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The lack of meaningful co-operation on the part of many people was a source of 
frustration to the project members, who saw themselves as offering a good 
opportunity to a group of isolated people which was much too easily scorned for 
short-term economic gain. They did not realise that they were basing their 
intervention of western notions of 'good business', in which even strangers base 
their transactions on the assumption that opportunistic behaviour is counter-
productive. The subtext of the economistic ICAD proposal presented to the Jimi 
communities was one of co-operation and participation, based on mutual respect. 
Later the message that the project would willingly leave if people were unhappy 
with their work became a recurrent theme in Bismarck-Ramu project presentations. 
As a result of the perceived lack of co-operation, the content of discussions between 
people was not restricted to the 'technical' issues of conservation and development, 
but had far more to do with fundamental questions as to how the relations between 
project and people were to be defined and which set of co-operative practices was 
acceptable to both. Matters such as how to negotiate, the meaning of agreements and 
mutual trust, the use of threats and violence, the occurrence of theft, the distribution 
of employment opportunities, the use of money and patrol assets, the acceptance of 
gifts, the sharing of food, the exploitation of the project as lever in inter-clan conflicts 
and for personal and community gain all point to a clash of values between project 
and people. The meaning and content of notions of 'development' and 
'conservation' were still largely to be touched upon. 

Chapter 6 
REDUCING EXPECTATIONS: THE BISMARCK-RAMU 
COMMUNITY ENTRY APPROACH 
'In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread' Genesis 3:19. 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
By early 1996, the Biodiversity Program and its ICAD projects were in a state of 
crisis. It was becoming increasingly clear that the Lak population was not willing to 
put an end to the timber operations, and that the project team had to make the 
difficult decision to terminate its operations (See Chapter 2). Operations in the 
Bismarck-Ramu area were not progressing satisfactorily either, as the repeated 
attempts by people to extort money, the conflict over the Bubkile biological survey, 
and the locking-up of the two conservation managers at Foroko-Brimde pointed out. 
All experiences suggested that the project was failing to establish rapport with local 
communities. 
Both the Lak and the Bismarck-Ramu projects had until then been dominated by the 
biological requirements of conservation, while local people had focused on the 
material goods and money that could possibly be wheedled out of the project. In the 
Bismarck-Ramu area, the project had also become enlisted in matters of Jimi inter-
clan rivalry and it was difficult to see how this situation could be turned around. 
This chapter 5 2 outlines the change in philosophy that took place as a result of the 
experiences in Lak and the first phase of the Bismarck-Ramu project. It will discuss 
the institutional changes that were made, and especially focus on the manner in 
which a new view of communities and their relations to outsiders would change the 
way in which project personnel presented itself during the second phase of the 
Bismarck-Ramu project. 
Part of this chapter will appear as VanHelden (2001b). 
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In contrast to the Lak project and the first phase of Bismarck-Ramu interventions, 
which were dominated by conservation experts, a new community entry approach 
emphasised the right of local people to define their problems. The new project team 
tried to create room for such an exercise by temporarily witliholding its own 
conservation agenda. As will be shown in the next few pages this focus on the 
problem definition by, and the empowerment of, local people generated several 
contradictions inherent to the practice of community-based conservation. I will 
amongst others argue that the ostentatiously open-ended and participatory 
community entry approach used in the second phase of the Bismarck-Ramu project 
was notwithstanding its participatory ideology in fact a highly structured and 
disciplined exercise. The realisation that participatory methods are not so much 
about discovering some pre-existing local reality, but more about the creation of a 
joint agenda, a 'middle ground' from which to work together, discloses the 
essentially political nature of such strategies. 
T O W A R D S A MORE PEOPLE-ORIENTED APPROACH 
By February 1996, the ongoing problems which the Biodiversity Program 
encountered in both the Lak and the Bismarck-Ramu areas led to a halt to all further 
patrols. A number of diverging views over what this meant for the program and its 
next project evolved. The key issue concerned the use of biological versus social 
indicators for protected area establishment, increasingly pitting the until then 
dominant conservation staff against a number of commentators who were arguing 
for a more careful and people-oriented approach. Among the latter, the resource 
economist of the Biodiversity Program played a key role. 
As recounted in chapter 2, the project had accorded priority to the biological 
narrative, presenting project development as a linear sequence of steps in which it 
first selected an area of future work, then determined its biological significance, then 
went through a social assessment, following which a strategic plan would be 
developed and implemented. Every step went accompanied by a concerted 
awareness drive, while the building of the base absorbed large amounts of energy 
and time. What was becoming apparent was that this order of things was a 
simplification of reality. Local people responded to what they saw happening, 
conflicts erupted as a result, and as the Lak experience demonstrated determining 
the area of work and making large scale investments in terms of surveys and base 
establishment were questionable if the willingness and ability of resource owners to 
co-operate was not yet apparent. This not only pointed to the need to include more 
sociologically and community-oriented people from the start of the project, but also 
suggested that the biological deterrninants of protected area establishment should 
maybe not dominate. 
The first suggestions that a different approach should be considered came from a 
June 1995 Project Review Mission, which took place at a time when the first patrol in 
the Bismarck-Ramu area had just been held. The evaluation report that an 
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evaluation of the Lak lessons would be 'essential' for the development of the second 
ICAD site, but also that a more 'soft approach' might be more appropriate. As the 
report writes: 
Such an approach would place emphasis on a more detailed understanding of, 
and closer relationship with the target communities before 'harder' conservation 
advocacy, which the project currently appears to favour is considered. With a 
better knowledge and understanding of the communities involved, the project 
would be in a better position to devise its strategy for ICAD implementation 
(PRM 1995: 3-7). 
In line with these priorities, the review team suggested a revision of the expatriate 
staffing structure of the Biodiversity Program to incorporate the need for a 
Community Development Specialist. Until then the Biodiversity Program had been 
run by conservation managers, and biologists with a resource economist to back 
operations up. At the time of the review mission the Biodiversity Program was 
recruiting another conservation manager to run operations in the Bismarck-Ramu 
area. Instead of employing a 'traditional Conservation Management Adviser', the 
review team suggested recruiting a Community Development (CD) Specialist (PRM 
1995: 3-8). This was not possible as a New Zealand conservation manager had 
already been recruited. As things evolved the person in question turned out to be 
the most people-oriented conservation manager that the Bismarck-Ramu project 
could have wished for. 
The review team also recommended to shift the balance between biological and 
social work in the Bismarck-Ramu area by suggesting that the CD Specialist and his 
counterpart should reside there ('without the construction of a permanent 
Conservation base, but provided with acceptable accommodation'), conduct a 
participatory rural appraisal program, mcluding a genealogy analysis and a local 
needs assessment. It also argued that 
'the substantive part of ICAD Development, including Conservation Base 
construction, detailed biological inventories ... and strong advocacy should be 
made after a year or sooner, depending on the advice of the CD Specialist' (PRM 
1995: 3-8). 
In other words, the biologists were to follow the social scientists and not the other 
way around as had been happening until then. With regard to the assessment of 
local biodiversity the team suggested that 'there is no urgency to undertake the 
studies and that a decision on the mode of s tudy could be made [later] '(PRM 1995: 
3-8). As we have seen in the last chapter, these various suggestions were not 
followed and the project continued as planned with the biological survey in Bubkile 
in October 1995, followed by the establishment of a temporary base at Pimbum in 
February 1996. 
By then, however things were becoming increasingly difficult and the realisation 
that the Biodiversity Program was not able to compete head-on with large resource 
developments led to a sense of pessimism amongst some of the staff members. This 
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feeling was based on the idea that due to the system of land tenure, the unrealistic 
expectations of rural people and the negative experiences in the Jimi Valley came to 
see conservation in PNG was well nigh impossible. To the resource economist, who 
would be instrumental in processing the Lak experience, the main issue was to 
avoid this very conclusion, and to argue that the Lak experience allowed for the 
development of a coherent strategy for the second ICAD site. 
It is at this stage that a CD specialist working for the North Simbu Integrated Rural 
Development Program made his entry into the Biodiversity Program. The CD 
trainer, a buoyant New Yorker, former Vietnam vet and community organiser with 
extensive experience in community training, organisation and planning in the 
Solomon Islands and PNG came to play a key role in processing the early Bismarck-
Ramu experiences described in the previous chapter. Later he would take 
responsibiUty for a new participatory community approach while framing the 
project's field staff in the Bismarck-Ramu area. His quickly developing alliance with 
the resource economist provided the latter with a rationale for continued support to 
biodiversity conservation initiatives in PNG and led to the development of a 
modified proposal for the second phase of the Bismarck-Ramu project. This 
philosophy would be used to analyse the events at Lak and to develop a new 
strategy for the Bismarck-Ramu project, finding its main outlet in the earlier 
mentioned Race for the Rainforest document (McCallum and Sekhran 1997). 
The CD trainer had a personal and political reason to get involved with the project. 
Having worked with a large number of NGOs in PNG, he had become increasingly 
disenchanted with the NGO movement as NGO people in PNG increasingly turned 
out to be not only ineffective, but also status-oriented, highly opportunistic, and 
even violent and corrupt. In a paper titled NGOs are Getting in the Way (Lalley, no 
date) he argued that the present generation of NGO workers had failed the country, 
and that the only solution was to train a new generation of fresh and critical people. 
His interest in identifying and training this new cohort of future NGO workers, 
coincided with the turn towards community work made by the Biodiversity 
Program and offered h im a vehicle to pursue his ideas. 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT A N D CONSCIENTISATION 
The CD trainer was not a conservationist, but in the first place driven by the idea 
that people need to make their own choices on the basis of their own experiences. To 
him the essential aspect of the forestry crisis was the political disempowerment that 
resulted, a process of which environmental degradation was but one symptom Not 
surprisingly, during the development of the Bismarck-Ramu project there would be 
a continuous tension between the drive to establish a protected area on the one 
hand, and the trainer's emphasis on the need to do tilings slowly and participatory 
by focusing on peoples own needs and perceptions on the other. In many ways his 
private agenda of building a team of hard-headed, dedicated and critical community 
workers, focusing on community self-help rather than on the implementation of an 
The Bismarck-Ramu community entry approach 231 
extemaUy-defined and narrow conservation idea, would be one of the most tangible 
results of the Bismarck-Ramu project. 
The trainer's view of community development was heavily influenced by radical 
perspectives of social work emanating from the United States. Whereas social work 
in the United States was institutionalised as a mainstream activity after the Second 
World War, work by Alinsky (1971) and others took a more radical and 
confrontational style when dealing with Government and private sector interests. In 
this view poverty and the lack of participation by deprived groups was not the 
result of cultural, racial or family factors, but in the first place the result of political, 
economic and social oppression (Midgley 1986). When this analysis took hold of 
community development projects, often in conjunction with a Marxist political 
philosophy, widespread confrontations with the sponsoring Government bodies 
were inevitable, a view caught in the title of Loney's 1983 book Communities against 
Government. 
The radical approach to community development had considerable appeal in the 
Third World and would be elaborated on by a range of people, foremost among 
them Paolo Freire, whose 'Pedagogy of the Oppressed' of 1973 has stood at the basis of 
many development manuals aiming at the conscientisation of local people (e.g. 
Hope and Timmel 1984). Whereas the radical arm of community work in western 
countries had helped to define Government institutions as part of the problem, 
Freire focussed on the psychological aspects of development, emphasising that for 
local people to unleash their full potential and battle the constraints of poverty and 
injustice, they first needed to be conscious of the root causes of their predicament. In 
this action-based model of community development, local people, with the help of 
trained facilitators, take stock of their situation by going through a series of training 
sessions designed to generate the ability to co-operate and tackle the issues that 
affect the community. 
In this agenda, the CD trainer would be strongly supported by a number of people. 
In the first place there was a PNG conservation manager appointed by DEC. He 
used to be a forest officer in Lak who was largely marginalised witfiin the corrupt 
regional forest office, until he was discovered to be a 'good' bloke by the Lak ICAD 
project team and subsequentiy recruited. The project offered him the opportunity to 
get out of a near hopeless situation as a minor civil servant tucked away in the 
corner of the country and he grabbed it with both hands. Although a forester by 
training, he would develop a strong interest in conservation and become one of the 
mainstays of the project. In this he was supported by his New Zealand Counterpart, 
a hands-on conservation manager who, unlike the recommendation by the PRM not 
to recruit a 'traditional conservation manager' suggested, came to play a critical role 
in organising the community fieldwork in the Bismarck-Ramu area. Later, when the 
project was located with an NGO based in Madang on the north coast of PNG, the 
team would be expanded with the director of the NGO, a church liaison officer, a 
number of PNG Cornmunity development workers and myself. 
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TOWARDS A REFLEXIVE AND PROCESSUAL APPROACH 
One of the first things that the CD trainer did, was review the interventions in Lak 
as well as those in the Bismarck-Ramu area. This review led him to propose a 
fundamental revision of the way in which project staff was to behave in the field. 
His so-called 'community entry approach' was designed to contact communities in 
such a way that the level of expectations generated by the presence of the project 
was minirnised. Instead of promising people development, income generating 
activities and services, this approach emphasised the self-generated, processual and 
participatory aspects of development and conservation. 
In response to the high-pressure experience at Lak and the difficult experiences 
during the start of the Bismarck-Ramu intervention, the trainer suggested to take 
more time to think things through, not to pin itself down on a single predetermined 
approach to conservation and development activities, and to turn away from 
economic incentives as a means to quickly establish a conservation a rea Instead, he 
suggested to focus primarily on establishing a working relationship with local 
people and on discussing the changes taking place witfiin their environment. In 
order to facilitate such a debate witfiin the communities of the Bismarck-Ramu area, 
it needed far greater room for manoeuvre in order to implement what was 
essentially an open-ended process of co-operation. 
The first step in getting away from the idea that the project had to plan on behalf of 
people, meant doing away with the blue-print nature of conservation area 
estabhshment. Greater flexibility had already been introduced as part of the 1995 
area selection process, when the project defined a broad area of interest on the basis 
of biological criteria, while the social feasibility of conservation area establishment 
was to be assessed through a separate sociological study and the work of a number 
of PNG Community Development (CD) workers. 
Thus the area which was to be conserved and the communities with which the 
project would work together were not predetermined. This decision was made in 
response to one of the first lessons from Lak, which had been that biological criteria 
may be used as a basis for identifying broad areas of high conservation value, but 
that the selection of specific sites was to be made dependent on social criteria In 
addition, it was deliberately decided to take an area not under immediate threat so 
as to have time to facilitate the process with local communities (DEC 1995, 
McCallum and Sekhran 1997). While this would initially create room for a more 
slow and reflexive community development approach, it would come to constitute a 
problem when a second phase of the Biodiversity Program was developed in 1998-
1999. As the GEF would by then only fund programs mitigating a real threat to 
biodiversity, the design team now had to argue that the Bismarck-Ramu area, first 
chosen because of its low levels of threat, was actually sufficientiy threatened to 
warrant further GEF investment (See chapter 8). 
The second step towards more room for adjustment to local circumstances came 
from the decision not to predetermine the type of conservation regime. Although the 
The Bismarck-Ramu community entry approach 233 
Framework Plan for the Bismarck-Ramu project (CRC 1995a) ostentatiously aimed at 
the declaration and gazettal of a national park by April 1998, the project team 
decided that it was more realistic to keep the type of management regime that 
would evolve open. The Bismarck-Ramu project team thus moved away from an 
immediate drive towards the establishment of a national park, towards a situation in 
which the type of conservation management and the size and exact locality of the 
area or areas that were to be conserved were made dependent on the responses of 
local people. This was a major shift in thinking as it meant doing away with the idea 
that the biological expert's opinion on local matters counted most. This shift, 
however, gave the Bismarck-Ramu team the flexibility to allow conservation 
initiatives to gradually evolve in an open-ended and long-term discussion between 
project and people. 
In the design of this new so-called community entry approach, the project team also 
decided not to start off by mentioning specific western definitions of 'development' 
and 'conservation' to local communities. This meant a departure from the earlier 
patrols where the project had presented itself and its intentions to local communities 
and had laid the basis for a possible ICAD deal. Instead, the trainer proposed to 
discuss problems and issues that affected peoples lives in a more general and broad 
manner. It also meant that the economistic idea of an 'exchange' of conservation for 
development such as that used in Lak and in the first phase of the project's 
intervention in the Jimi Valley had to be done away with and that the linkage 
between the C and the D of the ICAD concept had to be left much more open. As the 
Bismarck-Ramu Framework Plan formulated it in 1995, the project 
'must start not by talking about economic incentives, and not by talking about 
development. . . Instead they should be listening to the community, and 
facilitating a debate within the community... Conservation and the establishment 
of protected areas wil l be the outcomes, not the motivators'(CRC 1995a: 36) 
In order to allow communities to express their own view on issues that concerned 
them, the field staff were explicitiy told not to 'preach' with regard to the dangers of 
logging and the need for conservation. Instead the project team, through the a 
number of community development (CD) workers, tried to engage communities in 
the area into an ongoing dialogue. The topics of this dialogue focused on the nature 
of social, economic and environmental changes that were taking place in peoples 
lives, the good and the bad in those changes, the dreams that communities had for 
the future, and finally the things they could do for themselves to make some of those 
ideas come true. This dialogue thus shifted the onus of analysis from the global to 
the community level, away from biodiversity conservation towards resource 
management and development issues at the community level, and in some ways 
away from the 'traditional' ICAD concept towards a more broadly oriented open-
ended participatory rural development-like approach. 
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DEVOLUTION AND INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY 
Another step aimed at obtaining greater flexibiUty, but also one that created room 
for an agenda based on community development from wi tMi rather than 
conservation from without, came from the decision to redesign the institutional 
structure of the Bismarck-Ramu project and its position within the Biodiversity 
Program. The Lak project had suffered from poor communications, a!ifficult logistics 
and an awesome administrative burden involving several UN agencies. A lack of 
implementation capabiUty and delays had been the inevitable outcomes. Learning 
from this experience, the staff of the Biodiversity Program realised that daily 
fieldwork in the Bismarck-Ramu area should not be executed by the involved UN 
offices, but should be brought under the umbrella of an independent NGO under 
contract with the UNDP/UNOPS. The advantage of such a set-up was that it 
required one annual contract to be negotiated between the UNDP and the NGO, 
specifying the types of field activities to be undertaken, which after finalisation 
would allow the NGO to hire and fire personnel, program, plan and budget without 
needing to involve the DEC bureaucracy and three UN agencies for every cheque 
involved. A suitable NGO partner was found in the Christensen Research Institute 
(CRTjinMadang. 
The CRI was in the lucky possession of good infrastructure mcluding laboratories, 
maintenance facilities, sleeping quarters, office space and a conference room. The 
new physical and institutional set-up meant that the Bismarck-Ramu field staff at 
the CRI were able to carve out a considerable degree of autonomy from the office in 
Port Moresby, the involved UN agencies and the DEC. Whereas the Lak field 
operations had been managed from the CRC in Port Moresby outward, most 
decisions with regard to field work in the Bismarck-Ramu area were now delegated 
to the Madang project office. The field work was now physically removed from the 
policy discussions of Port Moresby, and financially largely independent through its 
new financing structure. This devolution not only meant a decreased administrative 
burden, but also a reduction in potential political pressure from the side of the DEC 
and the UNDP. It thus created room for a shift from conservation towards 
community-development. 
The move to Madang was appreciated less by the incoming chief technical advisor 
of the Biodiversity Program, who although formally responsible for project 
execution, found himself to have little control over whatever happened in the 
Bismarck-Ramu area He would on arrival, when community work had already 
started, note that the field staff in Madang perceived the Bismarck-Ramu area as 
some sort of 'free space' in which the project could do as it wanted to. Such a view 
clashed with the administrative imperative to structure the process in a more or less 
linear fashion with tangible and assessable outcomes. While his Madang staff was 
doing a variety of unclear tilings with a wide range of possible outcomes in the 
Bismarck-Ramu area, he found himself sitting in Port Moresby having to develop 
log frames and fill in progress reports to satisfy the administrative requirements of 
the donors. These documents were still based on the initial project document which 
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focused on establishing a conservation area by April 1998. The discrepancy between 
the fluid and processual developments in the field and the rigidity of the 
admirustrative requirements would be noted in the final evaluation report: 
'the mission ... notes the difficulties faced by Project staff in developing a 
logframe which would need to "rationalise" and accommodate outputs and 
activities which had evolved from shifts in implementation which were more 
made in response to external events than to any logical process of project 
plaruiing' (PRM 1998: 24) 
DEC officials didn't like the move to Madang either. The reasons were twofold. The 
first had to do with the underlying premise that an NGO would be better equipped 
to execute field operations than the DEC bureaucracy. Whereas the responsible UN 
officers were prepared to draw this lesson from the Lak experience, this was clearly 
seen as a threat within the DEC. Officers of the Department, and civil servants 
within the PNG bureaucracy in general, do not think highly of NGOs and see them 
as a direct threat to their competencies. Considerable effort for example has been 
made to 'organise' NGOs through the Department of Home Affairs, Women and 
Youth in an attempt to bring their activities under civil service control. As an 
increasing number of donors is pointing to the fact that Government services 
throughout the country are expensive, inefficient and of low quality and prefer to 
fund NGOs rather than cumbersome government bodies, the move to Madang and 
the devolution of responsibilities to the CRI were perceived as threatening. 
The second and related reason, had to do with the apparently mundane, but in 
practice all important issue of the distribution and use of project assets. The CRC 
constituted a pleasant and efficient microcosm in an otherwise dysfunctional 
department. After the termination of the project the Biodiversity Program assets, 
ranging from office equipment to vehicles would no doubt be transferred to DEC. 
The move to Madang, however, entailed the risk that substantial resources would 
end u p being put into the NGO rather than into the department. This assessment 
proved correct as most assets from the Lak project mcluding a boat and outboard 
engine, a four wheel-drive vehicle and a substantial amount of office equipment was 
shifted to CRI and thereby lost ' to the DEC. The issue of the level of autonomy 
granted to the Madang field staff would repeatedly become a source of discussions. 
First during the second half of 1996 when a newly appointed chief technical advisor 
based in Port Moresby tried to move his offices to Madang, a move which was seen 
as threatening to the autonomy of the CRI, the second time in 1998 when the 
discussions for a second phase of the Bismarck-Ramu project had the DEC rejecting 
UN or NGO implementation, instead trying to regain control by vying for what it 
called 'national execution'. 
BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT A N D DEPENDENCY 
In order to develop the new community entry approach, the project team led by the 
resource economist and the CD trainer decided to rethink its priorities. Rather than 
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putting 'conservation' u p front, assessing local biodiversity in order to subsequently 
and presenting people with a set of either/or choices, as had been the case in the 
high-pressure environment of Lak, it saw the building of a trust relationship and the 
emphasis on self-reliance as its first objective. Later steps would include taking 
communities through a problem identification and prioritisation process, after 
which people would have to be mobilised into implementing their own community 
plans. 
The analysis by the Biodiversity Program as it was contained in the earlier 
documents on the attitudes of the Lak population, the analysis of the CD ttainer and 
as it would be articulated in Race for the Rainforest presented certain characteristics of 
the target population as a key issue in the possible acceptance of conservation 
initiatives. One of the issues that played a large role in the analysis of the Lak ICAD 
project refers to so-called 'cargo' dunking found among rural people in PNG. Cargo 
Ihinking here denotes the manner in which many Melanesian communities regard 
'development' as the simple provision of externally provided material goods and 
money i.e. 'kago'. The term 'cargo tfiinking' is used to denote the idea that an 
improved material well-being is not so much seen as part of a complex process of 
changing educational patterns, new forms of productive work, changing power 
relations and new responsibilities and opportunities. The actual goods and their 
consumption are development and are in themselves expected to lead to a state of 
well being. 
This type of thinking is derived from the famous Millenarian movements known as 
'cargo-cults' and which resulted from a clash between pre-colonial culture and the 
advent of the colonial powers with their range of material goods. Development in 
PNG has in many cases become associated with similar sources of 'easy money' as 
those promised by the cargo-cults of the past. The best imaginable deal these days, 
and a very real possibility to a small number of resource-rich communities, is to 
have some foreign company exploit the available resources while the owners receive 
and consume the royalties that are being paid for the right to access these resources. 
As Filer (1997a: 171) states, 'PNG, which was once a nation of gardeners, is now 
becoming a nation of gatekeepers and rentcollectors'. The level of expectations with 
regard to the amounts of royalties paid and the provision of infrastructure and 
services is usually framed in the light of PNG's experiences with the multinational 
mining corporations. 
According to this analysis the ICAD project in Lak displayed large amounts of 
wealth through the use of helicopters on its biological surveys, the buUding of a base 
and the presence of four-wheel drive vehicles. In the analysis of the Biodiversity 
Program this led the Lak people to think that whatever they did with the project had 
to be compensated for in monetary terms. Whether the activities were to benefit 
themselves or the project did not matter. The case of the village health and water 
programs in Lak illustrates these feelings well: 
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'Many families spent considerable time each week to finding transportation (...) 
to the Health Center at Silur. After consultation with officers of the Department 
of Health, it was ascertained that a more efficient solution might be to address 
the problem of water quality, which in many villages had declined rapidly with 
the commencement of logging operations up-stream, and was thought to be a 
major cause of disease. Project staff devised a system of water reticulation for the 
villages worst affected by poor water quality. A donor was found to provide 
assistance. The installation of water tanks in each village, with water piped in 
underground from a safe source promised clean water and significant time 
savings as women would no longer have to fetch water from distant creeks, 
however, when this system was presented to the communities with project staff 
offering the equipment and technical advice and the village expected to provide 
labor, inevitably the first question was; 'how much will ICAD pay us to dig the 
ground for the pipe'? Although the community saw value in the communal 
water system their recent experiences with the cash economy and the interaction 
with the logging company, would not allow them, as individuals, to work for the 
community good. 'We won't work for free, we are not fools. Only fools would 
work for free like slaves' (McCallum and Sekhran, 1997: 34).The water supply 
was never built. 
The notion of external dependency thinking is an extension of the cargo argument 
and leads people to regard everything that comes from the outside as good or at 
least as better, while their own community and lifestyle is regarded as backward 
and inadequate. In the view of the new community entry approach this lack of pride 
leads people to think of development as an externally driven process that - per 
definition - can not be generated from wth in the community itself. As rural 
communities come to see themselves as unable to harness development from within, 
they increasingly wait for the government to bring services, the mining and logging 
companies to bring money and cargo and - in some cases - the church to lead them 
into a state of salvation. Development in all its forms has thus come to be seen as the 
responsibility of outsiders and may also paralyse community initiative, destroying 
local people's ability to actively take charge of their lives. 
SHARING THE BLAME OF FAILURE II 
The shift in policy from an expert-driven attempt to establish a conservation area in 
the face of industrial logging in Lak, to a more participatory and open-ended project 
in the Bismarck-Ramu area did not go without discussion. It entailed a fundamental 
shift in the underlying project discourse, the view of people and the make-up of the 
project team. Whereas the Lak project had been executed from the assumption that 
foreign conservation managers, driven by a feeling of environmental crisis, could 
make plans on behalf of local resource owners, such authority was now questioned 
by those emphasising a more participatory approach. In this view the need for 
nature conservation is to be determined on the basic of ecological criteria, not on the 
basis of social considerations. The Biodiversity Program had adapted itself to the 
PNG situation by recognising the importance of social criteria, but mamtained its 
emphasis on the biological determinants of conservation in its linear succession of 
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steps. First one had to determine the significance of local biodiversity, then people 
came in. In this view, the Lak failure could in the first place be attributed to the 
socio-cultural characteristics of the Lak cornrhunities which had made conservation 
area establishment impossible. The project's main shortcoming lay in the lack of 
attention paid to understanding these characteristics. In essence, however, the ICAD 
approach was not considered flawed. 
The CD trainer, however, came with a different analysis, claiming that the project 
team during the Lak project and in the opening stage of its Bismarck-Ramu 
interventions had manoeuvred itself into an impossible position by basing its 
conservation pitch on economic incentives. He argued that conservation projects 
could never hope to beat logging or mining companies at their own game, and that 
the ICAD analysis underlying the Lak approach led to a 'bribery for conservation' 
situation. Instead of simply blaming the recipient population, the CD trainer argued 
that projects and the manner in which they are implemented constitute an essential 
part of the problem. Projects give people the idea that outsiders are taking over, and 
reduce development from a co-operative venture to a one-way flow of consumption 
goods, in the process destroying the motivation of people to decide on their own 
priorities or generate change for themselves. 
The CD trainer illustrated the point that project interventions can be part of the 
problem through a particularly trenchant analysis of the opening speech used 
during the first patrols in the Bismarck-Ramu area. These patrols took place while 
the situation in Lak was still in flux and the speech reflects the emphasis on 
economic incentives as a means to secure conservation. The speech presented during 
the preparations of the Bubkile Biological Survey and during the first patrols among 
the Jimi settler communities in the Ramu valley, of which we have already seen 
another version in the previous chapter, went as follows: 
'We come from the DEC. The environment is everything around us, trees, rivers, 
cassowaries etc. Conservation looks after those things for the benefit of the 
people now and in generations in the future. We are interested in helping you 
with the conservation of your bush. The Government of PNG knows the village 
people largely depend on their bush for food, medicine, cash income & 
customary purposes. It is understood that the local people need some sort of 
development, or improvement of their lifestyle, and we can possibly help with 
this as well. Development can be big or small. Big development happens fast, 
such as logging and can kill off the bush. Small development might be slow, but 
it can be done so the bush is not lost. An increase in population and it impacts on 
subsistence farming, and also big fast development is coming in (which) can be a 
threat to the natural resources, the bush and to your culture. The Government 
has realized this and has come up with the idea of conservation and small 
development to help local people save their bush. We cannot do these things for 
you, we can only help you. Technical expertise for example, on how to improve 
gardening practices, or identify economic and other small business projects like 
chicken farms can be provided. We have come to this first patrol just to meet you 
and tell you who we are and why we came. We would like to know if you are 
interested in the idea of conservation and small development' (CRC 1996a: 5-6). 
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This speech in the analysis of the newly appointed CD trainer, show how easy it is 
to reinforce certain dependency and cargo notions. His comments follow on 
statements made in the entry speech: 
The first patrol teams said: 'they were interested in helping people to conserve 
their bush'. The trainer noted: 'Though we are interested in helping people 
conserve their bush, this should not be said at this time. We haven't heard from 
the people yet. Now when we do hear from them they will tell us they want to 
preserve their bush. (...) Better to say (that) we have come to help you help 
yourself. We can provide information to help you plan and organize.' 
"The PNG Government knows the village people largely depend on their bush 
for food, medicine, cash income & customary purposes. It also understands 
(that) people need some sort of development, or improvement of their lifestyle, 
and we can possibly help with this'. The trainer: '[It is] not necessary to bring this at 
this stage. Also why should we be telling them what they depend on from the bush? 
Better they tell us - that enhances the dialogue. (...). In addition we have defined 
development and told them they need it. It is never positive to inform people they need 
improvement in their lifestyle. Again if that comes at all it comes from them. Let them 
tell us (at a later date) what they think development is and during that discussion we can 
dismiss ideas that 'development' is only economic in nature. Lastly it sets up a 
dependency relationship - 'you need improvement - and we can help'. 
The teams said, 'Development can be big or small. Big development happens 
fast, such as logging and can kill off the bush. Small development might be slow, 
but it can be done so the bush is not lost. An increase in population and it 
impacts on subsistence farming, and also big fast development is coming in 
(which) can be a threat to the natural resources, the bush and to your culture'. 
The trainer: '[I] agree with the pitch -It's simply made too soon. Again we are defining 
development without hearing what they have to say about it. Who knows they could 
actually tell us this (about population and resource pressure) themselves'. 
'The Government has realized this and has come up with the idea of 
conservation and small development to help local people save their bush'. The 
trainer: 'Best to leave the Government out. This item makes it seem as if the Government 
has seen the problem and come up with an idea to resolve the situation. There is no 
dialogue. Once again it sets up dependency. We can't help ourselves. Good thing the 
Government is looking out for us and has come up with a solution to our situation'. 
'We cannot do these things for you, we can only help you. Technical expertise for 
example, on how to improve gardening practices, or identify economic and other 
small business projects like chicken farms can be provided'. The trainer: 'Good 
we've said we can't do these things for you. We touch on self-reliance. Yet we say we can 
help you and it takes away a bit from the self-reliance. How to improve gardening 
practices or small business projects should not be mentioned by us yet. We have done two 
things here. One, we haven't heard what they have to say and second, though we were 
only giving examples the people may now tell us they want to learn to improve 
gardening practices or start a small chicken project where before they weren't thinking 
about these. They may have more pressing needs they will now suppress'. 
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'We have come to this first patrol just to meet you and tell you who we are and 
why we came. We would like to know if you are interested in the idea of 
conservation and small development'. The trainer: 'Are they going to be interested in 
the idea of conservation and small development? You better believe it. We have steered 
the entire conversation. They are going to invite us back because they sense a bit of cargo 
and outside help. We've set it up.' (BRG 1996a; Appendix 3). 
In the analysis of the community trainer, cargo thinking and the resulting apathy 
may be triggered by the way in which the project presents itself. Many rural people 
in PNG take a cynical view to development projects, regarding them as a short-lived 
opportunity to pull in as many material goods, payments and favours as possible, 
before it collapses. A man from Wandumi village in Morobe Province, for example 
told the former Director of the Christensen Research Institute how his people had 
long ago understood that it was 'the nature' of projects to fail. It was just a matter of 
grabbing what one could and when they fell apart it was u p to the local community 
to attract a new project to the area (PC Orsak). 
There were also indications from the Bismarck-Ramu area that the project through 
its initial patrols had actually been stifling local community initiatives and 
engendering the apathy that characterises those PNG communities waiting for 
'development' to be 'brought in'. An example is the case of the Pimbum airstrip in 
the Ramu Valley, where community work on the construction of an airstrip started 
before the project entered, but ceased the very moment the project expressed an 
interest in 'working together' with local people. 
THE PIMBUM AIRSTRIP 
The story of the Pimbum airstrip starts with the arrival of Jimi settlers in the Ramu 
valley in the beginning of the 1980s. Some of them were from the Pala-Maipka clan 
and settled around Pimbum in the east of the valley, others were from the Kema-
Darlka clan and settled further to the west at Foroko-Brimde. The story goes that the 
Darlka were invited by the Ramu landowners at Foroko to come and live there 
because one of them was a councillor and the Ramu people wanted him to help 
them with getting an airstrip built. Construction was started at Pimbum after the 
Jimi settlers had put some money together and had received a donation from an 
election candidate. Construction started at Pimbum in about 1991, but was 
subsequentiy abandoned due to the size of the trees that had to be cut and the roots 
that had to be removed. The Brimde Jimi were more successful as they also helped 
organise the political campaign of the future Governor of Madang who rewarded 
them with K 6,600 to build the airstrip. In 1992 the first plane landed in Foroko-
Brimde. Later an aidpost and also a school would be built. Pimbum, in contrast has 
very little in the way of infrastructure and services and are envious of the Brimbe 
Jimi. 
The people at Foroko-Brimde complain that the Pimbum people make use of the 
services without contributing during community work days. The Pimbum people in 
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turn contend that these services are not really theirs as they belong to another clan. 
The distance and the many conflicts between the two villages, prevent them from 
using these services anyway. The people in Pimbum lacking the numbers and 
community cohesion to build their own airstrip, saw their chance when one of the 
few Jimi university graduates in the Bismarck-Ramu area visited the area in 1994. As 
the graduate and later community facilitator to the Bismarck-Ramu project, writes 
himself: 
'In July 1994,1 got one month annual leave while working at Porgera Goldmine 
as a Mining Geologist, [when I[ decided to visit relatives and step fathers living 
in Ramu. It was my first time to visit the area and as soon as I arrived [in the 
Ramu Valley] ... several pigs were killed to welcome me as an educated son .... 
While I was in the area for two weeks, the Pimbum people realized that having 
me as an educated man would facilitate a lot in terms of bringing development 
into the area. Hence, they called a meeting ... and told me all about the change of 
boundaries and the situation they were in.... They expressed their needs to 
establish such services [like in Foroko-Brimde] in Pimbum. I at last told them ... I 
would accept the task to act as facilitator.... The next day the community 
gathered to clear the bush' (Opo 1996; 2-3). 
Diiring the work, the people of Pimbum built the graduate a house, which later, 
when he came to work for the project, acted as radio house for the project and rest 
house for the Community Development patrols. The graduate divided the airstrip 
into small strips of 6 meters wide and 50 meters long. Every household had to take 
responsibility for the clearing and levelling of one such strip. 
Work progressed slowly, and was initially supported by the Bismarck-Ramu project, 
but ceased totally after the project intensified its presence by estabUshing the 'base' 
in the community facilitator's house in Pimbum. It appears that the Pimbum people 
inferred that the flurry of patrol activity followed by the occupation of the house 
with DEC equipment, the recruitment of two local labourers and the flying in of the 
surveyors to map the airstrip in January 1996 meant that the ICAD project was 
taking things, mcluding the construction of the airstrip, in hand. This led to a wait-
and-see attitude, which instead of continuing to work on the airstrip, and if 
necessary putting money together to buy tools, allowed the grass to grow. To be 
clear it must be emphasised that it was never said by anybody that the project 
would construct the airstrip for local people, although the option was discussed 
within the project and although assistance was promised and given. People at 
Pimbum, however, believed that the project was going to help them even further in 
building their airstrip and the first patrol report had to conclude that 'it is not a good 
sign that since the Biodiversity Program paid the surveyors to stake out the landing 
strip no work has been done as people are now waiting for the tools to be brought 
in' (CRC 1996a: 45). 
It would have been very easy for the project to provide the tools. The sum needed 
was tiny, estimated at about K500. The people in the area, however, regularly pay 
bride prices amounting to K3000 and a number of pigs, each worth several 
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hundreds of Kina, while the landowners at Pimbum invested no less than K3200 in 
hying to get a logging company to 'develop' their area. It seemed that local people 
would be able to put K500 together if they really wanted the tools to finish the 
airstrip. This was obviously not a popular message for the project to deliver, but one 
considered necessary if the team wanted to avoid ending u p in a situation like that 
of the communal water supply in Lak. If the team had provided tools it would only 
have emphasised that the airstrip was really someming that the project wanted, and 
not so much someming of the community. 
When I talking about the airstrip later in September 1996 with Simbil Apa, one of the 
big men in Pimbum, it became clear that the CD trainers analysis had its merits. The 
question now revolved around the ownership of the airstrip and thus the 
responsibiUty for its construction. Simbil asked me for whom this airstrip was 
actually being built, implying that it was for the benefit of DEC, rather than for the 
community. I in turn replied that that was a good question but better one asked 
before the people at Pimbum had put in all this work. It was their idea after all, and 
going to their strip, not DEC's wasn' t it? We left it at that, but the implicit attempt to 
make the project responsible for 'development' in the areas, the hall-mark of 'cargo 
dunking' as defined by the project would remain an issue. 
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES TAKE OVER 
The analysis conducted by the CD trainer differed from that of the Lak assessment 
in one crucial way. Whereas the latter assessments had put a large part of the blame 
for the Lak failure on the socio-cultural characteristics of the local population, the 
difficult relations between people and project in the Bismarck-Ramu area were in 
the first place attributed to manner in which the project had structured its 
interventions. Grant (1996:15) lists a number of drawbacks of the initial approach: 
• The physical appearance of the initial patrols emphasised outsiders' relative 
wealth in the form of tents, imported food, helicopter transport, large number 
of carriers and guides versus villagers' simple lifestyle. This was thought to 
raise development expectations to unrealistic levels, which the project would 
not be able to meet during later conservation work. 
• The time spent per village during the first patrols was short, usually one 
night or less and left little time to listen to issues important to local people 
and made it hard to build contacts between villagers and project staff. 
• The 'speech format' used in the initial patrol was one which did not 
encourage much participation from the side of the villagers, while it was 
feared that the content itself was 'dictated by outsiders'; 
• The fact that villagers were in some cases more or less promised some sort of 
small development such as poultry farms during the first patrols, raising 
expectations without knowing whether the project could and wanted to meet 
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these. The problem here is that many villagers will agree with whatever type 
of development and conservation activities are proposed. 
The combined experiences and analysis of events in the Lak and Bismarck-Ramu 
areas and the recommendations by the 1995 PRM were not only compelling in their 
own right, but were also supported by a shift in the staffing structure witxrih the 
Biodiversity Program. The sitting project leader took u p a new posting in Asia in 
February 1996, leaving the resource economist in charge of the Biodiversity 
Program A number of social scientists amongst whom the CD trainer, a 
participatory rural appraisal (PRA) specialist and myself, a sociologist and 
economist responsible for the Social Feasibility Study, were recruited, while the 
director of the CRI, an entomologist with a strong interest in community attitudes to 
conservation and forestry was to design a long-term conservation education 
program. The two conservation managers for the Bismarck-Ramu area, one a New 
Zealand conservation advisor, the other a PNG forester would strongly support the 
CD strategy, illustrating that the fissures that are being described do not simply 
reflect the differences between professional backgrounds. Later in 1996, an 
anthropologist was recruited as the new chief technical advisor of the whole 
Biodiversity Program. Thus whereas the Lak project had been predominantly run by 
foresters, biologists and conservation managers, the design of the Bismarck-Ramu 
project expected the social sciences and to take a more prominent role. 
This left the project biologist in a rather isolated position. He had until then largely 
driven the process in the Bismarck-Ramu area and was now told that the project 
would refrain from further interventions until it had re-assessed its strategy. When 
by July 1996 the basics of the new community entry approach had been developed, 
biological issues were put on the back burner, and no expatriates, with the exception 
of myself and one or two short-term visitors were allowed into the area. As the 
project biologist pointed out, this also introduced a potential problem, as one might 
find a community well willing to develop a conservation regime but without the 
natural resources worth conserving. To the proponents of the new philosophy, 
however, this was less important, as a first biological assessment had been made 
and as it was now time to focus on people. Whether this focus indeed leads to 
conservation is an issue dealt with in chapter 7. 
REDEFINING 'DEVELOPMENT' 
The shift in emphasis from nature to people and from a top-down planned 
conservation intervention as had taken place in Lak towards a more open-ended and 
participatory process approach became visible in a number of ways. 
In the first place the shift away from the politics of forest exploitation, away from a 
frantic awareness drive in the face of falling trees, and the associated crisis 
management under severe bureaucratic constraints that had characterised the Lak 
project, led to a much more relaxed and reflective project. Interventions in the area 
were planned in great detail, much emphasis was put on training and confidence 
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bimding of CD workers and project staff, and a lot of time was spent analysing the 
reactions and questions of individuals and communities in order to come u p with 
appropriate answers. In many ways the project team consistentiy refused tp be 
hurried into taking steps that would later have to be retracted. 
In the second place, the shift from relatively large scale, business-oriented 
development in Lak, to the more modest community development in the Bismarck-
Ramu brought a whole new language with it. In the Lak project and the first stage of 
the Bismarck-Ramu interventions, the emphasis had been on the 'exchange' of 
conservation and development, 'early rewards packages', determining the 'incentive 
price for labour', the need to 'develop irtfrastructure' and 'the transfer of skills' in 
order to compete with the logging company in material terms. Development was 
defined as principally market-oriented in nature and would also have to be sizeable 
as it would have to compete with the revenues from logging. In contrast, the 
development language in the new community entry approach of the Bismarck-
Ramu ICAD project was framed in terms of establishing a 'dialogue' and 'building 
trust' with local communities in order to generate the 'self-confidence' needed for 
local empowerment' . Key to this approach was the view that people themselves 
have to define the issues of importance and generate change for the better. It is not 
much good to have an outsider explain to local people that they have a 
'conservation problem'. Only those issues that generate strong emotions in the form 
of anger, fear or enthusiasm generate the motivation to really make a difference. 
Finally, the idea that economic incentives alone are insufficient to compete with 
logging operations as conservation projects can not hope to access similar levels of 
funding led to a gradual shift towards an emphasis on 'moral incentives' for 
conservation. Sekhran (1996:17), for example notes that 
If conservation is justified on purely economic grounds problems may arise if 
people aspire to higher incomes than can be provided by ICADP interventions. 
In such circumstances, communities would ... sell out to the highest bidder.... 
Therefore material incentives alone are unlikely to achieve conservation 
objectives. Other 'moral' incentives are needed to reinforce traditional cultural 
attachments to natural resources, for example by emphasising customary 
management practices and the maintenance of sacred groves. It is therefore 
necessary to challenge communities as a whole to rethink their strategies for 
development. 
The community entry approach, however, went even further by regarding 
development and conservation in the first place as organisational problems that had 
to be based on the perceptions and motivations of the resource owners themselves. 
Its starting premise was that communities and people can only make a change for 
the better if they organise themselves to make informed decisions leading to joint 
actions. In such a process donor funds can be used as a means to help people 
'organise themselves', but the funds are not to be used to 'generate development', to 
'purchase participation' or to 'sweeten' the opportunity cost of conservation, 
instead, local communities have to become aware of their predicament, have to be 
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made conscious of their ability to generate change and have to be led towards a 
feeling of self-confidence and mutual co-operation which allows them to tackle the 
problems that they are facing. This change in development philosophy, away from 
an emphasis on material goods and services in order to secure a conservation area is 
fundamentally incompatible with the underlying economistic premise of ICAD idea. 
By taking out development as an incentive or a tool for conservation, the Bismarck-
Ramu project team 'exploded the ICAD concept' (VanHelden 2001b). 
This turning away from the economic ICAD concept and its 'globalist perspective' 
(Milton 1996) was partly a result of the severe mistrust of international market 
relations held by the CD trainer. His view of market relations was one akin to the 
views held by political economists who see 'development' as a process by which the 
wealthier nations and multinational companies extend their power over developing 
countries. By constructing a vision of global degradation which blames the poorer 
nations for the processes of environmental degradation, and which emphasises the 
need to tackle environmental problems at the global level, western interest groups -
among them professional conservationists - claim the authority to make decisions 
with regard to other people's natural resources. By defining the solutions to 
environmental degradation in terms of the transfer of technology, the integration of 
economic systems and the expansion of the international bureaucracy these interests 
are seen to seek a continuation of their dominance over southern countries. The very 
idea of integrated conservation and development, aiming to seek an economic 
solution to environmental problems by integrating western recreational wants (in 
the form of eco-tourism) pharmaceutical interests (bioprospecting), resource needs 
(sustainable timber harvesting) or climatological buffering (C02 up-take) pushed by 
the United Nations and the World Bank is inherent to this perspective. 
The counter-discourse brought forward by the anti-globalist opponents to the 
extension of market relations and international regulations into the lives of poor 
resource-owning rural communities, is one which hinges on the assumption that not 
poor people that destroy nature, but that the integration into world markets forces 
people to adopt unsustainable practices. Shiva et Al. (1991), in a vociferous attack on 
the dominant biodiversity discourse, argues that western conservationists are good 
at blaming poor people for the loss of biodiversity, but fail to discuss the 
environmental consequences of the economic system within which they themselves 
operate. In her view, local people are the wardens of biodiversity and it is the 
introduction of market relations, the uruforming impact of industrial agriculture 
with its emphasis on mono-cropping and hybrid seeds, and the introduction of new 
patenting rights over resources developed by farmers around the world, which form 
the real threat to biological and cultural diversity. Development assistance is 
thought to play a central role in this process and 
'can be likened to the AIDS virus: a pathogen that destroys the ability of the host 
country to resist the invasion of a foreign socio-economic system. Throughout 
the Third World, the result of large scale AID has been the displacement of 
traditional cultures and sustainable patterns of land use, along with the rapid 
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liquidation of forests and agricultural lands for the benefit of the industrial elite' 
(Schucking and Anderson 1991: 21). 
The policy advice that follows from this view is one that emphasises the need for 
communities to uncouple from the world system and to go at it alone. This view 
often emphasises the ecological wisdom of indigenous peoples conflating cultural 
and biological diversity into one, by arguing that the goals of indigenous peoples 
and conservationists are 'isomorphic' (Alvard 1993). By preventing a further 
'contamination' with western influences, such conservationist behaviour can be 
maintained. This romantic view of indigenous communities also came to play an 
important role in the legitimisation of the community entry approach. 
It is obviously quite ironic to find a UNDP project, which is based on the idea that 
an integration of local communities in world markets through the judicious use of 
economic incentives may lead to the conservation of biodiversity was now being 
dominated by proponents of a radically opposing view. In a sense, the CD trainer 
thus 'hijacked' the project, turning the ICAD philosophy on its head, denouncing the 
use of economic incentives and globalisation, but at the same time making use of the 
resources and legitimacy accorded by the UNDP and the GEF. It would take three 
years before the contradictions between the new community-based philosophy of 
the Bismarck-Ramu project and its donors became apparent. 
Tacconi (1998), however, attributes the redefinition of 'development' between the 
Lak and Bismarck-Ramu projects to much more commonplace reasons, suggesting 
that this shift towards 'moral incentives' and 'grounding conservation in conviction' 
was in the first place the result of the fact that the Biodiversity Program had come to 
realise that it simply lacked the funds to bring economic development to remote 
areas such as in Lak and the Bismarck-Ramu area. A new definition of 
'development' as a form of self-help allowed the project to ignore what was in fact a 
fundamental design problem in its conservation approach. The lessons-learnt 
document on Lak, for example, brings forward the view that conservationists 
working with ICAD methods have to 
'invest heavily in education to transform communities' ideas about 
development. Unless communities come to redefine their strategies for seeking 
development in ways that ICAD projects can support, then 'conservation 
through development' initiatives will continue to fail'(McCallum and Sekhran 
1997: 56). 
As is evident in this quote, conservation initiatives are to transform the idea of what 
entails 'proper' development in order to achieve their conservation objectives. Thus 
conservation and development initiatives do not adjust their interventions to the 
needs and perceptions of local people, but communities' ideas have to be 
transformed to meet the problem analysis as well as the aarninistrative and financial 
abilities of the project agency. 
It is certainly true that the redefinition of 'development' as a form of self-help meant 
a headache less to the Biodiversity Program, as it was relieved of the burden to seek 
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T H E BISMARCK-RAMU COMMUNITY ENTRY APPROACH 
Field operations were managed by the community trainer, the DEC conservation 
manager and his New Zealand counterpart. This team was responsible for the 
recruitment, training and coaching of a number of Community Development (CD) 
workers and the logistics of patrolling in the Bismarck-Ramu area. The members of 
the CD teams were Papua New Guineans recruited from a variety of sources, with a 
number coming from the AusAID funded North Simbu Integrated Rural 
Development Project, and the Divine Word Institute in Madang. The rate of attrition 
among the CD workers was quite high and there was a continuous need to train 
new people in the basic concepts of participatory community development. These 
teams, however, were to become the key players in the Bismarck-Ramu project as 
they were to go out into the area and conduct different types of ixaining and 
exercises with communities. Later the strong personal links between team members, 
the unusual ease with which PNG and expatriate personnel mixed, and the 
increasingly prominent and leading role of the PNG staff would be positively 
commented upon by both Papua New Guineans and foreigners alike. 
In the light of the 'cargo' and 'dependency' notions mentioned above and the earlier 
project experiences, the CD trainer not only posed the question to what extent the 
project itself played a role in generating cargo expectations, but also questioned how 
far the project could avoid such cargo connotations. Issues such as the exhibition of 
wealth, the mode of transport, the presence of expatriates, the language used during 
patrols became a topic of intense discussion among the project team, finally 
resulting in an elaborate code of conduct with regard to the way in which 
large amounts of development funds. In contrast to these practical considerations 
that may have played a role in Port Moresby, the Madang project staff sincerely 
came to believe in this new 'non-cargo' approach, treating conservation as a self-
help rather than as lack-of-economic-incentives problem. Defining development as 
an organisational issue, also had the additional advantage that those people 
'genuinely' interested in conservation, would clearly stand apart from those 
professing an interest only as a means to access jobs, money and resources. Once the 
latter would realise that conservation did not mean jobs, roads or money they would 
turn away from the project. The disavowal of cargo-oriented development and the 
emphasis on what communities-can-do-for-themselves triggered a process of self-
selection allowing the project to identify those communities 'truly' interested in 
resource issues. 
This shift from using economic and moral incentives for conservation grafted on a 
careful community entry process as suggested by the resource economist and as laid 
out in various project documents (McCallum and Sekhran 1996, Sekhran 1996), 
towards a community development philosophy that did away with economic 
incentives all together would sow the seeds for a later conflict between the 
Bismarck-Ramu project team and its donors. 
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interventions would be structured. In order to limit the level of expectations 
generated by the project's entry into the area of interest, it was felt necessary to deal 
with the cargo and external dependency thtaking prevalent in many communities. 
As had been argued by the CD trainer these attitudes and the resulting unrealistic 
expectations are easily reinforced by the manner in which a project team first enters 
the area of future work. Once established, unrealistic expectations prove very hard 
to defuse. The perceptions and mental associations leading to such a 'cargo 
mentality' and the paralysis that results is generally related to earlier experiences 
with well-equipped companies, boastful pohticians and the well-resourced 
representatives of foreign dominated projects. 
The display of wealth and especially the mode of transport, the composition of the 
patrol teams and the way in which the teams present themselves during the first few 
meetings with local villagers dictate the way in which the project is looked upon in 
the future. Exhibitions of wealth in the form of clotiiing, project equipment and the 
consumption of urban foods were thought to give rise to the status of those entering 
the community, but also lead to unrealistic expectations with regard to the 'share' of 
wealth that would be made available to the community. It is a painful start for any 
project to have to bring people back from the daydream of unsuspected wealth and 
leisure to the harsh realities of self-reliance, everyday life and hard work. As a result 
the new approach meant that the community workers and other team members had 
to walk from village to village, were to stay and eat with local people, and were to 
avoid unnecessary exhibitions of wealth. 
The composition of the teams and the presence of 'whiteskins' engendered a similar 
argument. On the one hand the presence of expatriates was thought to increase both 
the confidence in the project as well as the level of expectations as villagers tend to 
compare the colonial patrols before 1975 that were conducted by white kiaps with the 
post independence government missions. A man in Bubulsunga, for example, told the 
expatriate conservation advisor during one of the first patrols in the Jimi valley that he 
was happy to see a white man, as it at least meant something would be done (CRC 
1996a). In addition, villagers automatically tend to regard the expatriate as the boss 
and it was felt better to allow the community workers to start work with local 
communities without having an expatriate present In addition the project team had a 
hard look at its presentation and use of language in order to reduce the risk of 
generating untenable 'cargo' expectations. 
In their discussions with local people the CD workers were to avoid certain notions. 
One was the already mentioned issue of being a 'project', as this term may be 
associated with short-term opportunities to capture cargo before they collapse; not 
exactly the mental luggage for a successful self-help community project The second 
was the notion of being there to 'help' which was thought to unduly reinforce external 
dependency. Instead the verb 'to teach' was chosen, medicating that local people and 
the community workers could possibly 'teach' each other to understand the changes 
that were taking place in the area, while putting the implementation of whatever 
action that was to follow on the local community rather than the project. The concepts 
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of Conservation and Environment were respectively described as 'lukautim' (to look 
after) and 'bus, na graun na wara' (bush, water and land). This seemed a perfectly 
sensible thing for the Government to do. Many people emphasised that this was 
exactly what they, the landowners in the area, had always done. 
The teams were also to be clear about what they were not and, by extension, what they 
did not do. This was to defuse some of the many expectations that would inevitably 
arise. The community workers thus stated clearly that they were not a bank, not there 
to 'bring' money or government services, not a logging or rnining company, not a 
church that came to win souls and not a political party that came to win votes for the 
oncoming elections. Neither would they bring anything. In later months these, and 
various other notions, would continue popping up and had to be defused time and 
time again while the communities had to come to grips with the fact that the 
community workers were there 'only to talk'. 
As people became increasingly tired with the CD workers during these meetings, 
insisting that the project should 'do' or 'give' something to demonstrate that it was 
serious about 'working together' with local communities it was emphasised that the 
project would only stay if the people wanted them to. People were always given the 
option of asking the team to leave. It was their land, their community and their 
'development problem'. As the project organisation was made u p of a number of 
different components the project team decided that during the field trips everybody 
would present themselves as being 'envkonmen-lahi (environmental-people) of the 
DEC. Experiences with another community project in Collingwood Bay had shown 
that many people there became confused with the number of different organisations 
and acronyms. 
In contrast to the Lak project with its strong awareness drive, the community workers 
in the Bismarck-Ramu area were expHcitly taught not to 'preach' on the issue of 
conservation. In doing so they would risk steering people into the direction of a 
conservation agenda whether there was a genuine interest in resource conservation 
issues or no t The project recognised the fact that recipient populations often act 
strategically in the face of outside interventions and once communities perceive the 
project to be after something, there is a risk that groups will simply make the 
necessary statements to secure the goods, jobs and money that are associated with 
the project. In that case it matters little whether one talks about the establishment of 
a logging or mining project, a rocket base or an ICAD project. As long as there is the 
explicit promise of material benefits at the end of the line people will define the 
proposal brought forward as exactly that which they had always needed. A type of 
behaviour which within the project would become known as 'jumping though 
hoops'. The project team assumed that if people would have an interest in resource 
management issues this would come out during communal discussions, informal 
'storying' sessions and PRA work. Emphasis was therefore placed on the technique 
of 'digging', asking a series of interconnected questions, to arrive at the root of the 
problem as seen by local people. This was a significant departure from the intense 
conservation awareness drive in Lak, in that people in the Bismarck-Ramu area were 
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themselves to define the issues that they rather than the project found important The 
topics of this dialogue inevitably touched on the nature of social, economic and 
environmental changes that were taking place, the good and the bad in those 
changes and the dreams that communities had for the future. 
ORGANISING THE COMMUNITY ENTRY PROCESS 
The first CD workers using the new Community Entry methodology were recruited 
in July 1996 when 7 applicants were trained in PRA methods. This training was 
followed by a one-week intensive briefing aimed at preparing them for the 
resumption of patrol work in both the Jimi and the Ramu areas. Since the survey 
trouble at Bubkile only one patrol had been in the eastern part of the Jimi valley, 
while the last patrol to the Ramu Valley had led to the locking-up of the two 
conservation managers in Foroko-Brimde. 
The first issue that needed to be resolved concerned the questions of what to do, 
where to go, and how to behave. In line with the principles of the new community 
entry approach outlined above it was decided that the first patrols would keep a low 
profile and would not be accompanied by whiteskins. During these patrols the CD 
team would merely introduce themselves using the introductory speech described 
above. The emphasis of this entry speech lay on a two-way process of 
communication through mutual learning instead of a one-way process of helping, 
and was to avoid 'conservation preaching' and 'cargo-tfiinking'. This introductory 
speech and the different exercises and role-plays were intensively studied. 
During the preparatory week, small groups were formed to write u p possible 
questions that would come forward in response to the presence and responses of the 
CD team. The questions ranged from 'Why are you here' and 'How are you going to 
bring us development' to 'why do you bother to seek us out' and 'What do you 
think you can learn from us?' By including such questions as 'We want to see the 
real boss [the patrol and survey leader] because he promised us.. . . ' , it was also taken 
into account that because of the lack of a familiar face, people could try to play 
different components of the project apart. After the preparation all members of the 
CD teams were grilled individually and had to come u p with suitable answers, 
which both avoided preaching on conservation issues and the raising of 
expectations. The teams also looked at the contents of the first patrol speeches, the 
comments that were made on it by the CD trainer and tilings that should be avoided 
this time round. Once the CD teams had clarified their presence to the community 
leaders they would seek permission to remain a few days in the village to get to 
know the community. 
The idea was not to 'do' much in terms of presentations but simply to spend time 
talking, working and eating with people in an attempt to get to know both people 
and their communities. During this stay it was their main task to listen for so-called 
'community themes'. Community themes are those matters which people find 
important and which they bring u p themselves. In practice the hearing of 
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community themes took the form of 'storying'. This usually consists of sitting 
around a fire and the relaxed sharing of memories, stories and experiences, the 
asking of questions followed by an open discussion of the answers and mental 
associations, which would again be followed by new stories and questions. 
Inevitably the issues that were on peoples minds would come out, whether they had 
to do with conflicts with other groups, their perception of their place in the world, 
the problems that communities face in drawing in the necessary Government 
services, or the difficulties in accessing sufficient gardening land. 
Thus during their stay the CD teams were to avoid focusing discussions on the 
objectives of the project, while keeping an open ear for the issues of importance to 
people themselves. As a leaflet handed out by the community trainer explained: 
'One of the keys to discovering the deepest feelings of the community is 
LISTENING!.. .The CD teams must listen for those things which the people have 
the strongest feelings about. Emotion is linked to motivation. Only on issues 
which they feel strongly will people be prepared to act. The CD teams must find 
out what people are worried about, happy about, sad about, angry about, fearful 
about and hopeful about. It is not possible to go to a person in a village and ask 
'what are your strongest feelings about'? It is necessary for the CD teams to be 
one with the people to listen closely and pay attention to the problems and issues 
in their lives which bring [up] strong feelings' (BRG 1996a: appendix 2). 
In addition to the 'hearing of community themes' the teams would try to respond to 
the symptoms of a cargo-mentality that had erupted during earlier patrols and the 
Bubkile survey and that would probably emerge again. VVnile it was already made 
clear in the opening speech that the 'environment people' were not going to 'help' 
the communities by 'bringing' any form of development, a number of exercises and 
metaphors could be used to reinforce the theme of self-reliance. 
The first was the so-called timeline. This exercise is aimed at putting all the talk 
about 'development' in a historic perspective by going back 50,000 years and 
emphasising that for all this time, with the exception of the last 200 years, Papua 
New Guineans had been in control of their own lives. It emphasises feelings of 
autonomy and pride in Melanesian achievements and tries to dispel the feeling that 
Melanesians are unable to give shape to their lives, by standing on their own legs 
(BRG 1996a). A number of secondary metaphors and exercises pointing to the issue 
of self-reliance were also prepared. These included the image of a mango tree with 
strong roots, pointing to the fact that people have to rely on their roots, their culture 
and community in order to make change. Cutting the tree from its roots inevitably 
means it will die. 
Two small plays called 'Give Man A Fish' and 'Naked Man' were also presented. 
The first illustrates the saying that it is better to help people help themselves (by 
giving them a rod) than to keep them continuously dependent (by giving them fish 
to eat), the second illustrates how people are disempowered once they loose control 
over their resources (become naked). These plays were used to liven u p the meetings 
with the villagers whenever the CD teams felt the need to do so. Over time a range 
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of metaphors, both from the side of the villagers as well as from the side of the CD 
teams, would be employed to make the point that peoples traditions are valuable 
and worth mamtairiing. 
TABLE 2: ISSUES AND TOOLS OF THE STEP-BY-STEP COMMUNITY ENTRY APPROACH 
1 • Introduction to the leaders of the community; 
• Use the community entry speech to explain who you are and what you are not; 
• Meet with the whole community and repeat the entry speech 
• Spend time with the community; work, story, eat, live, and promise to return. 
• CD workers meet to assess the community. 
2 • Hold a community meeting and again introduce yourself; 
• Emphasise self-reliance and Papua New Guinea history and culture through the 
presentation of the time-line exercise and the image of the mango tree; 
• Spend time with the community and promise to return. 
3 • Hold community meeting and repeat the things said and did during the last two 
meetings; 
• Use a community mapping exercise to discuss environmental changes that are taking 
place; 
• Emphasise self-reliance with the Give-man-a-fish-teach-man-to-fish drama; 
• Break the community into groups and list the strengths and problems of their 
community; 
• Spend time with the community and promise to return. 
4 • Take people through their strength and weakness analysis; 
• Break into groups and discuss the problems and possible solutions; 
• Discuss these possible solutions with the community; 
• Suggest that they begin with those problems, which they can address without help. 
• Promise to return if the community wants you to. 
5 • Return for another meeting and ask people to think about their vision for the future. 
How would they like it to look? 
• Present the problems, the strengths and the possible solutions and visions that people 
have come up with over the last few sessions and ask them to prioritise their 
problems and to focus on those problems which they can tackle without outside help. 
• Assist the community in formulating an action plan, and promise to return. 
6 • From then on the CD workers return to the communities and monitor, encourage and 
facilitate the action plan. Key is that communities themselves have to take it from 
there. If they encounter problems or have questions then they can discuss these with 
the CD workers. The aim is to start with small community projects and build on the 
success and confidence that results from joint action. 
Source: Adapted from Lalley (1999) and Ellis (1998). 
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There is a risk in such appeals to tradition, as in contrast to the intentions of the 
project, local people may view the situation of the past in terms of 'backwardness' 
and a lack of development'. Whereas many people, especially the elderly would 
often respond emotionally and with a sense of pride, in other instances, especially 
among Jimi youngsters, this call for tradition was deemed unacceptable. With their 
focus on the use and exploitation of the environment in return for better 
opportunities and cash, the calls for 'conservation' and 'tradition' would be 
regarded as antithetical to development. Conservationists aiming to convince people 
not to pursue destructive options to achieve 'development' may thus be regarded as 
people vvishing to maintain the status quo, of poverty and a lack of services. The 
extent to which various groups of people were open to these appeals to tradition, 
however, would be an important criterion for the project team as it was though to 
say something about the conservation predisposition of the communities concerned. 
Through trial and error, a patrol program evolved in which the first patrol would 
aim at trust building with an emphasis on self-reliance, the second aimed at bringing 
out changes in resource use and the environment with the use of PRA methods, the 
tiiird involved the analysis and prioritisation of community needs and wants and 
the fourth and further patrols would have to focus on aspects of action planning and 
community mobilisation so as to help people to plan and mobilise resources in 
addressing some of their local problems. The small problems identified and tackled 
by local people did not need to have anything to do with conservation but were 
rather a means to reinforce self-confidence, community cohesion and decision-
making mechanisms. The fundamental idea behind this program was the 
assumption that if people found themselves able to deal with the smaller problems 
in their daily lives, they would also be able to deal with larger development and 
resource management issues, thus gradually assisting communities to progress from 
a state of disorganisation, dependency and environmental neglect to that of an 
ordered self-reliant and environmentally benevolent community. 
In contrast to the Lak project, where the team had actively studied the option of 
developing conservation-linked forms of income generating activities, this approach 
left the question what type of 'development' would evolve unanswered. Out of the 
interaction with local people, the experiences gained with various visualising 
techniques a program would grow which would take communities through a step-
by-step process aimed at building trust, defining problems, raising issues of 
resource management and eventually leading towards what the team saw as the 
beginnings of community-based conservation. 5 3 
i 3 As the cornmunity entry approach consisted of a number of sequential exercises, the project team 
started referring to these as 'steps'. This would lead to several problems. In the first place CD workers 
began mentioning the use of these steps to people in the field, comparing them to a ladder which you 
needed to climb to get into a house on stilts. The result was that people were participating not because 
they saw the value in the exercises themselves but because they hoped for some reward at the end of 
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PATROL LOGISTICS 
Rather than establishing a permanent base in the area, as had been the policy in Lak, 
the team decided on the basis of the repeated offers by competing groups to provide 
land and houses for the project, that such would lead to envy and conflict between 
groups and that it would reinforce the image of the project as a source of 
'development'. This analysis proved correct but late, as the establishment of a 
'temporary base' in the community facilitator's house at Pimbum was already a fact. 
Instead of operating from the base and being permanentiy present in the area the 
project team opted to conduct a series of community development patrols with the 
help of the newly recruited CD workers. 
Patrols were undertaken for about three weeks at the time at eight to ten week 
intervals and would be preceded and followed by intensive briefing sessions. 
During these sessions the patrols were scheduled and speeches, role-plays, and PRA 
tools were practised. After the patrols, a debriefing session would record the 
experiences and problems that the teams had encountered and would pave the way 
for the next round of patrols. The systematic write-up of experiences in patrol 
reports and the later development of series of village files would allow for a tailor-
made approach in each community, and are one of the man sources of information 
used in this study. There were more reasons to choose for such an approach rather 
than for a permanent presence in the area. In the first place the permanent presence 
of the project in one locality, that of the base, would be seen as an indication of the 
project's loyalty within the clan-based landscape and thus affect the 'neutrality' of 
the project intervention. Unwittingly, in doing so, the Bismarck-Ramu project copied 
the ambulations of the colonial patrol officers, who also wandered through the area 
coming and going without displaying a specific affiUation to one or more clan 
groups. 
The second reason to use patrols rather than permanent field staff was that the CD 
workers, themselves village people, needed time to return to their villages, mamtain 
their gardens and see their families. Many other development projects recruit 
personnel, take them out of their respective villages, provide them with housing and 
thus create 'civil servants' who become increasingly detached from the realities of 
rural life in PNG. This in its self can be seen as a form of 'cargo ihiinking', as in many 
NGOs the institutional interests of the organisation, and the needs of its personnel 
come to play an increasingly important role at the expense of the needs and wants of 
local people. By giving the CD workers time to return to their villages such could be 
avoided. An interesting side effect of this practise was that the CD workers would 
all these meetings. This was just another variety of the 'jumping through hoops' problem mentioned 
above. A second problem was that at the briefings CD workers started talking about communities in 
terms of the 'step' they were in. This constituted a problem as it detracted them from giving a careful 
description of what had actually happened. Thus when asked what had exactly happened during the 
exercises in a particular community, the CD workers could not answer. Lalley (1999: 16) writes: 'We 
did not want to give labels to things we were doing. We wanted to talk about exactly what we were 
doing'. As a result the term 'steps' was eliminated from the process. 
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take their stories and exercises home. Over the duration of the project a variety of 
community-based self-help programs and resource management initiatives akin to 
those discussed in the Bismarck-Ramu area were implemented in villages in 
Madang, Simbu and Morobe provinces. 
During the preparations of the patrols, not only the content of patrol activities, but 
also the schedule had to be decided on. The logistics of such an undertaking were 
daunting for a number of reasons. In the first place the Bismarck-Ramu being a large 
area, with many clan-groups and a scattered settlement pattern is difficult to cover 
through patrols, especially if one wanted to come back repeatedly The whole area, 
about six days walking to get across, has two serviceable airstrips, Kol and Foroko-
Brimde, and one point where the Ramu River valley can be entered by motorised 
canoe. Just organising small aircraft and motorised canoes to drop the team and 
their supplies off was an intensive operation. Once in the field, the patrols would be 
largely out of touch as there were three working radio's in the area. Two at the 
respective airstrips and one at the community facilitator's house in Pimbum 
installed by the project. P rowl ing the Jimi teams with a portable radio, solved part 
of the problem. 
In addition, things were made difficult because of the dispersed pattern of habitation 
in the Bismarck-Ramu area As a result patrols would have to make an appointment 
with local leaders as to when and where the patrol work would be conducted to give 
the communities time to call one another together, and often this meant that the teams 
would have to wait for one or two days before the community could come together. 
Something which usually happened at night or after church or market. In many cases 
it would be difficult to call the four or five clans that make up a 'village' together as 
they live far apart and may not be willing to come to their neighbours land because of 
conflicts. The first patrol report noted that 'the logistical problems seem daunting but 
it is clear to all that we are trying someliiing new and are therefore in a constant state 
of experimentation'(BRG 1996a 8). 
THE SOCIAL FEASIBILITY STUDY OF THE BISMARCK-RAMU PROJECT 
It is at this stage, from July 1996, onwards that I became involved in the Bismarck-
Ramu project. Having worked in PNG the previous two years, I was recruited in 
order to conduct a so-called Social Feasibility Study (SFS). Following the Lak 
experience, the Biodiversity Program had decided that the collection of social and 
economic data was to be an integral part of the development of the second ICAD 
project in the Bismarck-Ramu. Between July 1996 and January 1998 I closely 
followed the work of the CD teams, while collecting my own data from a range of 
sources. The SFS took place in close collaboration with the community work, and 
most issues presented in the final document were discussed extensively witnin the 
project team during the various briefing and debriefing sessions. At the end of 1997 
the Social Feasibility Study provided an assessment of 16 of the 22 communities that 
the CD teams were working with. This shows how I was unable to keep u p with the 
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work of 12 to 15 CD workers, and had to prioritise among the various areas, 
meaning that a number of communities were never visited as part of the SFS.54 
On the basis of a number of considerations, the SFS suggested that the opportunities 
for conservation in the Jimi valley were limited, and that the mixed communities in 
the Ramu Valley were also 'unlikely to offer opportunities for conservation due to 
the high levels of mistrust a n d / o r conflict between the traditional landowners and 
the settlers' (Van Helden 1998b: 87). The best options for conservation were thought 
to he with the Sepu people on the Ramu River, due to concern with Jimi 
encroachment, a wish to maintain cultural identity and the hope to access better 
services through conservation-related development activities. Notwithstanding 
suggestions to the contrary (see Ellis 1998: 64 footnote 140), the fmdings of the SFS 
were largely borne out by later events. 
T H E POLITICS O F PARTICIPATORY CONSERVATION 
The nature of ICAD projects in PNG differs from that of mainstream development 
projects in many other countries, in the sense that the local communities with whom 
the project team interacts are not in the first place the intended beneficiaries of the 
project. Something called 'biodiversity' is. In the PNG context, however, the only 
way conserve biodiversity is by going through the local communities that own that 
biodiversity. Thus in the ICAD approach people's development tend to be seen as 'a 
means to', rather than an end in itself. As must be clear by now ICAD projects in 
PNG thus constitute a deal and a transaction between the owners of biodiversity on 
the one hand and the project implementing agency on the other. By demanding 
conservation from local communities the project team imposes a cost on people 
who, under the terms of the ICAD deal, are expected to stop logging, hunting and 
gardening in the protected area. In return the project offers some form of 
development. If local communities don't like the offer, or find a better offer 
elsewhere, there is no deal, and the project objective of conserving biodiversity is not 
achieved. 
The revised Bismarck-Ramu ICAD project approach claimed to get out of the 
negotiating position and away from the idea that there was a 'conservation for 
development transaction'. It did so by employing a participatory methodology in 
which the project team sought to assist people in their own attempts to harness 
conservation and development, instead of the project being the provider of services, 
development and conservation, and therefore the opponent at the negotiating table, 
the project team tried to support communities in coming to grips with the economic 
5 4 The Ramu landowners at Foroko, Lai and Karisanga were for example, never visited as part of the 
social feasibility work This was partly due to inability of the SFS to keep up with the CD work, partly 
a result of the initial rejection of the program in that area in September 1996, which suggested that the 
area was of less immediate importance. In late 1997, however, the Ramu landowners at Foroko would 
become strongly interested in conservation (See chapter 8). 
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and environmental changes around them. At such the project had to base itself on 
the issues that local people find important. 
Van Dusseldorp (1981) distinguishes two streams of thinking in participation; 'social 
planning' versus 'social action'. The first regards participation as an instrument to 
facilitate outside interventions, viewing participation as the provision of information 
by the target population as well as its involvement in the formulation, 
implementation and evaluation. The social action school of thought sees 
participation as a moral obligation, which not only allows people to part-take in 
development but which empowers people to take control of their own lives. This 
view can be summarised as an 'organized effort to increase people's control over 
resources and regulative institutions (...) hitherto excluded from such control' (Van 
Dusseldorp 1981: 51). In many ways this typology reflects the shift between the Lak 
and the later Bismarck-Ramu project. Whereas the first saw participation mainly as a 
means to get people involved in implementing an expert-driven and predetermined 
conservation area, the latter meant to give people control, raising questions with 
regard to the conservation content of its intervention. 
A more elaborate typology of participation by Bass et Al. (1995: 24) illustrates how 
the Lak project can be characterised by participation by consultation and the 
participation for material incentives. The Lak project took a largely top-down approach 
in which foreign experts predeterrriined the location, shape and size of the area to be 
protected and the type of management regime to be put in place. They even defined 
the type of development that people should accept as part of this bargain. Once 
these decisions had been made, the project team tried to interest local people for its 
conservation plans. The participatory element in Lak consisted largely of a number 
of plenary hearings during which people could make their opinions known on two 
possible courses of action: logging or ICAD. As recounted, these plenary forums 
were hardly successful in generating consent among the highly divided community. 
Orsak (1997b) argues that whereas all projects call themselves 'participatory' these 
days, proposing a single policy option can not be seen as such. Using an example 
from his own experience he recounts how a group of village people responded 
enthusiastically to his proposal for a butterfly fanning project only to find that 
'yes' doesn't always mean 'yes'. As I worked with the community I became 
increasingly disappointed. The villagers showed a lack of interest in carrying out 
the work needed for butterfly farming. Here I had been using the 'participatory 
approach' that everyone said was so important and yet my project was failing! 
Why? .... Later ... I realised, with some horror, that what I thought was a 
participatory approach was not that at all... Because i) I did not give the villagers 
a choice of activities. I gave them only one option - butterfly farming. What if 
they wanted to something other than butterfly farming? ii) I did not give them 
time to discuss options; and 111) I did not remove myself from the discussion 
process, so that they could talk about things, without worrying about trying to 
please me. It was clear that I wanted to hear the answer 'yes' and so they gave 
that answer even though they weren't committed to [the idea] (Orsak 1997b: 5). 
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In Lak and during the first meetings with the Jimi communities there was little 
sensitivity to the dynamics of social control in such plenary meetings with the tJhings 
people said generally taken at face value. It soon became clear that the main reason 
why the Lak people were interested in 'conservation' was because it was presented 
as an economically viable alternative to the logging concession. Without the 
promises of jobs, money and 'early rewards' people would probably not even have 
participated at the consultative level. Also during the Bubkile biological survey the 
project team failed to realise that people act strategically in the face of outside 
interventions and that there is no one-to-one relationship between what people say 
and what they actually do. 
In contrast, the community entry approach used during the second phase of the 
project emphasised the responsibility of local people to do something about the 
issues that they find important. The Bismarck-Ramu project thus operated at the 
actionist extreme of the spectrum aiming towards self mobilisation. Its community 
entry approach aimed to create room for local people by temporarily withholding its 
own conservation agenda. As will be shown in the next few pages this focus on the 
problem deflnition by, and empowerment of local people, generated several 
contradictions inherent to the practice of community-based conservation. Even a 
relatively open-ended and participatory approach such as that pursued by the 
Bismarck-Ramu project turns out to be a highly structured and disciplined exercise 
treacling on the fine line between mobilisation and manipulation. 
PARTICIPATORY CONSERVATION: THE GENERATION OF INCONSISTENCY? 
The shift towards increased community participation in project design and 
execution emphasising self-reliance, empowerment, and co-operation is also visible 
in a new drive towards community-based resource management (TIED 1994, 
Colchester 1994). Although highly fashionable, such approaches generate a number 
of internal inconsistencies. The first is inherent to participatory methods aimed at 
the 'empowerment' of local communities, while the second is more specifically 
related to the idea of 'participatory conservation'. 
In the first place, the paradox of participatory methods aimed at 'empowering' 
people to take charge of their own lives, lies with the fact that such self-reliance is 
thought to be best achieved by the injection of power and insights from the outside. 
One of the most often cited definitions of participation is revealing in this respect: 
'Participation is 'empowering people to mobilize their own capacities, be social 
actors, rather than passive subjects, manage resources, make decisions and 
control the activities that affect their lives' (Cernea 1985 in IIED 1994:18). 
In other words, without outsiders to empower local people, these are not even social 
actors. They are not capable of making decisions and not intent upon controlling the 
activities that affect their lives. This view of non-western people perpetuates the 
notion of recipient populations as passive, helpless and in need an enlightened 
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5 S In the context of PNG, where local people are the owners of the natural resources coveted by both 
conservationists and companies alike, the fact that a group such as the Bismarck-Ramu CD workers 
tells communities not to be dependent on other outsiders such as companies and politicians can also 
be seen as an attempt on the part of the project to limit the competition for the favour of the local 
community, thus reducing the risk that communities play various initiatives off against each other. 
outsider in order to advance. Some writers believe this the case because 
communities lack the ability to organise themselves due to a cultoahy-determined 
sense of fatalism, others suggest that political and economic factors paralyse 
community life (Midgley 1986). 
The argument that local highlands communities are unable to organise themselves 
was never taken seriously among the Madang project team and dispelled by an 
anecdote from the neighbouring North Simbu Integrated Rural Development Project 
for which a number of staff had worked before joining the Biodiversity Program. 
The community program of the North Simbu Project classified communities 
according to their readiness for development, with 'A' communities ready for 
participatory development, 'B' communities needing further training and 
awareness and ' C communities the 'basket cases' deemed fundamentally unable 
to organise themselves and not interested in any form of collective action. As the 
Chief Technical Advisor of the Biodiversity Program recounted this labelling had 
to be revised when he witnessed the preparations for tribal war one morning. 
There had been an incident, and fearing an attack the supposedly apathetic ' C 
communities were now collectively organising their defence on a grand scale. 
Women were bringing in the pigs and hiding possessions, while the men were 
taking up defensive positions, leaders discussed war strategies and young boys 
supplied the warriors with buckets of arrows (PC Mike Parsons). Based on this 
experience the project had to conclude that it was not so much the ability of the 
' C communities which was the problem, but a lack of interest in what the project 
had to offer that kept these communities on the sideline. 
In contrast to the fatalistic views mentioned above, many social scientists emphasise 
the ability of poor people to analyse their situation, to pursue their interests, to resist 
exploitation, to make change and to respond successfully to outside interventions, 
including those of well-meaning development specialists aiming to empower poor 
people. Berger (in Hall 1986:103) criticises the empowerment perspective as being a 
rather patronising view based on the idea that rural communities 'do not 
understand their own situation', and which perpetuates 'a hierarchical view of 
consciousness' in which outsiders' knowledge and understanding is considered 
superior to the perception of local people. Long notes how the shift from blueprint 
towards process approaches or from dirigist towards participatory management 
styles does not 'escape from the interventionist and managerial undertones inherent 
in the idea of 'development'. All they do is replace one form of interventionist 
Ihinking with another, in this case they with the 'image of more knowledgeable and 
powerful outsiders helping the powerless and less discerning folk... no matter how 
firm the good intentions, the notion of 'powerful outsiders' assisting 'powerless 
insiders' is constantiy smuggled in' (Long 2001: 89; see also Gardner 1997).55 
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The Madang project staff would no doubt accept these views, and still argue the 
intermediary position that people certainly have the ability to make change, but may 
not be sufficiently confident or motivated to organise themselves. In this view it still 
takes an outside intervention to catalyse local capabilities and motivations. The CD 
trainer would no doubt point to the fact that the Bismarck-Ramu project tries to keep 
its interventions as limited as possible, aiming to get communities 'back on their 
feet', while avoiding a situation in which people become dependent on the project. 
In 1998, the project would introduce the term to 're-empower' in order to capture 
this situation more aptly. 
In the case of the Bismarck-Ramu project the empowerment-from-witliin-with 
outside-help paradox and the views on community-capacity for development can be 
illustrated by a the contrast between what the project called the cargo versus the 
community approach. The cargo approach represented the 'wrong' approach in 
which projects 'buy' participation and conservation with promises of material gain. 
It is open to manipulation by the recipient population and is deemed fundamentally 
unsustainable, because such initiatives are not grounded in the conviction that they 
conservation is good for the community. The community approach in contrast, 
stands for an approach which builds upon the existing capacities and motivations of 
the community. The project team thus on the one hand saw people as active and 
knowledgeable actors, but simultaneously gave itself the role of mobilising this 
energy and intelligence by asking the right questions (Lalley 1999). 
The second dilemma with regard to participatory conservation, arises when the local 
definition of problems differs fundamentally from that used by the intervening 
agency and its donors, or when local communities make strategic use of projects to 
pursue other aims than those ostentatiously voiced. The amended view of the ICAD 
project as a fully participatory process in which project and people 'work together', 
does not defuse the fundamental tension between the project's conservation agenda 
and the various priorities of local communities. Whereas poor people are 
predominantly occupied with meeting their basic needs, the improvement of their 
incomes, and a reduction of their workload, donors interested in biodiversity 
conservation usually clearly stipulate that their funds are to be used for the 
establishment of nature reserves. As Wells and Brandon note: 
'Overlooked by most . . . [ICDP] projects is the fact that ICDPs by definition limit 
participation. For an ICDP to achieve its basic objective - biodiversity 
conservation - people can only be empowered in aspects of development, that 
do not lead to overexploitation or degradation of the protected wildlife and 
wildlands' (1992:47). 
A drawing titled 'The Long and Winding Road Towards Sustainable Development' 
in a PRA guide used for the frairring of the CD teams reflects the dilemma between 
the project's conservation agenda and its wish for a fully participatory approach. In 
almost biblical terms it shows the broad road of logging leading to a landscape of 
tree s tumps and a lying tree, with as alternative two narrow roads veering of to the 
right. The first path is the 'community development' path, the second the path of 
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'envirorimerital awareness'. The community development path consists of a number 
of steps which lead from an understanding of the past and present, to future 
aspirations. The environmental awareness path leads towards an understanding of 
local views of the environment and a number of environmental awareness raising 
activities. The two paths come together in the distance where a 'community 
committed to conservation', develops a 'community action plan', and launches 
'community development activities' which culminate in a 'protected forest' set 
against a low sun in a landscape dubbed 'sustainable development and 
conservation'. 
FIGURE 5 : T H E L O N G AND W I N D I N G R O A D T O W A R D S SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
Source: Grant 1996: 25 
Whereas the author states that the various steps are not to be understood in linear 
terms, she does not note that development aspirations are not necessarily 
compatible with conservation. The assumption underlying this vision is that a 
combination of sufficiently high levels of participation and a healthy dose of 
environmental education will make both roads meet and will lead local people to 
opt for sustainable development and conservation activities such as those proposed 
by the project. The Lak experience had already showed that such is not necessarily 
the case. 
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CHOOSING BETWEEN PAimcrPATioN A N D CONSERVATION 
During the many management meetings needed to trash out the Bismarck-Ramu 
patrol program, the dilemma between participation and conservation would become 
a point of acute discussion. The first view, was the 'traditional' view which had been 
used at Lak and which favoured a vigorous environmental awareness campaign 
before entering into any development and conservation activities. Once people had 
been informed of the risks involved in mining and logging ventures, they would be 
in a better position to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of different courses 
of action. In addition, it would be necessary to identify 'development' activities with 
a clear linkage to 'conservation' issues, as such constitutes the basis of the ICAD 
approach. If for example, people voice the quality of health services as their main 
concern, then it would be very difficult for the project to 'link' such with 
conservation issues. 
In contrast, eco-tourism and eco-forestry projects are predicated on the continued 
existence of relatively untouched areas and tie issues of income generation in with 
sustainable use regimes. The opposing view, mainly defended by the CD trainer and 
the PNG conservation manager, was that as this was a participatory project the 
project team should not start off with telling people what they were to think, or even 
what 'the problem' was. By 'preaching conservation', the project would never know 
whether people were genuinely committed to conservation issues, as communities 
would simply tell the project what they tiiink it wanted to hear, leading to the earlier 
mentioned 'jumping through hoops' problem (CRC 1996b: 7). 
In other words, the Madang team wanted an open-ended and participatory project 
in which communities felt sufficiently empowered and motivated to play the 
leading role. At the same time the team did not want people to by-pass resource and 
conservation issues either. The GEF after all was funding a project in which 
development activities were used as a tool to establish a conservation area. This led 
to a logical problem as there was no guarantee whatsoever that cornmunities 
engaged in an open-ended process of problem definition would opt for 
conservation. In due course consensus was reached that - nolAvithstanding the 
conservation aim of the project - in the early stages community priorities for change 
were more important than their linkage to conservation objectives. Thus 
participation and community development were given precedence over 
conservation. The main reasons for this position were that by helping cornmunity 
members to identify, understand and address their most urgent problems, the 
project would be able to build trust with the villagers. This trust was to constitute 
the basis of their long-term collaboration with the project and would hopefully 
eventually lead to conservation. As Lalley (1999: 27) explained three years later: 
'We have not lost sight of what the project is about. We believe any attempt to 
look after the environment or any attempt at conservation must be done in a real 
partnership with the community. This means a lot of time must be spent with 
local people. We must get to know them, share with them and always remember 
they have a lot of knowledge about the environment which community workers 
The Bismarck-Ramu community entry approach 263 
in their haste, do not take time to cultivate. Thus, how we enter the community, 
how we present and how we build the relationship with the community is 
essential if there is to be any conservation. Rather than entering the community 
preaching about the virtues of conservation we feel it is important to enter the 
community trying to establish a real dialogue... This cannot be achieved by us 
setting the tone, terms or defining the content of that dialogue. We must begin 
by hearing from the community. Hearing what? What they think about the 
environment? Nol If we steer the discussion towards conservation, they would 
quickly skew any discussion towards protection of the environment. We have 
chosen to begin from where people are - not in terms of conservation or the 
environment, but in terms of their lives, their problems, their struggles and their 
dreams. From there we can eventually get to conservation.' 
At the same time, this approach gave the project the chance to get to know local 
communities and to find out which held a 'real' interest in issues of resource 
management. Later, the logical inconsistency between participation and 
conservation noted above would be 'solved' by adopting the unlikely assumption 
that traditional communities are mtxinsically conservationist in nature. 
Over time, in what can be deemed an 'invention of tradition' (Hobsbawm and 
Ranger 1983), the Bismarck-Ramu project thus developed an artificial construct of 
the 'traditional community', revolving around the assumption that in the past 
indigenous groups were characterised by high levels of cohesion, self-reliance, and a 
conservationist ethic. These pre-colonial communities were unaffected by negative 
market influences, and therefore thought to be devoid of 'cargo thinking', instead 
relying on their own ability to make change, solve conflicts and manage nature. It 
now became the task of the CD workers to lead communities back to this original 
conservationist state by emphasising the need to fend for themselves and by 
imbuing them with respect for the traditional features of their communities (Lalley 
1999). The romantic view of traditional communities may have legitimised the 
specific shape of project interventions in the Bismarck-Ramu area, but bears no 
relation to the realities of local resource-use. It merely strategically deploys one of a 
number of age-old stereotypes of non-western people. 
BETWEEN STRATEGIC A N D ROMANTIC ESSENTIALISMS 
Next to a firm belief in local communities, there are other reasons why it may be 
attractive to depict local communities as essentially conservation-mclined. Brosius 
(1999) argues that we need to make a distinction between 'romantic' and 'strategic 
essentialisms'. Whereas the first is based on a deep-seated belief that indigenous 
people are indeed more likely to look after their environment than western people, 
the latter serves as a stratagem in political struggles. A growing group of indigenous 
people are actually making use of strategic presentations in the media, projecting 
upon themselves the image of the 'nature conserving native' in order to gain control 
over resources (See for example, Conklin and Graham 1995). 
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In the case of the Bismarck-Ramu project, the CD trainer may have used the 
narrative of the nature conserving community not only because he strongly felt that 
such was the case, but also because it serves as a 'motivational device' (PC Hershey 
March 2000). It gave the CD workers a sense of pride in the community and a sense 
of purpose in their interactions with local people which would positively influence 
their work, emphasise the fact that they and local people could 'do it' themselves, 
and thus feed into the self reliance that constituted the basis for the Bismarck-Ramu 
community approach. Later, the CD trainer would soften his position, as quite a 
number of project documents, argued that the form of conservation that the 
Biodiversity Program was looking for did not exist in the Bismarck-Ramu area 
(VanHelden 1998a & 1998b), or even in all of PNG for that matter (Orsak 1997c). By 
then, however, he had a highly motivated and self-confident group of CD workers 
who could deal with a raft of issues and would not be disappointed if the 
'traditional' community turned out not to be as harmonious as initially suggested. 
Filer (2000: 26), argues that conservationists may also feel inclined to uphold the 
'myth of primitive environmental wisdom', if they believe that this will 'maximise 
the flow of foreign funds which keeps them in employment'. This latter concern may 
play a role among many conservation projects but does not appear to have played a 
role in the considerations of the CD trainer. With his skills he could have become a 
high-flying and very well-paid consultant any where in the Pacific. Instead, he opted 
for the relative autonomy of the Bismarck-Ramu project in which he would be free 
to trial an innovative approach. This brings us to a comment by Brosius (1999: 281) 
to the fact that anthropologists should be careful with decomtxucting the narratives 
of local people as such deconstruction may be used by 
'those who would deny any sense of enchantment with nature whatsoever, 
putting in its place "commonsense" solutions promoting passionless, 
technoscientifically based management initiatives ... that reduce every form of 
engagement with nature to an extension of capital.' 
This form of self-censorship is argued against by Guha (in Brosius 1999: 293) who 
suggests that such fears stem from an 'exaggerated respect for activists' and 'should 
not inhibit the pursuit of the truth'. Filer (2000) notes that the Malaysian situation 
from which Brosius comments is fundamentally different to that in PNG, where due 
to the system of land tenure and the lack of a dominant group within society, there 
is a much smaller chance that anything that social scientists write will endanger the 
rights or strategies of local resource owners. 
T H E DISCIPLINING O F A N OPEN-ENDED PROCESS 
Mainstream conservation projects tend to restrict 'conservation' to the establishment 
of protected area with a raft of specifications related to size, location, shape and 
permitted activities within and outside that area. When such projects pursue a 
participatory strategy, they do so within the technical limitations defined by the 
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conservation experts. Thus the Lak people were welcome to participate, as long as 
the outcome was a protected area in a predetermined location. The choice of the 
Bismarck-Ramu project team for a wide area of interest and an open-ended 
approach over the furthering of an explicit and localised conservation agenda, 
however, did not mean that the participatory process in which the CD workers 
engaged was totally open-ended and free from strategic disciplining. In practice 
there is a gap between the ideology of participation which suggest that any outcome 
is possible, and the reality of participatory practice as it developed. 
The Bismarck-Ramu approach was no doubt more open than other conservation 
projects such as that at Lak. To start with it did not define the nature of 'the 
problem' for local people, but rather asked local people to define the issues of 
importance. It did not have a prefab solution called 'conservation' either. In fact, it 
would prove open to any suggestion that could have potential conservation spin-
offs. In the field of conservation thus not only protected areas were debatable, but 
over time also decisions with regard to modifying behaviour, restrictions on hunting 
or simply refraining from logging would all become possible outcomes of the 
participatory process in which it was engaging local communities. No t^ th s t and ing 
this relative openness, and its emphasis on total participation, the process by which 
the CD workers engaged with local communities was not free from strategic and 
political elements. As Pottier (1997: 220) notes: 'Even the most informal and 'open' 
workshops remain to some extent formal and political in character'. The Bismarck-
Ramu team too predetermined the limits wiliiin which local participation was 
acceptable. Power seeps through in a number of ways. Some stxuchiring elements 
are mtrinsic to the very process of participation, or refer to the way in which 
concepts are defined, others are the result of the exphcitly strategic choices made by 
the project team. 
In the first place it is seldom recognised that the implicit assumption of the notion of 
'participation' is that there is a difference in power. There are those that 'take' the 
initiative and there are those that are 'permitted' to participate. As such the very 
notion of participation introduces and maintains the inequality that tend to 
characterise planned interventions. If there were a level playing field between 
intervening agency and the subjects of intervention 'participation' would turn into 
'negotiation'. Negotiations are also subject to differences in power, but the word 
'negotiation' does not immediately betray who takes the upper hand. In the notion 
of participation there is always the supposedly more influential side which 'allows' 
or 'enables' the other stakeholders to participate (PC Inger Stocking Korzen January 
2001). In this sense the very notion of 'participation' perpetuates the inequahty 
between project team and local people. 
In the second place there is the manner in which key concepts are defined. As the 
CD workers of the Bismarck-Ramu project were to engage in what was defined as an 
open-ended process of problem definition, they were not to 'preach' on conservation 
issues. This did not withhold them from emphasising the issue of self-reliance, to 
local communities and that people had to make change for themselves. There is, 
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however, a duemrna with regard to the emphasis on self-reliance as it could 
potentially generate a situation in which the project would be confronted with a 
very much self-reliant community, actively aiming to enlist a logging or mining 
company. It was clear that such was not possible given the objectives of the project 
and its donors, and that the form of 'self-reliance' promoted by the project was not 
without normative attachments. On the contrary, it would take a very specific form, 
allowing people to define their predicament and participate within the limits 
defined by the project. 
As I have already argued earlier in this chapter, the Bismarck-Ramu project saw self-
reliance as opposed to an undue dependence on outside forces. Filer (1997: 75) for 
example, argues that resource dependency is characterised by a situation in which 
resource owners 'receive a substantial wmdfall without having to lift a finger', while 
self-reliance implies that local communities themselves make use of their natural 
resources in order to improve their lives. Tacconi (1998) concludes that this entails a 
narrow view of self-reUance as in this view 'a person who receives a royalty 
payment or a rental income is not self-reliant. In this interpretation to be self-reliant 
you need to swea t ' In contrast to Filer's definition of self-reliance, Simpson (1997 in 
Tacconi 1998) argues that landowners in PNG regard the establishment of 
landowner companies 'as a mechanism for establishing control over local social and 
economic issues and promoting a truly self-reliant community'. Whether such a 
landowner group negotiates with a potential mining company or decides to enter 
business itself is largely irrelevant, as the decision, control and agency lie with the 
people themselves. The notion of self-reliance as employed by the Bismarck-Ramu 
team excludes the possibility that people successfully enlist outside agencies. 
The project team, however, had a simple solution to the possibility that a 
participatory process of problem definition would reveal an interest in logging 
among its clients. It simply argued that those communities expounding an interest 
in logging or other forms of company intervention were suffering from 'cargo-
Ihiriking'. Such communities, after repeated discussions with the CD workers were 
viewed as incorrigible and left to their own devices. In the words of the CD trainen 
'they didn ' t get it'. These groups were not prepared to accept self-reliance such as it 
was defined by the project and were therefore considered too far gone. As such the 
combined notions of 'self-reliance', 'cargo-tiiinking' and the view of 'traditional' 
communities as essentially imbued with a conservationist ethic, provided a 
rationalisation by which the various communities in the Jimi and Ramu Valleys 
could be labelled (Woods 1985) and - if deemed necessary - excluded from further 
project work. Thus when in Sogeram, the leader of one of the local clans told the 
team that 
'You are trying to protect our land and we are still living like our ancestors when 
they lived in bush material houses The team figured out that [this person] has 
'cargo' attitudes. He is selling his forest to loggers for money (BRG 1999f: 2). 
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In some cases, the condemnation of whole villages as 'cargo-thinkers' led to a feeling 
of unease, which shines through in the patrol reports. With regard to Pimbum, 
presented earlier in this chapter as an archetypal case of cargo-thinking, it was for 
example noted that: 
'It is not fair to simply accuse the people in Pimbum of cargo thinking. They 
have done an awful lot of work on the airstrip. It seems we failed to explain the 
purpose of the ICAD project clear enough as we ourselves were still working out 
how to do it as we went along and may have made what now seem mistakes 
during the start-up phase' (BRG 1996a: 44). 
A similar comment can be made for the Jimi people in general, and especially those 
at Foroko-Brimde who have always actively tried to take control of their lives, partly 
by aiming to enrol the colonial administration, the churches, government and law 
enforcement institutions into their private and collective projects. This approach, 
however, did not mesh with the notion of 'self-reliance' employed by the project. 
Ironically, this s tudy argues that while the Bismarck-Ramu project denied local 
people the ability to deal successfully with outside forces, it would itself become 
enlisted in the territorial concerns of the Ramu people. 
USING PARTICIPATORY RURAL APPRAISAL TO 'SNEAK CONSERVATION IN' 
As with other participatory practices, the application of PRA techniques may not be 
more than product of the desire by donor-initiated development projects to rapidly 
access social-cultural information to satisfy the requirements of a project document. 
In such forms PRA becomes truncated to 'a way to get people to do what we want ' 
rather than a means to design the project to meet the needs of local people (Goebel 
1988). In recent years, however, attention in the application of participatory methods 
has shifted more and more towards the need to understand the perception, 
knowledge, circumstances and values of the target population in order to increase 
their participation in project definition and execution (Mosse 1994). This a partly a 
response to the extractive nature of earlier research, but also a reflection of the 
realisation that rural people themselves are knowledgeable with regard to the issues 
that affect their lives, and that designing techniques which facilitate communal data 
collection the local perception of development problems can come to play a role in 
the design and implementation of projects (Chambers 1997; Pottier 1997). 
The recent interest in PRA has had an especially profound impact on the manner 
and attitudes with which researchers and community workers have entered rural 
communities. Where in the past the usually foreign experts aimed to find the 'truth' 
about the local situation, the new focus on local people changed his role from that of 
an 'investigator' to that of a 'facilitator'. This has resulted in an emphasis on 
attitudes over methods. The attitudes which are deemed necessary for 'good' PRA 
usually revolve around building trust, buuding u p a mutual rapport and confidence, 
on showing respect, on taking time and on Ustening rather than on preaching, 
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criticising and 'raising awareness' (Chambers 1997). Many of these attitudes are 
visible in the Bismarck-Ramu community entry approach. 
Today there is an increasing realisation that researchers and community workers are 
part of the local scene and that 'value-free' or 'neutral' PRA does not exist as values 
are always implicit in the facilitation process. The simple fact that PRA practitioners 
aim to include all members of the community rather than the dominant group of 
decision-makers reveals values related to ideas of western democracy, popular 
representation, gender issues and social equality. In addition, strategic 
considerations revolving around the role of the facilitator, the selection of tools, the 
structure of the meetings, the time accorded to different elements and the group's 
dynamics and divisions, play a role in framing the process. As a result, PRA is 
increasingly recognised as a fundamentally political process whereby facilitators 
with a set of value-based preconceptions, and explicit or implicit strategic 
considerations, enter into discussions with local people about what reality looks like, 
what it ought to look like and how to bridge the gap (Pottier 1997). PRA may thus be 
more about negotiating a common understanding, a 'middle ground' from which 'to 
work together' than about discovering an objective rural reality. 
It is the realisation that PRA should not be seen as an value-free exercise, but can be 
used strategically in order to interest communities for specific issues that came to 
play a key role in the Bismarck-Ramu project. The Madang project team realised that 
people were pursuing their own agenda and that the Jimi people were actively 
enrolling the project into their private and collective endeavours. By stating up-front 
that the project wanted conservation, it would be very difficult to separate those 
communities 'genuinely' interested in resource management issues from those just 
making such statements in order to secure the funds, jobs and status associated with 
the project. 
Given that the whole intervention could be defined as a clash of agenda's and 
priorities in which various factions of local people would not hesitate to act 
strategically in order to further their own interests, the project team had no qualms 
about using PRA as a means to insert resource management issues into its 
community entry approach. The team did not simply want to get people to 'do' 
conservation as it realised that such would never be sustainable in the longer term, 
but wanted to use PRA tools as a means to select the 'good' pro-conservation guys 
from the 'bad' guys who only professed a strategic interest in conservation for 
material considerations. Where people were truly interested in conservation, 
communities would not be deterred by the fact that the project did not bring 
development, but would be prepared to tackle conservation and development issues 
through a process of self-mobilisation. 
Next to the choice for a narrow interpretation of the self-reliance concept, the project 
thus decided to strategically structure its encounters with local people. The CRI 
director for example, suggested that there were a number of PRA tools which could 
be used to 'sneak' conservation issues into the interactions with local villagers. Being 
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C O N C L U S I O N 
This chapter has outlined the fundamental shift in strategy that took place between 
the Lak and the Bismarck-Ramu projects. While chapter 2 has discussed the way in 
which the Biodiversity Program dealt with the Lak events, ttansfoirriing the failure 
to establish a conservation area into a success due to the important lessons learnt, 
this chapter outlines the way in which this generated room for a new participatory 
strategy of community development. This strategy was based on the idea that the 
project should avoid any talk of economics as such would shift the debate away 
from the issues that mattered to the community towards the issues that people think 
matter to the project. Mining companies, but also the Lak project and other 
interventions in rural PNG that from the start define their interventions as a source 
of income see themselves confronted with highly strategic behaviour on the part of 
local communities, a range of conflicts, and there where big money is involved with 
many years of litigation. In addition these processes of intervention tend to affect 
local people as these stop generating change for themselves instead expecting 
outsiders to solve their problems for them. This so-called 'cargo thiriking' was 
thought to have played a significant role in the Lak failure. By doing away with the 
responsible for the environmental education component of the project, he noted that 
one of the main issues in rural PNG is illiteracy. Many people would like to learn 
how to read. Through the selection of literacy ixaining materials the environmental 
message that the project was trying to drive home could be reinforced, while 
simultaneously serving the needs of local people. In actual fact many churches use 
evangelical materials to teach their congregations how to read and write. Why not 
do the same with conservation issues? In similar vein the first trust buUding patrols 
could be conducted using PRA tools which not only focused on self-reliance, but 
also on changes in the environment and the role of people in those changes. If one 
were to conduct the problem analysis after these exercises, communities 'touched' 
by resource issues would probably express these as part of the problem analysis, 
giving the project a legitimate point of entry to discuss conservation issues. It is here 
that a careful selection of PRA tools could play a role. 
A PRA training conducted during July 1996 provided two useful tools to bring u p 
conservation issues in a strategic manner. The first consisted of a resource mapping 
exercise in which communities were to draw their communities and its resources in 
the past as well as in the present. The difference between these two maps and the 
patterns of environmental change that become obvious would lead to animated 
discussions over how those changes have taken place, who is to blame and possibly 
about what can be done to stem them. In addition, it was decided to ask 
communities to conduct two timeline exercises. The first to look at the increase of 
the number of people, the second at the changing rewards from hunting. Thus, 
equipped with an introductory speech, a series of metaphors and a toolkit of 
strategically selected exercises the CD workers entered the Bismarck-Ramu area. 
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economic component the conservation program it essentially exploded the ICAD 
concept. 
The Bismarck-Ramu community entry strategy instead did not aim to push 
conservation, but rather through a gradual process of trust building, local problem 
analysis and an emphasis on self-reliance tried to find out which communities in the 
area of interest could have a potential interest in resource management issues, and 
would therefore be suitable partners for further project work. According to its 
philosophy, local people have been disempowered as a result of their incorporation 
into the global economy, a process to which development interventions can actually 
contribute by displaying excessive amounts of wealth, or by framing their project 
objectives in purely economic terms. The realisation that projects can play a role in 
the development of a cargo mentality necessitated the development of an elaborate 
set of behavioural rules in order to avoid such effects in the Bismarck-Ramu area. 
Not only did the project want to help people 'stand on their own feet', it also 
assumed that by emphasising self-reliance, a respect for traditions and local culture 
it would re-establish the conservation ethic that these communities were thought to 
possess in the past. In contrast to the increasing frustrations with local people in Lak 
and during the opening patrols among the Jimi people, which over time came to 
perceive local people in increasingly negative stereotypes, this philosophy was 
based on the combined images of the 'good native' and the 'fallen angel', blaming 
the outside world for diverting local people from the essentially harmonious lives 
that they were thought to lead in the past. Only those communities which took to 
the idea that they could make change for themselves could be expected to look after 
their environment. 
While the whole process was framed in terms of participation, and the supposedly 
open-ended nature of CD interventions which was to give local people the room to 
define their own problems, priorities and solutions, the project team also steered 
communities in a specific direction through its speeches, metaphors and through the 
strategic use of PRA tools. Used in this manner participatory methodologies, 
mcluding the use of PRA tools, are not so much about discovering some pre-existing 
reality in which people live, their lives, but essentially tools in a drawn out process 
of negotiations as to the conditions under which project team and people may co-
operate. The next chapter will outline the various responses to this new approach 
and the way in which people rejected adapted and co-opted the project intervention 
to meet their particular needs. 
Chapter 7 
COMMUNITY-BASED CONSERVATION AND TERRITORIALITY 
ON THE RAMU RIVER 
'That night Alphonse's patrol boots were stolen' (BRG 1997e: 12). 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
In July 1996, the first two CD teams left Madang. The first team flew u p to Kol in the 
Jimi Valley the second landed at Foroko-Brimde in the Ramu Valley. Between July 
1996 and end of 1999 a total of some 21 patrols, each consisting of between two and 
four CD workers were held. In addition the conservation area manager conducted a 
number of separate conservation visits. This chapter will outline the manner in 
which various groups of local people responded to the new project philosophy. 
While many of the more specific occurrences described below took place more or 
less simultaneously I have separated them by geographic area and ethnic group to 
keep the narrative manageable. The chapter therefore starts with describing CD 
work in the Jimi valley, and then looks at these interventions among the mixed 
communities in the area beneath the foothills of the Bismarck-Range. It continues 
with a description of the establishment of two so-called Wildlife Management Areas 
on the Ramu River and the role of Ramu territorial concerns therein. The chapter 
will end with one of the greatest successes of the Bismarck-Ramu project, when it 
assisted a number of clans at Sogeram to resist a logging company. 
The main argument of this chapter is that while relations the Jimi and mixed Jimi-
Ramu communities broke down, the project managed to establish a working 
relationship with the Ramu communities, moving towards the establishment of two 
large protected areas. The reasons why people and project co-operated, however, 
and the reasons that underlie this middle ground were very different Where the 
project team saw their establishment as proof for the success of its community-based 
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conservation startegy, local people enlisted the project in their corrflict with the 
mcorning Jimi settlers. The community entry approach with its many communal 
meetings gave Ramu landowners a forum to assret their authority over land and 
resource, while the actual establishment of two protected areas amounted to a more 
secure and more formal recognition of their status as landowners. 
T H E FIRST COMMUNITY ENTRY PATROLS 
As the CD teams entered a village, often exhausted after a long day walking, they 
would usually be welcomed, given a house to stay and would ask to be allowed to 
see the local leaders. As there are many different leaders even in the smallest 
villagers, the group of encountered would invariably be large. During this 
preliminary meeting the CD teams told the group who they were, asked permission 
to stay for a few days and called for a joint meeting. During this meeting, they gave 
the introductory speech, which was later repeated to the community at large. To 
give an impression of the content of their speech this is the CD team's introductory 
address to the people at Warabruk on the Ramu River: 
'We are from the DEC, which is a branch of our central government here in 
PNG; and we are based in Madang. We are not a bank, not a church; we are not 
politicians, nor are we a logging company. Not at all! We are mere workmen, 
and we work for the bush/forest, the land and the rivers or waters. We have 
come to visit and stay with you as friends, to live with you for a few days, to 
work with you in your gardens or wherever if needs be. We came to listen to 
some of your stories and we also have some stories to tell you, should you care 
to listen to those... Our work is primarily educational; but even then everything 
is in your hands. We can share with you whatever little knowledge we have, just 
as what friends normally do; but all the choices are yours' (BRG 1996b: 28-29). 
Note the difference in approach to the first patrol speeches held in the Bismarck-
Ramu area. There is no mention of conservation as something people must do. There 
is no talk of being careful with logging companies, no talk about small, big, fast and 
slow development and no notion of an exchange of conservation for development. 
The CD workers tried to avoid framing the discussion in terms of conservation as 
they did not want to put the objectives of the Biodiversity Program in the 
foreground but wanted local communities to voice their concerns. For this to 
succeed at least a certain level of trust would be needed. The CD workers also said 
that if people were not pleased with their presence or presentation they would 
leave, as there were plenty of other communities in the area which the CD teams 
could work with. 
The vagueness of the speech threw up many questions, not in the least because 
people would question the connection between the new CD workers and the earlier 
patrols and survey. Usually people allowed the CDs to stay, if only because of the 
entertainment value that a new group of guests could provide in generally boring 
village life. During the following days, the CD workers would spend time in the 
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village, work in the gardens and talk to people about the issues that people wanted 
to talk abou t Later during their stay or after having spent several days in another 
neighbouring village they would come back to do their self-reliance exercises. In 
Bubkile, the CD workers recorded their self-reliance talk in the following manner: 
•"The CD team's presentation started off by informing the people that our 
ancestors inhabited this land 50 000 years ago. They lived a nomadic life then; 
gathering food and other needs for their livelihood from the forest, rivers, and 
the whole environment. This understandably meant that the forest and all 
natural resources therein were very valuable to our ancestors. A noteworthy fact 
is that our ancestors were highly self-reliant; doing things on their own, without 
any outside help. 
As time went on many changes or developments took place; the greatest one of 
all came about ten thousand years ago, namely the first ever garden in the world 
at Kuk in the Wahgi Valley...5 6 Our ancestors lived long before Jesus was born. 
Jesus was born only about 2000 years ago, but our ancestors lived 48 000 years 
before that. The mere fact that our ancestors inhabited this land and managed to 
survive throughout the centuries, clearly shows that they were developed just as 
they were. Our ancestors did not need foreigners or outsiders to bring 
development to them, because development was already occurring and they 
were bringing that about themselves. 
It is the year 1996 now... Many changes and so-called developments are 
destroying us, though we fail to realise so. We should now be very careful in 
accepting changes or developments. Let us see to it that whatever development 
that comes to us must be beneficial not only to us and future generations, but 
also friendly to our valuable environment. Let us look into the future; what 
would it be like if we start using up every resource for today's glory and forget 
about our children? Let us think of our children who would grow up; ... Let us 
hope and make sure that they will still have their roots and not depend on or 
even expect outside help (BRG 1996c: 16-18). 
The CD team then displayed the posters of the mango tree to emphasise their point. 
"The mango tree is our land, our resources and our cultures. When a fruit is 
picked, the tree would never die. When a branch is chopped, the tree will still be 
there. But if the whole tree is chopped down from its stump, it would die. Our 
roots (cultures, traditions, and valuable resources) would die or be depleted if 
we do not value them anymore. If we destroy our land, we would never find 
another land to replace it. Let us live on and be careful how we live our lives and 
make our decisions; decisions that will affect not only us but also generations yet 
5 6 Evidence found of drainage trenches and taro gardens at Kuk in the Waghi Valley suggest that 
Papua New Guinean may have been the first gardeners on earth (Golson 1981). This fact would 
always provoke much excitement and pride during the CD presentations. At a presentation in Kumdi 
in Western Highlands Province one of the women present wanted 'to know the name of the first 
woman that first planted the taro seed in the gardens at Kuk The CD worker had to tell her that he 
did not know because she was not his predecessor but that 'the people of Western Highlands in Kuk 
should know because she was their ancestor' (BRG1999f: 15). 
274 Through the Thicket 
to come. Let us clean around the tree and look after it so that it will bear more 
fruit for us... (BRG 1996c: 16-18) 
The speech thus emphasised the ability of local people to take care of their lives 
while simultaneously warning them to be critical of the changes taking place around 
them. Only they, being the landowners of the area, could decide what they wanted 
to do with their lives and w h o m they wanted to work with. Often people would 
respond emotionally to these presentations. It was a radical turn around from the 
thinking of local people which often emphasised that they were 'rabbis lain' (rubbish 
people) who in the envious economy of rural PNG felt they were failing to keep up 
with their neighbours, the rest of the country and the world. 
Following a 1999 role play in Sepu, which once more emphasised the importance of 
people's roots, some would agree that they should maintain their customs and 
traditions and be careful to give away their land to local companies. Others, 
however, argued that going back to one's traditions was not easy. As a Banam 
settler explained 
'A lot of us have gone to school and our children are educated beliefs of today 
are from outside and are neglecting our customs and cultures. The educated 
children of now a days say that our customs are not good'.... The religious 
people ... are all confused. The role play that we watched has reminded us of our 
ancestors customs and cultures, it has put something very special in to our hearts 
and we do not have anything more to say' (BRG 1999c: 10-11). 
THE RESOURCE MAPPING EXERCISE 
Following the initial CD patrols in the autumn of 1996, later patrols would revisit 
the villages at intervals of about two months, gradually advancing the step-by-step 
community program. Most villages were happy to see the CD teams come. 
Following the initial presentations on self-reliance, the teams would move on to the 
resource map as part of the strategy to make environmental degradation and 
resource management an issue of debate. People especially followed the mapping 
exercise with much interest. At Dungo near Bubulsunga, the patrol report recounts 
how the PNG conservation manager explained that those present had to help the 
team by drawing a picture of the village and lands as it used to be before, and 
another one about what it was like in the present. The report notes that 
The elders were very much into this exercise, having the resource map of the 
past drawn on the ground with bush knives and placing objects within the map 
to mark the resources they had; whereas the youngsters merely watched.... 
[Afterwards] a discussion on their land and resources developed amongst the 
people and we allowed them to get through with it, before proceeding with the 
next map (BRG 1996b: 24). 
After people had finished with their discussions, the conservation manager had 
them construct the resource map of the present. This second resource map did not 
take long to construct because people simply removed a considerable amount of 
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objects representing resources from the first resource map in order to depict the 
changes that had come upon them. Then the deliberations started all over again, 
with especially the young men expressing their surprise at the changes that the old 
men had sketched. Part of their discussion went along these lines: 
'Almost all our natural resources on this side of the Jimi have already 
disappeared, and many new tilings and changes have happened on our land. 
The fact is, we are never satisfied, always seeking for and moving over to 'green 
pastures' (new areas) in search of resources. And now, after having contributed 
greatly toward the depletion of resources on this side of the Jimi, we have 
jumped over to the other side of the river, in search for those resources. ... We 
are busy doing our bit from up here downward toward the Ramu plain; and the 
Ramus are also doing their bit from down there, upward toward us. It is like, the 
resources and the whole environment (the forest) is caught up between two 
enemies' (BRG 1996b: 24). 
The ixendline exercises confirmed the view that the Jimi environment was changing, 
with especially game diminished. The elderly men told to the younger generations 
present that in their days the bush was much larger, gardens were located closer to 
the houses and wildlife was much easier to shoot. Now there were people and 
gardens everywhere and erosion had become a problem. The bush had disappeared 
and wildlife could only be found on the northern side of the Jimi River in the 
Bismarck Fall as 'all the cassowaries have run away'. 
THE INFLUENCE OF THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT WORKERS 
New in the speech, when compared with the preparatory briefings at CRI, was the 
fact that not only self-reliance was emphasised but that the CD team's would 
actively blame 'the white man' for the loss of self respect. 
'When the white people came to our land about 250 years ago, they 'blind 
folded' (mdoctrinated) our people. Our people were made to believe that our 
culture and resources are not good, as compared to the white peoples'. Our 
people never realised the negative effects of the changes that the white people 
(foreigners) were bringing about. During a very short period of time (the last 250 
years), as compared to the very long time (since 50,000 years ago), the 
foreigners/white peoples' influence has completely changed and even ruined 
our ancestors' and our lives. Our people thought that the white people 
(foreigners) have all the answers to all the problems of life, and so we started to 
wait for outsiders to give us more. This developed what we now call the 'cargo 
mentality'. Then the time came for PNG to attain political independence; this 
was in 1975. This political independence meant that we were going to stand on 
our own; to develop our country ourselves. But where is this independence 
today? We were self reliant in the past (our ancestors were) but today, 
dependency is everywhere. White people's money has poisoned our true self-
reliance. White people's goods have made us so weak and unproductive, we can 
not produce our own goods' (BRG 1996c: 16-18). 
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During this presentation the CD workers were able to tie their self-reliance talk in 
with contemporary political issues such as the civil war on the island of 
Bougainville. 
'People [on Bougainville Island] were forced (or fooled) into signing for the 
exploitation of the copper resource on the island and now there is a big incurable 
'sore' left. The changes that came about were clearly forced on the local people 
by greedy foreigners. Foreigners' development had come onto our land so fast, 
we the indigenous people are fast becoming slaves on our own land. We have 
been greatly disempowered mainly by foreigners' tactical mdoctrinatlon, so 
much so that we have a very low and negative self image of ourselves and 
everything that is PNG or Melanesian - everything that is foreign seems better 
than all that is local. We are losing a lot of our wealth, which we get from our 
land' (BRG 1996c: 16-18). 
There is something contradictory in blaming foreigners for the loss of self-reHance, 
when both the CD teams and the villagers know that the project of which they are 
part is set-up and funded by the international organisations and led by a number of 
'whiteskins'. This inconsistency, however, bothered neither CD workers nor local 
people. On the contrary, especially this aspect appealed to people as it provided 
them with a clear explanation for their development predicament. At the village of 
Pimbum a Jimi village leader replied to the self-reliance speech and timeline: 
'I can't find words good enough to express our gratitude for your presentations 
which have indeed opened our eyes to see things more clearly than before. Like 
my fathers, I have always been taking the whiteskins as my saviors; their 
propaganda as THE word; and the things they bring in as all-good and beneficial 
for us. This session has opened my eyes real wide, for me to see and feel the pain 
and injury caused us by many whiteskins. The whiteskins and their counterparts 
have sucked up almost all the blood in us like mosquitoes and leeches do, so that 
now you and I are but skeletons; more dead than alive' (CRC 1996a: 33). 
A second alteration introduced by the CD workers consisted of the presentation of a 
picture of a starving Somalian. Although the environmental awareness documents 
produced by the CRI director were not to be taken into the field, and an exception 
was made for a picture taken from one of his papers. The picture, among the CD 
workers known as the 'bun nating man' ('the just bones man') or the 'skinny man' 
shows a starving Somalian man on all fours with the caption reading: 
"This man is from the Sahel area of Africa. He has not eaten enough food for 
many months. Now he is nearly dead. What is happening today in Africa may 
happen in PNG if the population of PNG continues to grow and grow. PNG will 
never develop if it has too many people to take care of (Orsak 1997a: 1). 
This picture would be shown to people in the field as part of the CD presentations to 
local villagers. It came to serve as a powerful admonishment to think about the 
nature of development and conservation. Although I personally felt uneasy with the 
comparison between PNG with its small population and abundant resources and 
drought, war and hunger ravaged Somalia, the CD workers felt that the picture was 
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a powerful tool in capturing people's attention. The second patrol report, for 
example, notes how in Bubulsunga the picture 
'truly frightened and troubled the people; for they saw that if they were not 
careful, they too (and generations to come) will end up becoming like that man. 
They requested that DEC/CD team continue coming into their place and 
enlighten them more by way of education and training in order for them to see 
'things' and life more clearly' (BRG 1996b: 20). 
THE POSITION OF WOMEN 
A final personal twist to the speeches entailed the position of women wilxiin the 
teams. During training and recruitment the CD trainer always emphasised the 
equality of men and women, and gave them equal resporisibilities. The project made 
consistent efforts to recruit new women as the turnover of women proved larger 
than that of men. Some of the husbands of these CD workers preferred them to stop 
work while others fell pregnant. As the team gained experience, it turned out that 
female CD workers were more trustworthy in looking after the patrol budgets. They 
were less likely to purchase luxury foods such as meat, and were better able to 
withstand demands for money. Thus after women took over the day-to-day patrol 
finances, expenditures in the field fell by some 30 percent. 
A number of CD workers would make 'women's issues' a central part of their 
presentations to local villagers: 
'It was emphasised that women were the ones who discovered the 'art' of 
making gardens; they were the first ones to make gardens. Almost everywhere 
in PNG today, men look down on women, unlike what things were like during 
those ancient times. Womenfolk in PNG had created history; they have always 
played significant roles in human society' (BRG 1996c: 16-18). 
Often female CD workers held these, in order to provide a role model to local 
women. As the patrol reporter to the second Ramu patrol writes lyrically: 
'Grace introduced the team members and explained who we were and what we 
were here for. She then moved on with her presentation of the history timeline; 
and she did a real good job out of it - we can safely make such an assessment 
from observing the people's body language. The people, both men and women 
were speechless and wide eyed throughout the whole presentation. The mere 
fact that Grace (a woman) could stand up there confidently and address a crowd 
of no less than eighty people, the majority of whom are men, is itself 
empowering to the womenfolk as well as enlightening to the men.' (BRG 1996b: 
29). 
The presence of women in the CD teams did not go unnoticed and was often much 
appreciated by local women, who during the timeline and in the further 
presentations were exphcitly commended for their contributions to community and 
family life. The men too could not fail to note the clash between the role that women 
generally take in the Bismarck-Ramu area and the behaviour of the female team 
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members. In some instances, the role of the female CD workers took unexpected 
forms. A female CD worker explained how on the first time she visited Foroko-
Brimde: 
'I joined in a game of soccer. First I watched the men playing, to see how it was 
done. Then I joined in. Just playing was bad enough - but then I scored a goal! 
All the old men who had been watching me, very surprised, sang out to 
everyone else 'Meri scorem bol! Meri scorem bol!' (The woman kicked a goal! 
The woman kicked a goal!). And the whole village came running, like at sixty 
miles an hour, to see. I was so embarrassed. And that was the end of the game' 
(Ellis 1998:33). 
Browsing through the patrol reports one can not fail to note that the CD 
presentation offered women a chance to voice their concerns publicly where there 
previously was none. This took a number of forms. In the first place, and not 
surprisingly, as women are usually the first to suffer from environmental 
degradation, women would be more reluctant to engage a company than their 
menfolk. During a 1998 session in the Upper Jimi Valley, a patrol report collected 
the following comments from the various groups attending its presentations: 
'Young men were first to speak out and their concern was how they get money 
to cater for their family needs and wants. Thus, their intention was to allow 
companies of some sort to get their resources to get money. The women strongly 
voiced their concern about their future generations... they said that companies 
come destroy and go, but what about our future generation?... The elder men 
fully supported the women. One of them made it clear that they don't need 
money for every day life. He questioned why they should need more money. He 
ended his talks with T will live a simple life and I don't want to make money as 
one of my problem' (BRG 1998c: 3-4). 
In Sogeram in the Ramu Valley, 'some of the elderly women would be very vocal 
about the future of their environment, especially about the gardening and firewood 
collecting areas' (BRG 1999f: 14). In the second place, women are more likely to 
Ihink in terms of the benefit of the whole community. Men in contrast tend to focus 
on how they may personally benefit. In Sepu, n o l ^ t i i s t o d i n g the wish of many 
men to go and work on the oil surveying operations near Banam, the women 
insisted that they should go ahead and construct a classroom because that has what 
they had decided (BRG 1997e). 
At Sepu, things were made easier as there was one very outspoken female 
landowner, who at times would pull the men into line. On one instance, when the 
men were complaining that the CD workers were 'not bringing any development' 
she jumped u p to argue that the project was providing them with good ideas and 
that they should be ashamed of themselves. Finally, and more generally, the 
attention paid to women by the CD teams gave local women a forum to argue the 
importance of their place within their communities. Thus in Ganz in the Bismarck 
Fall, women stated in public that 'the men do not respect or listen to some of their 
knowledge and skills' (BRG 1998e: 46). 
Conservation on the Ramu River 279 
Although these effects could not bring about a fundamental change in the position 
of women, the attention paid to gender issues and the position of women with the 
CD teams did not go unnoticed among local people. 5 7 
THE CHURCH LIAISON AND EDUCATION STRATEGIES 
Next to its CD work, the Bismarck-Ramu project was looking at ways to insert 
conservation messages into the area of interest. At an early stage, it was clear that 
witliin the heterogeneous and disjointed social structure of the Bismarck-Ramu area, 
only the churches formed a rallying point between communities. In 1996, the project 
recruited a church liaison officer who was to develop joint activities with the 
churches in the area. His task was to collate materials emphasising the link between 
Christian beliefs and notions of self-reliance, community Uving and environmental 
stewardship. In building these links and in developing materials the project aimed 
to enlist the churches in driving home some of the key messages of the Bismarck-
Ramu project. In contrast to the CD workers, the church liaison officer did preach, 
thus hoping to convince influential church people within the various communities 
to pick u p the BRG message of self-reliance and conservation and carry it further. 
His materials and sessions would be extremely effective in motivating people 
through a separate body called Christians for Environment and Stewardship. 
Excerpts from a session in the Kumdi area In Western Highlands Province give an 
impression of the manner in which the Bismarck-Ramu CD work and biblical 
studies were meshed into a compelling conservation argument. 
'I started the evening presentation with the Bible verse of Genesis 2: 8-9 that 
teaches God created man and put him in charge of the creation. Psalm 8: 6-8 also 
talks about God putting man in charge of his creation. I pointed out to them that 
we the landowners are now in charge of our land and everything on the land 
and within the land. I urged them to take full control of their land and 
everything on the land. As it is said in the Bible in the book of Genesis 2: 8-9, 
God created man and put him in charge of the creation, so now the landowners 
are in charge of their land and everything on their land including other human 
beings. 
Then I asked them to define the word development. Two men and a woman 
volunteered to explain in their own language the definition of development. ... 
They were surprised to know that development could mean being wealthy or 
become poor, development is a change in ones appearance or living standard. 
Then I asked them if they knew why some people in rich countries are poor and 
5 7 Visitors from the UNDP and other agencies would always ask for the number of women involved in 
the CD work. The community development trainer recalls how during 1997 he was visited by two 
UNOPS staff - both women- on a familiarisation visit who asked him about the number of female CD 
workers. When he, somewhat ashamedly admitted, that at that stage only three out of the 11 CD 
workers were female, the enthusiastic response that 'that was wonderful' took him completely aback 
(PC Lalley march 2000). A 1999 evaluation team was more realistic when it recognised that the 
Bismarck-Ramu project was making a great effort to recruit more women, but simultaneously noted 
that all but one of the management staff were men. 
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some countries although rich in natural resources and yet are very poor. ... The 
most answer they gave was because those rich individuals were so greedy. I 
asked them again why man wants to dominate the universe and not look after it 
and work with nature? One of the men answered that this is because they want 
money and more money. I read the Biblical passage from the book of Timothy 6: 
6-10 where it teaches that money is the primary root cause of evil doings. The 
original relationship between God, man and creation is in big trouble because 
man wanted to make money and more of it and eventually forgot God. I told 
them they too that in most part of the white man's countries, they have no sense 
of God, they have made money their God and in the name of money and wealth 
they have destroyed their entire environment and all the natural resource have 
gone... 
As we went along they got angrier and angrier as they realize what is happening 
to our environment in the name of money and what tricks the companies are 
using to imprison our mentality and rip us off our natural resources. ...I finally 
concluded with the poster of the skeleton man from Africa. I told them that 
P.N.G has chosen this road ad if we are not firm enough to protect our land and 
limit the use of the natural forests, we could end up like the Africans, on the 
streets on fours tipping rubbish bins in search of food. If it will not be us, it 
would be our children or grand children... 
During ... questioning time ... the village court magistrate ... stood up and 
publicly announced that he would lead a volunteer group to support the work of 
the environment in the whole of Kumdi area. His group [would] organize 
environment awareness campaigns ... and would make laws to protect their 
natural plants and would punish any young children that mess around with fire 
(BRG 1999f: 13-14). 
A second component consisted of the development of an education strategy aimed 
at local schools. PNG has very little education material on natural resource 
management and environmental issues and from the long-term perspective of the 
project, the development of such materials was of prime importance. The Director of 
the CRI took the lead in developing these materials and produced a series of papers 
on the importance to preserve the environment. These well-illustrated documents 
strongly denounced the use of lire in agriculture and the growth of the PNG 
population, while emphasising the dangers of modern development and to look 
after the environment as a precondition for development (See Orsak 1997c). The 
departure of the CRI director in early 1997, however, meant that a series of lessons 
to be introduced to teachers in the area was never developed. 
A BREAKDOWN I N RELATIONS W I T H THE J I M I VALLEY C O M M J M 1 T E S 
The first CD patrols visited areas in which the project had already been working and 
focused on the Jimi communities both in the Jimi and in the Ramu Valley The new 
approach was initially well received and the CD workers returned from their first 
patrols, in good spirits. They agreed that people's responses to their presentations 
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had been very positive and that they had 'established a strong relationship with 
local people' and had built 'a fair bit of trust' (BRG 1996a: 20). 
During the debriefing, however, a sense of unease developed with the strangely 
uniform response encountered. All three Jimi communities visited during the first 
CD patrol, saw 'conservation' as their dominant problem, while simultaneously 
expressing a vehement opposition to the possible entreaties of logging companies 
(BRG 1996a: 28). This was a remarkable switch in comparison to the earlier 
experiences when a range of issues but few of them having anything to do with 
conservation had been the topic of discussion. Thus the first patrol to Wambin 
village in the Jimi valley reported on return to Madang that whereas the CD team 
tried to broaden the discussion to all kinds of possible themes as they had been 
taught during the briefing 
'the community was instead focusing on the environment and its conservation. 
Therefore we felt obliged to discuss [these issues] with them.... We also 
discussed the advantages and disadvantages of logging....- this we did in 
answer to people's request' (BRG 1996a: 19). 
At two other villages, the responses were similarly promising and oriented towards 
'conservation' with a strong rejection of all possible company activity in the form of 
logging. At Dungo near Bubulsunga the people 
'gave us their word that no other government department, company or other 
private enterprise would be allowed into their section of the area of interest. 
They further defined their stand by declaring that only DEC can go in at any 
time ... and also emphasized that DEC keep in touch with them always. The team 
is confident that it had established strong relationship with the people' (BRG 
1996a: 20). 
While in Bubulsunga itself, the people belonging to the community facffltator's clan 
stated 
'that they would not tolerate any other organizations coming into their village 
from then on. As they put it "the door is completely closed." They said only DEC 
was allowed into their village and land from then on' (BRG 1996a: 21). 
Upon reflection, it became clear that this unanimous and 'dizzyingly positive' 
response (Ellis 1998: 27) was the result of two factors. In the first place, it became 
clear that local people were strongly influenced by the earlier interventions of the 
project, during which the project staff had talked about conservation, logging 
companies and development. Thus whereas the project had made a significant turn-
about in its philosophy and now wanted to engage in an open-ended discussion on 
the issues that 'really' interested local people, these thought they knew what the 
project stood for. Thus all three communities focused the discussion towards 
conservation. 
The smgle-mindedness and uniformity of the response of what were otherwise 
widely divided Jimi clan groups, however, was such, that it became clear that a 
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second and potentially more influential impact stemmed from the activities of the 
Jimi community facilitator. The latter, it turned out, played a key role in briefing the 
involved communities as to the type of responses that the Bismarck-Ramu project 
was looking for in its attempt to select those communities with a 'genuine' interest 
in conservation. Not only did he brief the communities as to the type of answers that 
should be provided, he also played a key role in setting u p the first patrol schedule 
for the Jimi Valley. 
THE ROLE OF THE COlvlMUNrTY FACILITATOR 
Until halfway 1996, the project team had a lot of trust in the work of the Jimi 
community facilitator. The project had recruited him as he was one of the few 
graduates from the Jimi Valley and was knowledgeable about the area and its 
people. As such the project had a tendency to see him as a representative of all Jimi 
people. During the survey, the community facilitator did his work well, and would 
later allow the project to use his house in Pimbum as a 'base' and get two Jimi 
settlers appointed as radiomen. By the second quarter of 1996, however, the 
community facilitator was more and more absent from his duties. 
It turned out that he travelled around the Bismarck-Ramu area for unclear reasons, 
and visiting a number of development agencies in an attempt to muster funds for 
the Pimbum airstrip. Communications were difficult and repeated messages were 
sent out to various contact points and even by provincial radio to advise Mm of the 
date and venue of the first patrol briefing. The briefing, however, started without 
h im and the available information with which to plan this patrol was therefore 
limited. A first patrol plan was devised, but the information necessary for planning 
the patrol logistics, mcluding the walking distances between villages, the location of 
bridges across various rivers, and the all important question in which villages to 
start work was limited. The project team realised that from a conservation point of 
view the Bismarck Fall was the most interesting area, but did not know which Jimi 
and Ramu groups claimed use and ownership rights to that area. As such, the 
strange situation was that the CD workers were sent out to build trust with 
communities, without knowing exactly whom they wanted to build trust with in the 
first place. 
The CD workers, based on the information provided by the two conservation 
managers who had patrolled the Jimi Valley in February 1996, suggested starting in 
the village of Ambulluah near Kol. After this, two more villages would be visited 
before retxuriing to Madang. Bubulsunga, the community of the Jimi community 
facilitator was not on the list. After five days of planning, role play and exercise 
rehearsal, the community facilitator finally arrived in Madang and suggested that 
the proposed patrol schedule was not the most optimal as it included villages with 
Utile rights to the Bismarck FaU. He also suggested that it would be very difficult to 
caU the four or five clans that make u p the Ambulluah community together as they 
Uve far apart and may not be wiTUng to come to their neighbours land. In addition, 
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he said that conflicts could prevent people from getting together. These comments 
threw the schedule of the Jimi patrol into disarray and based on the information 
given by the community facilitator the project team decided to revise the schedule of 
the Jimi patrol. The new schedule - obviously - happened to include Bubulsunga, the 
village of the community facilitator. 
During the first patrol, itself the CD teams found themselves confronted with people 
saying 'oh, [the community facilitator] sent you, didn't he'? (BRG 1996a: 46), a 
situation which suggested to the CD workers, much more knowledgeable of PNG 
politics than the expatriate members of the project team, that the community 
facilitator could very well be preparing for the 1997 National Elections. On return 
from the field, the position of the community facilitator thus became a point of 
discussion. When confronted with the question whether he indeed intended to run 
for office in the 1997 national elections, he declined to answer. Instead, he promised 
to clarify his position after the termination of his contract at the end of the year. As 
the report noted, this was unacceptable to the project for a number of reasons: 
[In the first place] 'the credit for what the project does in terms of providing 
training, paying carriers etc. is not accruing to the project but to the person of 
[the community facilitator]. A second problem is that once we get closer to the 
elections the security risk of the CD team being perceived as John's election team 
makes it vulnerable to attack by supporters of other candidates. There are several 
other candidates in the Jimi area and the movement of the CD teams could be 
impeded for the larger part of next year if we come too closely tied in with his 
election campaign. The election campaign and [the community facilitator's] 
potential role is the third problem as elections in PNG are based on making 
empty promises and giving free handouts rather than on self-reliance and 
community organization. The whole election is contrary to the grain of the ICAD 
process' (BRG 1996: 46). 
The net effect of these events was that the community facilitator changed from being 
an asset into a hability for the project. The project team, however, was reluctant to 
fire him as doing such could lead to a violent backlash on the CD workers in the Jimi 
Valley. The Biodiversity Program therefore decided to transfer the community 
facilitator to Port Moresby where he compiled a report with detailed information on 
the Jimi Valley (Opo 1996), until the time that his contract expired. 
LEAVING THE J M VALLEY 
By March 1997, relations with the communities in the Jimi valley were becoming 
increasingly difficult. The Bubkile area had been largely abandoned as a result of the 
conflict following the Biodiversity Survey. The repeated compensation claims meant 
that the security of the CD teams could no longer be guaranteed. As a matter of 
strategy the project thought it would be better to see if the Bubkile clans would 
invite the teams back in if the project stayed away for a while. If people would ask 
them to return, then the project could do so on the condition that the compensation 
claim be withdrawn. During the year 1997, however, the Bubkile area became the 
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site of serious fighting between the representatives of various political candidates. 
One of the carriers on the first Bubkile patrol received an arrow through the chest 
but, amazingly, survived. 
Because of the elections, people were focusing on the material benefits that 
politicians could produce, a focus that also affected local responses to the CD 
presentations. The various election campaigns triggered a spate of rumours about 
the arrival of a logging company as numerous candidates were trying to improve 
their chances by presenting themselves as representatives of such a company. 
'At the market place there were talks given by a high school teacher and the Jimi 
School Inspector. The high school teacher is negotiating to bring a timber 
company into the area. He is also an intending candidate for the 1997 elections. 
He informed the people that K12 million is already in the country and that K60 
million is coming soon to run the operations. He urged the people to allow the 
company to come and 'develop' the rich timber resources'(BRG 1997b: 15). 
The fact that the Jimi Valley has very few resources, very little timber within the 
Bismarck-Ramu range and as far as presently known no mineral resources was 
obviously not part of the various campaign messages (See chapter 3) 
The activities of the Jimi community facilitator exacerbated the situation even 
further. Although he had been withdrawn from the area and set to work in Port 
Moresby, the project had offered him a useful opportunity to present himself as a 
leader. Following his resignation from the Biodiversity Program at the end of 1996, 
he thus had six months and the savings from his UNDP wages to run for office. 
During his time at the Biodiversity Program in Port Moresby, the community 
facilitator developed a pamphlet outlining his Curriculum Vitae and a number of 
policy statements. This pamphlet, written in English, a language which few Jimi 
command, obviously mentioned his work as a Consultant to the United Nations 
Development Program and the DEC. The 'policy platform' that followed, detailed 
his political intentions, which were very clearly at odds with the anti-cargo policy of 
the Bismarck-Ramu project. Item 2, for example, outlined his intention to 
'find investors and markets to develop our rich resources like gold, copper, 
timber, develop tourist industries [through which] money would be 
generated/better standard of living; Employment would be created for school 
leavers/local people, youths, etc, Developers can bring development like roads, 
bridges, schools, health centres, etc. You can enjoy spin-off businesses from the 
operations' (Opo 1997:2). 
Item 4, with an interesting interpretation of the notion of 'self-reliance', dealt with 
the need 'to secure funds and technical support abroad/overseas and not only 
waiting to get everything from Waigani [the Government centre in Port Moresby]'. 
He also added that 'if the wish of the Jimi people to see a more effective and efficient 
approach then I will not boast, but I know where to start'. Item 5 dealt with the need 
to develop a 'formula' to 'fruitfully' distribute the Electoral Development Funds to 
'people's needs and aspirations' (Opo 1997). 
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The campaign would have serious implications for the project. In the first place, this 
campaign made it harder and harder for the CD teams to move about freely. The CD 
workers were continuously associated with the community facilitator's political 
campaign and consequently received threats from other contenders. In addition, it 
became clear that his period in Port Moresby had also given the community 
facilitator an additional piece of strategic information, namely an idea of the total 
budget of the Biodiversity Program. At first, he flagged the figure of 1.2 million 
Kina, but as the elections approached, this figure doubled to Kina 2.5 milUon in his 
speeches to potential voters. He - not unreasonably - asserted that this money was 
intended for the Bismarck-Ramu area and that he would make sure that the Jimi 
people would receive 'their share' once he was elected into office. As time went by, 
he increasingly asserted that in fact he was responsible for the projects arrival. As a 
CD report notes: 
'The people in the Jimi area have been told, by [the community facilitator] that 
the Project has funds of K2.5 million... He told the people that the money is used 
by the DEC in the Bismarck-Ramu area. He said that he got this money from the 
World Bank and employed expatriates and locals to work in the project. Radios 
were also bought using this money, two being used by the patrol teams and one 
that is stationed at Pimbum' (BRG 1997d: 36). 
In such an environment, it became increasingly difficult to argue for self-reliance 
and a non-cargo approach and discussions with the Jimi turned increasingly nasty. 
At Bubulsunga, a community problem analysis stalled when local youngsters 
simply told the CD workers that they wanted what the CD workers had education, a 
job with a fixed salary and shoes at their feet. Increasingly, the CD teams became a 
symbol for what the Jimi lacked. 
While some people were becoming increasingly aggressive, others tried a more 
subtle tack by arguing mipela nidim wanpela kampani bilong environmen; 'we need an 
environmental company'. This was clever form of rhetoric that illustrates how some 
Jimi responded to the ICAD notion, which too bases itself on the idea that material 
wellbeing and conservation be linked. This strategic use of language is not 
fundamentally different from rhetorical attempts by the Bismarck-Ramu project to 
dispel the apparent opposition between development and conservation by arguing 
that development is only possible if one starts with conservation. One of the 
educational papers produced by the CRI Director for example had the title 
Conservation or Economic Development? No! Conservation for Economic Development! 
(Orsak 1997c). By the time these various statements were made, however, the 
Biodiversity Program was ptirsuing a non-economic approach to conservation and 
that an 'environmental company' was not on the cards. 
As time went by, a growing number of cornmunities became impatient with the CD 
presentations and exercises, instead demanding a 'ban mak', a material expression of 
the fact that the Biodiversity Program was serious in its work with them. The fact 
that the CD workers went to great lengths to discuss community development 
issues was seen as insufficient in an environment where social relations are 
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expressed through material gifts. It is thus not surprising that the location of the 
'base' and the fact that the village of Pimbum now possessed a radio continued to 
pop u p in discussions. Many communities argued that they too needed a base and a 
radio in order to part-take in the project. At Bubulsunga, for example, 
Pastor Kulinge said, since there is a radio at Pimbum in the Ramu area, there 
should be one placed at Bubulsunga as it is a centre place in the Jimi area. Since 
there are a lot of people and groups coming into the Jimi to talk about logging, a 
radio stationed in Jimi area would help to give information to the DEC in 
Madang (BRG 1997d: 13). 
When the CDs persisted in their attempts to convince people that they should not 
look towards outsiders to make change, there were increasing demands to see the 
'boss'. In many instances people would question the continuation of the earlier 
patrol work, the absence of the patrol and survey leader and his companions, the 
community facilitator and other staff. People regarded especially the survey leader 
as 'the boss'. With the new approach, which aimed to minimise the number of 
whiteskins in the area, people had to adjust to the idea that the PNG Conservation 
manager was now 'the boss'. On some occasions people thought that as the project 
biologist was staying away, the project was reneging on its earlier promises. This 
was to a certain extent was true as all talk of development activities had disappeared 
and was now replaced by a much less rewarding discourse on 'what you can do for 
yourself and your community'. Possibly, because of this contrast in presentation, but 
also because of his leadership qualities, the survey leader was often asked for. His 
tall stature, his many speeches and lectures on a variety of issues, his decisive and 
sometimes forceful responses during disputes and discussions earned him much 
respect. In many ways he exhibited the characteristics of leaders in highland society, 
where oratory skills, combined with strength, aggression and decisiveness are the 
hallmarks of bigmenship. For months to come, people in the area recounted the tales 
of his exploits and asked him to return. He could not do so, because of the project's 
new strategy. 
As time went on, relations became increasingly difficult and the CD workers had to 
note that the Jimi people simply did not buy into their non- cargo approach 
"The team's observation of the attitudes and body language of people during 
meetings gave an indication that there is really little interest in any community 
development if it requires the people to get organised or do actual work. The 
community has said again that, "The CD team come and come again and 
nothing is given to the villagers". It appears that in spite of the amount of time 
put into the village development process, the communities still have an 
overwhelming reliance on 'cargo' and they are waiting for the CD team to bring 
something (BRG 1997b: 39). 
As Jimi impatience grew, there were increasing fears on the part of the CD teams 
that they might be held up. During a patrol in March 1997, a team visiting the Jimi 
received a warning by portable radio from the Ramu valley about the possibility of 
being attacked, forcing the team to withdraw in a hurry. At first the project 
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responded to these fears by excluding women from patrols to the Jimi, as the risk of 
sexual assault was deemed too large, later during the national and local elections, 
patrols ceased altogether. At the end of 1997, a number of issues came together, 
leading the Biodiversity Program to scale back its activities in the area. The ongoing 
fighting, the 'cargo mentality' on the part of the Jimi communities and the safety 
concerns that resulted from the elections led the project team to end their work in 
the Jimi Valley. The only activities further employed were those of the church liaison 
officer. 
The tradings of the social feasibility study, which came available at the end of 1997, 
further reinforced decision to halt community work in the Jimi Valley. The study 
concluded that the Jimi valley is a difficult location for conservation initiatives, 
because of the large population with its high economic aspirations, the prevailing 
patterns of competition and conflict, and people's instrumental attitude towards 
both nature and outsiders (VanHelden 1998b and 1998c). One wonders if the 
Biodiversity Program would have entered the valley if this socio-economic 
information had been available before April 1995. A related issue concerns the 
question whether the Bismarck-Ramu community entry approach, based on notions 
of collective action and a non- economic approach to conservation, had any chance 
of success at all among the highly fragmented and materialistic Jimi communities. 
C O M M U N I T Y WORK A N D CONFLICT I N THE MIXED J I M I - R A M U COMMUNITIES 
The community entry process among the mixed Jimi settler/ Ramu landowner 
communities in the Ramu Valley proved similarly difficult. This, especially because 
of the ongoing conflicts between Jimi settlers and Ramu landowners on the one 
hand, and among the Jimi settlers themselves on the other. Especially • the 
establishment of the 'base' and the radio at Pimbum would become a source of 
contention. Nol^txis tanding the fact that the Pimbum area was seen as doing 'best' 
in terms of linking u p with the project virtually everybody in the area was unhappy 
with the project. The various disputes that arose had little to do with conservation. 
Instead, People increasingly enrolled the project in local conflicts. 
This came out very clearly during the second CD patrol to Foroko-Brimde and 
Pimbum when the team became involved in no less than four conflicts. Immediately 
after the team touched down in Foroko-Brimde, it was besieged by two groups of 
angry young men. The first problem arose when Jimi youngsters told them clearly 
that now that the project had established a base at Pimbum, they could not use the 
airstrip any longer: 
'Now listen to this! The next time you people are coming into this area for your 
work, make certain that you come in through another route, and NOT via this 
our Foroko airstrip. Is that clear? This is the last time you used this airstrip, no 
more, you hear' (BRG 1996b: 30)? 
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The second issue revolved around the payment that the community facilitator and 
thus the Biodiversity Program still owed local people for the carrying of equipment 
from Foroko-Brimde to P i m b u m When the community facilitator stocked the 
Pimbum base in January 1996, he had asked people from his own Maipka sub-clan 
to carry the goods from Foroko-Brimde to Pimbum. Due to a local conflict, his 
people could not travel and instead people from another Maipka sub-clan came to 
do the work. The community facilitator had told the Madang staff that there was no 
need to pay the people for the carrying as he regarded it as a 'community service'. 
The project team interpreted this as an expression of interest in working together 
with the project on the part of the Pimbum people. The people who did the carrying, 
however, did not agree with this explanation at all, and insisted on being paid. This 
issue came u p during the subsequent installation of the radio and the conservation 
manager provided the community facilitator with the funds to settle the issue. The 
community facilitator, however, travelling around the Jimi Valley had not come 
round to paying the carriers, meaning that the C D team ran into trouble. 
Moli their spokesperson said it all: 'Have you brought our money for the 
carriers? Hand it all to us right now! If you have not then you are not coming to 
our place. You can do your thing here but you are not corning the Pimbum way -
that is if you do not have our money with you'(CRC 1996b: 30). 
As these threats were made, the C D team just listened, not saying much, but finally 
stating that they would liiink tilings over and repeating the line that if people 
wanted them out of the area they would willingly leave. Unlike the two 
conservation managers in January, they could move on to Pimbum (BRG 1996b). 
DISPUTING THE BASE 
Other Jimi people tried to capitalise on the obvious disagreement between the 
various clans at Pimbum by arguing that the project would be much better off 
leaving establishing itself at their village. The C D report records how one morning, 
the old man Poko came to talk with the team, arguing that those that were 
complaining were 'mere settlers' as all land belonged to the Ramu landowners. 'We 
are mountain people from the Jimi.' He then, however, goes on to qualify his own 
position, which accorcling to him, is very different even though he is a Jimi settler 
too: 
'My case is quite different though, because I paid for the land I am settling on 
and am using: ten pigs, and K 1000 and a daughter whom we married over to [a 
Ramu landowner] from Foroko, and she died just recently. [The Ramu] 
Councillor is the sole landowner here at Pimbum area, all the others are settlers, 
the complainers are just settlers' (BRG 1996b: 36-37). 
Finally, he comes to the purpose of his visit, which is to assert that the project would 
be better off establishing its base at his own hamlet in Yangal. 
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'I am just fed up and infuriated by their baseless and childish complaints - this 
loudmouth Moli, he never carried anything, only his mother did; you know 
what that idiot is real good at? Talking, yes talking, that's what he is good at, 
nothing else but talking... If they are still complaining, let us give them all these 
stuff in this house...they are ever complaining about these stuff, so give it all to 
them. That will shut them up...give it all to them...except the radio, which we can 
bring over and install at Yangal' (BRG 1996b: 36-37). 
The team simply stated that they would see how things were in Pimbum. The above 
statements again show how social fragmentation and competition among the Jimi is 
not just limited to inter-clan issues but may also play a role in the relations between 
sub-clans of one and the same clan. 
During the same patrol, a third problem arose concerning the community 
facilitator's house, now in use by the project. While the Ramu landowners gave 
permission to build the bush material house, Jimi settlers belonging to the 
community facilitator's clan did the actual work. The Biodiversity Program never 
owned the house and simply used it free of charge for as long as it had not decided 
where it was going to set u p a permanent base. Local people, however, disagreed 
with this interpretation of things and when they realised that the house was being 
used by the Biodiversity Program they stopped seeing it as the community 
facilitator's house, instead redefining it as the 'base'. They now wanted pay for the 
work that they had put into it in the first place. The project team saw such a demand 
as typical of cargo thinking and yet another Jimi attempt to wheedle money out of 
the project. During the next patrol, the visiting CD team flatly refused the request 
stating it would rather pull back the radio and the project. A tiling, which it would 
eventually do in 1998 as discussions over the radio, the house, the airstrip, the 
division of labour would dog the project for the better part of the next two years. 
The fourth and final problem in Pimbum concerned the choice of two Jimi workmen 
to man the 'base' and its radio. The two labourers were selected by the community 
facilitator, one from his own Maipka clan the other from one of the Kema clans. The 
two men performed well and were an asset to the project. The Ramu clans, however, 
bore a grudge as the project employed two Jimi settlers, while their own people 
were left out. Therefore, they threatened to burn the house and the radio if the 
project would not meet their demands for employment. The villagers of a Maipka 
sub-clan other than the community facilitator's own, were also annoyed that no 
member of their sub-clan was working for DEC. They at least were temporarily 
pacified by the community facilitator's promise that one of them would be 
appointed to the position of airstrip supervisor once the airstrip opened. 
Again, as had happened during the biological survey, the project suffered from a 
lack of understanding of the local situation and the position of the community 
facilitator. By leaving him the choice of workmen, the project was now stuck with a 
built-in bias in favour of the Jimi settler groups. Once the team came to understand 
this situation, it was too late to make changes. First, there was no justifiable reason 
to change the existing labourers as they had done very well and it would not be 
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acceptable to these men and their respective clans if a Ramu landowner replaced one 
of them. Secondly, the DEC was facing serious budgetary cuts and any vacated 
position would be lost without replacement due to the reduction of the department's 
staff ceiling. The team thus concluded that there was not much prospect of solving 
this problem. The N e w Zealand conservation manager pointed out that the project 
would have this problem all the time, as whatever it did, 'people would always be 
jealous' (BRG 1996a). 
RADIO TROUBLES 
The above events show how during its interventions in the life of local communities, 
the project had to continuously grapple with the unintended consequences of its 
activities. Another example of such an issue concerns the use of radios. By the time 
that the CD patrols had started there were quite a number of radios in use by the 
project. There was one in Port Moresby, one in Lak, one in Madang, one in the 
'temporary base' in Pimbum, and a portable radio used by the patrol teams during 
their travels in the Jimi valley. As could be expected the placing of the radio in 
Pimbum led to continuous demands by other groups who felt that they too needed a 
radio and base as a precondition to their ability to participate in the project. 
The first radio-related surprise came when the radio at Pimbum just after 
installation at the beginning of 1996. Local people used it to request the community 
facilitator and the Biodiversity Program for further assistance with the building of 
the airstrip. A request that was not honoured (See chapter 6 on the case of Pimbum). 
The second issue came about when during one of the first CD patrols people 
enthusiastically inquired about the outboard motor and the four-wheel drive land 
cruiser which were being shipped from Lak. It turned out that the radiomen in 
Pimbum took their work extremely seriously and kept a continuous watch on the 
radio. One day in 1996 they overheard communications between the Port Moresby 
office and the remaining personnel at Lak concerning the shipment of excess 
equipment, including an outboard motor and a vehicle. They had inferred that this 
equipment was now destined for Pimbum. It had after all been part of the 'base' in 
Lak which was now being abandoned, and the new 'base' was located at Pimbum. 
This focus on 'things', however, was exactly the type of 'cargo ihinking' which the 
CD workers were trying to dispel. It had to be made clear that the car in question 
was going to be used in Madang, and that an outboard motor was not forthcoming 
either. Anything happening in Pimbum would have to be the making of local people 
themselves. 
A third set of issues arose over the use of the portable radios during patrols. The CD 
workers obviously enjoyed the use of the radio as it gave them a feeling of security, 
as they could communicate with the other teams and Madang while on patrol. This 
led to a situation where the CD teams used the radio almost every night. After the 
first patrols, the fear arose that the elaborate setting up of the aerial wire and the 
operation of the radio would become part of the 'cargo thing' that the project was 
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trying to avoid. A view which proved correct as the radio at Pimbum became a 
status symbol, and many of the discussions between CD workers and other 
communities would be over the need for a radio in their village in order 'to work 
together'. 
A fourth issue of concern arose when villagers requested the radio to transfer 
messages for them. This was risky as it threatened 'to politicise' the radio in the 
same manner as had happened with the base. An example occurred on the second 
patrol when the Jimi team was asked to radio down to the Ramu Valley. It turned 
out that 8 young men had abducted a woman and her children from Omin. The 
Ornin people now asked the team to relay the message to the Ramu Valley that they 
should send these men and the woman and her children back u p to Omin to sort 
their troubles out. The relay of these types of messages, however, could also be 
explained as the project being partial to one particular group and could thus lead to 
retaliation against the teams. Especially during the election period there was fear 
that the project would be seen as the community facilitator's personal message and 
broadcasting team. Consequently, the project had to rninimise the use of the radio. 
LANDOWNERSHTP, LEADERSHIP AND CONSERVATION 
Next to the endless discussions over the material aspects of the project intervention, 
the Biodiversity Program would also become an asset in the struggle over territorial 
issues between Ramu landowners and Jimi settlers. As recounted in chapter 4, 
relations in the area between Jimi and Ramu people are difficult. There is an implicit 
brides-for-land deal whereby the Jimi provide women to Ramu landowners, in 
return claiming land and resources. The number of Jimi following those initial 
settlers leads to strong feelings of unease among the Ramu. It also triggers a 
generation conflict among the Ramu people, as the elderly men oppose further 
intermarriage with the Jimi, while the younger men generally see intermarriage with 
the Jimi as their only option to acquire a wife. 
The entry of the project with its discussions of 'looking after the land', gave the 
Ramu landowners a welcome opportunity to reassert their authority and ownership 
over land. This became most clear among the mixed Aidem clan-cluster of Pimbum. 
This cluster is made up of a combination of lowland and highlands clans and groups 
who used to live in the Bismarck Fall, and who returned to Pimbum at the end of the 
1970s (See VanHelden 1998b for the details). Whereas the initial interventions by the 
project had been biased towards the settlers, the CD workers quickly came to see 
that the Ramu people were being marginalised on their own lands. The second 
patrol report describes the Ramu Valley as 'a colony' and the Jimi as 'the colonizers' 
(BRG 1996b: 43). 
In response to the CD interventions, one of the Aidem big men suggested forging a 
special link between the DEC and the Ramu in order to manage the land, forest 
resource, and wUdlife. He however, twisted the conservation discourse towards the 
need to secure Ramu resource rights in the face of Jimi immigrants. 
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'Folks, did you understand [the CD team's] point? You see, we have been very 
generous and just too friendly. We have been allowing and even inviting 
foreigners into our land and even befriended them. We have taken them into our 
forests, shown them our rivers, our wildlife and our resources. And what have 
they done after all these? They simply capitalized on our generosity and our 
ignorance; they took our guria pigeons, our cassowaries, our crocodiles, our 
birds of paradise, and other resources in order to sell and make big money. My 
goodness, how stupid we were' (BRG 1996b: 39-40). 
Related to the landowner issue is the authority issue. As discussed in the section on 
migration, immigrants fall under the authority of the true landowners (See chapter 
3). In principle, the Jimi respected this situation, but as time went by the Jimi proved 
not only to be much more numerous, but also economically and poUtically 
dominant. As many of the younger Jimi had been born in the Ramu Valley, 
especially those at Pimbum liked to see themselves as landowners in their own 
right. 
As the Ramu clans felt that they were losing control over events, the arrival of the 
Bismarck-Ramu project gave them an opportunity to reassert themselves as 'true 
landowners', branding the Jimi as 'mere' settlers. Especially one of the Aidem men 
from P i m b u m councillor Alu Opo, who was formally recognised as the 'main' 
landowner in the area, but who was in practice not taken very seriously by the 
Pimbum Jimi, saw his chance. One of the CD teams happened to be in the area on 
Monday 16 September 1996, which marked the twenty-first anniversary of PNG's 
independence. The team in conjunction with councillor Alu Opo saw this as an 
excellent opportunity to call together a large meeting: the CD workers to do their 
introductory exercises, Alu Opo to make clear he was the only true landowner. In 
the meeting that followed, people from all over the area came to Pimbum, where 
Alu reasserted his authority as councillor and landowner by presenting the crowd 
with two decisions. The first were that all people, Ramu and Jimi alike, were to work 
together with the 'environment people', the second that the complaints about work 
done for the community facilitator, the base and the radiomen were to cease. As Alu 
Opo stated metaphorically 
"This land is my land, I am the bird and all these my [Jimi] in-laws are but mere 
feathers... I hereby 'plant' this kwila [teak] pole to mark the constant 
collaboration between the CD team/DEC and the Pimbum people now and in 
the years to come. No more complaints from now on...I repeat, no more 
complaints! I have given my word and that word shall last and shall never be 
disputed* (BRG 1996b: 34). 
Unfortunately, for Alu and the Biodiversity Program, the Jimi settlers were hardly 
impressed by his speech. Nor did it keep the Ramu landowners from disputing 
events. During later patrols, for example, an adopted brother of Alu Opo presented 
a letter to the CD team expressing his concern with the fact that all the benefits were 
accruing to the Jimi settlers. During this patrol two other Ramu men told the team 
that the radio and house issues would have to be renegotiated and that the two Jimi 
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employees would have to be replaced by landowners (BRG 1997b). The conclusion 
of a May 1997 patrol report notes that: 
'the situation at Pimbum including the community facilitator's house, the two 
DEC employees, the land owners' feeling of being left out, and the obvious 
tension between the landowners and the Jimi settlers has to be dealt with before 
any progress can be made in the community development process' (BRG 1997b: 
46). 
In another attempt to gain control over events one of the Ramu landowners at 
Pimbum brought u p the idea of forging an 'environmen komiti' as people professed to 
being very worried about their environment. 
'It is just that we are very concerned about our forest.... We are therefore 
proposing to set up a committee responsible for land and environmental matters. 
This committee will see to it that no 'idiot' comes into our land and does his own 
thing as if he owns the place. Any developer and anybody at all interested to 
come into our land MUST consult that committee first'[He then mentioned the 
names of the Ramu men that would be on the committee] (BRG 1996b: 33). 
It is not entirely clear where the notion of environmental komiti came from,. It was 
first mentioned during the very first patrol that visited Pimbum in April 1995 (Filer 
et Al. 1995) but it certainly caught the CD workers off guard. As in many 
community development programs there was the idea that at some stage it would 
be necessary to establish some sort of Village Development Committees. These 
would then facilitate work between communities and the project agency (See Arlyne 
Johnson 1997 for an example from Crater Mountain). Nobody, however, had 
expected this to come in sight so fast, and certainly not the have this suggested by 
the very people that the project was trying to educate on matters relating to 
development and conservation. The attempt to establish a committee was also an 
attempt to structure the relations between project and people in such a way that it 
excludes the Jimi settlers. In response, the CD workers downplayed the role of 
committees as they argued that communities have their own decision making means 
and as there was no reason to introduce an alien concept at that stage. In 1999, 
however, the CD workers would get involved in setting up so-called Wildlife 
Management Committees (WMC) as part of the development of two Wildlife 
Management Areas (WMA) on the Ramu River. 
WITHDRAWING FROM THE R A M U BUSH 
Alu's speech and the many other speeches that followed, the multiple CD visits to 
the area during 1996 and 1997, and the continuous attempts to engender self-
reliance, did not lead to any activity on the part of the communities. Over time, the 
CD workers became increasingly exasperated. The Pimbum and Brimde 
communities had gone through the whole program of needs identification and 
priority setting, had been 'sensitised' to environmental issues with the use of PRA 
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tools, but would not do what they were supposed to be doing according to the 
cornrnunity entry philosophy. 
In Pimbum, the focus of these discussions would become the construction of an 
aidpost. During the PRA exercises both the Jimi and Ramu people there had agreed 
that health was the central issue to all involved and had decided to construct an 
aidpost next to the unfinished airstrip. Each consecutive patrol, however, had to 
conclude that nothing had happened, triggering increasingly harsh judgements on 
the part of the CD workers. Where the people were initially though to be 'blinded by 
cargo-lhinking' they were now deemed 'lazy'. 
"The CD team then asked why the aidpost was not being built. The people said 
there were three reasons. The first was that the national elections had unsettled 
everyone and there was no time to do things. The second reason was the 
problem of the very long dry season... The final reason was the local council 
elections. These are reasons that were given at the community meeting, but 
during informal discussions ... the CD team were given the general impression 
that the people are just too lazy to do the work in order to help themselves' (BRG 
1997d: 20) 
In Brimde-Foroko, where similar divisions between the Ramu landowners and Jimi 
settlers played a role, people again and again professed to not know what the CD 
workers wanted, but each time still asking them to return. By the end of 1997, here 
too frustration started to feed through in the CD reports. 
At Pimbum, complaints about the base, the radio and the workmen, which were 
essentially conflicts between rivalling Jimi groups and between Jimi settlers and 
Ramu landowners would go on and on. Every patrol would go through the same 
discussions as to why and for who the house was built, w h y these two radiomen 
were employed and not others, and who should receive compensation for some 
purported grievance associated with the state of affairs. During the drought of 1997, 
a fire used to clear the airstrip under construction at Pimbum, swept through the 
compound destroying the cornrnunity facilitator's house. One of the radiomen just 
managed to salvage the radio equipment, subsequendy setting it u p in his own 
house. The loss of the 'base', however, did not solve the problems associated with 
the base and the radio. It rather opened a new repertoire of complaints, revolving 
around the question who was to blame for the fire, why the radio was now set u p in 
this particular house and where the new base should be established. 
"The problem of the house and the project radio at Pimbum had to be heard 
again. At [Bubulsunga] six young men approached the CD team and said that 
the DEC workers at Pimbum had not taken proper care of the house and that is 
why it burnt down. They want [to be paid] for work they claim they did on the 
house. If they are not paid they say they will take the radio and keep it until they 
are paid. It is unfortunate that people are still ignoring the fact that the house 
was built by [the community facilitator] and is owned by him. The CD team has 
been unable to overcome this fixed idea that people have '(BRG 1997d: 36). 
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Over time, the Ramu landowners would become increasingly adamant that they 
were to be the focus of CD activities and not the Jimi as had been the case until then. 
In November 1997, as the CD workers were becoming increasingly unhappy with 
the lack of progress, one of the landowners once more explained that 
'during the past eighteen months the visitors and the settlers led the activities in 
the community, but from now on the landowners are going to lead the 
community and work with the CD teams. [He] also said that no work had been 
done in the past eighteen months because there are problems in the community. 
There is a problem between the settlers and the landowners and with the two 
men manning the radio' (1997e: 11-12). 
By January 1998, the Madang team became so tired with the ongoing disputes that it 
decided to pull out all equipment and fire the two DEC workers. This in the hope of 
focusing people's minds on the ethic of self-reliance that they were trying to 
establish. In subsequent months CD discussions would focus on the construction of 
the local aid post, while the Pimbum community would request the health 
authorities at the District Office in Walium to supply them with a health worker. It, 
however, proved difficult to get work started due to the continuing mistrust among 
people, eventually leading the project team to decide halfway 1998 that it was better 
to pull out altogether. 
Whereas the Pimbum area was left to its own devises in the hope that people would 
later on invite them back, the project made a different strategic choice with regard to 
the mixed Brimde-Foroko community. Here the CD workers suggested to start 
treating the Jimi settler (Brimde) and the Ramu landowners (Foroko) as separate 
communities (BRG 1997d). Relations with the settlers Uving around the airstrip were 
difficult as they were with all Jimi communities, but the Foroko people now saw 
their chance and became increasingly interested in the project. Whereas they had 
stood in the shadow of project-Jimi interactions since the start of the Bismarck-
Ramu project, the Foroko, together with the Sepu people would become the focal 
point of the project's conservation strategy on the Ramu River. 
C O M M U N I T Y ENTRY O N THE R A M U R I V E R 
In hindsight, it is remarkable how long it took the Bismarck-Ramu project to make 
contact with the people of the Ramu River. Already in April 1995, the NRI 
anthropologist joining the first patrol had concluded that 'the most obvious priority' 
for the project would be to conduct meetings with the Ramu communities (Filer et 
Al. 1995: 59). A view, which was, reiterated during the February 1996 patrol by the 
two conservation managers (CRC 1996b). Project activities, however, had focused on 
conducting the biodiversity survey in the Bismarck Fall and on setting u p the base at 
Pimbum. The first CD patrols using the new participatory methodology were also 
aimed at the Jimi Valley and at the mixed Ramu-Jimi communities in the Ramu 
Valley. A number of short meetings with members of the Ramu River clans had 
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been held, but no action had been undertaken to meet these people in their own 
villages. 
It was thus in September 1996 that the first CD patrol entered the Ramu River area. 
The first visit to two of the Ramu communities took place when the team visiting 
Brimde and Pimbum decided to visit a number of Ramu river settlements for the 
first time. The team first walked to the Ramu River to visit Katinga, one of the most 
influential Ramu people. On arrival, Katinga made clear that he only wanted to 
meet with the CD workers once the Jimi carriers that had guided them had left. The 
animosity between Jimi and Ramu clans had already become clear, when the Jimi, 
hearing of the teams intentions to visit the Ramu River group gave the CD workers a 
'piece of advice', stating that: 
"The Ramu (river) people are uncivilised, they are primitive, they are like wild 
people who know no hospitality. They will not feed you, they will not house 
you. And if they ever do house you, this will mean you sleeping underneath 
their houses. They don't even have food anyway, for they know no gardening. 
We were the ones who taught them gardening and all other skills; we civilized 
and 'tamed' them. They live only on sago. They can't even talk sense with you 
like we do, and they will never understand your message. Anyway, go ahead, 
visit them and see for yourselves' (BRG 1996b: 41). 
Once the Jimi had left, the team introduced itself, using the now farniliar entry 
speech, gradually clxifting into presenting to the people the pre history and timeline, 
as well as the posters of the mango tree, and the starving man. The old man 
welcomed them in a manner that was very different from the usual hard questions 
fired at the teams by the Jimi. 
'They [the Jimis] always want to know exactly what we are after.... To give an 
example; Kumbo and Mark... keep coming and asking questions such as: After 
you had visited us for so many times and have had enough of that, what will 
come next? What are you going to do; what are you going to establish?' (BRG 
1996b: 41). 
The there wee the rather aggressive demands by the elderly Jimi who were in a 
hurry to enjoy a state of development before dying, and who 'again and again' 
emphasised the fact that they 'wanted to see liiings happen' before they died (BRG 
1996a: 36). In general, Ramu responses to the CD team's presentations were baffled 
but inviting. In contrast to the willingness encountered in most Ramu River villages, 
however, the first visit to the village of Karisanga would be an unmitigated disaster. 
T H E KARISANGA REJECTION 
Karisanga was a village that had not yet been visited by the project and which 
therefore expected to be more susceptible to the community entry approach than 
villages which were already 'spoilt' by earlier contacts with the project. A youngster 
paddled the CD team downstream from Katinga's homestead and on arrival, they 
were warmly welcomed with plates of sago and fish. People were surprisingly 
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hospitable and the CD workers noted that 'the community spirit was very much 
alive'. It appeared to become a promising visit. In the evening, the team met with 
the whole community, some forty men, women and children. After the operiing 
prayer ended, the komiti, the village representative on the Local Government 
Council, officially welcomed them with the words: 
'Dear friends, as the 'komiti' of this village, and on behalf of my people, I 
welcome you to our place and invite you to address us. But just one more thing 
before you begin; you can go ahead and say what you want to say. If your words 
are sugar sweet, we will take it, and you will know that. But if your words are 
not so sweet to us.... this too you will know later '(BRG 1996b: 43). 
The team presented itself in the usual way, with the help of the timeline and mango 
tree exercises. Quite a few people had questions or comments, and the meeting went 
on for hours. The people agreed that the team would meet them again the next day 
and promised to tell them whether they would want the CD workers to come back 
in the future. After supper the next day people gathered again for the meeting and 
the komiti spoke u p on behalf of his people: 
"Thanks a lot for coming and visiting us; it was indeed a pleasure for us to have 
met with you. On behalf of my people, I have just one little word to tell you. Yes, 
I am a government officer myself, being the representative of the councillor in 
my village. And as such, I am quite knowledgeable as regards government 
regulations, policies and structures.... My people and I have the right to know 
whoever comes into our land and also know why he or she comes in. We asked 
you to clarify to us your work and you claim that you have done so. The fact is, 
we are ever more confused, because your words are like complete nonsense, they 
are absolutely meaningless 'toktok bilongyupela i nogat as or tel. na i nogat het bilong 
em' (Your talk has head nor tail). Therefore we ask you not to come again here in 
future; I mean not for your work. But please do not get me wrong! Our doors are 
always open to any visitor' (BRG 1996b: 44-45). 
The stunned team could only thank the komiti for his words and reply, in line with 
their ixaining; that these were people's land and resources, and that the community 
had the right to do whatever it wanted to do. The team left the next day. 
Later it appeared that the komiti who had thrown the team out, did so because the 
CD teams had been perceived as a sort of cargo-cult known as 'Bembe'. This is 
another name for the Yaliwan or Yah cult, which took hold of Wewak in the 1970s 
(See section of cargo cults in chapter 4). The suggestion was that the CD workers 
were spirits that had come back from the dead {'daiman') and sinners ('sinman'). 
People would fall ill if they spent the money that the CD teams had paid them for 
accommodation and food. People along the Ramu River were corifused and in a 
number of places waited with giving the patrol food until they had heard their side 
of the story. At Yawetama, the CD workers were refused entry with the argument 
that the houses were 'full'. Later it appeared that the various metaphors and 
speeches had backfired on the project team in the sense that local people had 
interpreted them as part of the magic that we were using to bring them under the 
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spell. One of the patrol reports notes that: 'It is obviously quite ironic that the strong 
emphasis on avoiding unrealistic expectations and self-reUance makes people think 
we are a traditional cargo-cult' (BRG 1997a: 42). 
COMMUNITY ENTRY I N SEPU VILLAGE 
Not perturbed by the Karisanga rejection, regularly visited the other Ramu River 
communities from November 1996 onwards. In order to get there, the teams used a 
new route. Whereas they had previously flown into Foroko-Brimde, the Bismarck-
Ramu project decided that to reach the River communities by canoe. This also 
reduced the risk of hold ups at Foroko-Brimde as had happened to the conservation 
managers during their visit to Pimbum in January 1996. The CD teams were 
dropped off at Brahmin Bridge, close to the mission station with the same name, and 
from there transported down the river to the village of Sepu. In contrast to the 
continuous troubles experienced in the Jimi Valley and among the Jimi settler 
communities of Brirnde and Pimbum the Sepu Community received them with open 
arms. People were aware of the CD visits to the mixed communities, knew they 
belonged to 'the environment and conservation' and were glad to meet them. As the 
team looked on during the first visit in November 1996, one of the Sepu big men 
'drew a big circle with four smaller circles inside and then scratched a star inside 
one of the four smaller circles. He then explained to us what he meant by that 
drawing: "The large circle represents the Sepu community. These three smaller 
circles right here with no stars in them represent three groups that had visited us 
before you: 1. An oil company; 2. Highlands Gold which is a niining company; 
and 3. The Forestry Department in connection with a logging company. 
Representatives from all three have visited Sepu, expressing their interest in 
exploiting various resources on our land. This fourth circle right here with the 
star, represents you (CD team); you are the fourth group and we were looking 
forward to your visit. After your visit, we will be in a better position to decide 
whether or not to allow any operation or project of any kind on our land and in 
our area'(BRG 1996c: 23). 
During subsequent visits, it appeared that the Sepu people were indeed very 
welcoming. In contrast to the Jimi who were all the time trying to find out when the 
project would provide some 'development', the Sepu community patiently went 
through the step by step community entry process. In addition, there were fewer 
conflicts witiiin the community than among the mixed communities where any 
debate concerning the project was always and inevitably pulled towards issues of 
territoriality and authority between the local landowners and the Jimi settlers. 
During the various exercises which followed, the Sepu people expressed their 
concern with a range of issues, mcluding the neighbouring mine, oil exploration 
activities and a logging concession in the proximity of their territory. Other issues 
concerned their low population numbers, the fear of witchcraft, the lack of health 
and educational services and the many Jimi settlers (BRG 1996c). People also 
recounted how 
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'missionaries had destroyed a lot of their culture including their haus tambarans 
(sacred houses) which served various purposes: that of a museum or archive 
where sacred or valuable artefacts such as skulls of ancestors were stored; a 
place of initiation where the young were initiated into adulthood; and a place of 
learning where the young were instructed and taught traditional wisdom by 
their elders' (BRG 1996c: 24). 
In contrast to the Jimi .these groups appeared to take more pride in their traditions. 
This was of importance to the projects as one of its central ideas was that tradition 
and conservation come hand in hand. Obviously the emphasis on tradition at Sepu 
did not mean that the people there did not grapple with the same socio-economic 
problems and the perceived trade-off between conservation and development found 
elsewhere: 
"The councillor said: "You are stopping me from dealing with any of the three 
groups (mining, petroleum, and logging), but I need money. How are you going 
to help me find money?" The councillor's question started an argument with ... 
the catechist, [the latter] arguing for conservation, and the councillor for the oil 
company to carry out explorations in the area' (BRG 1996c: 26). 
During 1997 and 1998 the CD workers would take the Sepu communities through 
the various steps contained in the process of community entry. Work during 1997 
was difficult. First there were the elections which did not lead to conflict as they did 
in the Jimi valley, but which certainly gave people a lot to think about and would 
dominate discussions with CD teams. Often people were away on political meetings. 
Then there were a number of serious conflicts among the Jimi settlers, leading to a 
number of deaths, accusations of sorcery and the related compensation payments. 
On other occasions, men worked with a variety of timber and rnining companies. In 
addition, the whole country suffered from drought-related food shortages. 
All of these issues made it hard to organise community meetings. Time was running 
out, however. As 1998 approached, the project became increasingly focused on the 
conservation issue. Funding for the project would run out by April 1998, and it 
became increasingly clear that the project would have to show some tangible results 
if it wanted to secure second phase financing with the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF). These results could not take the form of a series of 'lessons learnt' as had 
been the case in Lak, but would have to demonstrate that a conservation area was 
within reach as a result of the CD strategy. When at the end of 1997 both the Sepu 
and the Foroko clans expressed an interest in conservation this was an important 
development. In the next few pages I will argue that these conservation concerns 
were to some degree genuine, but also to no small extent pushed by the wish to 
assert land and resource ownership in the face of Jimi encroachment. 
TERRITORIALITY A N D CONSERVATION O N THE R A M U RIVER 
During the first discussions with the Ramu River communities the issue of Jimi 
encroachment did not take a prominent place. The Ramu people were probably 
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trying to find out how the relationship between the project and the Jimi stood, as the 
project had until then almost exclusively dealt with the Jimi settlers, only recruiting 
Jimi personnel in the form of the radiomen and the community facilitator. During 
subsequent sessions, however, the Jimi issue would gain in prominence, starting off 
with the suggestion that the project base should not be among the Jimi at Pimbum, 
but that the base should be moved towards the Ramu landowners (BRG 1997a). An 
important development came about with the turn around of the Karisanga 
community. As the project moved away from its initial focus on the Jimi and came 
to spend more time among the Ramu people, the Karisanga villagers lost their 
mistrust and would join the Foroko landowners in their dealings with the project. 
The fist connections made between conservation and the settler issues came with 
discussion over the issues of land registration. As recounted in chapter 2 there was a 
lot to do about land registration in PNG as a result of the World Bank structural 
adjustment program which many NGOs explained as an attempt to gain control 
over PNG resources. Land registration, however, may also come from witiiin 
communities that see themselves confronted with outside competitors. In the 
densely populated Jimi Valley, boundaries were 'frozen' in the 1950's when the 
colonial patrols demarcated boundaries and jailed troublemakers. In the Ramu 
Floodplains with its small populations, boundaries are much less strictly 
demarcated and defended and thus more open to mutual usage. 
In Foroko, the Ramu landowners themselves brought u p the issue of land 
registration as something worth pursuing. These very small groups of people who 
own vast areas of land, had in common that they wanted the Jimi out. As far as they 
were concerned they should then register their clan lands, after which every clan 
could do as they liked. As a CD report of September 1997 notes: 
'[All of the Foroko clans] appear to want the Jimis to go back to the Jimi River 
area. Their main concern was the Jimis were causing too much destruction to 
their forest. WUdlife was also becoming scarce in the nearby bush. Apart from 
moving the Jimis they have different ideas about what to do with their land. Two 
of them when interviewed said they wanted to bring in a logging company in 
order to get money and new road. One insisted that they equally divide their 
land amongst themselves. After that they must all get their land registered so 
that each one can do whatever he wants with his share. Two of the group 
wanted conservation and strongly opposed logging and land registration. The 
only concern the traditional landowners could agree on was that the Jimi must 
go back' (BRG 1997d: 23-24). 
Registration of land is becoming an increasingly important issue in the Ramu area, 
not only vis-a-vis the Jimi, but also in relation to possible attempts by other Ramu 
clans. During one of the first patrols on the Ramu River the CD workers came across 
Thomas Bunmeri, a settler from the middle Ramu River, who claimed ownership 
rights to a vast tract of land in the project area. He did so based on his interpretation 
of oral history, arguing that 'this is my land, this is the land of my ancestors, and I 
know the story as far back as nobody else here does'. More mteresting than his 
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historical claims, which could be one of many, was the fact that he also told the CD 
team that he was spending a lot of time and money on getting this land registered 
with the Lands Office in Madang (BRG 1996c: 30). The exact motivations of this 
settler remain unclear, but may have been fuelled by the approach of logging 
companies in the Sogeram Area, as well as the mining and oil drilling prospects in 
the vicinity of the Ramu River. As most options for development in rural PNG are 
resource, and thus land-based, people tend to see landownership as their last 
opportunity to economic development (Ballard 1997, Filer 1997b). Formal land 
registration, but also a more informal of assertion of territorial rights may thus be 
seen as an attempt to keep one's options for development open. 
It is here that the link between conservation and the registration of land comes to 
play a role. Because especially area-based forms of conservation, with boundaries 
demarcated by the Department of Lands are relatively secure, protected area 
estabUshment is attractive to local people as long as they maintain control over those 
areas. Unlike in most other countries, where protected areas are state-owned, the 
PNG Fauna (Protection & Control) Act contains a number of mechanism which do just 
that. The most important of these is the Wildlife Management Area (WMA). 
THE PRINCIPLES OF WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AREAS 
Wudlife management areas established under the Fauna (Protection & Control) Act 
provide a legal mechanism for local control of fauna on land and in waters held 
under customary tenure. WMA estabUshment has been the most used form of area-
based conservation tool in PNG. WMAs are always established at the behest of local 
landowners and may contain a variety of fauna! management regimes. 
In order to estabUsh a WMA, local people need to undertake a number of steps. 
These steps include in the first place the demarcation of social and spatial 
boundaries. The first may be dealt with through the drawing u p of genealogies and 
may be formalised by registering the clan group as an Incorporated Land Group 
(See footnote 13). The latter entails long term negotiations with neighbouring 
groups, the resolution of outstanding conflicts and a formal survey of the area. After 
the marking of boundaries people have to form a WUdlife Management Committee 
(WMC) and draw u p a schedule of rules and penalties. The WMC has the right to 
make and enforce rules concerning the taking of wUdUfe and may coUect fines. The 
WMC must also appoint an agent to issue hunting Ucenses and to coUect fees and 
may also appoint rangers to enforce hunting rules. 5 8 
FoUowing the establishment of the WMC, the resource owners together with the 
DEC and the supporting conservation NGO develop the rules and penalties, which 
5 8 These provisions are a typical reflection of the western idea of protected areas as a 'playground for 
hunters'. They have little or no bearing on the situation in most Papua New Guinea hunting areas 
where outsiders are allowed to hunt through personal contacts and where there is little scope for 
collecting license fees and hunting royalties at the level of the community (See VanHelden 1998b). 
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have to be gazetted to come into force. The act, however, also gives the Minister the 
right to 'make rules for the protection, propagation, encouragement, management, 
control, harvesting and destruction of fauna with in the WMA'. This implies that 
landowners cede part of control over wUdlife resources to the DEC on establishment 
of a WMA. In practice, however, the DEC lacks the field capability to monitor and 
enforce rules and regulations within WMAs while many WMAs lack gazetted rules 
(Whimp 1995, VanHelden 2001d). The enforcement of WMA rules is thus only 
feasible when executed by a motivated and organised community. 
WUdlife management areas have a number of advantageous quaUties over other 
forms of protected areas. Firstly, WMAs aUow resource owners to maintain control 
over their resources. In the second place, WMA rules are not necessarily restricted to 
fauna conservation only. WMCs can make a range of other rules relating to 
management of resources and land if they wish to do so. The act itself, however, 
only regulates the rules relating to the Ucensing and taking of animals. Rules not 
relating to these issues are not likely to be upheld in court, but are dependent on 
social controls within the group. 
WUdlife management areas also have a number of disadvantages of which the most 
important are that a WMA may be degazetted at the behest of resource owners, 
aUowing them to pursue other development activities if they wish so. In addition, 
WMAs without approved and gazetted rules are legaUy defunct. WUdlife 
management rules are a form of delegated legislation which have no legal effect 
unless they are gazetted. The inability of the DEC to process the WMA appUcations, 
draw u p the boundaries, and formaUse the WMAs and their rules, means that there 
is a sizeable backlog in WMA appUcations, whUe many of the existing areas are 
without formal rules and thus legaUy hoUow shells (Whimp 1995, VanHelden 
2001d). 
THE STRATEGIC USE OF WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AREAS 
Because the registration of landownership is part of WMA estabUshment, 
conservation proponents thus offer an indirect means to local communities to assert 
their ownership over land and resources. I am not arguing here that the Ramu 
people are aware of the articles of this act and intentionaUy developed some 
premeditated plan to enlist to Bismarck-Ramu project in registering their lands, but 
that such enrolment graduaUy evolved in the course of events. Even if people do not 
manage to acquire title through the provisions of the act, also in an informal manner 
each step in the conservation process aUows landowners to reassert their position in 
the face of competing claims. This explains the increasingly common attempts by 
rural clan groups to enlist green NGOs and conservation instruments in their 
attempts to gain control over land and resources (See for example Banks in Press, 
Kalwij and De Koning 2000). Fisk, quoted in the 1993 Biodiversity Program project 
document (!), already reached the same conclusion with regard to WMAs, when he 
wrote that 
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'At the bottom of many communities' interest in conservation and protected 
areas is a basic land rights/ownership issue. Most Wildlife Management Areas 
arise from the desire of a community to consolidate ownership over a parcel of 
land and regulate the use of that land by outsiders. These outsiders may be 
visiting hunters or squatters' (Fisk in UNDP 1993: 3). 
The establishment of protected area thus does not necessarily have anything to do 
with conservation, and may rather be a strategic attempt to regain control over land 
and resources. In some instances such protected areas are merely used as a vehicle 
to gain control over resources in order to subsequently commit them to more 
rewarding forms of resource use. An example of such a case took place in Garu 
village near Kimbe on West New Britain. The colonial government leased part of 
local clan land to develop oil palm, but also left a certain area under forest cover as a 
breeding locality for megapodes. In order to reclaim this land after Independence in 
1975, the Garu people declared it a WMA under the Fauna (Protection and Control) 
act. This WMA however, did not have management rules, and would subsequently 
become the site of eco-forestry activities sponsored by the European Union. The 
villagers have since planned to convert the WMA to oil palm blocks. A similar 
strategy may play a role among some of the Foroko landowners, as some of the local 
leaders saw land registration as a first step in getting a logging company in. 
During 1998, a number of queries come forward with regard to the exact nature of 
land registration and the role of the DEC therein. Thus, the people of Lai and 
Karisanga villages near Foroko said 
'that they heard that we the workers of environment and conservation would 
register their land and the Government will take it over' (BRG 1998g: 16). [To 
which the] 'CD teams replied and said, we have told you several times that the 
land belongs to you and the power is in your hands. If you want us to still work 
with you or not it is up to you' (BRG 1998g: 15). 
The nature of WMAs, the levels of control held by local landowners and various 
rumours would continue over the better part of 1998 and 1999: 
Question: 'We have heard that the project would lock the WMA and throw the 
key into the Ramu River". Answer: "That is not true, do not listen to false 
rumours. These WMAs are yours and you are in charge of them. You made the 
laws and penalties, and if the WMAs are owned by the Government, the 
Government workers would come and settle in the area and take care of them. 
You landowners would not be allowed to go into your own forest!' (BRG 1999b: 
17-18). 
As people became more confident that they were indeed in charge of the process the 
option of pursuing a WMA became increasingly attractive. 
The Jimi in Brimde, who had until then been focusing on the material benefits that 
would hopefully be derived from the Bismarck-Ramu project, saw this as a threat. 
Not in the sense that the project would help the Ramu people to evict them, but 
more in terms of the chances that the environment on which they depended would 
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be logged. As they continued meeting with the CD teams and increasingly agreed to 
recognise the Ramu Landowners as the true spokesmen for the area, they also 
voiced their concern that these would register the land in order to get it logged 
(Chitoa 1998a). This would impinge on their interests, as the Jimi realised that they 
would not receive the benefits from logging, but would be affected by the negative 
changes to the Ramu environment. They thus changed strategy and decided to 
support the Foroko landowners in their aim to establish some form of conservation 
area, hoping that this would keep the forest companies out (Ellis 1998). To the 
cynical observer, these concerns appear to open an mteresting scenario to the Foroko 
landowners. They first use the WMA to assert their ownership over land and 
resources, subsequendy seeking to develop a timber concession in order to kill two 
birds with one stone. As 'real' landowners they gain the perceived benefits from 
logging in the form of royalties, compensation for damages done, service delivery, 
infrastructure and wages, while simultaneously making their lands much less 
attractive to further Jimi encroachment. This scenario did not eventuate. Logging is 
(yet) to reach Foroko and the Brimde Jimi decided to move back u p to the Jimi 
Valley at the end of 1999. 
The people of Sepu were also motivated by territorial issues, but to a much lesser 
extent. Living on the other side of the Ramu River at a day's walk from the nearest 
Jimi settlement, they were not confronted with the presence of Jimi settlers on a 
daily basis. Instead, they worried about the impact that the neighbouring the oil-
drilling venture and rnine would have. What also played a role was their earlier 
experience with the WUdlife Division of the Department of Agriculture, Stock and 
Fisheries which tried to estabUsh a national park in the 1970s. Over time, it appears 
that the people at Sepu came to see the establishment of some form of conservation 
area as a means to preserve their group identity and culture through the 
preservation of their sacred sites. Setting aside land for conservation would allow 
them 'to show their chUdren how they used to Uve', implying a view of conservation 
which, in contrast to western ideas of biodiversity conservation, includes strong 
notions of culture and identity. In addition, they thought they could afford a 
conservation area because they would find work in the nickel-cobalt mine or with 
the oU companies drilling in Banam to the north. 
Thus during the latter half of 1997, a number of Ramu River communities started to 
express an interest in conservation. The Bismarck-Ramu project, uncertain of the 
Ramu people's motivations for conservation, decided to take a pragmatic approach. 
It argued that conservation could be interesting for other reasons that environmental 
protection, but could stiU constitute the basis for future work (See VanHelden 1998a 
for this argument). It thus laid the basis for the 'middle ground' that would evolve 
between project and people. The only motivation that the team excluded constituted 
the use of material reasons for conservation as such was deemed incompatible with 
its setf-reUance strategy. Having become much more careful fallowing the 
experiences with the community facilitator, and the strategic behaviour of the 
various Jimi communities, the project decided to gauge whether people were 
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interested in conservation matters. 5 9 The CD workers thus told the villagers to make 
and pay the two-day trip to Madang themselves in order to discuss their concerns 
with the DEC conservation manager. Only when people were motivated would they 
be prepared to make the effort (See Salafsky 1997 for this argument in the context of 
community-based forestry). 
COMMUNITY-BASED CONSERVATION ON THE RAMU RIVER 
Whereas the Ramu communities were familiar with the CD workers, and many 
friendships had developed, the conservation manager took on the role of DEC 
conservation expert, thus separating the community entry work from conservation 
discussions. In the beginning of 1998, both the Sepu and the Foroko people made the 
trip to Madang. Here the conservation manager briefed them on the various 
mechanisms available under PNG environmental law to conserve their resources. 
Over 1998 and 1999 these visits were followed up with a number of village meetings 
by the conservation manager. The main aim of these first conservation patrols were 
to i) explore the reasons given to set aside certain areas for conservation, ii) to get the 
landowners to talk about the ways in which their forefathers looked after the 
environment in the past, Hi) to present to the landowners the different ways that 
were nowadays used in protecting the environment; and iv) to hear from the 
landowners what option they would like to use (Chitoa 1998b). 
In preparing the conservation meeting at Foroko -Brimde, the CD workers talked to 
the Ramu landowners at Foroko as well as to the Jimi settlers at Brimde. The team, 
fearing that the Ramu landowners were eruisting them in their conflict the Jimi 
settlers, made clear to the former 
'that it was not the project's aim to help them remove the Jimi settlers from 
Foroko-Brimde. They said the project would only be involved with them if they 
want to conserve their natural resource. In that meeting, the landowners 
proposed that the team should not meet and work with the Jimi settlers, 
however, the team decided against the landowner's proposal and went right 
ahead and met with the settlers. [Upon hearing this the Jimi settlers] 'agreed to 
support the landowner's idea of conservation. They reported that there were 
rumours that some of the landowners had interests in logging. Those 
landowners had liased with the logging company operating in the Sogeram area. 
The settlers see that if logging is brought in ... hunting and gardening practices 
would be affected' (Chitoa 1998a: 5). 
5 9 In general, experiences in community development point to the rule of thumb that things for which 
people have not had to make any effort have little value, are rarely 'owned' by the community and 
seldom looked after. An increasing number of donors in PNG is actually discouraging communities 
who seek help for certain purposes, by insisting that people spend considerable time, money and 
effort in obtaining assistance. 'This serves as a process of self-selection which separates the motivated 
communities from those regarding development aid as a temporary source of cargo (Cf. Salafsky 
1997). This changes the emphasis from what aid organisations can do for people, to what people can 
do for themselves. 
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When the actual conservation meeting started with forty-six people, comprising four 
small Ramu clans present and with a number of Jimi settlers present, the 
conservation manager explained that he was there because the Foroko landowners 
had invited him to talk about conservation, what it was and how it could be done. In 
line with the usual approach of the CD workers, which tends to draw on historical 
parallels and traditional customs the conservation manager started by talking about 
the past. 
'[The conservation manager] used a bush knife to draw a circle on the ground. 
He labelled that circle bipo (the past). While standing in that circle he said, "let us 
look back at how our ancestors lived in the past." He asked, "did your ancestors 
have sacred places?" [A number of people] responded yes they did. The Pastor 
went further, "our ancestors had sacred places and people from the Maring area 
still have such places today." Mek added, "In the past, there used to be a 
hausman [men's house] in each village. The hausman was like a school where 
village elders taught the young ones about village traditions. Among the lessons 
on village traditions was the subject that dealt with sacred places. There were 
rules laid out concerning sacred sites that people adhered to. Any breach of 
those rules resulted in sickness and sometimes death' (Chitoa 1998a: 6). 
He drew another circle on the ground and labelled it nau (the present). He then 
asked: 'if we want to protect our environment now, is it possible to use the same 
practices that your ancestors used in looking after the sacred sites?' In Sepu this 
question would be answered elaborately by the eldest man present: 
'during the times of our ancestors, Sepu was Sepu, Warabruk was Warabruk, 
Banam was Banam and Yawetamen was Yawetamen. You could not find people 
from Sepu entering the areas of Warabruk, Banam or Yawetamen except on 
special occasions. If people wanted to go hunting, fishing or if they wanted to do 
other activities, their activities were confined to their own areas. However, today 
you see people from Banam, hunt, fish and make gardens in the areas of Sepu. 
Likewise, people from Sepu, hunt, fish and make gardens in the areas of 
Banam." He said that the village elders were the ones that set out rules that 
governed which areas people went to. There were certain areas that were totally 
prohibited from other clans other than the owners of those areas, places that 
were allowed to men only and places accessible to men, women and children. He 
said all classes of the society respected the rules set by the elders' (Chitoa 
1998b:2). 
N o w however, tilings are different. Both in Foroko and Sepu people argued that the 
youth was different nowadays and that past practices were of limited use. 
'there are lots of outside things that have entered our places. Children speak 
different kinds of languages such as tok pidgin and English. Children of today 
learn too many things from the outside and tend to forget their culture... children 
nowadays are slowly losing respect and rarely listen to the village chiefs and 
elders. For this very reason, I think we are going to find it very difficult to adopt 
practices used by our ancestors to protect our environment today' (Chitoa 1998a: 
7). 
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The conservation manager then introduced the concept of 'conservation', arguing 
that this was not a new tiling as people's ancestors already practised it. He said that 
even though he would introduce many new names for conservation people should 
not be confused because it all boiled down to the practice of looking after the 
environment (Chitoa 1998a). 
He subsequently presented the notion of national park, explaining that this was one 
way of protecting the environment and there were several others. He did so by 
linking u p the sacred sites of local people, arguing that these and protected areas 
were more or less the same tiling. During the subsequent meeting he took his 
audience through the range of set-asides available under PNG law, discussing the 
features of each mechanism, gradually building u p the matrix represented below. 
The conservation manager found that both in the case of Foroko, as well as in the 
case of Sepu, villagers were most interested in the option of estabhshing a wildlife 
management area (VVMA). This is not strange, given that this mechanism allows 
landowners to register their land, while mamtaining the greatest level of control 
over their resources vis-a-vis the Government (See table 3). 
TABLE 3 : T H E MATRIX OF CONSERVATION OPTIONS UNDER P N G LAW. 
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THE DEMARCATION OF BOUNDARIES 
Following the choice for VVMAs in both Foroko and Sepu, the conservation manager 
moved on to the designation of boundaries. This is a potentially difficult step as it 
may bring u p conflicts over land between the participating clans, or between these 
clans and their neighbours. Often development intervenors are not aware that by 
discussing issues with the help of PRA tools, simmering conflicts come to the 
surface, in some case leading to open violence (see for example Shah and Meera 
1995). The boundary aspect of the conservation process, however, was also likely to 
interest the participating Ramu clans most, as it would give them the chance to 
openly assert their ownership over their land. If the project could assist them in 
formalising these claims with the Registrar of Lands, then these would be 
recognised by state law. 
"The conservation manager introduced the other idea of making a boundary 
map. He stated that the map would give them a general picture of how each 
clan's land laid on the ground. He asked the participants if they ever did a 
resource map with the CD teams. The participants said they had. The team 
explained that a boundary map was a little bit different from a resource map. In 
a resource map, all features are shown but not on the boundary map. The 
boundary map shows the land boundaries only. Michael from the Motunga Clan 
began by using a knife to draw his clan's land boundary. When he finished, 
Jeremiah took over and did his clan's area. When the boundary map was 
completed, it showed the areas from the Marum River along the Ramu River 
towards the Laplap River and extending to the west ending at the Wendeng 
River' (Chitoa 1998a: 10). 
In many instances, the demarcation of land boundaries is difficult because 
boundaries can not be interpreted by strict lines of separation between two or more 
groups. Boundaries should thus more be seen as zones in which the influence of one 
group grows while that of another wanes but are not always easy to establish in 
great detail on the ground (Giddings 1984). Because the establishment of strict 
boundaries of a WMA could lead to corifhcting interpretations and conflicts among 
the groups working together in the WMA, it the project team decided to resort to a 
combination of external and internal boundaries. External boundaries are those 
boundaries that are shared with groups not taking part in the WMA. These 
boundaries need to be mapped clearly and preferably surveyed. The conservation 
manager continuously emphasised the need to talk to neighbouring groups outside 
the designated WMAs in order to avoid conflict (Chitoa 1998c). The internal 
boundaries are those that the clans who share in the WMA have in common, and 
which do not need to be established firmly. Boundaries were first established on 
maps drawn on the ground, then transferred to paper and very gradually marked 
on maps with the help of a Global Positioning System (Chitoa 1998d). 
While the Foroko landowners were generally able to mark their boundaries without 
to many problems, the Pimbum area would introduce a problem in the Sepu WMA. 
This problem did not exist between the Aidem, who having come down from the 
Bismarck Fall accepted the fact that the Ramu River clans were the real landowners 
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and that they would follow their lead. The lead in this case came from an old 
woman living at Sepu who was one of the few remaining Kankul clan members that 
used to live in that area and who thus claimed ownership over the entire Pimbum 
area. As a spokesman from the Aidem put it, recounting the Aidem story also told in 
chapter 4 
'We the landowners at Pimbum are not sure with our land boundaries because 
we were still [in the Bismarck Fall] when all our ancestors died. After all our 
ancestors died,... Mr. Katinga brought us down here to Pimbum. When Katinga 
brought us to Pimbum,... the old woman at Sepu gave us land which is Pimbum 
and told us to settle on Pimbum alone. This is the reason why we are not sure on 
which land to give for Conservation/WMA. We are just depending on the old 
woman at Sepu on what ever she says, then we will just have to follow her' (BRG 
1998d: 37). 
The conflict however, arose between the Sepu people and the Jimi settlers at 
Pimbum who felt threatened by this turn of events. In order to counter this threat 
they made use of Poko's story which suggests that the Jimi actually come from the 
Ramu Valley before moving up into the Jimi Valley (See chapter 4). This story was 
especially forcefully related by Gabriel Kenzegna, 'the president of the Ramu-Oipo 
association'. Kenzegna originally from the Bubkile area, had recently taken it upon 
him to organise the construction of the Pimbum airstrip and who now saw the 
position of the Jimi in the Ramu Valley threatened. He would step to the fore to 
argue the Jimi case, telling 
'the team that Pimbum is their land. People regard them as settlers because they 
came down from the mountains... [But] "after many of our ancestors passed 
away our forefathers moved up to ... [the] upper Jimi. We are beginning to come 
back to our land Pimbum and this is our land'" (BRG 1998d: 36). 
These men thus reversed the historical patterns of Jimi migration in order to present 
themselves as landowners. They then suggested that even though the Kankul lady 
obviously knew what she was talking about, she had no right to be seen as a 
landowner because 'She went and got married at Sepu and she does not have any 
rights to talk about the land at Pimbum area' (BRG 1998d: 36). This is a highland 
interpretation of the Ramu marriage patterns, which tend to be much more flexible 
than the marriage patterns that characterise the Jimi Valley. Kenzegna rounded off 
by resorting to simple threats arguing that it would be better for the lady to forget 
her clan's history or 'she will be sorry' (BRG 1998d: 36). 
Like the settler from the Middle Ramu who was trying to register the land along the 
Ramu River in his name, the two men suggested that recourse to local district 
authorities would be used to strengthen their case. This 'invention of tradition', was 
brought in a very aggressive manner, ending with the comment that as the Jimi were 
landowners in the Pimbum area, they would decide what portion of land to allocate 
to the WMA. These events did not make CD work with the Pimbum community any 
easier and would contribute to the decision to leave that area. The CD workers, in 
drawing u p the Sepu WMA area, would to 'solve' the problem by simply 
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subsuming the Pimbum area into their maps. Obviously, this leaves serious 
questions concerning the enforcement of WMA regulations among the Pimbum Jimi. 
The WMAs as they were drawn u p by the Ramu landowners, and as they were 
measured with the GPS system were transferred to butcher paper and aerial maps 
and from there on to a computerised mapping system of the area. The waypoints 
provided by the system were used to draw u p a legal schedule that described the 
boundaries of the WMA. Measurements from this system suggest that the Foroko 
WMA covers some 30,250 hectares, while the Sepu WMA covers shghtly over 39,000 
hectares. Later just under 2,000 additional hectares were added to the Sepu WMA as 
the Banam people decided they wanted to be part of it. Rather than having the CD 
workers take people through the whole conservation process, the Bismarck-Ramu 
team decided to let the Sepu people themselves take their neighbours through the 
process. The Banam people, after almost a year of discussions and consultations 
decided to adopt the Sepu rules and join in what is now known as the Sepu-Banam 
WMA. To the Madang group, this was proof of the fact that good ideas might 
actually be adopted by neighbouring groups and that the momentum for 
conservation in the Ramu floodplains was growing. 
DISTINGUISHING WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AREAS FROM CONSERVATION 
The intention of the WMA contained in the Fauna (Protection & Control) Act Is to 
provide a mechanism to which allow local landowners to put part of their lands into 
a so-called WMA to secure the conservation of specific fauna. In this area, hunting is 
regulated, while gardening and other practices may continue on the remainder of 
clan territory. The WMA and its rules thus cover only part of the clan's territory. In 
practice, communities wishing to secure their territories in the face of encroachment, 
however, prefer to put all of their lands into the WMA, using it as a legal 'holding 
vessel' for their land rights. This is what happened on the Ramu River where over 
time all of the clan lands were entered into the WMA. This outcome may not only 
have been a consequence of the wish of local people to secure their territorial claims, 
but may also have been a consequence of the actions of the project staff. In particular 
the wish to have a contiguous WMA, while also the project stance against a dual 
strategy of development and conservation may have played a role. 
The first issue came u p in discussion over boundary marking, when the result of the 
work by the local community was that each clan group selected a small area to 
protect. The conservation manager, however, explained that 
'it is much easier and better to have them connected. To explain he used the 
example of animals. Animals have the freedom to move around, if there is a 
space in between and used heavily by people it people will scare all animals. 
After the explanation the landowners understood and agreed to connect the land 
areas that were not connected (BRG 1998e: 17). 
Consequently, a single large Sepu WMA appeared rather then several small ones, 
the boundaries of which were mapped and transferred to an aerial photograph. The 
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second issue leading to large WMA, preferably covering all clan lands, had to do 
with the fact that people were told that a choice for conservation by part taking in 
the WMA, meant a choice against the companies. Because the Bismarck-Ramu team 
rejected the use of economic incentives, and actively spoke out against all company 
activity in the area, people were discouraged to follow a dual conservation and 
development strategy. A Foroko landowner, for example, explained that 
'My land is on the new road, can I give half to the WMA and half to the 
company? The company which builds roads has no gravel and I have allowed 
them to get gravel from my land and they have paid K15.000'. 
The CD team replied that he was the boss of his 'own land, forest and rivers', and 
that it was his choice, but also that to commit part of his land to conservation and 
another part to the company 'would be very hard because we educate you to protect 
your resources while the company destroys your resources' (BRG 1999a: 12). 
It appears that the Ramu people did the obvious thing in the light of these pressures. 
They first put their clan lands into the WMA, thus publicly who owned what, to 
later address the issue of what would be done in what part of the WMA. Thus soon 
after the WMAs had been marked and rules and penalties had been established (see 
below), discussions would take place to the effect that people had now put all of 
their lands into the WMA, but did not want the conservation rules that they had 
made to apply to their whole territory. Thus, they wanted the WMA to recognise 
their land holdings, but conservation to be restricted to a number of areas within the 
WMA. At Sepu one confused person, mixing u p the WMA with the more strictly 
protected areas therein, explained: 
'Our problem now is on the laws and the penalties. We thought that we would 
make the laws and the penalties for the restricted areas only and not [for the 
whole] of the WMA... We now have realised that the laws also cover the outside 
of the [restricted areas but inside the WMA], which now gives us a bit of 
problem' (BRG 1999b:18). 
Others more bluntly, stated that: 
'We, the landowners, want these rules to apply to the conserved areas only, 
while the outside [the WMA] will be taken care of by us... The company can 
come inside the WMA, outside the conserved areas and operate under our care' 
(BRG 1999b: 19). 
In line with their training, the CD workers could only reply that they, the Sepu 
landowners, could change the rules if they wanted, but that they should be careful 
with the type of companies coming in. What this illustrates, is the manner in which 
the WMA concept is co-opted to secure territorial rights, while subsequently the 
conservation content of the WMA mechanism is reduced to the conservation sites 
within the area. What is missing in the WMA set-up is a detailed land use plan that 
outlines the various uses to which the different areas can be put, and the rules and 
means to enforce these various uses. 
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TABLE 4 : RULES AND PENALTIES OF THE FOROKO WILDLIFE M A N A G E M E N T AREA 
No Law and penalty for mfringement 
No-one is to take, kill or injure an adult cassowary, goura pigeon, cockatoo, possum 
or crocodile. This is only allowed for the purpose of holding big celebrations. Fine for 
infringement: Landowners of the WMA pay K50, outsiders pay K200. If payment is not 
made, the matter is determined by the Council Court. 
No-one is to take, kill or harm wildlife in the sacred areas of the WMA. Fine for 
infringement One pig, two young cassowaries and K200. If payment is not made, the 
matter is determined by the Council Court. 
No-one is to take, kill or injure wildlife within the WMA by using: 1) nets 2) traps 
(this is only allowed around the edges of a garden) and 3) shot guns. Fine for 
infringement: Landowners pay K50, if no payment is njade, a pig worth K300 is given. 
No-one is to take, kill, injure wildlife using poisonous vines or plants in stagnant 
waters. These methods, however can be used in running streams. Fine for 
infringement Landowners pay K40,outsiders have to give a pig worth K110. If payment is 
not made, the matter is determined by the Council Court 
Oil, mining and logging companies are not allowed to carry out exploration, 
surveying and operating activities within the WMA. Fine for irifringement: The 
company is taken to Council Court 
Outsiders are not permitted in the sacred areas of the WMA. Fine for infringement: 
K500 or ten young cassowaries. If payment is not made, the matter is determined by the 
Council Court. 
No-one is allowed to light unnecessary fires in the WMA. Fine for infringement: K50. If 
payment is not made, the matter is determined by the Council Court. 
No-one is to damage plants and trees that wildlife feed on. Fine for infringement: K50. 
If payment is not made, the matter is determined by the Council Court 
Landowners within the WMA shall not permit outsiders to make new settlements in 
the WMA. Fine for infringement: K100 or a pig worth K100 or two young cassowaries: If 
payment is not made, the matter is determined by the Council Court. 
All proceeds go to the clan that owns the land where the offence took place. 
Source: Chitoa 2000 (see also BRG 1999b) 
RULE SETTING, PENALTIES, COMMITTEES A N D ENFORCEMENT 
In their treatment of WMA regulations and penalties, the CD workers started by 
consciously separating the establishment of rules from a discussion of penalties. 
They felt that the people first had to decide on what they actually wanted to protect 
within their WMA, only to look at the penalties they would impose on people not 
abiding by the rules later. This part of the process was largely left to the 
communities. The CD workers simply explained the need for rules and told people 
that they would return in three weeks time to see what they had developed. These 
rules were then extensively discussed and modified if such turned out necessary 
during the meeting. 
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A look at the rules as they were developed in Foroko, shows that they include a 
range of different mechanisms. Some of these show remarkable similarities in the 
mechanisms available under existing conservation legislation, others are in conflict 
with official law. 
• Certain animals can not be hunted unless there are ceremonial occasions for 
which they are needed. This includes the crocodile, which used to be an 
important source of cash for Ramu River communities. This mechanism is 
also reflected in the Fauna (Protection & Control) Act, which under section 29 
exempts automatic citizens from the prohibition on taking protected animals 
as long as the animal is taken for use in 'traditional native ceremonies' or 'for 
sale, not including money', to another citizen requiring the animal for 
customary purposes. 
• Certain devices are also prohibited such as nets, traps, guns and poisonous 
compounds. This too is a mechanism for which there exists a precedent in 
PNG state law, as under section 27 of the Fauna (Protection & Control) Act the 
Minister of Environment and Conservation may limit or prohibit the devices, 
equipment, and methods used for taking v\dldlife. If this were to be adhered 
to it would mean a serious reduction in Jimi incomes as many of them sell 
live birds caught with the help of traps and snares. 
• Sacred areas are totally off limits to hunters and outsiders. It is not clear 
whether these areas were defined separately or whether the people assumed 
that everybody, mcluding the Jimi settlers, knew where these were located. 
Such areas may also be exempted from resource exploitation under forest and 
rnining legislation. 
• Rule five states that oil, mining and logging companies can not enter the area 
without permission. This rule is partly incompatible with State law as unlike 
timber resources, mineral resources are vested in the State. Local people are 
only compensated for damages done in the process of resource extraction. 
This rule alone would probably make it impossible to declare the WMA. 
• Settlements, the use of 'unnecessary' (?) fire and damage to plants and trees 
are also forbidden. With regard to the penalties, one has to realise that none 
of these rules can be enforced in court until such day that the WMA and its 
rules have been gazetted. In this, the project would dependent on the DEC. 
• One can also wonder whether it is a good idea to penalise conservation 
breaches with a penalty consisting of two young cassowaries (rule 9). 
A similar process led to the drawing u p of a schedule of penalties related to these 
various rules. The CD team, however had to make clear that it would not act to 
enforce those rules, as people would have to do so themselves. The CD team 
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'told everyone that the WMA is theirs and the CDTs are always there to help 
educate them... There would be no one like policemen, CDTs or DEC officers to 
enforce the WMA rules and penalties. He told them that every one of them have 
responsibilities over their WMA' (BRG 1999b: 32). 
By mid 1999 the CD workers moved towards estabhshing WUdlife Management 
Committees (WMC) as stipulated in the Fauna (Protection & Control) Act. Committee 
formation would lead to problems wilTiin communities because in general 
community meetings the distinction between the various sorts of leaders is diffuse 
and multi-interpretable. The membership of formal committees, however, becomes 
an indication of local status, often outstripping the issue for which the committee 
was appointed in the first place (see for example Ellis 1998: 37 on attempts at 
committee formation in Pimbum). When committees are appointed these often serve 
as an excuse for the remainder of the community not to do anything. People will 
argue that the committee should take the lead, but because they have done nothing, 
nothing has happened. 
An additional issue may have to do with the fact that 'committees' are associated 
with 'sitting fees' as for example the members of local council committees receive a 
three monthly cheque for their work. In Lak, McCallum (1996) notes how the 
establishment of a local management committee not only led to debates on who is in 
and who is not, but also triggered protracted debates on 'sitting fees' and the use of 
vehicles. One and a half year after the CD work had started, and notwithstanding 
the endless repetitions by the CDs that they were not going to 'bring any form of 
cargo', some of the Brimde Jimi still thought they would be paid a wage if they 
established an environmental committee (BRG 1997e: 10). In some ways, this 
assumption is not so strange given the fact that two other Jimi were employed as 
radiomen. The distinction between those that were to do things for their own sake, 
and those that were being paid to do similar things may thus have appeared rather 
arbitrary. 
Consequently, committee formation became a source of dispute. Time and again the 
CD workers would return to hear that there were arguments about who was on the 
WUdlife Management Committee, that the chosen representatives had to be 
changed, that the relations between the community and the committee were unclear, 
or that the WMC had not met. This proved a frustrating experience in which the CD 
workers could little else than emphasise that if people 'really' wanted conservation, 
they really had to 'organise themselves' and 'work together'. 
'The team told the [Foroko] people that the WMA is not for the team, its is for 
them, the landowners. [The] team asked the people how they could look after 
and protect their WMA if there is jealousy, ignorance, laziness and divisions 
amongst themselves? ... The landowners have seen their failure and pleaded to 
the team to continue to work with them' (BRG 199d: 14). 
On subsequent visits however, little had been done. Over time some sort of 
management groups emerged, but in general the appointment of official committees 
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proved a source of a!ifficulties. Obviously the problem did not only he with local 
people, but also with the unrealistic stipulations of the Fauna (Protection & Control) 
Act which the Bismarck-Ramu project was trying to implement. 
It is at this stage, with the area boundaries, as well as the rules and penalties in 
place, and two management committee's appointed, that the CD worker handed the 
WMA over to local people as it was now 'up to the landowners to enforce those 
rules and regulations' (Lalley 1999: 46). How they were going to do this, and 
especially in respect of the forceful and numerous Pimbum Jimi settlers, is a 
question that remains to be answered. 6 0 This poses a question concerning the 
conservation content of the two Ramu River WMAs, an issue that will be discussed 
in the final chapter. Before entering into that discussion I will first describe how the 
project played a significant role in the emancipation of the Ramu landowners and 
the subsequent decision of the Brimde Jimi to move back u p to the Jimi Valley. I will 
end this chapter with a description of an event at Sogeram, which the Bismarck-
Ramu team regards as one of its greatest successes. 
T H E IMPACT OF THE PROJECT How THE BRIMDE JIMI LEFT THE R A M U VALLEY 
After the CD workers left Pimbum and focused on working with the Foroko and 
Sepu clans, things appeared to go well. The CD teams recognising the Ramu clans as 
the 'true landowners' and the Jimi as the 'settlers' emphasised the dominant role of 
the former in developing the WMA. Initially it appears that the Jimi settlers from 
Brimde, who were present at the first conservation meetings in Foroko agreed to 
follow the lead of the landowners. One of them, uncharacteristically meek, is quoted 
assaying 
'"We are not from here, we are settlers we do not have the authority to make 
decisions on what to do regarding your presentation. It is now up to these 
people to decide," he pointed to the representatives of the four clans that own 
the Foroko/Brimde area. He mentioned that whatever decision the landowners 
came up with, they would appreciate being informed' (Chitoa 1998a: 7). 
Notwithstanding this hopeful comment, which would lead some to suggest that the 
troubles were now over and conservation was about to take place (See Ellis 1998), 
relations with the Jimi in Brimde would not be very fruitful. In the beginning of 1991 
for example, a CD team noted that the Brimde Jimi told them that 
'the CD teams have been going in and out of the area and there has been nothing 
done so far by them. [They] worked in the Jimi area and did not bring any 
service or development, that is the reason why the Jimi people do not want us. 
6 0 One or two people were indeed fined for breaches of W M A regulations. In one case some outsiders 
were taken to task over illegal hunting and fined Kina 148. The penalty system, however,, also 
introduced new problems. During one of the last visits in 1999 a Ramu landowner explained that in a 
creek at within the WMA, some women used fishing nets to catch fish. This was forbidden by the 
rules of the W M A and when shortly afterwards one of these women died, her people claimed 
compensation from the owners of the creek as they regarded her death their doing (BRG 1999f: 42). 
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[The CDs] replied ... that [its] role is not to give money or cargo to people, but 
only to help them with ideas. The Jimi people do not want to work with the CD 
teams because they want money and cargo' (BRG 1999a: 9). 
Moreover, they would feel threatened by the WMA process 
'The Brimde people in seeing the [WMA] laws and penalties felt threatened and 
accused the CD teams and the [Ramu] clan leaders for coUaborating to throw 
them out. [One of the Ramu landowners] told the team that Brimde [Jimi] people 
threatened to provoke a fight between the clan leaders and the CD teams' (BRG 
1999c: 3). 
During 1999, the conflicts between the Jimi from Pimbum and those from Brimde, as 
well as those between the Jimi settlers and the Foroko landowners hardened to the 
extent that a number of serious fights took place. These continuing conflicts would 
make CD work among the Jimi settlers in Brimde very difficult, leading the 
Bismarck-Ramu team to focus on the Ramu landowners. By the end of 1999, the 
Brimde Jimi having suffered a number of deaths, some of which were attributed to 
sorcery, moved back up to the Jimi Valley. In doing so, they abandoned the various 
'services' that they had brought to the a rea Two Jimi men, wanting to remain 
behind asked to Foroko landowners permission to stay, but were told to leave as 
well (BRG 1999f). 
It is difficult to see what the exact influence of the Bismarck-Ramu project has been 
in this conflict. One can not escape the conclusion, however, that the Ramu 
landowners were largely able to reassert their authority over the Jimi settlers 
through the many sessions held by the CD workers. These sessions, emphasising the 
fundamental rights of landowners, and underlining issues of empowerment, self-
reliance and organisation, not only gave the Ramu landowners the self-confidence, 
but also the forum to speak u p against the Jimi settlers. Thus where Filer et Al. (1995: 
34) note during the first visit to Foroko-Brimde that the 'true landowners observed 
the proceedings in silence from a short distance away' and preferred to talk in 
private rather than public, over time the Ramu clans became increasingly vocal. In 
their assertions of authority, the project became a supporting factor. The CD 
workers, associated with the Government, deferred to the landowners as the key 
decision-makers and thereby implicitly, and at times exphcitly, told the Jimi settlers 
to know their place. 
Events in Pimbum and Foroko-Brimde took different turns for a number of reasons. 
In the first place the position of the Kema Jimi in Brimde was more tenuous that that 
of the Pala Jimi in Pimbum. The latter had entered a virtually uninhabited area as 
the owners either lived further away on the Ramu River or still resided with the 
Aidem in the Bismarck Fall. When these later came down, they were thus more or 
less confronted with a fait accompli. Thus where the Brimde Jimi acknowledged that 
they lived in the Ramu valley by virtue of the permission given by the Foroko clans, 
the Pimbum Jimi argued that they bought the land or were born there and should 
thus be seen as 'true' landowners. 
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Whereas the Pimbirm area initially appeared to be the most successful area in the 
Bismarck-Ramu, managing to attract the base, the endless squabbles finally led the 
project team to withdraw from that area. The teams kept coming to Foroko-Brimde, 
however, and due to work on setting u p the proposed WMA, mcluding the 
registration of all 'true landowners', the drawing u p of borders and the rules and 
penalties associated with WMA management, made clear that the Jimi were 
outsiders. A serious spell of bad luck in the form of a number of conflicts and deaths 
and the associated fear of sorcery was the straw that broke the camel's back, finally 
leading the Brimde Jimi to return to Bubkile. 
In a sense, history repeats itself. When the April 1995 patrol visited the area, Filer, 
following a conversation with a member of one of the Foroko groups suggested that 
due to the levels of Jimi-Ramu intermarriage these groups were being absorbed by 
the Jimi. This because children whose parents have different languages normally 
speak the language of their mothers. Filer's informants however did not see the 
identity of their ethnic group at risk, arguing that they had experience with such 
uneven relationships as previous to the arrival of the Jimi settlers 
'they had participated in another 'symbiotic' relationship with Gain) people who 
had migrated down to the floodplain from the Tagui valley (see Johnson 1982). 
We were told that... the number of Gainj people has been much reduced, either 
because of death and disease or because they have returned to their homes in the 
Tagui valley. These statements are apparently confirmed by the 1990 national 
census data' (Filer etAl. 1995: 52). 
T H E S O G E R A M CONSERVATION DEED 
By the end of 1998, the Biodiversity Program was not only active in establishing the 
two WMAs in Foroko and Sepu, but the CD workers were also visiting many other 
areas around the initially selected project area. Rather than selecting these areas 
based on biological of social indicators, they would follow the invitations of local 
people, who hearing about their work would ask them to come and visit their 
communities. CD work thus expanded into the Maring and Simbai areas to the West 
of Foroko-Brimde and the Jimi Valley, into the Garaligut and Usino areas to the east 
of Sepu and further north towards the Sogeram area. The latter area is of specific 
interest, as it is here that the Bismarck-Ramu project would book its greatest success 
(BRG 1999c, 1999e and 19991). 
The Sogeram area north of the Ramu River, lies adjacent to a number of large 
logging concessions operated by the Madang Timber and JANT forestry companies 
and was the next area that the National Forest Authority was trying to consign to 
logging. In order to do so, forestry officers were surveying the area, some of them 
already being seen as far south as the Ramu River close to Foroko in the middle of 
1996 (BRG 1996a). They also told local leaders to create landowner companies that 
could serve as a legal vehicle for the application for a timber permit. As with many 
logging concessions there was much debate among local people about the question 
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whether this was a good thing or not. Having heard of the work that the 
'environment people' were undertaking on the Ramu River, a number of Sogeram 
people invited the project to come and talk to them about these logging plans. 
This was an exciting and also frightening request to the Bismarck-Ramu project, as it 
had until now operated in an area in which it did not have to compete directiy with 
local forestry interests. The Lak experience still weighed on the project's mind. The 
project team, however, decided to go in with the same philosophy used in the 
Bismarck-Ramu area, discussing the pro's and con's as people saw them, allowing 
the involved communities to come to a decision on their own account. A major 
difference in their approach was that due to a lack of time they also decided to warn 
local people about the dangers of logging and the way in which logging companies 
operate. Various teams went in, emphasising self-reliance with the usual tools, 
spending time to get to know the local clan structure, at the same time building u p a 
range of social relations. 
Over time, 11 clans expressed an interest in conservation, following which the 
conservation manager took them through the matrix of conservation options. The 
community was divided with some clans expressing an interest in establishing a 
conservation area, while others favoured logging. The CDs visited the area 
repeatedly over 1999 to find out whether people could come to an agreement, telling 
people not to waste their time but to come sort of decision: 
'We applaud your decision but is it a true decision or a fake decision? We'll be 
back in May. You sit down and talk seriously about it. We are coming back to 
work with 2 clans for sure and 4 clans maybe. Now 6 more clans say they want 
in. Do you really? We'll see! It's easy to say yes we want to look after our bush 
now, but when the loggers come with their big promises and money and alcohol 
... what will you say then? That's the test. 
"You begged us to come.... You said please help us - we don't know what to do -
we can't keep the loggers out. We told you then - believe in yourselves. We told 
you then all you have to say is NO! You are the bosses of this ground - no one 
can tell you what to do. We'll be back in May -... only those clans who are strong 
and clear ... will not bow down once the loggers come"... The men put their 
heads down and not a word was said. The silence, said [the community area 
manager], was deafening. When the silence was broken it was from someone far 
in the back - a woman. She said this was the first time she had ever said anything 
in a meeting, but hearing Grace talk gave her the courage as a women to say 
what she felt. She thanked the CD teams for their work over the last 5 months. 
She said you have given us much to think about - and you are right - this is not a 
game for you CD teams or for us - it's about our life - and I support the strong 
words of our sister - we need to make a decision and we need to talk a lot more 
about it before the CD teams come back '(Lalley to VanHelden 21 April 2000). 
It was at this stage that the project decided to introduce a new legal instrument. 
Rather than trying to develop a WMA or Conservation Area, which would never be 
a legally recognised instrument in time to halt the logging, the project decided to try 
and use a so-called Conservation Deed, based on an idea by Brunton (1998). A 
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Conservation Deed is an agreement among resource owners themselves as to how to 
manage their joindy owned natural resources. The only thing it entails is a contract 
between all the members of a number of landowning clans to refrain from certain 
resource uses. Unlike all other forms of conservation legislation that define a variety 
of protected area regimes, a Conservation Deed is grounded in private law. The 
Deed falls under the PNG Law of Contract, which protects and enforces agreements 
not only between the parties that enter these agreements but also protects such 
agreements from third party interference. 
As the Constitution of PNG recognises the ownership rights of resource owners, and 
as these land-owning clans have made an agreement among themselves; the Deed 
can not easily be undone by a third party such as a logging company. Not even the 
Government of PNG is able to do so, for exactly the same reasons that it has so few 
possibilities to enforce state-led forms of conservation without communal consent. 
Attractive is also that the facihtating NGO itself is not party to the agreement either. 
Only if all involved parties agree that the Deed should be rescinded can such be 
done. Any unilateral violation of the Deed is punishable in court as a breach of 
contract, either triggering the enforcement of the contract, or forcing the defaulting 
party to pay damages. As such, it provides an interesting legal vehicle to protect 
resources. 
In the Sogeram case, a growing consensus developed against the timber concession, 
thwarting representatives of the local landowner company and the national and 
provincial forest authorities in their attempts to collect the necessary signatures. The 
BR team played a role in preparing local people, role playing the usual pattern that 
the interactions between logging proponents and rural communities take. Realising 
that especially the women opposed the forestry operations as they are usually the 
first to suffer from a loss of subsistence resources, a contamination of waterways and 
the drunkenness of their husbands, a drama team recruited by the Biodiversity 
Program presented the story of a fictitious African village. In this village the men 
were weak and said 'yes' to the offers of beer and money, only to see the women 
and children suffer afterwards. According to the CD workers that witnessed these 
plays the silence was deafening afterwards as everybody recognised the pattern of 
events taking place in other villages in the area. Not much later the role plays turned 
into reality in their own community: 
[In April 2000] a chopper dropped into Sogeram. On it were two representatives 
from the Forest Authority (FA) - one from Madang and one from Moresby. With 
them was the President of the local Landowners Association. A man who has 
been bought by the company and has been very uncomfortable with the CD 
teams. The two FA reps get out of the plane - tell the people who they are and 
why they are there. They are there for the people to sign a Forest Management 
Area [agreement]. There are 100's of people there. The FA people hand out some 
booklets and bring out 1 1 / 2 bales of rice. After making their pitch about 
development etc. the landowners (very friendly & politely we are told) informed 
the FA folks they were not interested in signing [the papers] and did not want 
their bush logged. The FA representatives gave the same tired old bullshit pitch 
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- "So you want to live like our ancestors huh? you don't want development to 
come huh? you don't want roads and a school and a clinic huh? 
Upon completion of that pitch the landowners said we've seen Madang Timbers 
here for many years, we've seen JANT here for 20 years. Where are the schools 
you talk about? .... Where is the house sick you talk about. We don't even see an 
aid post. And roads - do you call these roads - these are simply constructed to 
get the timber out - only logging trucks can use them. No we have seen your so 
called development and we say no ... Not expecting that response and not 
knowing what to do they took off saying they would return tomorrow. The 
people said fine and the FA representatives took off. The next day from the sky 
falls the FA representatives and Chairman of the Landowner Company again. 
They give the same pitch. When they finished the people began collecting the 
books the FA representatives gave them the day before: .... "Here you can go 
now and take these with you... ". The FA boys and the chairman took the books 
- got on the helicopter and took off (Lalley to VanHelden 21 April 2000). 
The deed that was drawn up, not only registered the various clan groups and their 
landholdings but also outlined a number of management rules which would be 
covered by the Deed. This there was a complete prohibition on logging. In Sogeram 
too the earlier noted pattern of using conservation mechanisms as a means to keep 
outsiders out shines through. As one commentator noted that many different people 
with their dogs hunted in his forest 'despite the fact that they have been asked not to 
hunt in other people's land' (BRG 1999e: 10). 
In May 1999, when the team emphasised the fact that local people should decide on 
its rules the Sogeram people added one more rule to the list. This rule said 'that the 
people from out side who are now settling on our land must leave and go back to 
their own land where they have originated from'" (BRG 1999d: 17). In June 2000, 
eleven clans from the Sogeram area signed a Conservation Deed in which they 
agreed amongst themselves that they would not have timber harvested from an 
18,500-hectare large area. As the CD trainer recounts 
It was quite a day - very festive. 3 company men were there to disrupt, but were 
shouted down by the people and sent on their way. ... I think one of the most 
remarkable things is that over signatories were all there to sign. Only those of us 
that have worked in Melanesia can appreciate what a feat that is. The Forest 
Authority went in 3 weeks ago with K40.000 cash and papers demanding they 
sign. They were thrown out. The day prior to their arrival (they informed the 
people they were corning), the women called a meeting and told the men - "you 
know damn well why they are coming- now don't weaken, stand up, be strong 
etc. etc." - and the boys did that. We role played possible scenarios and they 
played themselves out. For instance the people were told "okay if you don't sign 
- when the schools do come and the haus sik and the roads - any clan in the 
Conservation Area can not use these facilities. "The people said, "fine - now 
could you please leave - and don't forget your money!!! ... It proves what we 
have been saying all along. We don't have to start with economic incentives. 
There are deeper reasons to look after the bush' (Lalley to VanHelden 21 April 
2000). 
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C O N C L U S I O N S 
The chapter has started of with a description of how the CD workers presented 
themselves in the new community entry approach, what modifications they 
introduced in the process, and how gender played role both on the side of the CD 
workers as well as within the various communities. This was followed by a detailed 
account of how the Jimi communities responded to the change in project strategy. 
Where the Jimi were used to talking to the a expatriate-led project team which 
framed conservation in terms of an exchange for development, they were now 
confronted with a group of fellow citizens that had ceased talking about 
conservation and had carefully deleted economic notions from their presentations. 
Not surprisingly, relations between project and people deteriorated, a process 
further exacerbated by the fall-out of the biological survey, the national and local 
elections, tribal conflicts and the strategic agenda of the community facilitator. By 
the start of 1998, the project decided to leave the Jimi Valley altogether. 
Among the mixed communities hving the Ramu area beneath the foothills of the 
Bismarck Range things did not go much better, be it for different reasons. Here too 
past interventions by the project played a role, especially as a result to the 
establishment of the base at Pimbum, the appointment of two Jimi settlers as 
radiomen and again the activities of the community facilitator. The resulting 
conflicts over project-related assets, jobs and opportunities, however, were in the 
first place an expression of the conflicts between people in the area, into which the 
project was enlisted. Under these circumstances, the project team had little chance of 
establishing a community-based and collective-action type of conservation 
arrangement. In the end to project had to withdraw from the mixed Jimi-Ramu 
communities too. 
It was, however among the Ramu River clans at Foroko and Sepu that the CD 
workers, more or less coincidentally, stumbled across a fertile 'middle ground'. 
While project interventions had until then been heavily biased towards the Jimi, the 
CD meetings would increasingly offer the Ramu clans an opportunity to speak up 
against the encroaching Jimi. When these clans realised that a conservation 
arrangement could help them to assert their rights as landowners in the face of Jimi 
migration and competing claims within the floodplains, the project and Ramu 
people quickly found one another. The Jimi living at Brimde decided to support the 
local drive for land registration and the establishment of a WMA, as the alternative 
of land registration and logging was much less preferable. The remainder of the 
chapter outlines how the project developed a slow, participatory and step-by-step 
conservation approach. This approach would lead to the proposed establishment of 
two proposed WMAs, the drawing u p of boundaries, the establishment of 
committees and the development of a number of rules and related penalties. The 
chapter ends with description of the manner in which the Bismarck-Ramu project 
used a new legal mechanism to thwart a logging company in the Sogeram area, thus 
keeping some 18,500 hectares of forest from being logged. 
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I have argued that the coalition between project and Ramu people has its roots in the 
'expedient misunderstandings' that enable such middle grounds (White 1991: x). By 
bringing a number of different strategic goals under the catch-all notion of 
conservation rather disparate agenda's could be reconciled forging an alliance which 
was attractive to the involved parties for different reasons. To local people, the 
project became an ally in their attempts to keep highlands migrants at bay and to 
secure legal rights to land and resources. To the executing project team it confirmed 
the success of its participatory conservation strategy, while at the level of the 
program adnTinistration it facilitated an application for donor funds, as the program 
now appeared to meet the conservation goals defined by its donors. The question 
whether this indeed constitutes conservation in the sense intended by the donors 
and a discussion of the question to what extent such conservation on the Ramu 
River is sustainable constitutes the topic of the final chapter. 
This chapter will discuss a number of critical questions with regard to the 
conservation content of the Ramu River WMAs. The underlying debate over who 
drives the conservation and development agenda, matters of institutional control as 
these affected the Bismarck-Ramu project itself, and the all important discussion 
over how to secure the 'sustainabihty' of such community-led initiatives would 
bring to the fore how far the Madang project team, the DEC, and the international 
donor agencies had grown apart. It will be argued that these debates fall back on the 
two opposing views of local people introduced in the first chapter. The donor 
agencies, in line with the dominant conservation narrative viewed local people as 
the cause of environmental degradation, while the field staff of the Bismarck-Ramu 
project saw local communities as the point of resistance against the destructive and 
disempowering activities of foreign companies. 
The people responsible for the development of a second phase fimding proposal to 
the GEF, especially the chief technical advisor of the Biodiversity Program and a 
UNDP project development specialist, were caught in the middle. Having to frame 
the environmental situation in the Bismarck-Ramu area in terms of the narrative 
employed by the donor in order to secure funding, they lost the Bismarck-Ramu 
field staff on the way. 
Chapter 8 
NARRATIVES OF CONSERVATION, SUSTAINABILITY AND 
CONTROL 
INTRODUCTION 
By early 1998, as the events oulTined in the previous chapter took place, the matter 
of future fuxiding became an issue of concern to the Bismarck-Ramu project. This 
chapter will outline how in the attempt to secure second phase funding from the 
GEF it gradually became clear that the intervention philosophy of the Bismarck-
Ramu project and the dominant conservation narratives applied by the international 
donors were incompatible. The project team in Madang worked from the idea that 
communities are mtrinsically conservation-mclined and that leading people back to 
their tradition' would secure conservation in the form of two WUdlife Management 
Areas (WMAs). Representatives of the GEF and the UNDP were impressed by the 
community entry strategy, but less certain of the conservation content of the 
suggested VvTvIAs, and of the extent to which such management regimes would 
prove sustainable in the longer term. Consequently, they emphasised the need to 
use economic incentives in order to secure the sustainability of such conservation 
regimes. An additional problem was that the Bismarck-Ramu project did not meet 
three requirements necessary to make it eligible for GEF funding. In the first place it 
lacked a reliable co-financing partner, in the second place the project needed to 
define a set of 'baseline activities' which would be amenable to GEF 'incremental 
cost funding'. Thirdly and finally, there was the issue that the GEF only funds 
biodiversity initiatives in areas under threat, while the Bismarck-Ramu area had 
been selected because of its low levels of threat. All of these problems had to be 
addressed if the Bismarck-Ramu project was to be eligible for second phase funding. 
This chapter outlines how the chief technical advisor and the former resource 
economist of the Biodiversity Program, now a GEF project development specialist at 
the UNDP, made a concerted attempt to bridge the gap between the philosophy of 
the Madang group, the administrative requirements of the GEF and the realities in 
the Ramu Valley. They did so by entering into a coalition with The Nature 
Conservancy (TNC), that was developing an ecologically friendly timber operation 
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to the north of the Bismarck-Ramu area. In doing so, they reproduced the Lak idea 
where a sustainable timber operation was to fund the establishment and 
management of a protected area. Notwithstanding a careful management of the 
proposal, the proponents of a joint BR/TNC proposal underestimated the extent to 
which the Madang group believed in its community-based conservation philosophy. 
Seeing itself as the guardians of the Ramu communities, pointing to the supposed 
^compatibility between economic and conviction-based conservation strategies, 
and fearing a loss of control over their relations with local people, the Madang staff 
eventually decided to opt out of the GEF proposal. 
MEASURES OF SUCCESS 
At face value, the Bismarck-Ramu project had achieved some impressive results by 
mid 1998. Local people had agreed to designate some 122,000 hectares to the 
establishment of two WMAs, and were going through a nidimentary boundary 
mapping exercise. The combined emphasis on community organisation and the local 
interest in conservation meant that the Bismarck-Ramu team considered its work 
largely done. This view led the Bismarck-Ramu team to develop what it called 'an 
exit strategy', allowing it to wi thdraw from communities once these were at a stage 
where they could do things themselves. In this view, some communities had become 
self-reliant because of the CD work, and were therefore no longer in need of further 
assistance. As a patrol report from late 1999 notes: 
'The team is working very slowly to leave the [Sepu] community because: a) The 
community has organized and is working together to solve some of its problems, 
b) they have realized that they have the power and strength to be self-reliant and 
bring development into the community, c) they know the importance of their 
resources like rivers, land, wildlife and forests' (BRG 1999e: 3) . 
The Bismarck-Ramu project thus based itself on a rather static vision of 
communities, hoping that once local people had been 'led back' to their 'traditional' 
lifestyles, these values and perspectives would remain in place. Such a view is 
unrealistic not only, because it entails a reinvention of tradition (see chapter 6), but 
also because local perspectives of nature may change rapidly (See chapter 4). The 
very same type of social pressures that led to the establishment of the WMA on the 
Ramu River and the signing of the Sogeram conservation deed can also undo these 
achievements. 
Whereas the Madang project staff thus argued that it had helped the Ramu river 
communities to organise themselves, and as a result, now had 'more than 100,000 
hectares under conservation', not everybody was equally impressed. According to 
the conservation manager of the Bismarck-Ramu project, a lawyer working at DEC 
exclaimed that the Bismarck-Ramu project 'had achieved absolutely nothing' (PC 
John Chitoa March 2000). From a conservation policy perspective, this was indeed 
the case as there was no official designation of these areas as WMAs. In the parlance 
of conservationists, the Ramu River WMAs would not even achieve the status of 
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'paper park' until they were gazetted. 6 1 More important than the view of the more or 
less defunct DEC, which itself is responsible for an enormous backlog in WMA 
applications, are questions with regard to the actual conservation content of the 
management regimes on the ground. There are a number of problems that make it 
difficult to equate the present situation with conservation. 
In the first place, there is the problem that the project biologist already warned for in 
early 1996. The WMAs are established in an area about which very little is known in 
terms of biodiversity. It is lowland forest, and lowland forest in PNG is generally 
rich in species, but that is about as far as biological knowledge now goes. It is thus 
unclear whether the area that is now being presented as a WMA was actually worth 
the effort. Such a s tudy needs to be made, not only to answer the question whether 
these areas are worth further investment, but also to serve as a baseline to measure 
the impacts of human activities as well as the effectiveness of conservation measures 
in the future. 
A second and related question concerns an analysis of local threats from an 
ecosystem and species perspective in order to design and plan the best possible 
conservation mechanisms. At this moment, all clan lands are subsumed under the 
proposed WMA, without a land use plan that manages gardening, hunting, and 
conservation activities. The discussions over the extent to which land wilxiin the 
WMA would fall under 'conservation', and whether other parts could be used for 
'development' illustrates how the WMA itself functions more as a 'holding vessel' 
for local landowners than as a conservation mechanism. Developing such a land use 
plan may be a difficult exercise given that the WMAs are inhabited by a number of 
different Ramu and Jimi clans, probably requiring detailed negotiations between the 
various groups. It would also require ecological input. While local people have 
considerable knowledge of their environment, they do not have specialised 
knowledge concerning conservation area design. Neither does the Bismarck-Ramu 
project have such expertise anymore. Whereas the Lak project suffered from a lack 
of social scientists, it appears that the Bismarck-Ramu team now suffers from a lack 
of ecological knowledge. To some people within the Bismarck-Ramu project these 
questions may appear irrelevant as they are predominantly interested in the process 
of community development and the way in which the CD workers could get people 
organised. To conservationists and their donors, however, this is an unsatisfactory 
answer. 
A third issue concerns the question of enforcement. How will people make sure that 
everybody involved in these WMAs abides by these rules? Social control may play a 
role, but it concerns a large area with often scattered households who can pretty 
much do as they like. In addition, it is unclear whether the Jimi settlers are 
susceptible to such social controls. The Ramu people, often avoiding conflict rather 
than seeking it out, are unlikely to trudge into a Jimi village to demand 
6 1 The IUCN defines a 'paper park' as 'a legally established protected area where experts believe 
current protection activities are insufficient to halt degradation' (IUCN 1999a:7). 
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compensation for illegal hunting. H o w effective have the CD workers and local 
people been at estabHshing wndlife management committees, and do these 
committees manage to mete out punishment for breaches of regulations? Experience 
to date shows that management committees constitute a source of confusion and 
conflict and are often ineffective. Their establishment is however, a requirement 
under the Fauna (Protection & Control) Act. 
If we look at the earlier proposed définition of 'western' conservation as something 
which is intentional and imposes a short-term cost in order to avoid a demonstrable loss 
of resources in the longer run, it is difficult to see how the events on the Ramu River 
can be equated to conservation. The VVMA establishment was certainly intentional, 
and may also have been motivated by conservation concerns, but appears to be in 
the first place driven by local territorial considerations. Up to this day the WMAs 
have not imposed a direct cost on people, other than through the time and effort 
spent with the CD workers in establishing these areas. This should not be 
mderest imated, but is not comparable to the difficult trade off between resource 
development in the form of logging or rnining on the one hand and conservation on 
the other. The question whether the WMAs lead to long term conservation and if 
there is any difference between patterns of resource use before and after the 
Bismarck-Ramu intervention remains unanswered due to a lack of baseline data and 
ecological analysis. The situation at Sogeram is different People there have wittingly 
incurred considerable opportunity cost by signing the conservation deed, and in this 
sense, it is here that the Bismarck-Ramu team has scored its most significant results. 
In terms of its conservation effect, it is clear that any day without logging is again. 
Thus looking at the situation from this perspective, considerable conservation 
success has been booked at Sogeram. 
This brings us to the fourth and final issue concerning the conservation content of 
the Bismarck-Ramu program, which has to do with the issue of long term 
sustainability. Conservation activities entail a cost for local people while logging 
projects or other resource uses bring an immediate benefit. H o w can the project 
ensure that people continue to support these conservation ideas in the face of social 
change, the monétisation of the economy, the pending break-down of previously 
existing leadership structures and social controls and growing feelings of relative 
deprivation? This question would come to dominate during the negotiations over a 
second phase proposal to the GEF. 
BETWEEN CONSERVATION AND CONTROL I 
The Bismarck-Ramu team was obviously not unaware of the critical questions 
concerning its conservation success, but was not sure what to do about them either. 
The real matter turned out to be one of control rather than conservation. On pressing 
the issue, and posing the question whether there was really a change in communal 
resource management practices between the pre-project situation and the present, 
the CD trainer wrote back: 'the answer is we don't really know what they [the local 
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cornmunities] are doing'. The remainder of the answer made clear that his 
reluctance to drive the conservation management issue more vigorously had to do 
with the trade-off between conservation and control. By bringing in the biologists, 
the Bismarck-Ramu team runs the risk of losing control over the community process, 
thereby compromising its philosophy and achievements. The team would like to 
transfer the Ramu River WMA process to a conservation agency with the necessary 
know how and the 'right' set of attitudes, but is afraid that such will compromise the 
self-reliance that people have been developing. 
'Let's not go in like a [mainstream conservation organisation] and overstructure 
and fuck em up.... if another organisation can assist - really assist we're happy to 
move out. But the fear is if a [mainstream conservation organisation] goes in - it 
could spell disaster. So lots going on and good debates - as usual' (Lalley to 
VanHelden 12 July 2001). 
The Bismarck-Ramu team's perception of a trade-off between conservation and 
control and its reluctance to invite conservationists back into the project is not 
unique. The IIED (1994: 55) for example also argues that: 
"The study of biodiversity, its monitoring, and the implementation of measures 
to conserve it in the future are seen as the legitimate domain of natural scientists, 
most often expatriates, who have the skills of Western scientific methods to carry 
out these tasks. Thus, the aim of maintaining biodiversity militates against the 
empowerment of communities to manage their natural resources' 
These questions, about the nature of present day resource management on the Ramu 
River and whether the Bismarck-Ramu interventions have made a difference in 
terms of conservation, would come together in a discussion of the notion of 
'smtainability'. It was not just the question whether these WMAs actually conserved 
biodiversity, but especially whether they could be deemed 'sustainable' over the 
longer term, what the role of local people and economic incentives in securing such 
sustainability were, and - not unimportant - the question who decided what to do 
and where to go, that would introduce a fundamental break between the Bismarck-
Ramu project team and its donors. 
SECURING SECOND PHASE FUNDING 
From the end of 1997 onwards, the chief technical advisor in Port Moresby and the 
UNDP country office started working on the development of a second phase 
proposal for the Bismarck-Ramu project. Although the Biodiversity Program had 
also contained a number of other objectives, it was clear that the Bismarck-Ramu 
project was the most interesting aspect of the program and the one that most 
warranted a continuation in funding. 
Initially, the aim was to apply to the GEF for a so-called medium-sized grant of U$ 
750,000 for a period of three years. The project team in Madang, the chief technical 
advisor in Port Moresby and the UNDP were under time pressure to develop the 
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proposal, as the Biodiversity Program would officially end by April 1998. Although 
the chief technical advisor managed to extend the program until the end of the year, 
and although the UNDP country office continued funding the project after that time, 
it was unclear how long these funds would last. Priority was therefore given to 
continuing the fieldwork in the Ramu Valley and to keeping the chief technical 
advisor in the Port Moresby Office for another 8 months in order to facilitate 
development of a second phase proposal to the GEF. 
During the writing of the proposal, however, it became clear that the chances of 
getting a second phase of the Bismarck-Ramu project funded through a medium-
sized grant application were slim. The main reasons were firstly, that the GEF insists 
on co-financing arrangements. It will not fund projects without other parties putting 
their money and resources into the project, and a stand-alone project such as that 
suggested for the Bismarck-Ramu, was unlikely to receive funding. Related to this 
was the need to secure post-project financial suslamability. The Bismarck-Ramu 
project could obviously argue that the DEC was its main co-financing partner, but 
this turned out to be a hard pitch to make given the simple fact that the DEC had for 
years been withholding funding to the Biodiversity Program. As a project brief on 
GEF criteria for ehgibility noted: '[GEF funded] projects require a supportive policy 
framework, that abets rather than retards conservation' (UNDP, no date: 6). 
Resource politics in PNG, however, tend to be characterised by constant policy flip-
flops, while conservation issues are accorded little priority. This became clear during 
the ongoing financial crisis, which saw funding to the DEC cut time and again. In 
1998, the DEC was downgraded to the status of Office of Environment and 
Conservation (OEC), while 50 percent of its staff was retrenched. The likelihood of 
the new OEC being accepted as a counterpart to a second phase of the Bismarck-
Ramu project thus became smaller and smaller. Although the OEC did not even on 
paper look like a stable and reliable partner, this issue could probably have been 
dealt with in the medium-sized grant proposal, were it not for other problems. 
More difficult was the second fact, namely that the GEF only funds the incremental 
costs associated with making an otherwise environmentally damaging activity more 
ecologically friendly Thus, so-called 'baseline' activities can be made more 
environmentally friendly with the help of GEF financial assistance. The GEF, 
however, will not fund the baseline activities themselves. Problem to the Bismarck-
Ramu project was that it had no set of environmentally unfriendly operations that 
could be modified to become more environmentally benign. 
Thirdly and finally, there was the issue of sustainabuity such as that contained in the 
ICAD notion. The GEF only funds biodiversity projects that are likely to lead to long 
term conservation. Over time, there developed a concern with the question to what 
extent the community entry process produced conservation results, and even if it 
did, how sustainable these results were. This is not only a philosophical debate on 
how and when to bring economic activities into community-based conservation 
projects; it is also an administrative requirement on the part of the GEF. A UNDP 
brief for example states that projects must 'include an incentive-based design' to 
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ensure sustainability after GEF support ends (UNDP no date: 5). In other words, 
without economic incentives, the donor does not think that conservation projects 
can be sustainable in the longer term. The only answer the Biodiversity Program 
could come up with in the context of PNG land tenure was to assert, in line with the 
ICAD notion, that it would make it economically advantageous to local 
communities to pursue conservation. This, however, clashed with the community 
entry approach that denounced the use of economic incentives for conservation. It is 
here that the analysis of the donor and that of the field staff in the Bismarck-Ramu 
came to diverge to an insurmountable extent. 
T H E BIOSPHERE RESERVE A N D T H E NATURE CONSERVANCY 
At the end of May 1998, the Minister of Environment and Conservation, the chief 
technical advisor of the Biodiversity Program and a number of DEC officials paid a 
visit to the Madang office of the Bismarck-Ramu project. During this visit, it was 
proposed that a much larger proposal had a better chance of being funded by the 
GEF than the small stand-alone project previously proposed. One of the DEC 
officials, explained that it was DEC's policy to think in terms of Total Catchment 
Environmental Management, and that the second Bismarck-Ramu proposal was too 
small to fit DEC's main policy towards conservation (Ellis 1998). Instead the chief 
technical advisor and DEC suggested to expand the proposal to include the whole 
2500 square kilometre Ramu River basin in a new and much larger GEF proposal 
centring on the idea of a Biosphere Reserve. Although this suggestion came out of 
the blue to the Madang group, it is likely that it was premeditated between the chief 
technical advisor of the Biodiversity Program and DEC. 
This proposal entailed a close collaboration with The Nature Conservancy (TNC), an 
American conservation agency of world renown that was looking into conservation 
issues in PNG by taking a novel approach. Where most conservation projects aim to 
resist logging endeavours, in some cases such as in Lak, trying to use sustainably 
operated forest projects to fund conservation activities, TNC wanted to develop a 
sustainable timber operation itself. The central idea in this strategy was to 
demonstrate to local people and the Government of PNG that timber concessions 
could be both profitable, socially beneficial and ecologically sustainable if they were 
managed properly. In order to pursue this option, the TNC vied for a concession in 
the Josephstaal area in the north of Madang province through the same 
administrative and political channels used by Malaysian and Korean companies. By 
1997, the Josephstaal people had had their area slated for logging and the contract 
was being tendered by the National Forest Authority in order to select the best 
qualifying company. In entering the fray, the TNC got mixed up in a highly political 
process, whereby landowners, the provincial government, local politicians, factions 
in the national forest administration all tried to influence the outcome of the 
tendering process. The Biodiversity Program supported TNC by funding an 
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economic analysis of the Josephstaal logging operations, in line with its earlier 
design of the Lak sustainable forestry project. 
The TNC tender on the Josephstaal concession, the new DEC policy of Total 
Catchment Environmental Management, and the establishment of the two Ramu 
River WMAs through the Bismarck-Ramu community entry process came together 
in the idea of a 'biosphere reserve'. Key to this concept, already introduced in the 
opening chapter of this study, is the old idea of the national park, in biosphere 
language called a 'Core Conservation Area', surrounded by a number buffer zones, 
within which limited economic activity is allowed. In this plan, the Bismarck-Ramu 
area of interest and especially the proposed WMAs on the Ramu River, would 
constitute the core area of the biosphere reserve, while the area to the north, 
including the Josephstaal forest area would serve as a buffer zone. This was not the 
first time that the Biosphere Reserve concept had been mentioned in conjunction 
with the Bismarck-Ramu area project. Already in 1995 the site selection analysis 
mentioned that: "The DEC Resource Inventory Branch is of the opinion that the new 
site should employ the Man and Biosphere model of zones of protection and zones 
of regulated multiple use. This model will have to be modified to fit within the PNG 
land tenure system' (DEC 1995: 27). 
This area, consisting of the Bismarck-Ramu core area, the unassigned Middle Ramu 
area and the Josephstaal timber concession would be surrounded by an Outer 
Transition Zone covering the full Ramu River Watershed and of some 2500 square 
kilometres, involving no less than four provincial Governments and numerous local 
level governments. The Outer Transition Zone would also contain a number of 
private sector partners, such as the nickel-cobalt mine in the Bismarck Fall, the oil 
ventures being developed in the Banam area, Ramu Sugar on the Upper Ramu River 
and a subsidiary of the Commonwealth Development Corporation which was 
looking into the potential for oil palm development near Usino. 
From an ao!ministrative point of view this was a brilliant strategy, which not only 
enlisted the DEC through the use of its Total Catchment Environmental 
Management concept and the Biosphere Reserve idea, but by mcluding the TNC 
also 'solved' the three problems with the GEF submission listed above. By becoming 
partners with the TNC, the Bismarck-Ramu project would acquire a trustworthy 
partner with whom a co-financing arrangement could be drawn up. In addition, it 
could present its conservation activities as 'incremental' to the TNC forestry 
operations and those of other industrial ventures operating in the Outer Transition 
Zone, while the post-project sustainabuity issue would be much easier to defend as 
the expected profits of the forestry operations in the Josephstaal could be applied 
towards developing income generating activities and social services in the Bismarck-
Ramu area. This strategy would 'make conservation pay', in line with the dominant 
ICAD philosophy which regards 'development' as a means to off-set the 
opportunity cost of 'conservation', and was thereby thought to keep communities on 
board even when faced with competing logging proposals. 
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FIGURE 6: M A P OF THE PROPOSED R A M U BIOSPHERE RESERVE 
Explanation: The Bismarck-Ramu project area was to become the Core Conservation area of the 
Biosphere reserve, while the Josephstaal concession was to be part of the buffer zone protecting 
the conservation area. The Middle Ramu area was of yet unassigned but could get a combination 
of sustainable logging and conservation designations. The Outer Transition Zone that covers the 
Ramu River catchment area is not indicated. 
BIOSPHERE RESERVES I N THE CONTEXT OF CUSTOMARY LANDTENURE 
During the development of this proposal, nobody talked about the question to what 
extent the biosphere concept is applicable in the context of PNG land tenure, or 
about the fact that the Biodiversity Program was coming full circle in its design of 
conservation areas. Whereas the 1992 CNA workshop in Madang had featured the 
first serious discussion of the need to integrate social and biological indicators in 
protected area design, and while the Lak experience had emphasised the need to 
collect socio-economic information which had led to the community-based approach 
in the Bismarck-Ramu area, the TNC-Bismarck-Ramu proposal was back in the 
mode of conservationists drawing boundaries on maps. 
Together with the TNC, the Biodiversity Program produced a map outlining the 
various zones that the biosphere reserve would contain. One of these maps contains 
an overview of all known villages, but one wonders whether the resource owners 
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living in those villages would be happy at being included in this endeavour. The 
plan not only carved u p Madang province, but it also determined the development 
options which local people would be allowed to pursue in the various zones of the 
reserve. People in the Josephstaal area would be involved in reduced impact logging 
(Development > Conservation), people in the Middle Ramu would have to develop 
in a sustainable manner yet to be determined (Development = Conservation), and 
people in the Core Conservation Area to refrain from pursuing destructive 
development (Development < Conservation). 
Such a map thus details the intentions of the conservation agency, but has little to do 
with project outcomes. The conservationists concerned have no means to enforce or 
restrict certain behaviour and can for example, not stop a community from pursuing 
a logging concession dead in the middle of the Core Conservation Area, nor can 
they include communities in their forest operations if these would not want to be 
included. 6 2 The only thing they can do is develop differentiated packages of 
incentives in an attempt to steer communities in the Core Conservation Area to 
conservation and those in the other zones towards sustainable development. In 
other words, nothing more than yet another area of interest in which the outcomes 
of project operations were entirely unpredictable and dependent on the interaction 
with local people. The only thing that was certain was that if the TNC would secure 
the Josephstaal concession this would take place in the area designated under the 
permit. 
What is missing is these maps is a realisation of the heterogeneity mtrinsic to 
landowner undertakings in these different zones. The options pursued by local 
people are highly variable and may differ from community to community. Thus 
while the Jimi communities in the proposed Core Conservation Area were through 
with the Bismarck-Ramu project, two groups of clans on the Ramu River, partly 
outside the planned Core Conservation Area, were pureuing the WMA option. Their 
neighbours in Bundi in turn were focussing on mining, while to the north 
communities were working on an oil company, and in Sogeram communities 
supporting logging and communities vehemently opposing logging would live in 
each others vicinity. To lump such disparate communities together in a series of 
zones may look good on paper, but has no relevance to the outcomes of the project. 
The experience in the Bismarck-Ramu project suggests that these maps are hardly 
worth the paper they are printed on, as in the practice of CD work the expansion to 
new areas would take place on the basis of invitations from neighbouring groups, 
and thus follow local social relations rather than the geographical and ecological 
considerations used by external conservation experts. 
6 2 This may appear unlikely, but it does happen. In 2001, the Bismarck-Ramu Group met a number of 
clan groups in the Wenang area As part of the CD process, they discussed the option of community-
based forestry in conjunction with a EU funded eco-forestry programme. Local people, however, 
wanted nothing to do with forestry small or large (PC Lalley July 2001). 
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Success of this undertaking depended on two issues. In the first place, the TNC 
would have to secure the timber permit of the Josephstaal area. In the second place, 
the project philosophy proposed by chief technical advisor in Port Moresby, the 
TNC in Washington and the UNDP in New York had to be meshed with the 
community philosophy of the field staff in Madang. As this final section will argue, 
the narrative used by the administrators in Port Moresby and New York, which 
were based on the need to meet the administrative requirements of the donor, were 
increasingly out of step with the realities as perceived by the field staff. 
Beneath the adrmnistrative requirements which determine the funding ehgibiliry of 
conservation projects lies the dominant conservation narrative described in the first 
chapter. This narrative, based on the assumption that nature is vulnerable, local 
people's practices are the main threat, and that local communities either need to be 
coerced or enticed to leave protected areas alone, continues to dominate the 
international funding agencies. In a textual analysis of several of the first GEF-
funded projects, Zerner (1996) notes that many of the narratives contained in the 
GEF project documents reflect those described in the first chapter as they 
'are based on simplistic and questionable assumptions about nature: the idea of a 
steady state, autonomously regulated natural world has been increasingly 
critiqued by biologists and environmental historians... [but] the development 
narratives [continue to] project images of an undisturbed, pristine natural world 
that is no longer regarded as valid in the natural sciences' (Zerner 1996: 73) 
While he distinguishes a number of narratives about local people and their relations 
to nature, he also notes that the 'majority of GEF narratives ... display human 
communities in a negative light, as major threats to the preservation of prized 
biological diversity'. This combination of stereotypes are used to legitimise GEF 
interventions, as they 
'create the authority for interventions which inevitably affect the economic, 
cultural and property rights of local communities and nations ... The idea of a 
disjunct, autonomously developing natural world, easily leads to biodiversity 
conservation missions in which human groups are marginalized' (Zerner 1996: 
72) 
In the next section, I will argue that as 'money talks', the proponents of conservation 
projects are hard pressed to meet the dominant narratives such as these are 
employed by the international agencies. I will first look at the process of project 
development, discussing some of the documentation produced in order to sketch a 
picture of the local conservation problem in such a way that it meets the 
decontextualised definitions of the donor. This will also allow me to illustrate how 
the program became increasingly divided over its view of local people and the use 
of economic incentives. Whereas the Madang team regarded local communities as 
the key to conservation, the documents drawn up for the GEF were based on the 
usual condemning descriptions of local people, emphasising the need to off-set the 
cost of conservation through economic activities. 
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W R I T I N G A SECOND GEF PROPOSAL 
As 1998 progressed, and the debate on how to approach the GEF raged, a number of 
documents were drawn up. Pulling together support for complex and expensive 
conservation interventions under the tight bureaucratic guidelines of the GEF is a 
complicated, highly technical and intensely political affair which requires long lead-
times, much perseverance and a feel for the fashionable terminology of the moment. 
It helps to develop a range of written outputs which build upon each other to 
provide a coherent and upbeat argument why this particular project is unique, 
highly promising in its response to severe environmental threats and therefore 
worth funding. 
The first document of importance in supporting the GEF submission produced in 
early 1998 was the Bismarck-Ramu evaluation by an independent Project Review 
Mission (PRM 1998). This evaluation was generally positive about the progress 
made in the Bismarck-Ramu area. The main problem with the review report, 
however, was the fact that it had to note that the Biodiversity Program had failed to 
expand the area under conservation in PNG. While the 1995 Framework Plan of the 
Bismarck-Ramu project (CRC 1995a) had been to set up a conservation area, by the 
end of the project in April 1998 this had not been achieved. The community entry 
process in the Bismarck-Ramu had only been going for one and a half years when 
the Biodiversity Program went through its final evaluation. 
A second item, more aimed at public consumption and partially addressing this 
problem, was a report called Race for the Rainforest IT (Ellis 1998), which built on the 
success of the first Race for the Rainforest publication. This first report had turned 
what was essentially a failed experiment into a success story by establishing an 
original and convincing community-based strategy for future experimentation in the 
Bismarck-Ramu area. Race for the Rainforest JT gives a good overview of the CD teams 
progress in the Bismarck-Ramu area, the variety of issues that had been dealt with 
and the extent to which the project team was making progress in the field of 
conservation. The report explains in detail how the community entry approach was 
followed u p with a conservation strategy, the tools used, leading to the proposal of 
two WMAs on the Ramu River. 
It is here however, that the politics of accessing donor funding take over. The report 
is for example overly upbeat on the size of these WMAs, the extent to which these 
had been put in place by mid 1998 and the ability of the mixed Jimi-Ramu 
communities in the Pimbum area to work together. The report simply equates the 
good intentions of local people with conservation, saying nothing about land use 
planning, rule making, leave alone rule enforcement. All of these are obviously 
essential to conservation management in the area, and especially difficult given the 
strong social divisions among people in the area. The suggestion that a WMA of 
122,000 hectares was about to be established, was something of an exaggeration. The 
area suggested in the report not only contains the areas inhabited by the Jimi 
between Pimbum and Foroko, but also a large portion of the Bismarck Fall which is 
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being claimed by a number of highland groups (VanHeldenl998b: 236-240). Simply 
writing u p what one group says about the extent of its landholdings, without 
corifiiming these with neighbouring groups is a recipe for social conflict in PNG. 
The suggestion that the achievements to date showed that conservation could be 
pursued without material incentives (Ellis 1988: 66) was simply premature. The 
communities involved in WMA establishment had not yet been confronted with the 
opportunity cost of conservation, and it is entirely unclear what will happen once 
they are. 
Race for the Rainforest If also argues that the Jimi settlers living in the area between 
Brimde and Pimbum would now happily follow the lead of the Ramu landowners. 
The fact that the Jimi have refused to do so over the last 20 years, are heavily 
divided among themselves between those coming from Bubulsunga and those from 
Bubkile, and the history of conflict between all involved is ignored. The report also 
carefully omits to mention the fact that the Foroko landowners might be interested 
in WMA establishment as a means to gain control over resources before committing 
them to logging (BRG 1997d), nor does it mention earlier attempts at Pimbum to 
bring a logging company in (BRG1996a). Shortly after the Race for the Rainforest II 
document was written, the Bismarck-Ramu team withdrew from Pimbum, while 
talks with the Foroko landowners were mainly confined to the Ramu River groups. 
During 1999, the conflicts between the Jimi from Pimbum and those from Brimde, 
and between the Jimi settlers and the Foroko landowners hardened to the extent that 
a number of people were killed. In the end, fearing sorcery, the Brimde Jimi decided 
to move back u p into the Jimi Valley (BRG 1999f). Up to this day, the Ramu River 
WMAs have not been gazetted and it is unclear whether there is any difference in 
the management of resources between the period before the Bismarck-Ramu project 
intervention and thereafter. But then, this upbeat presentation was logical, because 
as the PNG conservation manager put it, 'the report was written for money to come' 
(PC Chitoa March 2000). 
The third document of importance was an apphcation to the GEF Project 
Development Facility in order to access funding for the design of the joint 
submission for what had now become known as the Ramu Biosphere Reserve 
Initiative. The UNDP project development specialist put together a proposal that 
was approved for funding at the end of 1998. This document built on the evaluation 
report and particularly on the suggestion in Race for the Rainforest U that a sizeable 
WMA was on the verge of being been formed (Ellis 1998). 
As the application to the GEF Project Development Facility was being written by the 
UNDP project development specialist in New York, work in Port Moresby 
commenced on drawing u p a fourth document. This last document was to be the 
'mother of all documents' as it would contain a detailed project proposal for a six to 
eight year joint TNC/BR submission. Work on this so-called project brief started 
halfway 1998 and some of the draft documents produced for the proposal make 
interesting reading. While most of the administrative issues were thought to have 
been more or less settled through the co-operation with TNC, there was still the 
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issue of identifying credible threats to the proposed Biosphere Reserve that had to 
be dealt with. The GEF would only fund a second project in an area under threat, 
and the resulting narrative was in the first place geared to meet the conservation 
vision of the donors rather than to reflect the views of the staff on the ground. 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF A THREATENED ENVIRONMENT 
Conservation proposals show a general pattern that is very similar to that of 
development projects (Apthorpe 1986) and of folk tales in general (Roe 1991). In the 
first place, the proposing organisation identifies the object of its concerns, in this 
case highly valuable and vulnerable nature, then it presents the serious pressures in 
the form of population growth, logging or detrimental forms of resource use which 
threaten nature, subsequently to come u p with a solution in the form of awareness 
raising activities, a spatial management regime a n d / o r ICAD approaches. 
Both the draft project brief to the GEF and the PDF proposal started in the usual 
manner by emphasising the uniqueness of nature in the 25,000 square kilometre 
large Ramu catchment. Both explained how the 1992 CNA exercise had accorded 
'very high conservation priority' to the Bismarck-Ramu area, while the PDF 
proposal mentioned the fact that the Ramu was now listed as one of the WWF's 200 
most important eco-regions. The results of the 1995 site selection analysis and 
biological survey provided quantitative information on the levels of biodiversity in 
the Bismarck Fall. The fact that no assessment of the Ramu Valley had as of yet 
taken place, and that the areas surveyed by the Biodiversity Survey of October 1995 
were not included in the Ramu River WMAs, was not mentioned. More difficult 
than emphasising the uniqueness of the proposed Core Conservation Area and its 
natural resources, however, was to define a threat sufficiently serious to warrant the 
investment of GEF funds. 
As we have already noted in the opening pages of this study, environmental crises 
are the lifeblood of conservation interventions. The Biodiversity Program was an 
experimental program based on a generalised perception of PNG biodiversity being 
under threat, and had not stipulated the exact locations where the ICAD pilot 
projects were to be implemented. The Lak project was purposely selected in an area 
under threat. Following its failure and the resulting recommendation that 'scarce 
conservation monies should not be invested in areas under severe threat' 
(McCallum and Sekhran 1997: 51), the second ICAD project was deliberately sited in 
an area not under direct threat. The area selection document (DEC 1995: 35), for 
example, stated that there was 'no immediate threat' to the Bismarck-Ramu area, 
while Sekhran (1996 appendix 1) defines the levels of threat in the Ramu valley as 
'low'. By 1998, however, the lack of a substantial and identifiable threat in the Ramu 
valley became an obstacle to the second phase submission. The experimental phase 
was over and regulations determined that the GEF only funds projects which 
'reduce or eliminate an immanent threat' to biodiversity of global importance 
(UNDP no date: 5). 
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This requirement thus led to the need to present a picture of nature in the Ramu 
Valley as being under serious pressure, ignoring the earlier selection criteria (DEC 
1995: 28). This predicament becomes most clearly visible in a number of project 
briefs developed by the Biodiversity Program during 1998. Like in most other 
conservation analyses, the threats identified in these briefs take the form of logging 
and population growth combined with the environmentally detrimental behaviour 
of local people. Thus whereas the Madang team emphasised the conservationist 
nature of traditional societies in the area, its office in Port Moresby and the UNDP in 
New York set about presenting a radically different picture. 
In the next section, I will discuss two documents which illustrate the way in which 
these threats were represented: The first concerns a draft of the GEF project brief 
from September 1998 which is fascinating in its stereotypical representation of local 
livelihood practices. The second concerns the Project Formulation Document 
presented to the GEF, which illustrates the manner in which the Malthusian 
narrative comes to play a role. 
RE-ENTER THE 'DESTRUCTIVE OTHER' 
The draft project brief, held in the archives of the Bismarck-Ramu Group, contains a 
section on threats to the natural environment. Whereas other aspects of the brief 
discuss logging and other developments in the area, this particular section provides 
a caricature of local people and their practices. This description never entered the 
PDF proposal or later drafts of the GEF proposal, but illustrates the frame of mind 
from which the author worked. The main threats summed u p in this draft document 
are: 
'Forest loss due to aggressive swidden horticultural practice, burning 
unnecessarily large areas for gardens, unsustainable harvesting of fuelwood, 
housing and garden fencing material, and hunting practices that see over one 
hectare of forest cut down to capture one cuscus [tree kangaroo]. 
Degradation of habitat in montane areas due to increasing soil erosion resulting 
from shortening fallow periods and cultivation of steeper and higher slopes. 
Dimtaishing populations of species such as birds of paradise and crocodiles, 
both hunted for cash sale of skins, wi th their eggs collected for food. Birds of 
paradise are also trapped for live sale. Mammals such as the nearly-extinct black-
spotted cuscus (Spilocucus rufoniger) hunted for meat. 
Overharvesting of wi ld plants for medicinal use and as food' (CRC 1998: 8). 
Further d o w n in the brief 'aggressive forest clearance' and 'hunting with 
firearms' is also mentioned as a problem (CRC 1998:17). 
One can not fail to note that this summation is replete with negative qualifications. 
Horticultural practices in the area are presented as being 'aggressive', marred by the 
burning of 'unnecessarily' large tracts of land and the 'unsustainable' and 'over' 
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harvesting of firewood and wild plants. There is no reason to believe that any of 
these qualifying statements are warranted, while the presentation of threats itself is 
far from credible to anybody familiar with the Ramu Valley. To start, the amount of 
work put into cutting large trees by hand in order to grow food is such that 
'aggressive' horticultural practices are out of the question. An able-bodied man 
equipped with a steel axe spends several weeks a year to clear land for his 
subsistence garden and build fences and will generally aim to minimise the amount 
of work he puts in. Extraordinarily strong men may enhance their status by clearing 
gardens in primary forests, or by growing additional foods for ceremonial occasions 
(VanHelden 1998b, VanHelden 2000). These are exceptions in a harsh environment 
where people need to be economical with their available energy. 
Similarly there is no indication whatsoever that wood collection in the Ramu valley 
is being conducted in an unsustainable manner, with most firewood and fencing 
materials generally derived from trees cut in order to grow food. The statement that 
local people are prepared to cut one hectare of forest in order to capture a cuscus, a 
tree kangaroo, refers to an observation by the patrol team leader during the April 
1995 patrol when the project biologist set out with two local men to look for goura 
pigeons near Pimbum. When this group encountered a spotted cuscus in a tree eight 
men proceeded to cut down 'almost a hectare of small and medium-sized trees in a 
vain attempt to isolate and thus capture the animal' (Filer et Al. 1995: 31). The draft 
brief represents this event as if the razing of a hectare of forest is part of daily 
hunting practice in the Bismarck-Ramu area. 
Crocodiles are indeed under serious pressure from hunting, but there are no records 
of crocodile eggs being eaten in the Ramu area, maybe because the skins are much 
more valuable. Birds of paradise, are unlike the brief states, not caught for live sale 
and very few are hunted for their skin due to the declining demand for feathers in 
the highlands. There are no records of eggs of birds of paradise being eaten. The 
main threat to birds of paradise comes from habitat conversion, a threat relatively 
minimal in the Ramu Valley and the Bismarck Fall (VanHelden 1998b: 188-190). The 
main birds caught for live sale are goura pigeons and cassowaries, the main type of 
eggs eaten are those deposited by megapodes. There is no evidence whatsoever of 
the 'overharvesting' of wild plants for medicinal use and as food. Hunting with 
firearms is very limited and restricted to wild pigs and cassowaries and special 
occasions due to the high cost of cartridges (Van Helden 1998b: 183-184). 
This summation was made even though information attesting to the fact that the 
levels of threat were rather low was available to the project as part of its own 
selection process (DEC 1995), several pubUcations by its staff (Sekhran 1996, 
McCallum and Sekhran 1997) and the Social Feasibility Study that was finalised by 
the end of 1997 (VanHelden 1998b, 1998c). This information however, was 
judiciously ignored. Filer (2000: 20) suggests that the SFS 'failed to place a 
sufficiently positive spin on the outcomes of the community development process' 
and that Race for the Rainforest fJ was commissioned to make 'up for this deficiency'. 
In a scathing analysis of conservation projects in PNG contained in the same paper, 
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he comes to the conclusion that many conservation proponents simply do not want 
to know what the reality of rural PNG looks like, as this would force them to reverse 
of some of their most cherished assumptions and propositions. 
In malting this judgement, however, he does not mention the pressures under which 
project development personnel are placed to comply with the dominant 
conservation narratives. Even if on-the-ground conservationists would be willing to 
revise their propositions, it is unclear whether their funding agencies would allow 
them to do so. As I have argued in the opening chapter of this study, narratives 
concerning conservation tend to be embedded in law and administrative 
requirements such as those described for the GEF ehgibility guidelines. The project 
developers involved in the BR/TNC submission, were pragmatic people that simply 
had to set their priorities. Battling the constellation of beliefs that underpins the 
international conservation establishment, or presenting a nuanced picture of the 
situation in the Ramu Floodplains was not one of them. The goal was to write a 
project proposal, comply with the expectations of the donor and secure funding. All 
involved knew that once a program is on stream there will be room to adapt actual 
project implementation to the visions of the field staff and local communities. In 
doing so, however, the simplistic but dominant international narratives about local 
people and the manner in which they threaten nature, continue to be reproduced. 
THE PROJECT FORMULATION DOCUMENT A N D THE POPULATION ARGUMENT 
The proposal to the GEF Project Development Faculty (PDF) provides a more 
realistic view of the local environment and a less harshly condemning analysis of 
local people and their practices than contained in the draft brief. It however slips 
into the same type of argument when it states that communities colonising the 
Bismarck-Fall are 'engaging in farming methods that are poorly adapted to agro-
ecosystems at lower elevations' (UNDP 1998: 4), a comment that stands in total 
contrast to the findings of the SFS which argue that the rapidity with which the Jimi 
settlers have adjusted to the ecological opportunities offered by lower elevations is 
actually quite remarkable (VanHelden 1998b: 165). Like the draft GEF brief, it also 
suggests that Birds of Paradise are still being hunted, although such hardly takes 
place anymore. A number of other bird species are the focus of trappers, aiming to 
sell these birds on the Madang market. 
The Project Formulation Document (PFD) also pays attention to the dangers of 
logging, confirrning the views of the SFS that the Bismarck Fall is at little risk due to 
its steep slopes, but does not mention the fact that much of the lowland forests along 
the Ramu River may not be at risk either, as they are more or less permanently 
inundated. In the Core Conservation Area, the main area under threat from logging, 
the alluvial floodplains just below the Bismarck Fall, is also the area where most Jimi 
settlers have built their villages (VanHelden 1998b: 156-160). Other areas at risk are 
areas allotted to logging north of the Sogeram River, where the BRG organised the 
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signing of the conservation deed, and in the Middle Ramu area. 6 3 The PFD is much 
more realistic than the draft brief when it argues that 'it must be emphasised that 
these pressures are small' (UNDP 1998: 4). In essence, the PFD is based on the 
assumption that the threats of forest loss due to horticulture and hunting practices 
are limited but can not be ignored in the longer run. The document thus balances 
between the need to sketch an endangered environment in order to secure GEF 
funding and the wish to do so without too blatant an exaggeration of threats. 
The main amplification in the PFD lies in the assertion that 'parts of the project area' 
are exhibiting population growth rates of 3.5-4 percent due to such factors as in-
migration and a decline in traditional family planning practices' (UNDP 1998: 5). A 
possible source of information for this suggestion is Stanhope (1970 in VanHelden 
1998b: 136) who found that in the early 1970's annual growth rates among the Breri 
on the Middle Ramu River stood at some 3.5 %. It could also be an erroneous 
interpretation of a TNC project document (1998:10) that argues that 'the situation in 
general in PNG is one of accelerating population growth. Birth rates average in the 
3.5 - 4% range per year'. By only mentioning birth rates, and not child mortality, 
this gives the impression that growth rates are extremely high, a conclusion that can 
not be drawn from this figure. The annual growth of population between 1980 and 
1990 for Madang province as a whole is thought to stand at 1.8 % (UNDP 1999: 25). 
It however, is widely acknowledged that this figure may be too low an estimate due 
to undercounting in the 1990 census. 
The available figures from the Ramu valley section of the project area suggest 
population densities of between 0.5 and 2 persons per square kilometre for the 
Bismarck Fall and Ramu Valley respectively. At such low densities, and without 
significant changing technology or the advent of logging, even with high population 
growth it would take long to significantly increase human impacts on the local 
environment. The available population data from Sepu village suggest a growth rate 
of some 1.6 percent for the population on the Ramu River. (For a discussion of the 
available sources of population information see VanHelden 1998b: 126-129). These 
estimates may also be too low due to the already mentioned problems with the 1990 
census. 6 4 Even if populations were growing rapidly, what this means to the 
environment, is a different question altogether. There is no one-to-one correlation 
1 3 The forest company winning the Josephstaal concession would also have the right to develop the 
adjacent timber concession in the Middle Ramu (UNDP 1998). Thus if the TNC had won the 
Josephstaal concession the middle Ramu could, at a later stage, possibly have been designated to a 
combination of conservation and sustainable forestry activities. 
6 4 It will be Interesting to see the population figures from the 2000 census when they come out. These 
will likely show a much higher national growth rate than that standing at 2.3 % at the moment. 
Important for an analysis of the situation in the project area would be to break these down by census 
division in order to get a picture of what is happening on the Ramu River rather than at the national 
or provincial level. It might be necessary to omit the 1990 figures altogether in order to get an 
acceptable idea of average population growth over the last 20 years, as the underestimates for the 
period between 1980-1990 will otherwise result in an overestimate for the 1990- 2000 period. 
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between population numbers and environmental degradation as the Malthusian 
argument suggests. 
This fear of growing populations is also present in the draft project brief which 
suggests that montane slopes in the Jimi Valley are under threat from erosion and 
declining fallow periods due to population growth (CRC 1998). While such is indeed 
taking place within the Jimi Valley, the available information on downward 
migration does not appear to suggest exponentially growing populations in the 
Ramu Floodplains. In the first place, those Jimi who are able to appear to orient 
themselves on the Waghi rather than the Ramu Valley. Secondly, many of those 
migrating into the Ramu valley die of malaria, while there is circumstantial evidence 
of a general decline in population among some of the Ramu River clans over the last 
couple of decades. Following a spate of deaths, migrants may move into the Ramu 
Floodplains or back u p into the Jimi Valley, in an age-old response to misfortune. 
Such happened in the Foroko-Brimde area during the 1970's when Gainj settlers 
moved back u p to the Tagui Valley (Filer et Al. 1995) and such happened again in 
1999, when a substantial part of the Kema clans decided to return to their ancestral 
lands in the Jimi Valley. There may thus be a process of populations spilling over the 
highlands fringe into the Ramu valley, a pattern which combined with high 
mortality rates may be referred to as a 'population sink' (Stanhope 1970, Filer et Al. 
1995, VanHelden 1998b: 136-138), but it is highly questionable whether this 
migration constitutes a major threat to the Ramu environment. 
What both the mentioned draft project brief and the PFD ultimately have in 
common is that they regard 'the lack of understanding' by local people as the main 
threat to local natural resources. According to the PFD landowners in the Ramu 
Valley lack the 'basic capacity' and 'basic awareness' (UNDP 1998: 4) to manage 
their resources in a more conservation-oriented fashion. This illustrates the 
fundamental difference in approach of the GEF project designers and the Bismarck-
Ramu team. Whereas the former claimed that nature in the Ramu valley is under 
serious threat, and argued that local people are to be blamed, the Bismarck-Ramu 
team saw communities as essentially conservation-mclined and regarded the 
unequal power relations that result from international market incorporation as the 
main threat to communities and their environment. 
Another difference of opinion between the GEF proposal and the BRG approach 
concerned the use of financial incentives. The use of financial incentives is 
fundamental to the ICAD approach and it is in this vein that the proposal argues 
that 'without financing mechanisms such as community trust funds, micro-credit 
faculties etc. even communities that have interest in pursuing conservation and 
sustainable use options can not do so' (UNDP 1998: 5). Thus, while the Bismarck-
Ramu team tried to practise conservation without the use of financial mechanisms, 
the latter argued that such could not be done without financial incentives to 
guarantee sustamability. The GEF draft brief mentioned above also contains this 
contradiction as it on the one hand argues that the Bismarck-Ramu project pioneers 
'a holistic participatory approach that openly repudiated.. . the provision of material 
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incentives for conservation' (CRC 1998: 9) and on the other hand argues that 'for 
conservation measures to be sustainable rural Uvelihoods will need to be enhanced' 
(CRC 1998:11). 
It appears that both sides of the argument about the disposition of local people 
towards their environment are prone to simplification and exaggeration. Those that 
think that local people are 'natural conservationists' tend to regard the absence of 
degradation as proof of their environmentally benevolent attitude. As I have argued 
in chapter 4, this is an untenable conclusion for the simple reason that many rural 
people in PNG simply have never had the ability or motivation to degrade their 
environment and thus never had to prove their conservation mettle. 
Conservationists regarding people as the main threat to the environment 
continuously fall back on facile population arguments and over-the-top descriptions 
of local Uvelihood practices to make their point. In this clash of caricatures, both 
tend to ignore the available information that suggests a much less exciting 
intermediate position. 
T H E BREAK AWAY PROJECT 
For the Bismarck-Ramu project team in Madang things were moving far too fast. 
Whereas until May 1998 they still thought the Biodiversity Program and the UNDP 
Country Office were looking into the option of developing a small-scale stand-alone 
project, they now saw themselves thrown together with a much larger partner in 
what would become a complex and expensive undertaking. While the Madang staff 
had been busy in the field and dealt with collapse of the CRI, the chief technical 
advisor in Port Moresby was working on the new proposal and trying to meet the 
GEF requirements. Once he developed the basic principles underlying a joint 
TNC/BR proposal, these were presented during the ministerial visit to Madang, 
during which it became apparent that the small-scale proposal had been abandoned 
in favour of a joint TNC-Bismarck-Ramu proposal. 
The Madang staff was aware of TNC's high profile attempts to gain access to the 
Josephstaal concession. It was an interesting idea that was closely followed by 
environmentalists throughout the country. The CD workers, however, had few 
positive feelings for TNC following a visit to the Madang office by the Country 
Director for PNG earlier that year. The latter was felt to be 'talking down' to the CD 
teams, telling them that with their knowledge of community development they 
could earn much higher wages and that they should be 'out there marketing their 
skills'. The CD teams thought his presentation to be 'cargo-oriented'. When the 
Bismarck-Ramu project team was thrown together with the TNC following the 
sudden emergence of the Biosphere Reserve concept, this was received with mixed 
feelings. A number of Madang staff and CD teams felt that the TNC was only 
interested in the Bismarck-Ramu project as it provided them with an avenue for GEF 
funding, a complaint which could also be levelled at the Bismarck-Ramu proponents 
of a joint submission. 
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In June 1998, three weeks after the sudden rninisterial visit to Madang, a workshop 
was held at the Gateway Hotel in Port Moresby at which the Chief Technical 
Advisor of the Biodiversity Program, the UNDP country office, DEC officials, the 
TNC staff in PNG, the project team from Madang and several others convened to 
talk about the new GEF proposal. An immediate problem was that UNDP funding 
of the Bismarck-Ramu project ran out by the end of 1998 and that developing a 
much larger proposal would take at least a year to complete. This issue was partly 
solved by extending the existing budget u p to the end of 1998. In December, 
however, the Madang team lost the New Zealand conservation manager because the 
program closed. The group was now out there on its own and, as the Biodiversity 
Program was officially closed, decided to take on a new name, calling itself the 
Bismarck-Ramu Group (BRG) until its future prospects became clear. At the 
Gateway meeting it became apparent that the funds needed for the development of 
a new six-year proposal were to be made available by applying for a separate project 
design grant. The GEF generally assesses large project proposals in two stages, 
financing a process of project formulation before actually considering long-term 
project fimding. In the following months, the Biodiversity Program in Port Moresby, 
TNC and the UNDP Country Office rapidly developed a proposal for the so-called 
Project Development Facility (PDF) of the GEF, to fund the nine month design 
phase. 
The full proposal that was to be developed in these nine months was vastiy larger 
than the old medium-sized grant stand-alone proposal. Where the medium-sized 
grant proposal had looked at securing U$ 750,000 for a three year period, the joint 
TNC/BR submission contained a budget of no less than U$ 23.6 million for period of 
six to eight years of which U$ 5.3 miTlion was to be funded by the GEF. The single 
largest component consisted of U$ 15 rnillion to be brought in by TNC's forestry 
partner in order to develop the Josephstaal timber concession in an ecologically 
sustainable and economically viable manner. At the end of 1999, after two years of 
political wrangling, the TNC, bidding based on the quality of its proposal rather 
than on its inside connections, lost the concession to a Korean company. In many 
respects this outcome mirrored a complaint also made in Race for the Rainforest, 
which had argued that conservationists were handicapped as they had to 'play by 
the rules', while the timber companies bent these rules wherever they needed to 
(McCallum and Sekhran 1997). 
BETWEEN CONSERVATION A N D CONTROL II 
While the chief technical advisor of the Biodiversity Program and the UNDP 
administration in Port Moresby and New York set to work on the PFD and the full 
TNC/BR submission, the project team in Madang became increasingly uneasy with 
the whole plan. In the first place there was a certain amount of resentment against 
the fact that the GEF could not fund a small stand-alone project requiring some U$ 
250,000 annually in order to pursue a worthwhile trial in participatory cornmunity-
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based conservation, but was apparentiy more likely to fund the large and complex 
TNC/Bismarck-Ramu submission. The Madang team with its highly developed 
sensitivity to 'cargoism' was well aware of the fact that too much money could 
inflict greater damage on its working relations with the Ramu communities than too 
little. 
More important, however, was that the Madang team felt that although on paper the 
collaboration looked nice and solved the administrative requirements of the GEF, it 
would generate a raft of practical problems in the field. The proposal was from the 
start dubbed 'crazy' in its complexity, with the many involved organisations and 
their respective ideas and assumptions. An important issue of concern revolved 
around the administrative structure in which the Bismarck-Ramu team would be 
placed. The Bismarck-Ramu team had always cherished its independence and 
flexibility. It had moved its offices to Madang, distancing itself from the 
claustrophobic administration that had characterised the Lak project and had 
reduced its administrative burden through its contract with the Christensen 
Research Institute (CRI). This latter strategy almost failed when the CRI collapsed at 
the end of 1997, this time not threatening the self-reliance of its communities, but the 
independence of the Bismarck-Ramu team itself. 
By mid 1997, however, the American Christensen Foundation that funded the CRI in 
Madang, ran into trouble with the US Tax Office. The tax exemptions from which 
the US foundation benefited were contingent upon the auditing of all its activities. 
The accounts of the CRI, however, proved to be so muddled that the auditors could 
not certify the institute's accounts over a number of consecutive years. 
Notwithstanding attempts on the part of the board to reconcile the various accounts 
and save the institute, the CRI had to close its doors in December 1997 in order to 
save the tax-exempt status of the foundation. Consequently, PNG lost what had 
until then been its best facilities for marine research. The director of the institute, 
also responsible for the education program of the Bismarck-Ramu project, left the 
country shortly afterwards. 
The hypothesis that the CRI would provide an environment in which the project 
could calmly pursue it community work thus proved false, and the Bismarck-Ramu 
project saw itself confronted with a number of serious problems with regard to its 
housing, financing and administration. The housing problem was eventually solved 
as the premises previously occupied by the CRI were now leased from the hotel that 
owned them. The financial and personnel matters were after long negotiations with 
the UNOPS taken on by the Biodiversity Program. These issues took a lot of time 
and energy, distracting the project from its work in the Bismarck-Ramu area. As 
Ellis (1998: 42) notes, these events also 'shot home' to the project that it had been 
dependent on the CRI and that it now had to become more self-reliant in the same 
manner that it was telling local communities. The matter of control would come 
back a year later, when the joint BR/TNC GEF submission was being developed. 
Sustainability and control 345 
RESERVATIONS BY THE BISMARCK-RAMU TEAM 
By the beginning of 1998, the Biodiversity Program was in trouble. Funding was 
running out by April and in order to continue operations both institutional and 
financial arrangements had to be made. At first it had been the intention of the chief 
technical advisor in Port Moresby to transfer the responsibility of the whole BT 
program to TNC one the Biodiversity Program closed down by April 1998. TNC 
appeared to be a good candidate to undertake an executive role in the second phase 
of the project and pull the GEF application together with the UNDP Country Office. 
Later, when the lifetime of the Biodiversity Program had been extended until the 
end of 1998, and when it became clear that the Bismarck-Ramu team in Madang 
cherished its independence, a different institutional structure was designed. The 
structure proposed a triadic division of labour along the zones of the Biosphere 
Reserve, with the Bismarck-Ramu team, strengthened with the position of a chief 
technical advisor, taking responsibility for the Core Conservation Area, the TNC 
and its timber concessionaire looking after the outer buffer zone in the Josephstaal 
area and with the Upper Ramu Local Level Governments responsible for the Outer 
Transition Zone in which oil ventures, the nickel-cobalt mine, oil palm and sugar 
plantations were active. The use of the Middle Ramu area between the Core 
Conservation Area and the Outer Transition Zone was to be determined as the 
project developed. 
The entire project with its three different columns would come under a Provincial 
Steering Committee consisting of representative of DEC, the Madang Provincial 
Government, TNC and the UNDP. The Bismarck-Ramu team, however, saw this 
proposal as an outright threat to its independence and its conservation agenda. In 
the first place it feared that there would be a conflict of interest within the steering 
committee, as it would contain both logging and rnining as well as conservation 
proponents. In addition, DEC was increasingly trying to take control of the project 
by vying for 'national execution' of the second phase in its negotiations with the 
UNDP country office. The Madang team was thus worried that it would be 
subjected to all kinds of unwanted political and administrative influences and 
increasingly fearful of losing control over events on the Ramu River. 
More menacing than the expected administrative workload and the institutional 
structure of the future project, however, were the contradictions in the future 
dealings with communities in the Ramu catchment area. These first became 
apparent during the Gateway meeting. The CD teams, increasingly radical in their 
opposition to the local nickel-cobalt rnine, oil palm developments and rejecting all 
forms of forest exploitation, did not want to be seen to collaborate with what they 
saw as 'the enemy'. This view clashed with the fact that the proposal for a Biosphere 
Reserve was supported by the nickel-cobalt mine and a sustainable forest 
concession. Therefore the TNC was, rather unfairly, perceived as 'just another cargo 
outfit', using the promises of royalties, jobs and income to 'buy' conservation. This 
view stemmed from the fact that the TNC approach reflected the Lak ICAD 
philosophy that had served as a counterpoint in the development of the Bismarck-
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Ramu community entry approach in the first place. The irony of the fact that the 
failed Lak approach was now sprung back on the Bismarck-Ramu project, was 
iroufficientiy appreciated by those responsible for the TNC/Bismarck-Ramu project 
submission. It appears that these concerns became subsumed to the all out drive to 
access funds and safeguard the continuity of the program. Even if the Madang team 
would have been prepared to step over their objections to the biosphere philosophy 
they did not see how they could possibly explain to landowners in the Ramu area 
that they were supposed to conserve nature on the basis of strongly held 
convictions, while 50 kilometres further downstream, the same project was paying 
people to cut their forest in a sustainable manner. 
The proposal that came out of the Gateway conference did not show much 
sensitivity to these practical issues, as it initially suggested putting TNC and the 
Bismarck-Ramu project in a joint office in Madang, while in addition proposing a 
'Biosphere Reserve Stakeholder Forum' in which landowner groups from the Ramu 
basin, local-level governments and companies active within the area would meet to 
discuss their collaboration with the TNC and the Bismarck-Ramu teams. Such a 
forum would be exactiy the place where the Ramu people would find out that while 
the Bismarck-Ramu component of the project was leading people towards self-
reliance and conservation, the TNC was paying their Josephstaal neighbours to 
engage in forestry. Even without such a forum, news would trickle through quickly 
enough, probably meaning the end of the non-economic Bismarck-Ramu approach 
to conservation. 
Thus in the view of the Madang team, the need to comply with the administrative 
requirements of the GEF, the all out drive to secure donor funding even if the 
various partners involved did not really see eye to eye, led to a highly complex 
project proposal. This proposal was characterised by an internally inconsistent 
project philosophy, as it on one hand focused on the non-economic community 
entry approach of the Madang group, while on the other developing an ICAD 
mechanism. While various briefs speak of the need for a 'strategic logic' to structure 
a successful proposal to the GEF, the designers did manage not solve this 
fundamental contradiction, the most common response being to build an ever-
increasing physical and institutional distance between the two main stakeholders in 
what was to be a joint submission and co-operative endeavour. Consequently, the 
idea for a joint Madang office was scuttled, while the idea of the Bismarck-Ramu CD 
teams working in the Josephstaal area was rejected out of hand by the Madang 
group. 
To the TNC this situation must have been most confusing. They were dealing with 
the Port Moresby Office and the chief technical advisor there, and assumed that he 
could make commitments on behalf of the Biodiversity Program, mcluding the 
Madang project staff. As time went by, however, it became apparent that the 
Biodiversity Program itself was split over what to do, and that the chief technical 
advisor was pushed into a Janus-faced position, having to integrate both the 
philosophies of the GEF/UNDP/DEC/TNC coahtion as well as the strong ideas of 
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his Madang field staff. Over time, it became increasingly clear that the Madang team 
of the Biodiversity Program was only co-operating because it needed future 
funding. 
A BREAKDOWN IN RELATIONS 
At the end of 1998, following the closure of the Biodiversity Program in Port 
Moresby, the departure of the NZ conservation manager and the chief technical 
advisor, left 12 CD workers, the DEC conservation manager, the church liaison 
officer, the expatriate CD trainer and a small number of support staff as the 
remainder of the once much larger Biodiversity Program. Following the formal end 
of the project, the Madang group took on the name of 'Bismarck-Ramu Group' 
(BRG), reflecting its ad hoc nature. In institutional terms the BRG was a sorry bunch. 
It did not have formal legal status other than being an unincorporated association; it 
did not have a board, no formal hierarchy outliruhg decision-making procedures 
and no financial adrninistration. Due to the collapse of the CRI in 1997, its housing 
and office facilities were at the beck and call of the hotel from which they were 
rented, and financially the group and its field operations depended on the UNDP 
country office until the new GEF proposal was approved. The DEC continued to pay 
the salary of the PNG conservation manager, leading to the strange situation where 
a civil servant was found to be leading a non-governmental group. 
Whereas other NGOs would immediately get to work in trying to sort these matters 
out and apply for furiding to a large number of donors in order to achieve a 
modicum of institutional security, the BRG saw the lack of institutional trappings as 
a source of pride, cherished the informality of its structure, relied on its good 
relations with the UNDP Country Office and kept focused on its work in the 
Bismarck-Ramu area. The dissolution of the Biodiversity Program in Port Moresby 
not only meant that the BRG group was out in Madang on its own, but also meant 
that the gap between field operations and those responsible for the development of 
the GEF proposal became larger than ever. Whereas the UNDP Country Office in 
Port Moresby, the UNDP Office in New York and the TNC in Washington went 
about the development of the full-scale GEF proposal, the BRG continued work in 
the Ramu Valley. 
As the BRG was now on its own and few links to DEC in Port Moresby existed, a 
certain radicalisation of viewpoints took place. At the end of 1998 already, DEC 
officials were shocked to find that during a joint workshop, the CD workers of the 
Bismarck-Ramu project were selling T-shirts with texts such as "MP's and Nappies 
are full of the same thing". An increasing number of CD workers felt that the nickel-
cobalt mine which was being developed in the Bismarck range, as well as plans for 
oil palm development near Usino should be opposed at all costs and could thus not 
be an ally such as proposed in the joint BR/TNC proposal. 
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This also led to a hardening of the views of what TNC was trying to do, with the 
BRG increasingly preferring to be able to freely lash out at all resource-based 
projects operating in Madang Province. As the CD trainer explained 
'It appears TNC will NOT get the Josephstaal concession... It is rumored the 
Koreans have the inside track. If that is the case we will be able to mount a more 
direct pro-environment, anti-logging campaign. ... We feel that the biodiversity 
will best be preserved by letting the Koreans have the concession as there is a lot 
of anti-logging feelings in the areas. Had TNC got the concession we would have 
had a less direct approach. Now we can open up' (Lalley to VanHelden 15 July 
1999). 
Consequentiy, the relations with the TNC, formally its partner in a joint GEF 
submission, were not particularly good. Halfway 1998 the TNC had established an 
office in Madang and its two American consultants would regularly visit the BRG in 
order to discuss issues. They however, were generally coolly received because, as 
the church liaison officer of the Bismarck-Ramu team explained: 'mipela bikhets', 'we 
were arrogant'. As the TNC tried to interest landowners in the Josephstaal Area for 
the sustainable logging project they gained an interest in the community entry 
process that had been developed by the BRG. Repeatedly, TNC asked for assistance 
from the Bismarck-Ramu team, first in using the CD teams in the Josephstaal area, 
then in asking the CD trainer to train their own field staff. Both demands were 
rejected as the CD teams did not want anything to do with the TNC for fear of 
jeopardising their work in the Ramu valley. 
A number of CD teams had contacts in the Josephstaal and it was generally believed 
that any association with the TNC timber project would harm the conservation work 
in the Ramu communities. By the end of 1998, a number of BRG CD workers were 
fired following disputes. Still, they were well-respected trainers, among them some 
of the very first with whom the project started in July 1996. The Bismarck-Ramu 
team stayed in contact with all of them and finally recommended several of them to 
the TNC for the training of its field staff. Consequentiy, TNC was framing its 
community workers in a very similar community entry process to that used by the 
BRG by the beginning of 1999. Still there was the strange situation that while 
ostentatiously partners in the GEF submission, and both located in Madang, there 
was little communication between the two project teams. Relations between the 
Bismarck-Ramu Group and the TNC did not improve when the BRG told UNDP 
and TNC in the beginning of 1999 that it did not believe that the TNC would get the 
Josephstaal concession, even though the first hurdle, that of its recommendation by 
the Provincial Forest Management Committee to the National Forest Board had been 
taken. The CD teams with their many and varied contacts vvithin the Madang area 
had been informed that a Korean company had the inside track with the National 
Forest Board and that the TNC proposal would be rejected. This assessment later 
proved correct. 
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THE U N D P / T N C MEETING WITH THE BISMARCK-RAMU GROUP 
Even though the confusion surrounding the allocation of the Josephstaal forest 
concession continued, it was by the beginning 1999 clear that hard choices had to be 
made if the full-scale GEF proposal was to be brought to a good end. GEF funding 
for project development was in place and two questions had to be answered. The 
first was whether the TNC would acquire the concession, the second was whether 
the BRG was actually on board in the joint TNC/BR submission or not. In order to 
answer this second question a workshop was organised in Madang at the end of 
March 1999 during which the UNDP/GEF project development specialist, formerly 
the resource economist to the Biodiversity Program, and the Financial Director of 
the TNC came to discuss matters with the BRG. All CD workers were invited for the 
meeting and four of them showed up, while the permanent Madang staff was there 
as well. 
The meeting got off to a rocky start with the CD workers emphasising that they 
could not work together with the TNC because they saw three main problems: i) the 
TNC used a cargo-approach, while the BRG emphasised self-reliance, ii) the TNC 
operated at the landscape level through its adoption of the MAB concept, while the 
BRG operated at the community-level, and 111) there would be a problem when local 
people would see the CD workers collaborating with a logging company. 
Notwithstanding this start, it turned out to be a good meeting after all. The TNC 
director took a low-key approach, explaining the view of his organisation, the fact 
that it was in the first place a conservation organisation, the nature of its proposed 
operations in the Josephstaal area and the Biosphere Reserve concept while taking 
ample time to answer questions. In doing so, he cleared away a number of 
preconceptions held by the CD workers with regard to the proposed timber 
operations of the TNC forestry partner. The director explained the overall goal of 
mamtaining productive forest capacity and diversity over the longer term, and went 
into a detailed explanation of the principles of reduced impact logging and 
independent certification. He emphasised TNC's commitment to worker safety, 
downstream processing, and the fact that no township would be built. In his 
judgement the BRG staff were impressed with how different this was to the usual 
Asian logging practices (Cohen to VanHelden 9 April 1999). 
The GEF project specialist in turn explained the requirements of the GEF and the 
way in which the TNC and the Bismarck-Ramu project complemented each other in 
meeting these requirements. He also explained the principles of the Biosphere 
Reserve and the need to ensure sustainability. At a certain stage the UNDP project 
development specialist drew the three circles of the Biosphere Reserve concept out 
on the black board, explaining the various zones, only to see them wiped out by the 
church liaison officer who said it made no sense to have outsiders draw u p region-
wide conservation zones, when resource decisions are made at the community level. 
In addition, the church liaison officer argued that Melanesian communities had a 
much more holistic view of resource management issues. The ensuing debate on 
strategies to assure sustataability eventually led to a stalemate. The UNDP specialist 
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contended, in line with mainstream GEF thinking that spatial zoning and economic 
incentives were necessary to guarantee the long-term sustainabuity of biodiversity 
conservation witfiin the proposed Core Conservation Area. 
The CD teams in turn, maintained the view that this had nothing to do with 
sustainabihty as such could only be achieved if local people were empowered to 
look after their resources themselves. In this view conservation had to be done for its 
own sake and sustainabihty was in fact a consequence of a strongly held conviction 
within the participating communities, not of economic incentives. The discussion 
over the issue sustainability also touched upon the situation with regard to the 
Ramu River WMAs, with the CD trainer conceding that that though he was pleased 
with what had happened in Sepu, he was not so sure the people there would say 
'no' to a logging company coming in with cash. The question than became whether 
the proposed reserve was likely to generate higher levels of sustainabihty than the 
CD approach, and whether the reserve idea was worth taking the risk as the CD's 
feared that the new approach would destroy their achievements on the Ramu River. 
D O I N G AWAY WITH THE JOINT SUBMISSION 
At the end of the meeting, it was agreed that the Madang group would come back to 
TNC and the UNDP to make clear what their choice was going to be. That choice 
turned out to be a difficult one. The CD workers were impressed by the 
presentations given, and appreciated the relationship with the UNDP Country 
Office, the UNDP GEF specialist and the TNC financial director. Much like the CD 
workers themselves had built personal relations with Ramu villagers in order to 
feed their conservation and development messages; they now found it difficult to 
upset relations with these people. On the other hand, the grave doubts about the 
Biosphere Reserve concept and the issue of sustainable logging remained. It appears 
that many of the staff made a distinction between the UNDP Country Office on the 
one hand and the TNC/GEF on the other. One of the CD workers for example 
explained that he did not like the Biosphere Reserve concept, and that he did not 
agree with TNC's sustainable forestry approach, but that 'going independent' 
entailed the risk of jeopardising a good relationship with the UNDP Country Office, 
which made it difficult for him to decide what to do. Everyone realised that opting 
out of the joint GEF submission could mean the end of the project if the UNDP 
Country Office cut funding and if another donor was not found in time. 
More diplomatically inclined people in the UNDP Country Office suggested that the 
BRG did not really have to take a decision at all, as the TNC did not yet have the 
Josephstaal concession and as the likelihood of it not getting that concession was 
growing. By simply waiting for the outcome of the application process, BRG could 
avoid txurning down the joint GEF submission that would give them the name of 
being a group of radical and arrogant naysayers. The CD trainer and the 
conservation manager, however, decided that it was time for a decision as the 
ongoing discussions with TNC, the status of the Josephstaal concession and the 
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design of the GEF project brief were taking too much time and energy and were 
detracting the group from it its fieldwork. In addition, the management team of the 
BRG felt that the group had to make a principled decision with regard to its 
philosophy, rather than being led by outside agencies, the fear of losing its funding 
and the turn of events. This latter point was especially brought forward by the CD 
trainer who took the view that people matter more than institutions. His philosophy, 
based on training people to txiink critically for themselves, meant that it was of Utile 
importance where these people work. Institutions come and go, but in the end the 
quaUty of people determines the quaUty of work and in the longer run the 
development course that a country takes. In this view, the Bismarck-Ramu Group 
was a temporary training vehicle. A good one, located in a pleasant spot, with an 
exceUent donor in the form of the UNDP country office, but even so not 
indispensable. 
It was the first time in the almost three years that the CD teams had been together, 
that several talking sessions faUed to come u p with a jointly agreed solution and the 
conservation manager and the CD trainer worried about the cohesion of the group. 
FinaUy a decision had to be made and a session was held during which the CD 
teams were prepared for the eventuaUty that a vote would have to be taken. Long 
talks were held to the tune that if push came to shove and one or the other decision 
was voted for, this should not affect group soUdarity. The decision was to stand and 
was to be defended by the whole group regardless of personal opinions. When at 
the end of April 1999 the moment finaUy came, those present voted with a margin of 
one vote to wi thdraw from the joint submission. The rehef that some decision had 
finaUy been made was shared by aU, and a year after the Biosphere Reserve concept 
had first been brought u p during the ministerial visit, the conservation manager 
wrote a short letter to the UNDP country office, the UNDP GEF-speciaUst, and the 
TNC explaining that the BRG opted out of the joint GEF proposal. The UNDP in 
turn had to inform the GEF of the fact that the project development funds that it had 
made avaUable would not be used. The tone of the letter written to the UNDP 
Country Office was sUghtly different. This being the main financial UfeUne of the 
BRG, the letter emphasised that the rejection of the joint submission should not be 
seen as a rejection of the UNDP Country Office. 
The responses to this decision wavered were very varied. Some thought it was the 
right decision, other responded with outright anger to disbeUef. Here was a tiny 
NGO, with Utile or no institutional structure and a more than tenuous future, 
rejecting a U$ 23 miUion doUar submission to one of the largest environmental 
donor bodies because it could not agree on the principles underlying the planned 
intervention, and feared loosing control over the process that it had started. It also 
put the BRG in a tight spot. Whereas the UNDP Country Office agreed to continue 
funding the group, it was clear that this could not go on ^definitely and that the 
future of the project depended on the groups abiUty to soUcit new funds and to 
transform itself into an independent NGO with aU the trappings in the form of a 
board, a management team, a financial aclministration and audited accounts. 
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During 1999 and 2000, the BRG widened its scope of activities considerably, 
becoming a sort of clearing house for a number of smaller community projects 
implemented by CD workers and former CD workers, with funding provided by the 
German Development Service. In addition it spent much time setting u p accounts, 
developing a basic management structure, and writing a much smaller project 
proposal for a number of potential donor agencies. The church strategy gained 
momentum through the conduct of large countrywide environmental crusade for 
which an American preacher came over. The preacher held a number of public 
gatherings in May 1999, which drew wide publicity. Only the careful observer 
would note that the various community projects, as well as the environmental 
crusade, were operating from the same post office box as the BRG. 
T H E B I S M A R C K - R A M U G R O U P AFTER M A Y 1999 
Over the last few years, the philosophy of the Bismarck-Ramu philosophy has been 
losing some of its sharper edges. This most clearly visible with regard to 1) the 
relations between communities and other outsiders than the CD workers of the 
Bismarck-Ramu team, 2) the vision of people as natural conservationists, and 3) and 
- most interesting of all - the use of economic incentives. 
During 1998, while the CD workers talked to local people about self-reliance and 
conservation, the people of Sepu also started a number of small-scale development 
initiatives. At Sepu, as in many other places, the main priority lay with establishing 
a school and with health issues. There used to be a school in the village and a 
number of elderly people know how to read and write, but since the school broke 
down a whole group of children and youngsters is growing u p illiterate (VanHelden 
1998: 107). When this issue was brought up, people would obviously complain 
about the loss of Government services as rural Papua New Guineans do across the 
country. Rather the pointing to the responsibilities of the Department of Education, 
however, the CD workers asked people what they could do about this problem 
themselves. Over time, a plan evolved to support the framing of local literacy 
workers and pre-school trainers. The Sepu people themselves constructed a bush 
material school and in 1998 the first literacy lessons would come off the ground. One 
of the best stories is the one concerning a delegation of Sepu people visiting the 
Provincial Education Department at Madang in search of a blackboard and chalk. 
They explained that their school had long since been abandoned, that various 
requests had come to nothing, and that they had now built their own school and that 
one or two literate people were to be trained as literacy trainers. They expected the 
Government to at least supply them with some basic materials, something which he 
astonished officials did (PC Lalley March 2000). 
Health issues proved more difficult. Over the previous ten years the Sepu 
community had repeatedly failed to secure a community health worker for the 
village and was after deliberations with the CD workers, considering sending one of 
its people for framing on preventive and environmental health measures. Following 
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the drought of 1997, for example, the Sepu people expressed their doubts about the 
quality of their dririking water. The project had the water quaUty assessed and could 
inform the village that their water was suitable for drinking, but that contamination 
could not be avoided if too many pigs would be left to wander around. The village 
therefore decided to move its pig herds to the other side of the Ramu River, 
rendering its source of drinking water safe. SimUar measures to manage pigs and to 
dig pit latrines were taken in a number of other villages as weU. The difference in 
approach between these cases and the example of the water project in Lak given in 
chapter 5 is self-evident. 
What these initiatives have in common, was not only the fact that they were to a 
large extent setf-propeUed, but also that local people themselves engaged with 
outside institutions. People were stimulated to seek out the relevant outsiders that 
could help them after having first assessed what they themselves could do about the 
problem To the Bismarck-Ramu project team the issue at stake thus graduaUy 
shifted from preventing any relations with outsiders, to the question of control. As 
long as people knew what they wanted, why they wanted it, and were able to take 
the lead in the process such linkages could be beneficial to the involved 
communities. Mamtaining control, however, is difficult as many weU meaning 
organisations and projects have their own agenda, dynamics and priorities, often 
subsuming those of local people to their own. In a sense the Bismarck-Ramu project 
thus acted as a guardian to local communities, carefuUy helping people to select 
institutions that are to be trusted and the conditions under which these are to be 
admitted. The rejection of the forest officials at Sogeram (See previous chapter) is an 
example of the manner in which people were prepared by the BRG to say 'no' to 
outsiders that they do not wish to deal with. 
The second issue already came out during the meeting with TNC when the CD 
trainer mentioned the fact that he was not sure if local conservation convictions 
would hold in the face of logging. This was departure from the initial view of local 
people as conservationists, who may have erred but can be made to recoup their 
'traditional' respect for nature. As I have argued in chapter 6, this also served as 
means to motivate the CD workers and local people. Recently he would argue: 
'I'm not sure BRG believes that people were traditionally conservationists. I 
tliink they beUeve people had/have a relationship with the land that we 
expatriates may not understand. Also the masalai (spirit) places and other tambu 
(forbidden) places, and places of malaria which were avoided and thus 
conserved. Certainly this is conservation by default, but still it is conservation' 
(LaUey to VanHelden 10 August 2001). 
This is a departure from the earlier visions of local people, which has also had an 
impact on the manner in which the Bismarck-Ramu Group views to role of 
economic activities. IronicaUy, the BRG is now more open towards the use of 
economic incentives, be it only after a community has gone through its program and 
has demonstrated its ability to organise itself. The BRG is now considering giving 
training on 'money', what it is and how it works and is actuaUy in a number of 
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places looking at the possibilities to use small-scale forestry projects as part of its 
program. Thus while its community entry strategy remains in place, and the CD 
workers continue to de-emphasise economic issues in order to defuse unrealistic 
expectations and cargo-thinking, the direction in which communities go after this 
process of community entry is more open then ever, and the possible range of 
institutions and tools that are used to assist communities in managing their lives and 
resources has grown. 
T H E BISMARCK-RAMU G R O U P A N D CONSERVATION I N M A D A N G PROVINCE 
In other respects, it appears that the Bismarck-Ramu Group is becoming more 
radical and more openly critical than it could afford to be when it was still part of 
the Biodiversity Program. During a 1998 information campaign against mining 
projects, for example, representatives of the nickel-cobalt mine would call the UNDP 
to complain about the activities of the BRG. These complaints were never taken 
serious, and over time the BRG would come to play a growing role in disserninating 
information concerning a range of environmental and political issues in Madang 
province. Over the years the BRG has become something of action group, picking up 
conservation issues as they come along and gain political importance. It thereby 
makes use of its network of different contacts throughout the province, directly 
Morming local people as to the choice that they have, and the patterns of interaction 
that they can expect. The result is a very different and much more 'political' type of 
conservation than that first aimed for with GEF funding, but definitely one much 
needed in the high pressure environment that characterises PNG resource issues. 
Possibly it is one that is more worthwhile in the longer term than the blind pursuit 
of protected areas that characterise most international conservation interventions. 
In recent years, as the BRG no longer feels the pressure to meet the goals as defined 
in its foreign sponsored project documents, its drive towards the establishment and 
management of WMAs on the Ramu River has lost some of its urgency. In contrast 
to the previous years, where it had to more or less think about the wishes of its 
donors, it can now determine its own course. Consequentiy, a raging debate is 
taking place over what the BRG should actually do. Is it to be a conservation agency 
in line with its initial formation, a community development organisation as it has 
developed, or a training centre to teach other organisations the principles of its 
community entry approach? Is it to stay involved in the further development of the 
Ramu River WMAs or is it to transfer the responsibility for WMA formation and 
management to a conservation organisation? These issues have not been solved. 
In the beginning of 2001, as UNDP funding was about to come to a halt, a three year 
funding proposal was accepted by a coalition of the German Bread for the World 
and the Dutch Interchurch Organisation of Development Co-operation (ICCO), 
enabling the BRG to continue its work in the Ramu Valley and to redefine its place 
in the spectrum of PNG environmental organisations. 
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C O N C L U S I O N 
To present, as I have done in the opening chapter, the discourse of 'fortress 
conservation' as a rather monouthic discourse which is only gradually being 
challenged is rather limiting. It is clear that preservationists policies still persist in 
the eUgibiUty requirements of the various donors, but it is also clear that the daily 
practices as developed by the Biodiversity Program or other conservation projects in 
PNG have very Utile to do with these mainstream ideas. In practice, the project 
implementing agencies and their staff draw ideas from a number of different 
discourses and visions. 
The suggestion that people in PNG can simply be enticed to establish strictly 
protected areas of several tens of thousands of hectares is unrealistic. Even though 
project documents continue to slate the estabUshment of a sizeable 'conservation 
area' (UNDP 1993), a 'national park' (CRC 1996a), or 'core conservation area' 
(UNDP 1998) as the ultimate aim of their projects, there is not a single project 
implementing agency in PNG that does not in practice enter into the development of 
much less strict land and resource use plans. The grand scenarios of national park 
formation that dominate the multilateral donor and the international conservation 
agencies have nothing to do with actual conservation practice as it takes place in 
PNG. In practice, pragmatic considerations as to what is deemed possible and 
desirable take over, and the various project teams pick elements from various 
discourses in order to legitimise and shape their interventions. 
It is only when the donors with their decontextuaUsed and generally preservationist 
narratives as to what is conservation and what not, come into the play, that project 
teams are puUed back into line, trying to represent their situation in such a way that 
it secures another round of funding. Once the money has been aUocated however, 
agencies go back to the day-to-day negotiations with local landowners, in the very 
best scenario corning up with integrated land use plans in which only certain areas 
are slated for total protection. In a sense, the difficult practice of having to deal with 
nature and the people that Uve wilhin nature as it evolves in PNG conservation 
projects, is a much more mature than the preservationist visions of separating 
people from nature that dominate the donor agencies. 
The wide gap in perceptions between various stakeholders, especiaUy between the 
field staff of the Bismarck-Ramu programme and the eUgibiUty requirements of the 
GEF, and the manner in which those responsible were caught between the reaUties 
of the Ramu VaUey, the phUosophy of the Bismarck-Ramu project and the 
guidelines of the GEF has been the topic of this final chapter. 

CONCLUSIONS 
In these times of strong environmental rhetoric with regard to the loss of tropical 
biodiversity and concerted interventions in developing countries in nature's name, 
detailed anthropological studies of the actual practices that constitute such 
interventions may cast light on the ideological and methodological struggles that 
these contain. As conservation interventions in developing countries are inevitably 
characterised by strongly opposing - often culturally and professionally influenced -
understandings of the relation between mankind and its environment, and the 
nature and source of the problem such project interventions tend to fall apart in a 
variety of debates and factions. These confHcting understandings become apparent 
at the 'interface', the points of interaction where people and groups of people 
engage in daily negotiations 'to make Ihings work'. Such interfaces not only occur 
within the hierarchy of the project, such as between administrators and project staff 
or between project staff and local people, but also between different professional 
groups, among the various ethnic groups 'targeted' by the intervention, between 
different generations within these communities, and between men and women. It is 
within this framework that this s tudy has recounted the history of a complex 
biodiversity program in PNG. 
Chapter one provided a background to some of the narratives that legitimise 
conservation interventions. Chapter two outlined the specific nature of conservation 
policy in PNG, and the experiences of the Biodiversity Program in the Lak area in 
that country. Together they provided a background to a more detailed account of 
the program's interventions in the Bismarck-Ramu area between early 1995 and mid 
2000. Chapters three and four described in some detail the Jimi and Ramu societies 
and the interactions between them, with special attention given to the way in which 
intermarriage relations enable Jimi highlanders to settle in the lowland Ramu 
Valley Chapters five and six dealt with the first interventions in the Jimi valley and 
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the shift in thinking that the program went through as a result of the combined 
experiences in the Lak area and the Jimi Valley. This shift in Ihinking would be 
reflected in a fundamental change in staff make-up. In the remainder of this thesis, 
the second half of chapter six outlined the principles of the highly reflexive and 
participatory community-based conservation strategy that was developed, while 
chapter seven deals with the subsequent interactions with different groups of 
people, and the manner in which the project became enrolled in local territorial 
concerns. The final chapter dealt with the manner in which the project breaks away 
from its donors due to the fundamental differences of opinion over the nature of 
'local people', the 'conservation' and 'development' problems perceived and the 
necessary policies to address these. 
In looking at these interventions, I have used an interface analysis as my main 
methodological framework, presenting the project as an 'arena' in which various 
individual and collective actors, each equipped with their own mode of 
understanding, agenda's and power base interact. By looking at what divides these 
various actors, and how they interact and contest each others ideas and authority, an 
interface analysis may help to explain the particular course that a planned 
intervention has taken, draw attention to the crucial differences in understanding 
and clarify the evolution of project ideology and practices through time. Important 
to note is that the extent to which interfaces constitute a site of struggle fluctuates, 
with the fissures between various actors taking on varying levels of importance and 
urgency through time. In a number of cases such interfaces are 'solved' in the sense 
that they either 'dissolve' into a common understanding, or alternatively they 
develop into a 'middle ground' where people co-operate, be it for often different 
reasons (White 1991). In these final pages, I will revisit the main interfaces that have 
become apparent in the Biodiversity Program, discuss a number of the underlying 
ideas that constitute the most important sources of contention within the program, 
and provide an overview of the main changes in ideology and implementation that 
have taken place. 
INTERFACES A S CLASHING W O R L D VIEWS 
The key issue in an interface analysis is to define the various fault lines that run 
through a planned intervention. It is at these fault lines where representatives of 
opposing world views, each with their own explanatory framework, individual and 
collective agenda's come to interact and where both the key differences as well as 
the options for co-operation, become apparent. Cussins (1998) Speaks of a clash 
between 'whole moral universes', which represent a complex mixture of images of 
nature and people, the role of science and professional and cultural values. 
Important to note is that the various actors playing a role at these interfaces are not 
just detached collective or individual actors but tend to represent whole networks of 
people and organisations which in turn represent a series of powerful, often 
ideological and culturally determined images and narratives. 
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In this study, the fact that the daily encounters between individual and collective 
actors at the interface may represent whole life worlds has maybe become most clear 
in the discussion of western forms of conservation (chapter 1) as opposed to the 
ideas held with regard to their environment by local people (chapter 4). Westerners 
regard nature as vulnerable, under threat and something that should be cared for, 
giving themselves the resporisibility to look after nature, often viewing protected 
areas as the main instrument to safeguard nature separate from human society. 
Local people in the Bismarck-Ramu area do not share the idea that nature is 
vulnerable. They have to work hard to keep nature from taking over, cutting their 
gardens in the bush. In general they tend to regard people as the weaker of the two. 
They certainly do not share the idea that they should take responsibility for nature, 
as such is, certainly by the elder people, seen as the task of the spirits of the bush, 
who need to be propitiated or tricked into surrendering wildlife. The idea of not 
using nature, as it would be more valuable in an untouched form is completely alien 
to pragmatic and utilitarian people. In addition, setting land aside without using it 
may weakens one's claims to ownership, as it is exactly through the use of land, the 
cultivation of crops and the planting of trees that ownership and use rights are 
created. 
While such images may seem rather ephemeral and theoretical, it is at the interface 
between various groups and individuals where apparently clear cut, but in practice 
highly ambiguous, concepts such as 'conservation' and 'development' are loaded 
with meaning and translated into practices that serve the understandings and 
interests of the actors concerned. It is at the interface between CD workers and local 
people for example, that negotiations are conducted with regard to the management 
of resources, the way in which such should be done, and that competing 
explanations, realities and interests become apparent. 
INTERFACES IN THE BIODIVERSITY PROGRAM 
In the analysis of project development, most attention is usually given to the 
interconnections between project and people, taking a dyadic view of planned 
intervention as consisting of a project that intervenes and local people that are being 
intervened upon. A look at the fissures that run through the Biodiversity Program, 
however, allows us to identify a variety of different nodal points, which, each in its 
own way, constitute a source of debate, contention and argument. I can not hope to 
identify them all, as one's field of vision is inevitably limited, but believe that the 
account presented in this s tudy allows us to identify to following crucial interfaces 
for both the Lak and the Bismarck-Ramu projects. 
Both in the Lak as well as in the Bismarck-Ramu project the field staff of the 
Biodiversity Program tried to engage local communities in the ambit of its 
conservation program. In essence, this consisted of communications between people 
and project either through plenary meetings and the awareness drive in Lak or 
through the conduct of patrols and the use of PRA exercises in the case of the 
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Bismarck-Ramu project. Presenting it as such, however, is a gross simplification as 
these encounters were seldom two-sided. In practice, both local people and project 
staff are made u p off a number of factions or are supplemented by other actors. To 
start with the latter aspect, in the case of the Lak forums, during which local people 
were consulted over their participation in the ICAD proposal, and asked to 
terminate the logging agreement, the logging company constituted the physically 
absent, but in practice omnipresent competitor to the ICAD project team. In the case 
of the Bismarck-Ramu project it is clear that there is no such thing as 'local people'. 
Not only the apparent division between Ramu landowners and Jimi settlers plays a 
role, also the fact that the highly competitive Jimi themselves consist of many 
different clan and sub-clan groups proved of crucial importance to the way in which 
the project intervention was received, absorbed, and enrolled. Other fissures 
rurining through these communities include the different interests of women and 
men, the latter being more predisposed towards managing resources than the latter, 
and between youngster and elders. The different interests across the generation gap 
can be illustrated by the fact that the Ramu elderly would like to cease intermarriage 
with the Jimi settlers, while the Ramu youngsters, in search of a wife, simply 
disregard these directions. 
Within the Biodiversity Program team itself, a number of different interfaces became 
apparent. The Lak project, for example, was dominated by the differing interests of 
the higher management in the UNDP Country Office, which overemphasised 
aspects of aaxniriistration, proper procedure and accountability, and liked to play 
power games, while the staff of the Biodiversity Program was trying to establish a 
presence in Lak as quickly as possible in order to outcompete a local logging 
operation. This conflict became especially apparent with regard to the construction 
of the Lak base. Around the time of the phase two negotiations with the TNC and 
the GEF the Bismarck-Ramu project was characterised by two essential fissures, 
which put especially the chief technical advisor in the Port Moresby office in a 
difficult position. On the one hand there was the interface with the donor which 
revolved around the use of economic incentives to secure conservation, on the other 
there was the Bismarck-Ramu team which vehemently opposed the use of such 
incentives as these were thought to destroy self-reliance. This situation points to the 
fact that not only the interfaces themselves may form a site of struggle, but also that 
the contradictory requirements between a number of interfaces in one and the same 
social setting may constitute a source of problems. 
As described in the last chapter, the chief technical advisor and the UNDP 
consultant made a concerted but unsuccessful effort to bridge the gap by drawing 
the sustainable timber concession of the TNC into the fray. Below the surface of 
these contradictory requirements lay opposing visions of local people, with the GEF 
taking a rather cynical view of local people and regarding economic incentives as a 
way to secure conservation in the longer run, while the Bismarck-Ramu team 
thought conservation could be secured by grounding it in a communally held 
conviction. Even deeper than this issue lay the issue of control. The Bismarck-Ramu 
Conclusions 361 
team most of all feared to be subjected to unwanted pressures, fearing that its work 
on the Ramu River would be undone if the provincial politicians and the biological 
and economically inclined technocrats of a second phase program would take over. 
There is one obvious interface that is missing throughout the Biodiversity Program. 
That is the interface with the logging companies. Although the conservation debate 
in PNG can be framed in terms of a competition between loggers and 
conservationist over local landowner's resources, there is very Utile interaction 
between mainstream timber organisations and their conservationist opponents. This 
stands in contradiction to practices in West Africa where conservation agencies and 
timber companies actively discuss matters, and where in some cases forest 
companies play a role in curbing the hunting for protected species in their 
concessions. In PNG, this debate has not evolved beyond the highly poUticised and 
pubUc discussions between the various stakeholders in PNG forestry and attempts 
by the Biodiversity Program in Lak and the Nature Conservancy in the Josephstaal 
area to evict the proponents of industrial clear felling and to replace them with 
ecologically more sustainable and socio-economicaUy more advantageous 
operations. 
INTERFACES AS ORGANISING ENTITIES 
Important to note is that interfaces do not represent fluid and nondescript zones of 
encounter in which various actors bounce ideas off against each other, but tend to 
develop a logic of their own. It is through the practical encounters between various 
people and groups, each with their own history, images, needs and strategic 
resources that patterns of interaction develop, social boundaries are drawn and that 
the interfaces itsetf turns into an element that structures future encounters. 
Thus the encounters with local people in Lak organised in plenary meetings, or the 
meetings at the market in BubkUe in the Jimi VaUey took the usual shape of 
conservationists talking down to local people. The involved expatriate personnel 
told people to become aware of their conservation predicament, infoirning them of 
the risks they were taking by Uving as they did, and suggesting a vague and poorly 
defined alternative caUed ICAD to their present situation. People in turn Ustened 
and adopted the resolutions or invited the project back in. Whereas these pubUc 
meetings ostentatiously produced the outcomes desired by the project, they would 
usuaUy be disputed later on, or would prove to have Utile impact on the manner 
with which people treated project staff. When people in the Jimi vaUey, briefed by 
the community faciUtator, finaUy thought they knew what the project wanted, and 
started making the right noises about conservation and keeping logging companies 
out, a new community development approach changed the patterns of interaction as 
they had evolved, throwing the Jimi people into confusion and later anger. 
The community development approach of the Bismarck-Ramu project took a 
different format of interactions with local people. In the first place it involved Papua 
New Guinean viUagers talking to Papua New Guinean villagers, rather than highly 
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skilled expatriates giving presentations to largely uneducated rural communities. 
Although plenary meetings were also called for during the later community entry 
approach of the Bismarck-Ramu project, much of the interactions between project 
staff and people took place before and after these meetings in a much more informal 
setting. The community workers of the Bismarck-Ramu project were encouraged to 
work and spend time with local people, thus gairiing an insight in local divisions of 
interest and the make u p of the various communities. What worried local people 
about this process was not so much the presence of the community development 
workers who would strike u p friendships throughout the area, but the fact that 
people did not know what the project was after. 
Even three years after patrols had started villagers would profess to be baffled as to 
what the community development workers 'really' wanted. The community 
development workers in turn, wanted people to be 'self-reliant', while 
simultaneously pushing a conservation agenda through the selective use of PRA 
tools and metaphors. If people were unhappy they could always ask the teams to 
leave, which they on one occasion indeed did. Most communities, however, baffled 
as they were, had no reason to evict the project but rather continued to hope that 
something would eventually emerge. The community development workers in turn, 
hoped that the local communities would through the continuous emphasis on self-
reliance and the elaborate community planning process, address those issues that 
they themselves found relevant. Even though it was presented as an open-ended 
process, in practice the community development approach of the Bismarck-Ramu 
project depended on a carefully thought out combination of exercises to 'sneak 
conservation issues in', and consituted a highly political exercise. The responses to 
these meetings and the various tools, would allow the community development 
workers to label people either as 'self-reliant' or 'cargo thinkers' if necessary 
excluding the latter from future work. 
The interfaces described above have in common that they occur between the 
hierarchical layers of the program, with UN aaniinistrators clashing with project 
aclrninistrators, and the project staff clashing with various groups of people. The one 
important interface in the Biodiversity Program that runs across all layers of the 
organisation is the one between biologists and social scientists. 
T H E BIOLOGICAL VERSUS THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
Throughout the Biodiversity Program runs the fissure between social and natural 
scientists, an interaction which not only covers notions of best practice under PNG 
circumstances, but which also entails a discussion over the relative authority of the 
biologists with their emphasis on positivistic science and that of their community-
oriented colleagues from the social sciences. Thus, where the Lak project was 
dominated by the former, the Bismarck-Ramu intervention would be largely driven 
by social scientists. Both projects have been criticised by the other party. Social 
scientists for example tend to argue that biologists should spend more time thinking 
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about and talking to local people (see chapter 4), while biologists strike back arguing 
that it is all very well to talk to local people, but of Utile use if these people do not 
own the resources worth protecting, or if the outcome is some wishy-washy form of 
environmental protection (see chapter 8). 
These approaches faU apart in very different interpretations of what conservation 
projects should look like and which issues take priority. Examples of both a nature-
oriented project and a people-oriented approach can be found in the history of the 
Biodiversity Program. In the first place there is the technical and managerial attitude 
to conservation as seen in Lak. This is the mainstream conservation approach as 
pushed by the international conservation agencies. It is usuaUy based on a spatial 
zoning program and accords prime authority to, often expatriate, biologists and 
conservation managers who select the area of their choice on the basis of biological 
indicators, develop a management regime based on an analysis of threats and 
subsequently aim to develop mechanisms to coerce or entice people into certain 
beneficial forms of behaviour. In this view, social scientists are an 'add-on' to a 
largely technical and managerial project. In the more enlightened varieties of such 
programmes, local people may voice their concerns on carefully selected issues. As 
recounted in chapter 1 the sustained conflicts between local people and project 
managers, are often repUcated in differing opinions between the social and natural 
scientists that make u p the project teams. 
In the second place, there is the community-based form of conservation as proposed 
by the Bismarck-Ramu project that argues that people can very weU look after their 
environment, and that it is their decision anyway. In this view biologists may have a 
place in the program, but only as advisors after people have decided that they may 
need certain information. In practice the project is puUed by community 
development workers, trainers, and the odd social scientist 6 5 Conservation 
outcomes may be based on spatial zoning through land use plans, but may also 
include simple rules of behaviour such as 'we wUl not allow timber companies into 
our lands' such as that contained in the deed agreement among the Sogeram clans 
(See chapter 7). The weak spot in such management regimes is the issue of 
enforcement in the face of social change, a break down of 'traditional' patterns of 
authority, the monétisation of the economy, growing feelings of relative deprivation 
and the offers made by foreign resource developers. 
FROM GROUPS TO INDIVIDUALS 
Talking about interfaces as existing between parties and their respective 
worldviews, it is important to qualify and compUcate the above description of the 
8 5 The latter is not necessarily indispensable as the CD workers, through their contacts with local 
communities, may gain sufficient information for the project to shape its daily interventions. In fact it 
may be more attractive not to have an academically inclined social scientist in the project as the 
outcome of his/her work may contradict the strategic representations of the project (See chapter 8). 
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various hierarchical, social and professional boundaries at play in the program. An 
issue of importance is to note that interfaces are not necessarily between collective 
actors. Often key debates are triggered or punctuated by individuals that do not 
appear to 'fit the bill', as they draw upon resources, affiliations and knowledge from 
a variety of sources. An example is the person of the Bismarck-Ramu community 
facilitator, one of the few educated people in the Jimi Valley, who having his 
residence among the settlers in the Ramu Valley, enlisted all his resources, contacts 
and information into his election campaign. Another is the community development 
trainer of the Bismarck-Ramu project who managed to turn a GEF/UNDP project, 
essentially based on the idea that an integration into world markets may serve to 
establish conservation-related incentives, on its head by pursuing a radical and 
experimental community development strategy. 
People or groups of people thus do not necessarily act on behalf of the group to 
which they appear to belong. Long (2001) notes that such linkages, or the absence 
thereof, needs to be empirically established. Thus the ongoing debate between social 
scientists and biologists described in these pages is not one of all biologists versus all 
social scientists. The conservation manager of the Bismarck-Ramu project for 
example, accepted and supported the community entry approach wholeheartedly, 
thereby reducing the influence of his own profession on the interactions with local 
people. The resource economist, instrumental in developing the community entry 
approach and processing the Lak experience, would later emphasise the need to 
bring economic incentives back into the project in order to ensure sustainabihty and 
secure further funding. Among local people too, individuals played a similar role, 
with some Jimi agreeing to recognise the Ramu landowners as their hosts, while 
others coristructing elaborate 'traditions' in order to assert their status of 'true 
landowners'. This s tudy show that one of the main problems that well-meaning 
conservationists time and again run into is that they take public utterances by 
individuals as a reflection of group opinion. 
One of the problems with mainstream policy discourses is that these provide no 
room for the manner in which individual and collective actors involved in planned 
intervention may act differentiy than their status or position would suggest. These 
discourses tend to fall back on broad sweeping reified images such as that contained 
in notions of 'community', local people', 'the program', or 'the social' versus the 
'biological sciences' (Long 2001). Such imagery, combined with the practice of 
labelling' (Wood 1985), is attractive to the poUcymaker trying to design a 
development or conservation project geared towards a specific 'target population' 
but does not allow for an understanding of the complex interactions between 
individuals and groups that tend to determine the specific outcome of such 
interventions. Often such imagery is based on a number of implicit assumptions 
about local people, their communities, their leaders and so on. In chapter 4,1 have 
critiqued the way in which such simplified and often implicit images with regard to 
local society set the stage for subsequent disappointment among conservationists. 
The most complete treatment of such stereotypes, however, was given in the 
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opening chapter where I provided an overview of some of the stories that we tell 
concerning local people. In chapter eight I have described how such stereotypical 
narratives are reproduced as part of the process required to secure further project 
funding. These stereotypical images of local people warrant a further discussion. 
T H E STORIES T H A T WE TELL ABOUT NATURE A N D 'LOCAL' PEOPLE 
This s tudy started by, arguing that one of the most defining aspects of conservation 
discourse is the omnipresent notion of 'crisis'. The continuous invocation of a 
vulnerable environment that is being threatened by human behaviour serves to 
mobilise resources. Project documents tend to be constructed in the same manner, 
starting with a description of the importance of local biodiversity, subsequently 
entering into sometimes graphic descriptions on how nature is being threatened, 
and ending with what should be done. The dominant image of people against 
nature tends to de-emphasise the different understandings of the situation, the 
variety of possible solutions and the diverging interests among the various actors 
involved in conservation interventions. Consequentiy, the establishment, expansion 
and improved management of a variety of protected areas are the inevitable policy 
suggestions. The human component is dealt with through participation on a number 
of carefully selected issues and a package of 'linked' development activities. 
Project proponents tend to sustain the images of vulnerable nature and destructive 
local people, because it is only be complying with the dominant and usually 
decontextualised narratives that exist TOthin the international institutions, that they 
can tap into the resources necessary to implement their programs and maintain their 
jobs. In doing so, conservationists tend to be prone to exaggerate those aspects that 
serve their case. This is not only visible in the nightmare scenarios on species 
extinction developed by a number of prominent conservation biologists, but also in 
the daily practice of project development and implementation. In the case of the Lak 
project it appears that both the biological significance of local nature as well as the 
logging threat were overstated. In the case of the Bismarck-Ramu project the area 
was initially selected because of its low levels of threat, a classification which had be 
turned around in the run u p to a second phase proposal to the GEF. Thus even when 
it is obvious that the threats are low, that reality is highly complex and that strictly 
protected areas of a rninimum size will not be the outcome, the need for funding 
drives project proponents to present their case in the usual stereotypical format, thus 
reproducing these stereotypes ad mfmitum. 
Next tot the notion of 'crisis', conservation literature now abounds with the 
importance of the 'community'. This aspect too has been introduced in the first 
chapter, where I have argued that for a number of moral and especially practical 
reasons, conservationists have come to see the involvement of local people as part of 
their trade. The views taken of people vary widely, with some seeing local people as 
the ultimate threat to the biodiversity that they cherish, others seeing local 
communities as a means to secure conservation, while a small but vocal group see 
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indigenous people as the allies of nature. These views essentially fall back on a 
number of characterisations of indigenous people which I have, by reference to the 
African literature, identified as either the 'good' and 'nature loving', the 
'destructive' and 'ignorant' and the 'economically rational native'. Even though one 
might think that such stereotypes are a thing of the colonial past, this s tudy shows 
how all of these descriptions of indigenous people, pop u p throughout the 
interventions of the Biodiversity Program, providing the ideologically-tinted raw 
material from which policies are subsequently made. 
These visions of local people not only constitute the corner stone for the shape that 
planned interventions take, but also determine who is in charge. Where people are 
held to be destructive and ignorant they need to be excluded from nature, where 
they are held to be nature caring they need to be given the autonomy and self-
confidence to pursue these conservationist practices. The first view leads to a policy 
which reduces the authority of local people over nature, transferring the 
management of resources to more educated professionals acting in the name of the 
public good, the second view legitimises an opposing view which argues that 
communities are best equipped to look after nature as local and global interests 
agree. These opposing explanations are part and parcel of the history of the 
Biodiversity Program 
An alternative view inherent to integrated conservation and development methods 
is the idea that people are essentially economic beings who move towards or away 
from sustainable Uvelihoods, depending on the nature of local incentives. In this 
view, poUcymaking concerning conservation management involves modifying 
incentives and disincentives in such a way that what the intervening 
conservationists deem more favourable lifestyles evolve. Looking at the history of 
the Biodiversity Program, it is remarkable how little influence this latter view of 
local people has had in practice. Whereas the policy documents of the Biodiversity 
Program talk about conservation area establishment, ICAD methods and the need to 
develop 'linked' activities, in practice, discussions with local people were dominated 
by the do's and don'ts of community-based conservation and development rather 
than by the establishment of a series of incentives. This had partly to do with the fact 
that the Lak project never reached a stage where economic incentives were applied 
as it simply lacked the funds and time to do so. The community approach of the 
Bismarck-Ramu project did away with economic incentives all together. 
In practice, the image of the 'economically rational native' made way for the much 
older stereotypes mentioned above. These stereotypical views of local people are not 
'given' however, but rapidly change and shift as events unfold. Where the Lak 
project started from the premise that local people were naturally predisposed 
towards conservation, this view quickly made place for a short-lived attempt to 
develop economic incentives in order to. compete with the timber company. Later, 
when the project did not eventuate as planned, the positive and economic view of 
local culture made place for more disparaging views. A similar pattern is visible in 
the interventions in the Jimi Valley. Where conservationists hoped to find local 
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cornmunitJes susceptible to their offers of integrated conservation, social services 
and economic development, this initial optimism disintegrated in the face of reality. 
The discussions and conflicts that followed tended to focus on the ground rules for 
working together, rather than on the content of the program itself. Here too an 
unfavourable view of the Jimi communities would come to dominate. 
These negative preconceptions of local people were replaced by a radical change in 
philosophy. This view, based on a much more positive view of local society 
suggested that not local people were at fault, but that the manner in which the first 
interventions in the Lak area and in the Jimi Valley had been conducted had 
triggered a range of expectations and problems when these were not met. Based on 
this analysis the Biodiversity Program changed tack towards a highly participatory 
community entry approach. This approach, based on the assumption that 
'traditional' communities are not only self-reliant but also essentially conservationist 
in nature, would come to dominate a drive to 'put people back on their feet' with the 
help of Paolo Freire's conscientisation approach. The underlying stereotype of 
'primitive ecological wisdom' however is difficult to maintain in the face of the 
available anthropological studies on man-nature relations in PNG and the available 
field material from the area itself. Still this image of the 'traditional' community 
became a driving force in the development of the program. 
Over time, the Bismarck-Ramu team developed a conceptual framework based on 
notions of 'self-reliance', 'cargo-thinking' and 'traditional conservation'. This 
framework is essentially a variety of the 'fallen angel' perspective in which people 
are seen as mtrinsically nature loving, but corrupted due to outside influences. This 
framework, a critical analysis of the first interventions, plus the activities of the 
community facilitator helped to explain to the Bismarck-Ramu team why the Jimi 
were lost ' to conservation. The Bismarck-Ramu team, however, was successful in 
establishing relations with a number of Ramu communities, and even got them to 
agree to establish two protected areas. Notwithstanding this success in forging a 
relationship with local people, the assumption that this constitutes long-term 
conservation is under dispute. 
The vision of local people as being natural conservationists, who are likely to remain 
so as they have been l e d back to their traditional culture' and as they have 
'organised themselves' would prove incompatible to the sustainabiMty narrative that 
dominates the international donor agencies. This latter narrative does not mind how 
protected areas come about, but argues that once these have been established, 
economic incentives constitute the main 'safety latch'. Such is especially in the PNG 
situation where coercive measures can not be applied. The clash between the 
Bismarck-Ramu project team and its donors over the views of people and the role of 
economic incentives led to the collapse of the second project proposal. 
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T H E FRAGILE 'MIDDLE G R O U N D ' 
In the introduction, I have introduced White's (1991) 'middle ground' concept, 
which in simple terms refers to an interface 'that works' . Where project staff and 
people, decide that they have enough in common to pursue a number of joint 
activities, even when this might be for a variety of reasons, such a middle ground 
evolves. In the Bismarck-Ramu project this became visible in the articulation of the 
project's community-based conservation strategy and the territorial concerns of the 
Ramu people. 
While the project staff grappled with the respective views of local communities, the 
attitude of local people towards the environment, and the authority of biologists 
versus social scientists, local people themselves also set about ruling the notion of 
conservation. Thus the busmess-rninded Jimi would talk about the need to establish 
a kampani bilong envtonmen, 'an environmental company'. This concept, which in 
some ways mirrors the ICAD concept, fell flat because the project changed its course 
towards a non-economic view of conservation, over time triggering a breakdown in 
relations with the Jimi. The Ramu people in contrast, were more successful, 
asserting that lukautim graun na bush na wara, looking after the land, the forest and 
the waters ' was what they had always done, thereby almost coincidentally offering a 
possibility to link the non-economic community-based conservation policy pursued 
by the Bismarck-Ramu project team to their own territorial concerns. In the village 
of Sepu also the fear of a loss of culture and identity and a general apprehension at 
the pace of change played a role in adopting notions of conservation. 
The joint middle ground that evolved centred on the establishment of two wUdlife 
management areas, and the signing of a conservation deed in the Sogeram area. The 
latter was a remarkable feat on the part of the Bismarck-Ramu project team as it 
meant that local people successfully and on their own account resisted the entreaties 
of a company and its supporters in the PNG forest administration. A detailed 
description of the interactions between community development workers and the 
Sepu and Foroko communities however suggests that the battle for conservation is 
far from over. People appear to have actively and successfully used the WMA 
mechanism, their links with the community development workers of the Bismarck-
Ramu project and the forums that the community development work offered, to 
reassert their authority as landowners in the face of Jimi encroachment and 
competing claims from within the Ramu Floodplains. In Foroko the changing 
situation, combined with a spell of bad luck on the part of the Jimi settlers there, led 
the latter to abandon the area altogether and move back u p towards the Jimi Valley. 
There are, however, also indications, that the some of the Ramu people see the 
WMA as an intermediate step in the development of economic activities. Thus 
people do wish to conserve certain sacred areas within the WMA, but also mention 
that they may want to give certain companies access to their resources by following 
a dual strategy. 
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Important to note is that the 'middle ground' that evolved between the Ramu 
communities and the Bismarck-Ramu team, was in no small way facilitated by the 
ambiguity of the 'conservation' notion. 'Lukautim bush an graun an waia' can mean 
many different things to different people, and the concept will be acceptable as long 
as it is not translated into actual practices. As long as there is no enforcement of 
conservation rules in these protected areas, not further influx of Jimi into the Ramu 
territory, no direct offers by timber companies, and the conservation activities of the 
project are not seen to actually inhibit the economic aspirations of local 
communities, both the project team and local people can sustain the idea that they 
are talking about the same thing. 
Once reality overtakes however, and people see themselves forced to turn this vague 
and free conservation thing into real practices, the diverging explanations of this 
concept will inevitably become apparent. As long as the interests of the Bismarck-
Ramu project and Ramu River groups coincide, the first seeing its conservation and 
self-reliance goals met through the establishment of two protected areas, the latter 
regarding the project as a means to consolidate it claims to landownership in the 
face of Jimi encroachment, all will be well. The moment, however, that 
landownership becomes a vehicle to pursue other means than keeping the Jimi at 
bay, the partnership will likely disintegrate. As in many other cases on this globe, 
the conservationists run the risk of being sorely disappointed by their local allies. 
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SAMENVATTING 
Deze Studie beschrijft de activiteiten van het Biodiversity Conservation and 
Resource Management Program in Papua Nieuw Guinea (PNG) in de jaren tussen 
1992 en 2000. Dit programma, gefinancierd door de Global Environment Facility en 
uitgevoerd door het United Nations Development Program en het Papua Nieuw 
Guineese Department of Environment and Conservation was gericht op het 
ontwikkelen van een tweetal natuurparken. Het eerste project vond plaats in het 
Lak gebied op N e w Ireland, een van de grootste eilanden van PNG. Het tweede 
project richtte zieh op het Bismarck-Ramu gebied op de noordelijke hellingen 
van het vasteland van PNG en vormt het hoofdonderwerp van deze studie. 
Tussen juli 1996 en januari 1998 was ik als sociaal-economisch onderzoeker aan 
dit laatste project verbonden. 
Natuurbeheer in PNG kent een hele specifieke vorm. Waar het door de overheid 
opzetten van natuurgebieden over het algemeen gezien word t als de beste 
manier om biodiversiteit te beschermen kan een dergelijke, door de overheid 
geleide benadering, niet worden toegepast in PNG. Al het land en de zieh 
daarop bevindende natuurlijke hulpbronnen zijn het e igendom van lokale 
groepen. Omdat dit gewoonterecht erkend word t in de constitutie van PNG, 
heeft de overheid geen middelen om in het algemeen belang land te onteigenen. 
Dit betekent dat buitenstaanders, zoals bos- en mijnbouwbedrijven die gebruik 
willen maken van de aanwezige natuurlijke hulpbronnen, gedwongen zijn direct 
met lokale groepen landbezitters te onder-handelen. Sinds het einde van de jaren 
80 is met name de wijze waarop bosbouwbedrijven lokale leiders omkopen om 
daarna tegen een minimale vergoeding en met grote ecologische en social 
egevolgen enorme stukken bos te ontginnen een bron van zorg. Omdat 
natuurbeschermers lokale gemeenschappen ervan willen overtuigen dat er 
andere, meer duurzame manieren zijn om van het bos gebruik te maken zijn ook 
zij gedwongen een dialoog met de lokale bosbezittende gemeenschappen aan te 
gaan. Deze situatie plaatst PNG in de voorhoede van op gemeenschapsbasis 
georganiseerde vormen van natuurbescherming: de ervaring die hierbij 
opgedaan is kan relevant zijn voor de ontwikkeling van soortgelijke community-
based vormen van natuurbeheer in andere landen. 
Sinds het begin van de negentiger jaren maken projecten die zieh bezig houden 
met de bescherming van biodiversiteit in PNG in toenemende mate gebruik van 
zogenaamde geintegreerde natuurbeheer en ontwikkelingsmethoden (integrated 
conservation and development methods). Deze methoden hebben gemeen dat zij 
natuurbeschermend gedrag belonen door middel van positieve economische 
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prikkels. Een toenemend aantal milieuorganisaties stxeeft ernaar om samen met 
de betrokkenen tot een probleemdefinitie te komen, te bespreken wa t gedaan 
kan worden, of een beschermd gebied kan worden opgezet en hoe degenen die 
de gevolgen van natuurbeheer voor h u n rekening nemen beloond kunnen 
worden. 
In het ontwikkelen van dergelijke programma's maken natuurbeschermers in 
toenemende mate gebruik van methoden onüeend aan het ontwikkelingswerk. 
Net als de ontwikkelingswerker probeert de hedendaagse natuurbeschermer 
lokale mensen van kansen in de vo rm van banen, inkomens en diensten te 
voorzien. Echter niet alleen de praktijk van het ontAvikkellngswerk bevat lessen 
voor natuurbeschermers: ook de antropologische Studie van projectinterventies 
kan van belang zijn. Een gedetailleerde analyse van dit soort projecten maakt de 
verschilfende aannames waarop zij gebaseerd zijn en het verschil van inzicht met 
de lokale bevolklng inzichtelijk, en werp t tevens hcht op de wijze waarop de 
betrokken personen dit soort interventies aanpassen, verwerpen, dan wel 
aanvaarden. Deze Studie analyseert zo 'n casus. Daarbij word t niet alleen naar de 
perceptie en reacües van de ontvangende bevolklng gekeken maar word t ook 
besproken wat Olivier de Sardan (1995) nogal cynisch la configuration 
developementiste heeft genoemd: 'de hele constellatie aan experts, ambtenaren, 
werknemers van niet-gouvernementele organisaties, onderzoekers, technici, 
projecüeiders en veldstaf die op de een of ander wijze leven van de ontwlkkeling 
van anderen ' . Deze focus op het totaal aan betrokken actoren past in een 
onlwikkeling waarbij sociale wetenschappers h u n blikveld hebben ver ru imd van 
de wijze waarop de lokale bevolklng dit soort projecten ontvangt naar de manier 
waarop ook degenen die deze projecten uitvoeren een veelheid aan persoonlijke 
en collectieve belangen, ideeen en gezichtspunten vertegenwoordigen. 
Projectinterventies worden vaak gezien als poUtiek neutrale en op 
wetenschappelijke inzichten gebaseerde processen die berusten op een lineaire 
en werktuigelijke voorstelling van de relatie tussen beleidsformulering, 
uitvoering en uitkomsten. In het geval van tropisch natuurbeheer is het 
gebruikelijke patroon er een waarbij biologische experts zieh buigen over kaarten 
om daarmee de gebieden van hoge biodiversiteit te bepalen, om vervolgens de 
contouren van toekomstige na tuurparken te tekenen op basis van ecologische en 
bestuurlijke overwegingen. Pas als dit gebeurd is, verschuift de aandacht naar 
lokale mensen. In het verleden betekende dit vaak dat lokale mensen uit 
na tuurparken verdreven werden. Tegenwoordig ontwikkelen 
natuurbeschermers gei'ntegreerde natuurbeheer en ontwikkelingsactiviteiten die 
door middel van een combinatie van dwang en positieve prikkels de d ruk op 
beschermde gebieden moeten verminderen. Sociale wetenschappers hebben de 
a-poUtieke en lineaire voorstelling van dergelijke projecten bekritiseerd door 
erop te wijzen dat ook lokale mensen, belangengroepen en onderdelen van de 
Samenvatting 393 
overheid h u n eigen belangen nastreven. De verschillende wereldbeelden en 
waarden, ui tgedragen door deze groepen, sporen niet noodzakelijkerwijs met de 
belangen van de projectuitvoerende instantie en leiden tot een au fond 
onvoorspelbaar proces van sociale verandering. Op deze wijze bezien is een 
geplande interventie niet §eh enkel project dat uitgevoerd w o rd t längs de lijnen 
van de projectcyclus, maar eerder een bundel van constant verschuivende 
individuele en collectieve inspanningen. 
Het feit dat lokale mensen externe interventies bei'nvloeden heeft geleid tot een 
aangepaste visie op ontwdkkelingsprojecten. In deze visie produceren de inter-
venierende organisaties en de ontvangende bevolking de ui tkomsten van 
projecten gezamenlijk in een voor tdurend proces van onderhandel ing en 
interactie. Op deze wijze bezien vormt een project een sociale en politieke arena 
waar in verschillende groepen hun belangen najagen. Zelfs als projecten en lokale 
mensen besluiten samen te werken zal er een voor tdurende strijd bestaan over 
de inhoud van deze activiteiten. Een en ander leidt ertoe dat de uitkomsten van 
soortgelijke projecten vaak heel verschillende vormen kunnen aannemen en 
fundamenteel onvoorspelbaar zijn. 
Theoretisch kader 
Een manier om de verscheidenheid aan belangen en gezichtspunten binnen een 
project te analyseren is een zogeheten interface analyse. 'Interfaces', ofwel 
contactvelden, zijn de raakvlakken waar de verschillende bij een 
projectinterventie betrokken actoren, ieder met h u n eigen belangen, waarden en 
machtsmlddelen, interacteren. Overeenkomstig de voorstelling van een project 
als een arena, is het op deze raakvlakken dat in de dagelijkse praktijk van een 
project de verscheidenheid aan probleemdefinities, ideeen, prioriteiten en 
belangen zichtbaar wordt . Een voorbeeld van zo 'n soort raakvlak in de context 
van deze studie zijn de relaties tussen natuurbeschermers enerzijds en de lokale 
bevolking in het Bismarck-Ramu gebied anderzijds. 
Hoewel een dergelijke analyse zieh in de eerste plaats rieht op de confrontatie 
tussen verschillende actoren en de sociaal-economische, politieke en culturele 
verschilfen die daaraan ten grondslag Uggen, is het ook op deze contactvelden 
dat projectteams en lokale mensen al dan niet tot samenwerking komen. De 
historicus Richard White (1991) heeft hiervoor het 'middle ground' begrip 
gebruikt. Dit begrip beschrijft de manier waa rop actoren met heel verschillende 
achtergrond er door een proces van onderhandeling, confrontatie en 
vernieuwing toch in slagen tot een vo rm van samenwerking te komen waarbij de 
betrokkenen menen een of meerdere van hun doelen te kunnen realiseren. In 
eenvoudige termen is de 'middle ground' een contactveld dat 'werkt ' , zelfs als de 
betrokkenen alleen maar tijdelijk samenwerken om heel verschillende, soms op 
de längere terrnijn zelfs tegengestelde, redenen. 
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Projectinterventies kennen echter niet alleen de tegenstelling tussen degenen die 
het project uitvoeren en de lokale bevolking die daaraan onderworpen wordt , 
maar kennen een groot aantal verschillende partijen en een veelheid aan 
contactvelden. De ontvangende bevolklng is vaak gedifferentieerd op basis van 
verschillen in welstand, etnische groep, sociale verhoudingen, verwantschap, 
geslacht en territorialiteit. Ook de ui tvoerende instanties zijn zelden homogeen. 
Meer gebruikelijk is dat zulke organisaties een aantal verschillende groepen met 
verschillende prioriteiten en doelen bevatten. Tegenstellingen binnen 
projectuitvoerende instanties kunnen bijvoorbeeld Uggen tussen verschillende 
beroepsgroepen zoals natuurwetenschappers en hun collega's uit de sociale 
wetenschappen, tussen buitenlanders en lokale staf en tussen afdelingen en 
bestuurlijke lagen binnen de ui tvoerende instanties. Voor een succesvol project 
zijn d u s een veelheid aan samenwerkingsverbanden of 'middle grounds' nodig. 
Overzicht van deze studie 
Toen ik in Maart 1998 terugkeerde uit PNG realiseerde ik me dat ik in het kader 
van rnijn werk voor het Bismarck-Ramu project voornametijk de bevolking van 
het Bismarck-Ramu gebied had bestudeerd, maar dat ik eigenlijk niet veel wist 
van het begrip 'natuurbeheer ' (conservation) zoals dat binnen het project zo 
vanzelfsprekend werd gebruikt. Een gevolg hiervan is dat deze studie begint 
met een hoofdstuk over de oorsprong van het westers mil ieudenken en de wijze 
waarop een aantal ideeen rond 1930 samenkwam in een ideologie die zieh richtte 
op het in s tand houden van 'ongerepte ' na tuur met behulp van nationale parken. 
Dit gedachtegoed is niet alleen gebaseerd op de twijfelachtige aanname dat 
ongerepte na tuur per definitie meer waardevol is dan door de mens beinvloede 
ecosystemen, maar berust ook op een negatief beeld van lokale 
bevolkingsgroepen. De rest van dit hoofdstuk bespreekt een aantal 
concurrerende ideeen ten aanzien van lokale mensen en natuurbeheer die sinds 
de jaren 70 in ontwikkeling zijn. Met het dekolonisatieproces en het inzicht dat 
de regeringen van de n ieuwe onafhankelijke staten meer nadruk zouden leggen 
op economische ontwikkeling dan op na tuurbehoud ontstond er een 
toenemende aandacht voor het koppelen van ontwikkelingsactiviteiten aan 
natuurbeheer. Dit werd versterkt doordat in de praktijk nationale parken en 
natuurgebieden gekenmerkt werden door hoogoplopende conflicten tussen 
lokale bevolkingsgroepen en het van overheidswege aangestelde en vaak vanuit 
het westen gefinancierde nationale park management . Het inzicht dat de kosten 
van natuurbeheer niet zonder meer op de - vaak arme - groepen rond 
natuurgebieden konden worden afgewenteld leidde tot de ontvdkkeling van een 
veelheid aan participatleve en op gemeenschapsbasis georganiseerde 
natuurbeheersprojecten. In deze laatste aanpak past het specifieke geval van 
PNG. 
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Het tweede hoofdstuk beschrijft hoe, ondanks de natuurlijke rijkdom van PNG, 
het land tot voor kort nauwelijks aandacht heeft gekregen van internationale 
natuurbeschermers. De belangrijkste reden hiervoor hangt samen met het 
communale landbezit en het feit dat lokale gemeenschappen niet bereid zijn land 
af te staan voor het algemeen belang. Het opzetten van natuurgebieden door 
onteigening en uiteetting zoals elders gebruikelijk is word t daarmee 
uitzonderlijk moeitijk. Aan het eind van de 80er en het begin van de 90er jaren 
leidde een toenemende zorg rond de toekomst van het tropisch regenwoud, het 
opzetten van de Global Environment Facility en het houden van de United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development uit 1992, tot een golf van aandacht 
voor de situatie in PNG. Het tweede deel van dit hoofdstuk beschrijft hoe deze 
aandacht leidde tot het opzetten van een biodiversiteitsprogramma en hoe dit 
p rogramma tevergeefs probeerde om een natuurgebied op te zetten in N e w 
Ireland. Toen het project er niet in slaagde de lokale bevolking ervan te 
overtuigen dat een lokaal actief bosbouwbedrijf zijn activiteiten moest stoppen, 
besloot het p rogramma zijn tweede project in het Bismarck-Ramu gebied op 
radicaal n ieuwe wijze op te zetten. 
Hoofdstuk drie en vier geven een etnografische beschrijving van het Bismarck-
Ramu gebied en zijn bewoners en introduceert het conflict tussen Jimi migranten 
in de Ramu Vallei en de bewoners van deze vallei waar in het project betrokken 
raakte. Het vierde hoofdstuk kijkt ook naar lokale vormen van het beheer van 
natuurlijke bestaansbronnen en betoogt dat natuurbeheer zoals voorgesteld door 
het biodiversiteitsprogramma niet goed aansluit bij de wijze waarop lokale 
mensen h u n relatie tot, en eventuele veranrwoordelijkheid voor, de na tuur 
ervaren. In de Jimi vallei is het moeitijk te zien hoe een participatieve community-
based benadering zou kunnen werken aangezien het een dicht bevolkt gebied is, 
mensen hoge economische verwachtingen hebben, de lokale sociale s tructuur 
gefragmenteerd is en gekenmerkt word t door voor tdurende conflicten. Daarbij 
zijn de Jimi geneigd buitenstaanders en hun eigen natuurhjke hulpbronnen in de 
eerste plaats te beschouwen als middelen om op de korte terrnijn de eigen 
economische situatie te verbeteren. In de Ramu Vallei zijn de mogelijke redenen 
voor deelname aan natuurbeheer gevarieerder, maar niet zozeer een gevolg van 
zorg voor het mileu. De motivatie tot deelname lijkt hoofdzaketijk voort te 
komen uit de angst overlopen te worden door grote groepen Jimi immigranten. 
In de optiek van een aantal Ramu groepen kan het opzetten van een nationaal 
park dienen als buffer tussen henzelf en de naderende Jimi. Een bijkomende 
reden is dat de veel kleinere en conservatievere Ramu groepen bang zijn voor de 
snelle sociale veranderingen die met de mijn- en bosbouwactiviteiten in de 
omgeving gepaard gaan. Conservation word t door hen d u s veel breder gezien 
dan alleen de zorg voor de natuur, en word t ook betrokken op aspecten als 
territorialiteit, culturele identiteit en behoud van de status quo. Het zijn met name 
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deze overlappende redenen die de samenwerking tussen het project en een 
aantal Ramu groepen mogelijk maakte. 
Hoofdstuk vijf geeft een gedetailleerd verslag van de interacties tussen project-
team en Jimi groepen. Het project presenteerde zijn interventie in eerste instantie 
als een ' run ' van natuurbeheer voor ontwikkeling. Hoewel dit voorstel 
publiekelijk w e r d verwelkomd, werden de projectmedewerkers al snel 
geconfronteerd met een serie conflicten met een grote verscheidenheid aan 
mensen. Deze conflicten spitsten zieh met name toe op de organisatie van een 
onderzoek naar de lokale biodiversiteit. De teleurstelling aan de kant van de 
projectmedewerkers was vooral een gevolg van de nogal optimistische 
aannames ten aanzien van de lokale samenleving waarmee zij in eerste instantie 
het veld in gingen. Impliciet verwachtte het projectteam homogene cooperatieve 
groepen mensen met een langetermijnperspectief aan te treffen met wie het goed 
samenwerken zou zijn. Lokale gemeenschappen bleken echter gefragmenteerd, 
conflictueus en op de korte termijn gericht, met als gevolg een houding ten 
opzichte van het project die erop gericht was te halen wa t er te halen viel. Dit 
hoofdstuk stelt dat een beter geinformeerde en wa t realistischer houding met 
oog voor de belangentegenstellingen binnen gemeenschappen dit soort projecten 
beter zou voorbereiden op h u n contacten met lokale groepen. Het hoofdstuk laat 
aan de hand van koloniale rapporten, beschreven in hoofdstuk vier, zien hoe de 
reacties van de Jimi groepen ten aanzien van het project een hoge mate van 
continuiteit vertonen met de reacties op eerdere buitenstaanders. De Jimi reactie 
op interventies van buitenaf tijkt niet in de eerste plaats gedreven door de aard 
van de interventie als wel door de onderlinge rivaliteit tussen de Jimi 
gemeenschappen. 
Hoofdstuk zes analyseert de n ieuwe benadering die door het Bismarck-Ramu 
project ontwikkeld w e r d in het licht van de ervaringen in N e w Ireland en de Jimi 
Vallei. Deze n ieuwe benadering week af van de eerder gebruikte natuurbeheers 
en ontwikkelings-methoden en Steide in plaats daarvan een participatieve 
Strategie voor die zieh baseerde op het idee van zelmeschikking (self-reliance) en 
gemeenschapsversterking (empowerment). In tegenstelling tot de eerder gebruikte 
benadering benadrukte de n ieuwe filosofie het feit dat gemeenschappen zelf 
moeten bepalen welke ontwikkeling en miUeuproblemen zij centraal wensen te 
stellen in h u n samenwerking met het project. Daarmee verlegde het p rogramma 
zieh van een beheersmatige en economische benadering die zieh met name 
richtte op het opzetten van een natuurgebied, naar een benadering die lokale 
mensen en hun problemen en prioriteiten centraal Steide. Het gebruik van 
economische prikkels w e r d daarbij afgewezen omdat mensen dan aan het 
project deel zouden nemen om de 'verkeerde' redenen. Waar de eerdere 
benadering gebaseerd was op het feit dat lokale mensen een bedreiging vo rmden 
voor de natuur ging deze n ieuwe aanpak uit van de gedachte dat lokale mensen 
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van nature geneigd zijn voor hun omgeving te zorgen. Deze verandering in 
beleid betekende ook dat de samenstelhhg van de staf zieh wijzigde en dat de 
eerder dominante biologen en professionele natuurbeheerders in toenemende 
mate vervangen werden door sociale wetenschappers . Het hoofdstuk eindigt 
met een analyse van de moeizame en soms paradoxale relatie tussen ideeën als 
participatie, zelfteschikking en gemeenschapsversterking en betoogt onder meer 
dat wa t gepresenteerd werd als een open en participatieve benadering in feite 
een in hoge mate gestructureerde intervenue was . 
Hoofdstuk zeven beschrijft de wijze warop deze nieuwe benadering door een 
aantal Papua Nieuw Guinese gemeenschapswerkers in het Bismarck-Ramu 
gebied werd toegepast en de verschillende reacties op deze nieuwe benadering. 
Niet verwonderlijk is dat deze in de Jimi vallei niet aansloeg. Waar de uitermate 
economisch georiënteerde Jimi eerst was voorgesteld een m i l tussen 
natuurbeheer en ontwikkelingsactiviteiten aan te gaan, werden zij nu 
geconfronteerd met een verschuiving in de projectfilosofie die het gebruik van 
economische prikkels juist afwees en zelfredzaamheid benadrukte. De 
gemengde gemeenschappen waar Jimi en Ramu samenwonen bleken dermate 
confhetueus dat een benadering gebaseerd op de gedachte dat de gehele 
gemeenschap samen zou werken niet realistisch bleek. In de praktijk w e r d het 
project een speelbal van verschillende groepen en individuen die territoriale 
rechten dan wel status of autoriteit najoegen. Op den d u u r moest het project 
besluiten zijn pogingen zowel in de Jimi Vallei als onder de gemengde 
gemeenschappen in de Ramu Vallei te staken. 
Onder de volledig Ramu gemeenschappen bleek echter met name territorialiteit 
een raakvlak voor samenwerking tussen project en lokale mensen te bieden. De 
Ramu gemeenschappen zagen het project in toenemende mate als een potentiële 
medestander in h u n pogingen de Jimi migranten op afstand te houden. Het 
hoofdstuk beschrijft gedetailleerd hoe mensen geleidelijk aan voldeden aan de 
verwachtingen van het project, leidend tot het opzetten van een tweetal grote en 
aaneensluitende natuurgebieden. Hoewel dit proces door alle betrokkenen als 
'natuurbeheer ' w e r d aangemerkt haden de betrokkenen duidelijk tegengestelde 
agenda's . Waar lokale mensen tevreden lijken omdat het bereikte resultaat hun 
rechten op dat gebied vastlegt is het onduidetijk in hoeverre de na tuur in de 
resulterende natuurgebieden ook daadwerkelijk beschermd wordt . Het verschil 
in doelstellingen maakt een dergelijke 'middle ground' erg kwetsbaar. Pas 
geleidelijk aan, in de alledaagse praktijk van het gezamenlijk nemen van 
beschermende maatregelen en het ontwikkelen van de daarvoor nodige 
organisatie worden de verbaal verhulde maar niettemin tegengestelde agenda 's 
duidelijk. 
Het laatste hoofdstuk beschrijft hoe het Bismarck-Ramu project in de problemen 
kwam door de verschillen in benadering zoals die door de donoren werd 
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nagestreefd en de wijze waarop het project zieh in de praktijk had ontwikkeld. 
Deze verschillen spitsten zieh toe op de vraag in hoevere het bereikte resultaat 
duurzaam was en hoe duurzaamheid in het opzetten van beschermde gebieden 
in de context van communaal landeigendom kon worden gegarandeerd. Waar 
de donor uitging van het 'oude ' beeld dat een natuurgebied alleen opgezet en 
beheerd kan worden door het gebruik van economische prikkels, wilde het 
projectteam zijn op de behoeften van de lokale bevolking toespitste stratégie 
vervolgen. Het was aan het hogere management van het biodiversiteits-
p rogramma om te proberen deze twee benaderingen te verenigen om daarmee 
verdere financiering veilig te stellen. Daarbij koos het voor de benadering van de 
donor die uitgaat van de gedachte dat lokale mensen een bedreiging vormen en 
dat alleen door positieve economische prikkels en een proces van zonering 
duurzaamheid kan worden gegarandeerd. Het voorstel dat werd gedaan 
verschilde echter dermate van de projectfilosofie zoals deze zieh in de dagelijkse 
praktijk had ontwikkeld dat de veldstaf uit het p rogramma stapte. Daarmee 
stokte de middle ground' tussen veldstaf enerzijds en het management en de 
financiers anderzijds. De veldstaf heeft sindsdien (1999) haar eigen organisatie 
opgericht en vervolgt haar activiteiten in het Bismarck-Ramu gebied met behulp 
van nieuwe financiers. 
Het laatste hoofdstuk sluit de cirkel door de verschillende contactvelden in het 
Bismarck-Ramu project te bespreken en een aantal kenmerken van deze 
raakvlakken, h u n aehterliggende benaderingen en de kwetsbare middle grounds 
tussen de verschillende betrokken partijen op een rij te zetten. 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
Frederik Wijnand (Flip) van Helden, was born on the 24th of April 1967 in 
Leiden, the Netherlands. In 1987, he started his studies at the Development 
Sociology Group of Wageningen University. During these studies he under took 
two practical training periods: In 1990 he was assistant to the editorial committee 
of the General Directorate for International Co-operation of the Department of 
Foreign Affairs in charge of writ ing a development policy paper. In 1991 he 
became a s tudent member of the Interdisciplinary Research Project in Malang, 
Indonesia, analysing rural non-farm employment in an agriculturally marginal 
up land area. He graduated in 1993. Between 1992 and 1993 he s tudied at Wye 
College of the University of London where he took a Masters of Science in 
Agricultural Economics. 
In December 1993, he was employed by the Fellowship Scheme of the Overseas 
Development Institute in London and sent to the Department of Finance and 
Planning in Papua N e w Guinea. As a senior planning officer he was responsible 
for the planning and implementation of institutional and financial arrangements 
for forestry, fishery, agricultural and environmental projects. In July 1996 he 
became an associate researcher at the National Research Institute in Papua N e w 
Guinea and was seconded to the GEF-funded Biodiversity Conservation and 
Resource Management Program developed by the UNDP and the national 
Depar tment of Environment and Conservation. Here he took responsibility for 
the execution of a social feasibility s tudy for the Bismarck-Ramu integrated 
conservation and development project. This s tudy assessed the best possible 
options for community-based biodiversity conservation in a remote area on the 
mainland of Papua N e w Guinea. 
Upon returning to the Netherlands in March 1998, he conducted several short-
term assignments before becoming a research fellow with the Development 
Sociology Group of Wageningen University. His research interests and 
publications focus on the socio-economic aspects of community-based resource 
management . Since Augus t 2001 he works as a staff-officer on international 
biodiversity issues at the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and 
Fisheries in The Hague, the Netherlands. He lives in Wageningen together wi th 
Inger Stocking Korzen and their son Natan. 
For comments and queries please contact: vanhelden-stocking@hetnet.nl 

. Recent yea r s h a v e seen a shift f rom"exper t -dr iven m e t h o d s for b iodivers i ty conse rva t ion 
to m o r e pa r t i c ipa to ry c o m m u n i t y - b a s e d a p p r o a c h e s . Whi le the fo rmer - a n d by far 
; d o m i n a n t posi t ion - p r o p a g a t e s a policy of spat ial z o n i n g based on the v i e w that local 
p e o p l e cons t i tu te the m a i n threat to na tu re , the lat ter a p p r o a c h sugges t s that local 
; c o m m u n i t i e s m a y be allies in the s t rugg le to conse rve biodiversi ty. This s t u d y ana lyses the s 
' d eba t e b e t w e e n these two pos i t ions in the l ight of the GEF- funded B i smarck -Ramu 
in tegra ted conse rva t ion a n d d e v e l o p m e n t p r o g r a m in P a p u a N e w Guinea . A de ta i led 
desc r ip t ion of the in te rac t ions b e t w e e n the project team a n d local peop le , discloses s o m e . 
of the often impl ic i t a s s u m p t i o n s o n w h i c h such in te rven t ions are based . Local peop le . 
, howeve r , s e l d o m fit the s tereotypical images that ou t s ide r s i m p o s e o n them. Ins tead , they : 
tend to enro l such in te rven t ions in a var ie ty of pe r sona l and collective e n d e a v o u r s . This 
s t u d y for e x a m p l e , a r g u e s that the e s t ab l i shmen t of a conse rva t ion area by a n u m b e r of 
; R a m u c o m m u n i t i e s can no t be a t t r ibu ted to the existence of an i n d i g e n o u s conse rva t ion 
• ethic, bu t w a s in the first place based o n the w i s h to main ta in control over land a n d 
resources in the face of i n c o m i n g mig ran t s . The d i spa ra t e mot ives a n d pr ior i t ies that 
u n d e r p i n the co-opera t ive a r r a n g e m e n t s between, conserva t ion projects and local peop le 
attfiStiQ the fragility o f s u x h ag reemen t s . 
Flip v a n H e l d e n , a d e v e l o p m e n t sociologist a n d economis t by t ra ining, w a s a t tached to 
the B i smarck-Ramu in tegra ted conse rva t ion a n d d e v e l o p m e n t project between. July 1996 
a n d J a n u a r y 1998, before r e t u r n i n g to the D e v e l o p m e n t Sociology G r o u p at W a g e n i n g e n 
Univers i ty . At p resen t , h e w o r k s at the D e p a r t m e n t of N a t u r e M a n a g e m e n t of the 
h-Tijf Agr icu l tu re , N a t u r e M a n a g e m e n t and. Fisheries in The, .Hague 
